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1 China’s New Strategy for 
Long-term Growth and 
Development: 
Imperatives and Implications
Ross Garnaut, Cai Fang and Ligang Song
The New Model of Chinese Economic Growth
The Chinese economy is undergoing profound change in policy and 
structure. The change is necessary to increase the value of growth to the Chinese 
community, and to sustain growth into the future. The change is being driven 
partly by economic pressures that are emerging naturally from successful 
economic development, as labour scarcity and rapid increases in real wages 
change patterns of resource allocation, income distribution, environmental 
impact, and rates of economic growth, savings, investment and international 
capital flows. These changes that have emerged from the success of old patterns 
of growth are being reinforced by changes in national policy to secure more 
equitable income distribution, and less damaging impact on the domestic and 
international environment.
The changes are so comprehensive and profound that they add up to a 
new model of Chinese economic growth. This book describes the replacement 
of an old, uninhibited investment expansion model of growth, by transition to 
modern economic growth.
The book presents the results of recent research on various aspects of the 
transition to modern economic growth. The chapters that follow provide insights 
into recent changes and where they are likely to lead. They bring out some of the 
implications of change for China’s interaction with the international economy.
Once an economy has stepped onto the escalator of modern economic growth 
it never stays still. China has been undergoing restless change at a dazzling pace 
since Communist Party decisions in 1978 committed the country to a path into 
market-oriented reform and integration into the international economy.
Change has been continuous and rapid. Every year of the reform period 
has thrown up new barriers to economic progress, new policy challenges, 
new solutions to some old problems and new patterns of economic activity. 
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But while change has been continuous, if we stand back and look at the reform 
period as a whole, we can identify three broad periods, each requiring policy 
and structural transitions before it could give a new shape to development.
The first is the era of strong growth in agricultural and rural incomes, roughly 
from 1978 to 1984. The second is uninhibited investment expansion from 1985 
to 2011. The third is the transition to a modern economy, which commenced 
in 2012.
Two innovations in economic institutions underpinned the era of strong 
growth in agricultural and rural incomes: the replacement of the rural People’s 
Communes by the Household Responsibility System; and the rise of township 
and village enterprises out of the redundant structures of the People’s Communes. 
Institutional changes were supported by adjustments to agricultural pricing 
arrangements that improved farmers’ terms of trade. The increases in incomes 
and their equitable distribution throughout China during this period provided 
the political and economic foundations for general market-oriented reform as 
well as the springboard for far-reaching reform of urban economic institutions. 
Many other changes were occurring during the era of strong growth 
in agricultural and rural incomes that supported wider economic reform and 
transformation in later years. The reforms to foreign trade and investment, the 
financial system and enterprise governance that became important from the 
mid 1980s had long incubations. More fundamentally, the rehabilitation of 
the education and research systems after the Cultural Revolution and the far-
reaching changes of Communist Party and state personnel were preconditions 
of future economic change. 
That change took the form of transition from the mid 1980s into a long 
period of uninhibited investment expansion, which continued until about 2011. 
Urban and industrial investment were given priority and the investment share 
of output grew from high to higher levels to unprecedented rates at around 
50 per cent of output late in the first decade of the new century. 
This period was associated with high and rising savings as a proportion 
of income; the commitment of a high proportion of those savings in domestic 
investment; rapid expansion of industrial production through absorption of 
large numbers of rural migrants at wages that increased less rapidly than labour 
productivity; increasing focus on industrial exports—at first technologically 
simple and labour-intensive but with more complex and capital-intensive 
elements becoming an increasingly important part of the mix over time; 
intensive use of metals and energy; and, increasingly damaging domestic and 
global economic impacts. 
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Uninhibited investment expansion involved rapid catching up from a 
low starting point with the capital intensity and technology of the advanced 
countries. It was built around deep and deepening integration into global 
markets for goods, services, capital and knowledge. 
The several features of uninhibited investment expansion were mutually 
supporting. Rapid industrial expansion and a steady real wage rate increased 
profits, and the savings share of income in turn supported high and increasing 
levels of investment and rapid economic growth. 
Uninhibited investment expansion 1985–2011 had several subplots. A major 
focus of the early years (1985–1992) was the search for an ideological and 
political basis for internationally oriented growth. 
Collective enterprises—the township and village enterprises—were the 
locus of the most rapid industrial, output and employment growth in the early 
years. From 1992, that mantle passed to the private economy—some of which 
was formed through the privatisation of what had been collective enterprises. 
The rapid increase in the private share of economic activity through the 1990s was 
arrested by the re-emergence in central roles in economic growth of large-scale, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the first decade or so of the 21st century—
underpinned by the huge Keynesian fiscal and monetary expansions that were 
crucial to China quickly restoring growth momentum when it was challenged 
by the Asian Financial Crisis (1998–1999) and then the Global Financial Crisis 
(2008–2009). 
Uninhibited investment expansion was extraordinarily productive. Output 
increased by an average of slightly more than 10 per cent per annum, with 
no weak periods from 1992 to 2011. This was the strongest sustained growth 
in history, exceeding the extraordinary postwar expansion of Japan to 1973 
in average strength. Uninhibited investment expansion took Chinese average 
incomes (once they were measured correctly) from low levels into the ranks of 
middle-income countries. China came to have the world’s largest total savings 
and surplus savings for international investment and the world’s largest exports. 
It was (and remains) on a path to be the world’s largest economy within a few 
years (PPP) or by end of the decade (national accounts at ruling exchange rates).
Despite, and because of, its achievements, uninhibited investment expansion 
was approaching economic, social and political limits through the first decade 
of the 21st century. 
Amongst the signs of approaching economic limits, average output and 
income per person were nearing the levels at which other north-east Asian 
economies had experienced change in patterns and rates of growth. Per capita 
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income in real purchasing power at the end of the first decade in the new 
century was similar to that in Japan a few years before its step down from high 
to moderate growth in the mid 1970s. 
From about 2004, as China entered the turning period of economic 
development, the old growth model began to be challenged by increases in 
wages in excess of productivity. This development was reinforced when the 
work-age population began to decline in 2012.
The international economic environment became less benign for the old 
growth model. While China’s huge current account surplus (over 10 per cent 
of GDP in 2007) had allowed other countries, especially the United States, to 
maintain growth while implementing other policies that would have brought 
it to an end, the great financial crisis of 2008 encouraged criticism of Chinese 
surpluses. Tepid growth in the old industrial countries after the financial crisis 
diminished opportunities for rapid expansion of exports, although continued 
growth in developing markets allowed some refocusing of China’s geographic 
focus in trade expansion.
Uninhibited investment expansion was also approaching social and political 
limits towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The increase in 
income inequality between rural and urban residents and between workers 
and owners of capital and privileged positions in government and economy 
became the focus of increasing comment and tension. The mandatory purchase 
of peasants’ land for urban development, which was a feature of uninhibited 
investment expansion, was increasingly controversial. International concern 
about China’s increasing contribution to the build-up of concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere broke out as diplomatic tension at the 
Copenhagen meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in December 2009. Increasing community concern about health and 
amenity impacts of domestic pollution reached a crescendo in early 2013. 
Longstanding community concern over corruption within government was 
explicitly identified as a potential source of political instability by party and 
state leaders in 2012 and early 2013, and the old model of economic development 
was recognised as being conducive to corrupt use of public office.
For all of these reasons, the need to move to a new model of economic 
development—to make the transition to an advanced modern economy—began 
to be discussed with increasing purposefulness amongst Chinese scholars and 
thoughtful officials from around the middle of the first decade of this century. 
It  was not that uninhibited investment expansion was exhausted; it could 
continue to add to economic output at a rapid rate for a few more years. But 
there would have to be transition to a modern economy at some time in the near 
future, and leaving it too late would increase the strains and costs of change.
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As several contributors to this book observe, economic forces and, especially, 
the turning period in the labour market have been driving structural change 
with increasing force since about 2004. Alongside this structural change, driven 
by rising real wages and real exchange rates, policy adjustments to reinforce 
change were discussed with increasing purpose within the Chinese policy 
community and, in due course, within high echelons of government. 
So, China entered the third major transition of the reform era, the transition 
to an advanced or modern economy.
The transition to an advanced economy is characterised by the gradual fall in 
the share of GDP represented by industrial investment and urban infrastructure, 
heavy investment in education and upgrading of the quality of education, 
expansion of the consumption and the services shares of expenditure, reform 
and improvement of the legal and institutional bases for an advanced market 
economy, and rapid structural change to technologically sophisticated industry 
with a much larger proportionate place for services. 
All of the standard sources of growth are affected by these changes. 
The labour contribution to growth is markedly lower, and the contribution of 
capital intensification moderately lower. The contribution of total productivity 
increases to growth can rise if the increasingly sophisticated economy is 
supported by the necessary institutional improvements. The outcome is likely 
to be average growth in output two or perhaps three percentage points below 
the average of the period of uninhibited investment expansion.
The necessary changes in economic institutions require restraint in the use 
of old-style fiscal and monetary expansion through public institutions to avoid 
downturns in economic growth. This implies acceptance of moderate cyclical 
slowdowns without large-scale Keynesian responses—although strong anti-
recessionary responses, at some cost to desirable structural change, could be 
expected in response to a major downturn. 
Much higher priority is assigned to domestic and international environmental 
amenity in the transition to an advanced economy: energy saving and reductions 
in the carbon intensity of production are major objectives of the 12th five-year 
plan (2011–2015). 
While the desirability of reduced inequality has been prominent in official 
statements of policy goals right through the reform period, reduced inequality 
is an objective that attracts strong policy action in the transition to a modern 
economy. Rising real wages have been making a strong contribution to reduction 
in inequality from about 2008. This book provides data on the increasing and 
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now large central government payments to rural education, health, transport, 
communications and an income safety net over recent years. Quantitative 
measures of inequality have begun to fall.
China’s adoption of a new model of economic growth is of immense importance 
to people in China and everywhere. This book is an early attempt to take a close 
look at many of the features of the new model.
Structure of the Book
The transition to a modern economy—China’s New Growth Model—
requires adjustments in economic structure and policy and the strengthening 
of institutions for effective national and corporate governance and for effective 
market exchange. Dwight Perkins lays out the ground that has to be covered in 
Chapter 2.
Perkins argues that China needs to build on some emerging institutions 
in its economy and society, the substantial modification of some, and the 
replacement of others. Big changes are needed in the regulatory system, the 
political system as it relates to government economic decision-making, the 
legal system, land ownership, and the development of decentralised sources of 
government revenue. 
Perkins points out that many features of current arrangements facilitate 
the widespread corruption that threatens political stability and economic 
performance. Reform in these areas is crucial to continuing prosperity and for 
the transition to a modern economy
Reform in a number of other areas is essential to the strong productivity 
growth that is required if reasonably rapid growth is to be maintained through 
the transition to a modern economy. Some of the most important of these involve 
reform in the relationship between urbanisation, the social welfare system, 
and the changing Chinese demographic structure. Others involve institutions 
that are important to modernisation of the financial system, the upgrading and 
expansion of research and development in engineering and the sciences, and the 
continued upgrading of the universities. 
China has made major progress through dismantling inappropriate 
institutions. Perkins argues, however, that creating new and fundamentally 
restructuring old institutions is inherently more difficult than dismantling 
inappropriate institutions. It takes time, and the passing of time contributes to 
the slowing of GDP growth that is inevitable as per capita incomes rise and the 
economy and society become more complex. 
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Yiping Huang, Cai Fang, Peng Xu and Gou Qin call the new model for 
economic growth during the transition to a modern economy the ‘new normal’. 
They argue in Chapter 3 that important changes to the Chinese growth model 
are already underway. They assess growth potential as probably having fallen 
from around 10 per cent during the first decade or so of the 21st century to six–
eight per cent during the decade ahead. In the meantime, the current account 
surplus narrowed from by far the largest amongst substantial economies to well 
within the range of developed countries. Two well-established trends of the era 
of uninhibited investment expansion that had been thought to be undesirable 
and unsustainable were reversed: the consumption share of GDP started to rise, 
and income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient began to fall. 
Huang, Cai, Peng and Gou identify changes in factor markets, especially the 
labour market, as the primary drivers of the transition to the new growth model. 
Emerging labour shortages and associated rapid wage increases in recent years 
are largely responsible for the current transition to the ‘new normal’, with slower 
growth but more balanced structure. The authors propose that the next-step 
reforms should focus on redefining the relationship between the government 
and the market by liberalising factor markets, establishing macroeconomic 
policy frameworks that are compatible with expanding roles for markets and 
changing the government’s role from directly supporting production and 
investment to facilitating innovation and industrial upgrading. They conclude 
that these reforms are necessary for China to complete the transition toward the 
new growth model and to avoid falling into the ‘middle-income trap’.
In Chapter 4 Cai Fang and Lu Yang argue that, as a result of the shrinking 
working-age population (aged 15 to 59 years), all of the forces that have driven 
China’s rapid economic growth over the past 30 years have diminished from 
about 2010. They estimate the average annual growth rate of potential output to 
be 7.2 per cent over the 12th five-year plan period (2011–2015) and 6.1 per cent 
over the 13th five-year plan period (2016–2020). Future sustainable growth 
requires deepening and extending the scope of economic reform, particularly 
the development of new and related areas to enhance potential growth. They also 
develop two scenarios in which an increase in labour force participation and 
improvement in total factor productivity (TFP) can significantly enhance the 
potential GDP growth rate. They use this to argue that a floor can be placed 
under the decline in the potential growth rate. 
The transition to an advanced economy requires a fundamental transformation 
of China’s economic growth pattern from heavy reliance on inputs of capital 
and labour to more rapid increases in TFP. The new growth model requires that 
central and local governments accept slower economic growth—and, in times 
of lower growth, desist from pumping up public investment through fiscal and 
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monetary expansion that was so important in ending downturns in the era of 
uninhibited investment expansion. Policy should seek to accelerate growth by 
adjusting supply-side factors, rather than demand-side factors. 
A competitive environment is vital for enhancing the potential growth rate 
in China in the era of transition to a modern economy. The government has 
an important role in improving China’s TFP through reforms to strengthen 
institutions that are essential for the effective operation of the labour and 
financial markets, enterprise governance, and the government system.
In Chapter 5 Huw McKay and Ligang Song describe China’s economic 
structure as both over-industrialised and under-urbanised relative to its level 
of income per head, while having a high degree of export orientation for such 
a large economy. They note that some aspects of the historical path of China’s 
development and the economic structure that emerged from it were impediments 
to constraining damage to the environment and inequality of income and 
opportunity within acceptable bounds. 
McKay and Song then outline desirable changes in policy to accommodate 
the new model of economic growth. These changes include the removal of factor 
market distortions through accelerating financial reform, wholesale reform of 
the hukou system that limits rights and services available to migrants from 
rural areas to the cities, continuing the current movement towards market-
based pricing of energy and imposing prices on negative external costs to the 
environment, giving higher priority to investment in infrastructure than in 
industrial capacity, and dealing with some long-run fiscal questions that are 
important in the reallocation of resources across the economy that is necessary 
in the transition to a modern economy. 
McKay and Song conclude by saying that the superordinate goals of China’s 
transition to a modern economy—reducing ‘over-industrialisation’, optimising 
urbanisation and emphasising domestic absorption over foreign sales—are 
ultimately complementary. They also caution that there is much that is of value 
in the policy contours that have already emerged in pursuit of those inherently 
complementary goals. Yet, inside those contours, a political battle must still be 
fought in some major areas of policy and institutional reform—competition 
policy being amongst the most important of them.
China’s high levels of saving not only provide capital for prodigious levels 
of domestic investment, but the excess of saving over domestic investment is a 
major source of finance for the rest of the world, and particularly for the highly 
indebted English-speaking countries led by the United States. In Chapter 6, 
Rod Tyers, Ying Zhang and Tsun Se Cheong discuss the implications of lower 
Chinese saving for the international economy. They point to lower savings coming 
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from all three sources: households, enterprises, and government. The  slower 
and more ‘inward focused’ growth to which the Chinese Government is now 
committed will reduce the excess saving available for international investment. 
Rises in consumption will reduce household saving. Reduced oligopoly profits 
and financial development will reduce corporate saving. The recent rise in 
provincial debt has already eliminated government saving. This reduction in 
Chinese savings rates coincides with reduced Japanese saving and hence the 
end of the ‘Asian savings glut’. It must eventually raise the global cost of debt, 
although this has been postponed recently by quantitative easing (QE) in the 
United States, Europe and Japan. 
The monetary reaction to reduced Chinese saving will see the transmission 
throughout the world economy of higher long bond yields, causing a new 
headwind against investment worldwide. 
Tyers, Zhang and Cheong then discuss the implications of lower Chinese 
saving rates for capital markets and investment in the United States. The eventual 
rise in the cost of financing in the United States will not be conducive to US 
economic recovery, which will have negative effects on the global economy. 
A major offsetting force is fiscal consolidation in North America and some other 
parts of the world, reducing the demand for financing in deficit countries as 
global saving falls, and softening the impact of reduced Chinese surpluses on 
global private investment. Without continuing fiscal consolidation, however, 
serious global contraction could follow as investment expansion resumes in the 
old industrial countries and QE is withdrawn. 
While China’s increasing focus is on domestic rather than international demand 
from the perspective of its own economic transition, and while investment from 
China has been sought by the United States and other developed countries, its 
timing could be unfortunate. 
Innovation becomes more important the closer China approaches the global 
productivity frontiers. Yixiao Zhou in Chapter 7 discusses how institutional 
quality will affect China’s innovation performance. She presents the results 
of statistical analysis of firm-level data that suggest that institutional quality 
is critical for China’s innovative performance and hence for the economy’s 
future growth. 
Stronger intellectual property protection clearly boosts the probability of 
a firm investing in innovation. The analysis suggests that the goals set in the 
‘National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Scientific and Technological 
Development (2006–2020)’ are more likely to be met if firms become the major 
agents performing R&D activities. Zhou points out that improving the quality 
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of domestic institutions is just the first step towards building a knowledge-
intensive economy, becoming a global R&D player and contributing to the 
world pool of knowledge and technology. 
The development of the agricultural sector has played a crucial role in 
Chinese economic transformation during the reform period (1978–2012). 
Li Zhou in Chapter 8 reviews the major achievements in China’s agricultural 
development in the past, and discusses the challenges that the sector faces now. 
He notes that China can confront these challenges by deepening agricultural 
reform, including in relation to land ownership; by enhancing technological 
progress in agricultural production; by providing social support and protection 
for farmers as part of governments’ efforts to reduce China’s rural and urban 
income inequality; and, by modifying food consumption patterns in order to 
improve people’s health and reduce the wastes of agricultural resources. 
Li points out that the issues relating to farmers, agriculture, and rural areas 
are the weak links in the chain of China’s economic development. Rural China 
is undergoing rapid economic and social changes, which have affected the ways 
in which farmers themselves, the traditional communities and the governments 
operate. Li concludes by saying that it is important for government policies 
to complement market mechanisms in facilitating the ongoing process of 
urbanisation, and creating more employment opportunities for both migrant 
workers and farmers, while maintaining rural social stability. The transition to 
a modern rural economy would be helped by governments adopting measures 
that conform to or respect, rather than overrule, farmers’ own choices. These 
latter developments would be assisted by more democratic local governance. 
Xin Meng in Chapter 9 uses official data sets on rural migrants’ income and 
population to describe some important features of the rural–urban migration 
over the past decade and discusses their policy implications for China’s future 
development of the labour market. The key findings from the survey data show 
that in the next few decades, the main addition to the labour force for Chinese 
cities will still come from the rural hukou population, as less than 30 per cent of 
the rural labour force had migrated to cities to work. Whether those remaining 
in rural areas will migrate depends largely on government policy. Currently, the 
lack of social welfare provision and social service access have deterred many 
people from migrating to cities. Even when they go to the cities, they only stay 
for a short period, on average eight to nine years. If this duration can be doubled, 
rural migrant labour supply in cities could be doubled. Another finding of her 
work is that migrant productivity reaches a peak at the 24th year. The current 
average duration of migration, however, is far away from the productivity peak, 
indicating significant opportunities for increasing productivity by increasing 
duration. Migrant duration is also affected to a large extent by policy. While in 
cities, rural migrants work extremely long hours, reflecting weak protection of 
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conditions for migrant workers. Long work hours are identified as being related 
to migrant mental health problems. Social welfare reform for migrants in cities 
is therefore an important area of reform. 
In Chapter 10, Christine Wong examines the current state of China’s 
public finances and discusses the reforms necessary to improve their capacity 
to support the long-term growth of the economy. Amongst much else, she 
discusses the macroeconomic stabilisation role of the budget, and the way that 
local government finances make macroeconomic control more difficult. Wong 
focuses on two critical areas where reforms are urgent—the persistence of extra-
budgetary resources and fragmented control of the budget, and the tendency 
toward excessive public investment. Both have remained stubbornly resistant 
to reform. 
By focusing on the fragmentation of budget control and the decentralised 
and extremely problematic management of public investment, Wong has traced 
the roots of the government’s current macroeconomic problems to weaknesses in 
the fiscal system. She proposes that to support sustainable, long-term growth in 
the Chinese economy, the government must regain control over macroeconomic 
management, by curbing local government borrowing and investment, 
establishing a framework for managing subnational borrowing, and introducing 
a monitoring and regulatory framework that requires local governments to 
report on their debt. 
Wong also suggests that the government regains fiscal discipline by assigning 
the oversight authority and responsibility over the comprehensive budget 
with all of the components to a single institution. The Ministry of Finance is 
most suitable for this purpose. The implementation of these reform measures 
would require political support from the top leaders to adjust the distribution 
of authorities across central institutions to elevate the Ministry of Finance and 
put it firmly in charge of all fiscal resources. Support should also be given to 
enhance the capacity of the National People’s Congress to play its supervisory 
role over the budget—and hence the Ministry of Finance—that is assigned to it 
by the Constitution. 
Improving the business environment is an important policy objective, 
which can greatly enhance private firms’ contributions to productivity 
growth. Xiaolu Wang, Jingwen Yu and Fan Gang in Chapter 11 use output 
from four enterprise surveys to explain changes and provincial differences in 
China’s business environment in recent years, and to draw out some policy 
implications. The business environment in China generally improved over the 
period 2006–2012. 
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Wang, Yu and Fan also identify some negative developments for the business 
environment in China. For example, the focus of expansionary fiscal policy in 
response to the global financial crisis on SOEs over the sample period had the 
effect of squeezing out normal business demand on credit and damaged the 
non-state sector. Firms covered by the survey focused complaints on ‘openness, 
fairness, and equity’ of policies and government administration. Problems 
include non-transparency of policies and government administration, uneven 
enforcement of regulations and, more generally, unequal treatment for different 
enterprises. The authors also find that sectors with greater market competition 
have better business environments than monopolised sectors. 
Wang, Yu and Fan also reveal discriminatory treatment between SOEs and 
non-state enterprises (NSEs), which have a negative effect on the operation and 
performance of NSEs. They conclude by saying that it remains an important task 
for governments at different levels, through their policy changes, to improve the 
business environment which is conducive to the implementation of the new 
growth strategy adopted by the Chinese Government. 
In Chapter 12 Shiyi Chen and Jane Golley estimate the changing patterns of 
‘green’ TFP (GTFP) growth of 38 industrial sectors during the period 1980–2010 
to assess whether or not Chinese industry was on the path towards a sustainable 
form of low-carbon growth during those years. China’s industrial GTFP growth 
was significantly lower when productivity takes account of the negative impact 
of carbon dioxide emissions in the production process. Through the period 
covered by the study, both in aggregate and for the majority of sectors, GTFP 
growth was predominantly shaped by technical change. The rate of technical 
change increased steadily from the mid 1990s to the early 2000s, but declined 
continuously after that, in contrast with fluctuating but generally low rates of 
efficiency growth. GTFP growth was positive in the majority of sectors and in 
aggregate, both over the entire period and in each sub-period. 
Chen and Golley reveal, however, that between 2003 and 2010, GTFP growth 
was not only low (and well below the 50 per cent level often taken to signal 
the transition to ‘sustainable’ growth), but lower than in the preceding decade. 
This finding suggests that Chinese industry seemed to have lost its way in going 
green. The final year of the period covered by this chapter is late in the period 
of Uninhibited Investment Expansion. The hope to which the authors make 
reference at the end of the chapter is presumably drawn from the changes in 
policy and structure than are emerging in the transition to a modern economy. 
Yongsheng Zhang, from the State Council’s Development Research Centre, 
and a participant in the major World Bank–State Council study of green 
growth, argues in Chapter 13 that green growth could play a significant role in 
China’s modernisation. The barriers against green growth in China stem from 
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institutional weaknesses in its distorted market system. China has advantages 
that are not available to old developed countries in seeking to establish a pattern 
of green growth. It can leapfrog over old industrial practices into practices that 
are appropriate in the modern economy.
Zhang describes green growth as involving the decoupling of economic 
output from heavy dependence on use of material resources, carbon emissions 
and other sources of environmental damage, through the creation of new green 
products markets, technologies, investments, and changes in consumption and 
conservation behaviour. 
Zhang’s conception of green growth is based on three key concepts: that 
economic growth may be decoupled from rising greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental degradation, that the process of ‘going green’ can itself be a 
source of growth, and that ‘going green’ is part of a virtuous circle which is 
mutually reinforcing with growth. To seize the opportunities for a transition 
to a sustainable pattern of modern economic growth, China should seek green 
transformation of traditional sectors, expansion of emerging green industries 
and expansion of service sectors. Implementation of these approaches requires 
reforms in a number of areas: transformation of government functions, 
consolidation of market exchange, tougher policies and regulations on emission 
reduction, and environment protection. Zhang warns that there is a window of 
opportunity in the next two decades for China to take action; if missed, China 
will have to pay a much higher price for ‘going green’. 
Ross Garnaut in Chapter 14 describes recent progress in one of the central 
elements of China’s transition to a modern economy: the breaking of the links 
between economic output and energy use and between energy use and carbon 
emissions. China’s growth in the era of uninhibited investment expansion was 
characterised by exceptionally high energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. 
These features of old-style Chinese growth made the country the world’s largest 
source of greenhouse gas emissions in the final years of uninhibited investment 
expansion. It was associated with increasingly severe domestic environmental 
problems, and increasing international pressure on China as a disproportionate 
source of contemporary and prospective global warming tendencies. Heavy 
energy use and reliance on imported fossil fuels for an increasing proportion 
of China’s expansion raised concerns for energy and economic security within 
China. 
The change in the trajectory of Chinese energy use and emissions growth in 
the transition to a modern economy is as outstanding as the earlier extremes in 
energy and emissions intensity of growth. So far the transition has been secured 
mainly through the use of instruments out of the old economy: regulatory 
intervention to close plants with unacceptably high energy or  emissions 
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intensity, mandatory provincial and local limits on energy use and emissions, 
imposition of discriminatory high prices of inputs on high energy use and 
emissions produced by particular industries and plants, discretionary subsidies 
and other support for investments in low-emissions plants, and tilting of 
investment approvals processes in favour of low-energy and low-emissions 
plants and against high-energy and high-emissions plants.
Increasingly the discussion policy is exploring interventions based on the 
introduction of market mechanisms and the pricing of carbon externalities. 
There is movement towards removal of transport preferences and favourable 
pricing for fossil fuels, experimentation with emissions trading systems in 
two provinces and seven cities. Resource taxes are being redesigned to modify 
use and carbon emissions, and the Ministry of Finance has been undertaking 
research on carbon taxes. Elements of each of these approaches to policy are 
likely to find a place in the future Chinese energy and greenhouse gas policy mix.
While strong energy and emissions intensity targets were introduced 
from the beginning of the 12th five-year plan (2011–2015), a marked change 
in energy and emissions intensity was not powerfully evident in the growth 
statistics until 2012. The much lower trajectories of energy use and emissions in 
2012 are likely to be extended progressively through the transition to a modern 
economy. For this reason amongst others, when it is useful for exposition to 
draw clear temporal boundaries between periods, we see 2011 as the last year 
of uninhibited investment expansion, and 2012 as the first year of transition to 
a modern economy.
China’s progress on changing the trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions 
transforms what is possible in effective international action to constrain global 
warming. Garnaut suggests that this could provide the basis for global tightening 
of emissions reduction targets at the United Nations Conference of the Parties 
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, to be held in Paris in 2015. 
China has recently become the world’s largest energy consumer and, yet, it is 
still only in the middle stages of development. In Chapter 15, Simon Wensley, 
Stephen Wilson and Jane Kuang describe China’s energy policy Trilemma. 
The  Trilemma refers to the tension between maximising security of energy 
supply, minimising cost of energy and minimising environmental impacts of 
emissions. 
Wensley, Wilson and Kuang point out that resolving the Trilemma is the 
key challenge for energy policy makers everywhere. They explore the Trilemma 
through four case studies: the 1970s oil crisis, China’s cost revolution in nuclear 
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power that is quietly unfolding today, the US unconventional oil and gas techno-
economic revolution, and the challenge for Japan in closing the 30 Gigawatt gap 
in the power system post-Fukushima. 
With these case studies as background, the authors discuss the opportunities 
and challenges in the development and management of China’s resources 
They highlight the increasing role of imports in balancing domestic supply 
in oil, gas, coal and uranium through the period of uninhibited investment 
expansion. They also explore emerging technologies, many of which China is 
actively developing, that have the potential to transform energy supply and 
use. These include development of unconventional gas and oil sources, and the 
electrification of transport including through electric automobiles. Security of 
supply is already a high policy priority, most acutely in oil. 
The tensions between the three corners of the Energy Policy Trilemma are 
steadily becoming more acute in China. As China’s energy import dependence 
deepens from oil to gas, security of supply is expected to increase rather than 
decrease in importance. Despite these challenges, the authors conclude that 
structural change in the Chinese economy towards a greater weighting of less 
energy-intensive secondary industries and higher value-added services are 
expected to moderate the strong linear relationship of the past two decades 
between energy requirements and GDP. Improvements in technical energy 
efficiency will further help to moderate the rate of energy demand growth.
In Chapter 16, Bijun Wang, Miaojie Yu and Yiping Huang discuss the financial 
constraints on Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) from the private sector. 
Using a firm-level panel dataset from Zhejiang Province between 2006 and 2008, 
they find that firms with access to finance that is less constrained are more likely 
to pursue ODI, and if they are involved in ODI to make larger investments. High 
productivity does not mitigate the negative impact of financial constraints on 
engaging in ODI. They conclude that, policy-wise, if financial constraints are 
not overcome, many productive and competitive Chinese private enterprises are 
likely to be shut out of ODI opportunities. As a result, the quality and return of 
Chinese ODI and the image and reputation of overseas Chinese enterprises will 
be compromised.
In Chapter 17, Kunwang Li and Bingzhan Shi examine the quantity and 
quality of China’s information and communication technology (ICT) exports 
and their determinants. They find that China’s ICT exports are characterised 
by high quantity and low quality. Patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
opportunities for processing trade and government policy support are the main 
determinants of China’s ICT export growth. Expansion of processing trade 
increases quantity but decreases quality. On the other hand, FDI and government 
policy have the opposite impact. 
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Expansion of the quantity of China’s ICT exports employs more labour, 
and increases consumption of natural resources, pollution and damage to the 
environment. Upgrading quality rather than simply increasing quantity needs 
to be the central feature of ICT exports in the transition to a modern economy. 
The authors expect that China’s export sector will be transformed from being 
driven by quantity, to being focused on quality and high value-added products. 
They conclude by saying that this transformation is consistent with the new 
growth strategy adopted by the Chinese Government in confronting the new 
challenges for future growth.
The book as a whole describes a great deal of progress across a wide range 
of issues in China’s transition from uninhibited investment expansion, to the 
building of the foundations of a modern economy. The transition to a modern 
economy is in its early stages. Immense challenges lie ahead, especially in the 
institutional and legal developments that are discussed in the first few chapters 
in the book. The evidence presented in this book says, ‘so far so good’.
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If China’s economy and per capita income is to continue to catch up to the 
levels of the world’s high-income economies, China will require a different 
approach from the model that has dominated its extraordinary development 
over the past three plus decades. The model of the past in essence involved 
three basic components during these three decades, and a fourth component 
during the most recent decade. The first component involved the dissolution 
of  the Soviet-style system of centrally planned command economy and 
collective agriculture and replacing it with an economic system governed 
to  a  large degree by market forces. The second component was the opening 
of the economy to foreign trade and foreign direct investment, and the rapid 
expansion of  manufactured exports in the growing manufacturing sector. 
Most of the dynamism in this manufacturing sector came from the domestic 
and foreign private sectors, together with township and village enterprises that 
first were collectively owned and later mostly privatised. The third component 
facilitating the rise of export-oriented manufacturing was the shift of a large 
part of the rural labour surplus to urban industry and services, a shift that 
helped keep wages low and labour-intensive manufactured exports competitive. 
Beginning to some degree during the world financial crisis of 1997–1998, the 
fourth component involved the massive expansion of infrastructure investment 
and the equally rapid expansion of urban housing investment, in effect removing 
the last major feature of a Soviet-type system that neglected both housing and 
transport infrastructure. This last component was made necessary, to a large 
extent, not only by the weaknesses of housing and transport, but also by the fact 
that the labour-surplus economy produced low levels of household consumption 
as a share of GDP. This low share in turn necessitated an unprecedented rise in 
the share of investment in GDP in order to maintain a high rate of GDP growth.1
These components of the post-1978 economic model produced more than three 
decades of high GDP and per capita income growth and created what, in many 
respects, is a first world infrastructure. Institutional change, however, mostly 
1   For my views on how inadequate aggregate demand, represented by low household consumption as a 
share of GDP, necessitated the large infrastructure and housing investment program, see Perkins 2012.
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involved the dissolution of the institutions of the Soviet-style system and the 
partial dissolution of some controls, such as the household registration (hukou) 
system that had been used to restrict rural to urban migration. The incomplete 
dissolution of the regulations of the centrally planned command economy and 
of the household registration system left a large residue of regulatory controls 
administered by government officials who retained much of the discretionary 
authority of the old system. Only now, in the privatised market context, 
these officials had far wider latitude for discretion than under the old, tightly 
controlled, command system. 
What is required going forward is a different system for controlling the 
economy, a system that can build on some of the institutions that have begun 
to develop, but requires replacing or substantially modifying many of the 
other institutions that continue to govern China’s economy and society. In this 
chapter I focus on two areas where fundamental changes in these institutions 
are required, and briefly discuss a third area where the outlines of what needs to 
be done are well known and progress is already well underway. The first of these 
areas involves a variety of interrelated institutions, including the regulatory 
system, the nature of the political system as it relates to government economic 
decision-making, the legal system, the land ownership system and inadequate 
decentralised sources of government revenue. These systems, as they operate 
today, are responsible for a large share of the widespread corruption that 
threatens political stability and hence economic performance. The second area 
of interconnected institutions that will be discussed involves the relationship 
between urbanisation, the social welfare system, and the changing Chinese 
demographic structure. The third area I will label ‘technical institutions’ for lack 
of a better description. This involves continued modernisation of the financial 
system, the steady improvement and expansion of research and development 
in engineering and the sciences, the continued upgrading of the universities, 
and other institutional changes designed to maintain a high rate of growth in 
productivity.
Regulation, Politics, Law and Corruption
The dismantling of the Soviet-style system of centrally planned commands 
over the economy has left an extensive residual of regulations governing all 
aspects of economic activity both public and private. For example, access to land 
on which to build a factory or office tower is controlled by urban governments; 
large-scale investments must be approved by the National Planning and Reform 
Commission, and lesser projects must be approved at lower levels of the planning 
hierarchy; and, access to electricity is regulated as is access to any other utility 
that is controlled by local governments. Then, there are the regulations that 
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all countries have that are designed to make sure that a building is safe for its 
occupants, that companies are fair to their workers, or that a factory doesn’t 
pollute its neighbourhood. All countries, for example, have customs authorities 
that determine whether and with what taxes goods and services can enter the 
economy.
For the past decade, the World Bank has attempted to calculate a number of 
measures designed to estimate the ease or difficulty of doing business in each 
country. In 2013, the World Bank ranks China 91st out of 185 countries, which, 
by itself, does not seem so bad, except that countries only ten or so places below 
China include Zambia, Papua New Guinea, and Pakistan—countries that most 
would consider highly corrupt and difficult places in which to do business. 
China, to be sure, has been steadily improving its regulatory environment—
it ranks 12th out of the 50 countries that have made the most progress in 
improving their regulatory environment (World Bank, 2012: 9). China ranks 
well, or fairly well, at enforcing contracts, registering property, and trade across 
borders (customs) (19th, 44th and 68th respectively), but poorly, or abysmally, 
with respect to getting credit (70th), resolving insolvency (82nd), protecting 
investors (100th), getting electricity (114th), paying taxes (122nd), starting a 
business (151st), and dealing with construction permits (181st). Given the vast 
amount of construction that has gone on in China during the first dozen years of 
the twenty-first century, the last number is particularly striking.
The fact that China ranks among the worst five countries in construction 
permits, but has by far the most construction activity of any country in the 
world in recent years, presents a paradox. In China it takes a long time to get 
the necessary permits (270 days) (in Singapore it is 26 days) and there are a large 
number of procedures involved (28) (Hong Kong requires six procedures). 
The  number of procedures puts China near the bottom, with the worst 
performers on this measure, where only nine countries have more procedures, 
although the length of time required to receive a permit in China is well below 
that of the worst ten performers, which range from Mozambique at 377 days to 
Haiti at 1,129 days. The cost of obtaining a permit is also high for China, at 3.75 
times the country’s per capita income, but that is far below Zambia at 17 times, 
or Chad at 51 times per capita income.
This paradox of obstructive procedures, but large amounts of construction, 
is no doubt partly due to the fact that companies can make significant profits 
from construction (and in many other areas of business) in China, and so it is 
worth the wait and the expense. But it is also likely that the permitting process 
is predictable for those with the right connections and the willingness to do 
what is necessary, above or below the table, to get through that process. What is 
true for construction permits is also true for a wide variety of other regulatory 
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barriers in China. It is profitable once one has gotten through them and the path 
through them is predictable at least as long as one has the right connections or 
is willing to develop them. 
There are straightforward ways of trying to eliminate some of these 
regulatory obstruction issues, although they do not by themselves fully solve 
the problem. One key is to remove as much discretion as possible from the 
domain of the officials who decide whether to issue a license or permit or not. 
The rules for issuance should be clear and public, and the process itself should 
be transparent. If an applicant complies with all of the rules, the permit should 
be issued automatically. To prevent delaying tactics by officials as a means 
of extracting rents, there should be time lines that establish the point in the 
process at which a permitting agency must make a decision. The process of 
what is required and where a given application stands should be accessible 
online, so that an applicant (and a government monitoring agency) can readily 
check on the progress of an application. For straightforward procedures, such 
as issuance of a driver’s license, this method will go a long way toward solving 
the problem of delays by the issuing official that are designed to extract rents. 
Where the procedure involves more complex problems, however, requiring 
official judgement as to the desirability of the project or the character of the 
applicant, these simple procedures are not likely to be sufficient to solve the 
issue of excessive delays.
When judgement and discretion on the part of the issuing office are involved, 
the problems of removing regulatory barriers are much more difficult. In China, 
the problem begins with the fact that the Chinese Communist Party and its 
key members, at both the local and higher levels, have discretionary power 
over a variety of issues, including many that determine whether a company or 
individual can receive permission to go ahead with a project or program. If the 
Party leadership strongly supports a project or program, it can cut through 
regulatory barriers and get the necessary authorisation to proceed. One problem, 
however, is that the Party can operate on both sides of a transaction. Local 
and higher level party officials can have a major say in the appointment of the 
government official in the regulatory office, and a similar say in the appointment 
of the enterprise manager (or party secretary) in the application for regulatory 
relief. Similarly, in the past, in applications for project funding, local party 
officials have had an influence over both the local branch of one of the national 
banks making the loan and the managers of the company or the local government 
officials applying for the loan. When there is more than one applicant for a 
single permit, the applicants with the best connections to local or higher level 
officials have an obvious advantage. 
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From the viewpoint of the applicant for permits or regulatory relief, there are 
a variety of solutions to overcoming another applicant’s political advantage—
they can, for example, make illegal payments to the official or to others with 
influence over that official, they can hire a close relative of the official or of the 
Party secretary of the official and pay that person a high salary or give them 
a large consulting contract. China has no monopoly on these practices—they 
are common throughout the world, including in most high-income countries. 
Straightforward payment of bribes can be dangerous for both the payer and 
payee, and official malfeasance of this sort can sometimes be identified by 
requiring officials and other senior political people to fully report their financial 
and other assets to a higher authority; this practice has been used to a degree in 
China. In a country such as China, however, where success or failure of a project 
or enterprise can depend on making one’s way through a maze of regulations, 
there are circumstances in which there is no need for formal bribes. Placing a 
person with powerful political connections on the board of directors, or in some 
other conspicuous position, can have a equivalent influence. The individual so 
employed may not have to actually contact the regulatory officials dealing with 
the company, or do anything whatsoever, to overtly help the company with the 
regulators. The mere knowledge that that individual is supporting the company 
will influence a lower level regulator to try to be helpful. The possibility that 
the powerful consultant or member of the board of directors might criticise the 
regulatory official and thereby damage or end that official’s career is sufficient. 
Many officials will not be willing to take the chance that this will happen.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the family members of some high party 
officials have ended up making large fortunes. Many of these officials have no 
doubt made these incomes because they have skills that have contributed in a 
technical sense to the companies they work with, but there are examples where 
the main thing the family member brings to the table is his or her political 
connections. The problem does not occur, however, only at the top of the 
pyramid; it exists right through the system, down to the local level. 
There are three ways of trying to deal with the relationship between regulatory 
power, political influence, and rent seeking. One way, which has dominated 
Chinese practice throughout the last three decades, is to have stiff punishments, 
including the death penalty, for financial crimes. This is problematic in a 
highly regulated economy, such as China’s, where all officials have a significant 
discretionary decision-making power, it is difficult to find and convict enough 
law breakers to make a difference to the overall problem. China has a population 
of 1.3 billion, comprising 80 million party members, tens of millions of officials, 
and over 2000 county-level governments, plus even more numerous townships 
and villages. It is noteworthy that China has prosecuted high level officials, 
and not just low level rent seekers, but the task of discovering whether a crime 
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of corruption has actually occurred, or whether it was just the excessive use 
of political influence, receipt of a personal gift that was a little too large, or a 
trip that was a little too lavishly funded. To an extent, the massive surveillance 
system that existed in the 1960s and early 1970s could control these forms 
of corruption, but at the price of far worse abuses of power in non-financial 
areas. Short of massive police surveillance, it is difficult to prove that a crime 
of corruption has been committed. Going after officials who are only suspected 
of malfeasance, but where firm proof is missing, leads to other kinds of abuses. 
Inevitably it is seen as motivated by a desire to eliminate political opponents. 
The second straightforward method for controlling this kind of corruption 
is to reduce the number of regulatory barriers that companies and individuals 
must get through in order to prosper. The fewer regulations there are to deal 
with, the less a company needs to spend in time and money in getting through 
those regulations. A well-functioning market system can control many forms 
of behaviour that harm the economy without the need for regulation of any 
kind, but even in the most market-oriented economy, Hong Kong being a good 
example, there is a need for some regulations. But, if one reduces the number of 
regulations and hence the opportunities for rent seeking, it is easier for public 
security and prosecutors to identify and try the smaller number of violations 
that do occur. It is no accident that the two economies with the lowest level 
of corruption in Asia, Singapore and Hong Kong, are the economies that are 
most regulated by market forces rather than government regulations. Even in 
Hong Kong, a market economy did not immediately diminish corruption in some 
areas, notably in the police, where a high degree of discretionary authority was 
inherent in the job. In Hong Kong it also took a major anti-corruption drive 
orchestrated by the Independent Commission Against Corruption that was 
founded in 1974, but the task before the commission was a simpler one than 
that faced by any commission responsible for the People’s Republic of China.
Thus, there must be a third way of combating corruption, and a critical 
step in that third way would be to change the role played by the Chinese 
Communist Party in the economy. In essence, as long as the Party plays a role of 
determining the rules of the economic system, follows that by appointing most 
of the government officials that administer that system, and then also directly 
appoints, monitors and replaces those leading major producing units in that 
economy—including all enterprises with a substantial degree of government 
ownership—the system will be riddled with conflicts of interest. Success in that 
system will depend more on one’s political relationships than on anything else. 
If the Party is to get control of corruption, therefore, it has to remove itself 
from the direct administration of the central and local government and of large 
parts of the economy. There is a precedent for doing this in recent Chinese 
history. The Party effectively removed itself from the day-to-day management 
New Institutions for a New Development Model
23
of agricultural production when it abolished the Rural People’s Communes. 
The privatisation of large parts of the urban economy, both industry and services, 
has also meant that decision relating to management personnel in this sector are 
mainly made by the private owners, foreign and domestic. Most large private 
units have party committees and, no doubt, many party members, but the Party 
does not determine company priorities and day-to-day management in any 
direct way. Even in the state-owned enterprises, including those shareholding 
enterprises where the majority shares are held by government, there has been 
some success in separating the role of the Party from the technical operation of 
the enterprise. What is needed is to complete the process of removing the Party 
as the main vehicle determining senior employment throughout the system. 
The Party would instead become a body that set the rules of the system, gave it 
its overall direction, and then monitored whether officials and economic units 
were following the rules and implementing the broad goals. It would play a role 
more like the traditional censorate in the imperial dynasties, but with a broader 
mandate than that of the censorate because it would also replace the policy-
making role played by the emperor. 
If the Party were to remove itself from the day-to-day management of the 
economy and society, certain other institutions would have to be strengthened 
from what they are today. Foremost among these institutions is the legal system. 
China has made progress in rebuilding the legal system after its dismantling 
during the Cultural Revolution, but it is far from adequate for what would 
be required in a system where party leaders and government officials were 
no longer the ultimate settlers of disputes between economic parties. In a full 
market economy, most economic disputes are handled through the courts, 
which are largely independent of the parties to those disputes, including 
government officials and units. By having independent, competent, and honest 
judges deciding disputes, political considerations are largely eliminated from 
the verdict, which is decided on its legal merits.
The contemporary legal system in China is neither independent of higher 
political authority, fully competent or consistently honest. The easiest to fix 
is competency. When the legal system was reconstituted after the Cultural 
Revolution, there were few people trained in the law and, hence, the judges often 
had no legal background. In 2010, China’s law schools graduated 26,165 lawyers 
(NBS 2011: 746) and the total stock of lawyers numbers in the hundreds of 
thousands. Making judges independent so that they can make decisions strictly 
according to the law and the facts of the case is far more difficult. Higher level 
government and party officials often feel they can overrule or ignore court 
decisions; even company managers with sufficient political influence can often 
do so. Furthermore, the judges are appointed by the government and the Party, 
and can be removed if they do not fulfil the expectation of carrying out the goals 
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of the Party. Truly independent justices must have a credible commitment to 
long tenure, as long as they themselves do not violate the law, and they cannot 
be removed for a verdict disapproved of by higher authorities. In the absence 
of that kind of commitment, judges will be influenced by the political winds 
blowing at any given moment and the legal system will be regarded as unfair. 
It will probably be a long time before courts in China are made independent 
of politics, especially in areas where there are perceived threats to the state 
or the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, but the Party has no obvious 
interest in letting political considerations govern economic verdicts. Individual 
government and party members will retain their own interests, including those 
of the rent-seeking variety, but those interests can be a bigger threat to the rule 
of the Party than judges who are sometimes seen as too independent. If one 
can remove overt political biases from the legal process, it will also be easier to 
remove the problem of corrupt courts. Paying judges well and monitoring their 
personal assets would also go a long way toward eliminating judicial decisions 
driven by corrupt practices. 
If China is ever to get full control of corruption, and to have a functioning 
economic system driven by market forces combined with regulations designed 
to compensate for real market failures, therefore, there are fundamental changes 
needed in the institutions governing China’s economy and society today. The 
changes are interrelated: there needs to be a substantial reduction in the role 
played by government regulations as contrasted to market forces, and the 
discretionary authority of those government officials in implementing those 
regulations must be greatly reduced or eliminated. There must be a further 
withdrawal of the Party from the day-to-day operation of government agencies 
and economic units and a focus of the Party, instead, on setting the goals for 
the system, translating those goals into legislation, and monitoring progress 
in their implementation, but doing so from outside government agencies and 
economic units, not as day-to-day managers within them. There are other kinds 
of political institutions that could play this role, but most of them are part of 
China’s future, rather than its present. Failure to make major progress in these 
areas will foster a continued rise in corruption that will steadily undermine the 
ability of the Party to govern the country.
Rural Land and Local Government Revenues
A major source of political instability in China over the past decade and 
longer has been the perceived corruption of the process whereby agricultural 
land is taken from farmers, at low prices, and sold to developers at much higher 
prices with the fund from difference between these two prices going to local 
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governments, and sometimes to local officials for personal use. Unlike the issue 
of the role of the Party being overly involved in the day-to-day operation of 
government agencies and economic units, this problem of the distribution of 
rural land can be solved to a substantial degree by technical reforms that do 
not involve a change in the role of the Party, or anything else that would be 
politically sensitive.
The first step to solving this problem would be to allow land to be sold on the 
open market at prices set by that market, and giving the farmers tilling that land 
either ownership or long-term user rights, with the right to sell the land or their 
user rights, similar to the system that allows companies to lease urban land. 
Government officials would then no longer be able to take land away from the 
farmers without paying them a fair market price, or, if they managed to do so, 
it would be seen as theft and prosecuted as such. There would still occasionally 
be the need for what is known in many high-income countries as ‘taking the 
land by eminent domain’ to serve a public purpose, such as building a road, but 
there would be a reference price set by the market, not by administrative rule. 
Ideally there would also be independent courts to determine whether the land 
was taken at a fair price and for a legitimate public purpose or not.
If one pays a fair price for the land, and if one allows land to be taken by 
eminent demand, however, there need to be two additional changes in related 
institutions. The first such institutional reform would be a need to change and 
expand the social safety net as it affects not only the rural population, but also 
the population registered as rural that is in fact working in non-agricultural 
occupations, mostly in the cities. The issue of urbanisation and rural migrants 
(discussed below) is relevant here because rural land in China is an important 
part of the safety net for these migrants, as well as those living in rural areas. 
Allowing migrants to sell their land rights gives them funds that will ease their 
permanent transition to urban life, but it will also remove the fallback position 
of returning to their land, something that many have used when employment in 
the cities has fallen through. A new fallback position or safety net is required.
The second necessary institutional change is to provide local governments 
with sources of revenue commensurate with the level of expenditures that they 
are required to make. In recent years, notably during the large stimulus spending 
designed to maintain high GDP growth in the face of a world recession, the 
central government pressured local governments to carry out and pay for a 
large part of this stimulus. That, together with the fact that local government 
officials get promoted in part on the basis of the GDP growth in their area, led 
local governments to run up debts that have been officially estimated at close to 
RMB10 trillion, but unofficially at perhaps twice that figure. It is now widely 
recognised that the local governments do not have the revenue sources to pay 
for these expenditures or to service these large debts, even if they continue 
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to earn revenue by paying low prices for local land and then selling the land 
to developers at a much higher price. If the land market is reformed and land 
prices become true market prices, this source of local revenue will disappear, 
thereby increasing the revenue shortfall. 
One modest way of raising local revenues would be to charge a land tax 
on developer land other than agricultural land. One could also tax agricultural 
land, but the government only recently abolished the agricultural tax as part of 
an effort to increase the disposable income of the rural population. The other 
way is for the central government to take over more local expenditures or, 
alternatively, expand the subsidies it pays to local governments from central 
revenues. Whatever the ultimate solution, continuing to allow local governments 
to buy land cheaply and sell it at high prices must end if China wants to maintain 
rural stability.
Urbanisation, Migration, Ageing and the 
Hukou System
China, in many respects, is following the pattern of urban development that 
is characteristic of all countries that have achieved middle-income status and 
are heading toward becoming high-income nations. China, having spent the 
two decades prior to 1978 trying to tightly restrict the growth of the urban 
population, is rapidly becoming a nation where the increasing majority of the 
population is no longer involved in farming, and a large share of that non-
agricultural population now resides in cities. Officially, the registered urban 
population in 2011 was 51.3 per cent of the total, up from only 17.9 per cent in 
1978. The figure for 2011 includes some migrants (those who had been in a city 
for over six months), but excludes others. The urban figures also include some 
farmers who reside within the urban district, but this would be a small number 
in the major cities today. The population that is still involved in farming is much 
smaller than the population listed as residing in rural areas—employment in 
agriculture in 2011 was under 35 per cent of the population, down from a little 
under 70 per cent in 1978.2 Most of the people doing farm work as their major 
occupation today are over the age of 40. 
There are three major challenges connected with the fast pace of urbanisation 
that China faces today and going forward over the next one or two decades. 
The first is keeping the growth rate of urban employment at a level sufficient 
to absorb the increases in the labour force, both rural and urban. That number 
2   The official figure for the primary sector in 2011 is 34.8 per cent, but this includes employment in 
mining (NBS 2012). 
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is  perhaps 14 million per year, if most of the increase in the labour force 
is  absorbed by urban employment.3 Since there will be close to ten million 
urban workers reaching retirement age and leaving the labour force each year, 
the net increase in employment needed to absorb these new entrants into the 
labour force is small, relative to the past, and will become a negative figure over 
time. When one adds the fact that the share of the service sector in this new 
employment is likely to rise and that of manufacturing begin to fall, the labour 
market will remain tight and wages will rise. The service sector will grow more 
rapidly because China has already reached the point where, in most countries, 
manufacturing output as a share of GDP and employment in manufacturing falls 
even more rapidly than the share of output.4 Thus, if China maintains a GDP 
growth rate of six or seven per cent per year for another one or two decades, 
wages should continue to rise, possibly and hopefully faster than GDP.
The second and third challenges are not so easily met, and they will require 
fundamental changes or improvements in the institutions currently in existence. 
The second challenge is the need to entirely get rid of the household registration 
system (the hukou system) as it is currently configured. The system is no longer 
used to restrict the entrance of workers into the cities, but key features of 
the system ensure that the population that is working, but not registered, in 
the urban areas is discriminated against in ways that are ultimately harmful 
to Chinese society. There is widespread acknowledgement that this is the case 
among a wide range of Chinese scholars and others who have thought about the 
problem. There are even a few urban districts that have taken steps to deal with 
important aspects of the issue, mainly cities that seek to attract migrants rather 
than repel or ignore them.
The problem with the way the current system is administered stems from 
the fact that there is little affordable housing of any quality that is available to 
migrant workers from the countryside. That in turn leads workers to live on 
construction sites, others are crowded into a single rented room in a distant 
suburb, and young women often reside in factory dormitories. The poor housing 
conditions also leads large numbers of migrant workers to leave their children 
in their home village with their grandparents, instead of having them attend 
generally higher quality urban schools that would better prepare them for 
urban life. The government now makes urban schools open to migrant children, 
3   There were 222 million people aged 14 and under in 2011, or an average of 16 million for each year of 
age. A few of these people, when they finish schooling at whatever level, will stay in agriculture and 
a few will not enter the labour force. I have assumed that these two categories would amount to two 
million people per year, with the remainder looking for work in the urban workforce.
4   Manufacturing employment in 26 OECD countries, plus Taiwan, began declining on average when they 
reached a per capita Purchasing Power Parity Income of US$13,300 (or within a range from US$7,000 to 
US$17,000 per capita) (Eichengreen et al. 2012: 87). This decline in manufacturing employment is often 
referred to as deindustrialisation although manufacturing output in most cases continues to grow.
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but few can afford the high fees and related expenses that are associated with 
most of the urban schools. The central government has a large public housing 
program for the registered urban poor, but, on the national level, there is still 
no such program for the migrant population. There is also a greatly improved 
program for rural and urban health insurance, but again the migrant population 
has to return to the villages where they are registered to take advantage of this 
program. Finally, the university entrance quotas are based on a national exam 
that is biased in favour of registered urban residents, what is in effect a reverse 
affirmative action program for the well off.
Few, if any, of these migrants will return to farm work. There are still far 
too many workers in agriculture and that keeps incomes for farm work low, 
although they have certainly risen substantially over the years. The children of 
these migrants are also not going to be farmers. The system needs to figure out 
ways to support rural migrants to the cities with housing, access to schooling 
for their children, and a social welfare and pension system that includes them. 
And these systems or institutions need to be created over the next one or two 
decades. To accomplish such an ambitious goal, the government following 
standard Chinese practice will have to experiment with what kinds of housing 
would be appropriate, what kinds of health care will be both affordable and 
will meet as many needs as possible, and what kinds of education would also 
be affordable and meet the needs of migrant families. Creating these institutions 
is not a simple matter. As the United States among others has demonstrated, 
high-rise apartment buildings may not work as well for poor migrant families 
as for the urban middle class. Similarly, the educational needs of children from 
the rural areas, where their parents had limited education, are different from the 
needs of urban families with well-educated parents, to mention only two areas 
of potential differences in the kinds of support required for migrants.
The third challenge has some things in common with the second challenge, 
but it is relevant to the entire urban population and not just to recent migrants 
from the countryside. It is the challenge of China’s ageing population in the 
context of a society that is becoming mostly urban. There are two aspects to 
the impact on Chinese society of a rapidly ageing population. The one that 
typically gets the most attention is the fact that in China, the enforcement over 
a long period of the one child family policy has created a situation in which 
the old-age dependency ratio will rise rapidly, and fewer and fewer people 
of working age will be available to support those who have retired from the 
labour force. The second aspect is that urban life, in most countries, typically 
ends the practice of several generations of one family living under the same 
roof (or in adjacent houses in villages built by the families themselves). Rather, 
grandparents live separately from their adult children and the nuclear family 
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is the norm. The working-age children may in fact live in a different city from 
their grandparents, something that is common in most high-income countries. 
Traditional ways of taking care of ageing grandparents thus no longer apply. 
China’s population’s overall dependency ratio has fallen steadily over the past 
three decades, and has only recently begun to level off. This is as a result of the 
one child family policy which caused the share of children below working age to 
fall sharply, while the share of the elderly outside the labour force grew rapidly 
(by roughly 50 per cent over the past two decades), but from a very low level 
(from 8.3 per cent of the population in 1990 to 12.3 per cent in 2011). The share 
of children as of 2013, however, has levelled off, and may even rise modestly if 
the one child family policy is finally abandoned or modified, as many in China 
are advocating. The share of the ageing will definitely continue to rise, and do so 
rapidly as people live longer and as China’s own ‘baby boomers’ (the population 
born after 1949 but before the one child policy) begin to retire. Of the 133 million 
people who were zero to nine years old in 1950, 94 million are still alive today, 
are aged 60 to 69 and are soon to be, or already, retired. The next age cohort that 
was zero to nine years old in 1960 totalled 192 million in that year, 161 million 
of those were aged 50 to 59 in 2010; many of the women in this group have 
already retired and the men will soon be approaching retirement. In addition to 
these people, in 2010 there were 71 million people aged 70 and over still living, 
up from only 30 million as recently as 1980. And the largest age cohorts of 
retirees come in the decades immediately after those who were zero to nine years 
in 1960. In 2010, there were 225 million people at an age (15 to 24) that will 
make them eligible to enter the labour force, compared to the 161 million in the 
50–59, about to retire, age group. Ten years later (in 2020) there will be roughly 
225 million in the 50–59, about to retire, age group and the same number in the 
15–24, about to enter the labour force, group. (United Nations 2011)
The burden of this demographic change is usually expressed as the 
dependency ratio that has fewer and fewer people in the work force supporting 
more and more retirees. In a rural peasant society, however, this burden is 
mainly one of more mouths to feed around the dinner table, most of the food 
comes from the family’s land and they build their own houses on that land. 
This is hardly an ideal existence, since the cultivated land is small and illness 
can make it difficult to cultivate even that small amount. Generally, there have 
been no institutions that intervene in this process—one either grew enough 
food and stayed reasonably healthy or one starved and got sick and died. 
In an urban environment and in a modern economy, where families are 
mobile and go where their work takes them, elderly retirees from the workforce 
must have a steady income to pay the rent on their apartment, buy food from 
the market, and to pay for other activities. Those other activities are typically 
more extensive than in a peasant village, in part because more activities in an 
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urban environment must be paid for with cash and people in urban centres are 
also used to a higher standard of living than those in rural villages. For people 
with sufficient funds, a variety of institutions can be created to meet their needs 
starting with independent housing but moving on to assisted living facilities 
and then to nursing homes, hospitals, and hospices toward the end of life. 
China is creating these kinds of institutions and it is being done commercially 
for those who can afford it.
The problem is that most urban residents in China, let alone the migrants 
from the countryside, do not have the retirement incomes that can support 
institutions of this sort. Many have meagre pensions, or none at all, because 
the company they depended on did not provide those benefits or it became 
bankrupt and could no longer honour commitments that it had made in more 
prosperous times. Thus, China faces the challenge of ensuring that its urban 
population has an adequate source of income in retirement and a wide range of 
institutions to support their needs as they age, and a health insurance system 
capable of paying for it. And all of this has to be created in the next one or two 
decades, when China will still be a far from rich nation. The one saving grace is 
that family ties in China remain strong and adult sons and daughters will take 
responsibility for their parents when they can, but, as countries such as Korea 
(or the United States before social security and medicare) demonstrate, in the 
absence of a strong safety net for the elderly, a large number will live out the 
remaining years of their life in poverty.
Institutions Promoting Growth in Productivity
The institutional changes that get the most attention from policy makers 
and the educated public in China are those connected with sustaining a high 
GDP growth rate. China’s potential GDP growth rate will decline from the nine 
to ten per cent rates of the past three decades, even if China does everything 
right in the economic sphere. This decline appears to be underway now, but 
will almost certainly be underway within the coming decade. A major stimulus 
for infrastructure and housing going forward, similar to what occurred in 2009–
2011, may keep the GDP growth rate up for a few years longer, but this kind 
of spending at levels similar to the recent past is already facing diminishing 
returns. Maintaining a high growth rate of, say, six to seven per cent a year 
over the next one or two decades will require steady and substantial increases 
in total factor productivity.5 High rates of growth of total factor productivity 
over the first two decades of the reform period were sustained by the steady 
5   For a systematic analysis demonstrating the relationship between a continued high growth rate and total 
factor productivity, see Perkins & Rawski 2008: 829–86.
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dismantling of the many barriers to efficiency and growth that had been thrown 
up by the Soviet-type economic system. Going forward, however, productivity 
growth will depend on the creation of ever more efficient, new and improved 
economic institutions, not the dismantling of old ones. Creating new and 
improved institutions is inevitably more complex and more difficult than simply 
getting rid of institutions that do not work. 
The key economic institutions that are needed to sustain a high GDP growth 
rate are thus those that raise the productivity of both capital and labour. 
Sustained increases in the efficiency of capital are mainly dependent on steady 
improvements in the financial system, further reforms of state-owned enterprises 
in general and those with state monopolies in particular, and in the strategy of 
development pursued. There is a large literature on how to improve the financial 
system, and another chapter in this volume is devoted to the subject. It is noted 
here that China has already moved a substantial distance from a financial system 
made up almost exclusively of large, state-owned commercial banks that lent 
mainly to state-owned enterprises. There are many more banks, there are other 
important financial institutions, ranging from insurance companies to the two 
stock exchanges and beyond, and privately owned companies and individual 
citizens have an important degree of access to bank loans. There is still too 
much politics in lending decisions, and many of those promoting the most 
innovative enterprises have little or inadequate access to the capital markets. 
Thus, there are still major improvements possible and, if pursued vigorously, 
these improvements should substantially raise the efficiency of capital.
Reforming the state-owned enterprises is likely to be a more difficult challenge, 
in large part because the political power of these enterprises is formidable. 
It took considerable political courage to implement the major reforms of these 
enterprises that occurred in the late 1990s. Monopolies produce large profits 
that benefit powerful people, but they also reduce the incentive to promote 
efficiency in these critical sectors. The slowing of the massive infrastructure 
and housing investments will also create a situation where industries, such 
as steel, will face years of financial difficulties because of earlier decisions to 
build capacity beyond any plausible future domestic demand. The large state 
construction companies that have built much of this infrastructure will also have 
to be cut back. The alternative, such as that followed by Japan, of continuing 
large state construction projects designed to keep these companies busy will 
lead to results in China not dissimilar from what has contributed to Japan’s 
anaemic economic growth rate. China’s infrastructure investment of the past 
decade made a major contribution to economic growth and the efficient use of 
capital, but the number of projects of this sort that will contribute to raising 
growth and the efficient use of capital is declining. As China moves into an 
economy that is increasingly dominated by the service sector, the temptation 
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to support numerous inefficient service providers at the expense of new, more 
efficient, service providers, a pattern pursued for years by both Japan and 
South Korea, also needs to be resisted.
Finally the efficient use of capital depends on getting the right balance between 
reliance on market forces and the need for some regulatory interventions to 
correct for important market failures. This chapter began with a discussion of 
the major issues connected with this challenge, and they are also discussed in 
the chapters in this volume on the environment and reforms in the financial 
system.
Improving the efficiency of labour is equally as important as raising the 
productivity of capital. At the low-skilled end of the labour force, and to a 
degree for the entire labour force, the need is for healthy and increasingly well-
educated workers. There is also a need to remove the remaining barriers to the 
movement of that labour to its most productive uses. Those issues in essence were 
the subject of the second major part of this chapter. At the higher-skilled end 
of the labour force, the main issues have to do with steadily raising the quality 
of education at the university level in general, and at the postgraduate level 
in particular. Steady advances in the quality of research produced, whether in 
universities, companies, or research institutes, is critical for continued growth in 
the economy. China’s progress in this latter area is considerable, but, as per capita 
incomes rise, sustained economic growth depends increasingly on innovation 
through research and development, that moves from small improvements in 
products and production processes to new products and services. 
Conclusion
The challenge facing China over the next one or two decades, and the 
essence of the new model of growth that is required, therefore, is to create the 
institutions of a truly modern economy and society. Creating new institutions 
and fundamentally restructuring old ones is inherently more difficult than 
the dismantling of inappropriate institutions. It is also more time consuming, 
and thus contributes with other factors to the slowing of GDP growth that is 
inevitable as per capita incomes rise and the economy and society become more 
complex. In most of the areas described in this chapter, where institutional 
reform is required, China has made major progress. This chapter, however, has 
focused mainly on economic reforms, and economic reforms usually require 
accompanying political reforms; the political reforms needed to sustain China’s 
transformation into a modern, high-income society are likely to be an even 
greater challenge than those in the economic area.
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3 The New Normal of Chinese 
Development
Yiping Huang, Cai Fang, Peng Xu and Gou Qin
China’s New Transition
China’s economic performance during the reform period is sometimes 
described as a miracle (Lin et al. 1995). Its GDP per capita increased from US$220 
in 1980 to US$6,000 in 2012. Not only is it now the world’s second largest 
economy, but it also contributes at least one-third of global economic growth in 
recent years. China is already a major player in global markets for luxury goods, 
labour-intensive manufacturing exports, commodities and foreign exchange. 
Many economists are optimistic that China can continue its rapid economic 
growth, albeit at a somewhat slower pace, in the coming decades (Perkins and 
Rawski 2008; Lin 2011).
Structural risks, however, also grow over time, dimming China’s economic 
outlook. Former premier Wen Jiabao once described the growth model 
as ‘uncoordinated, imbalanced, inefficient and unsustainable’ (see, for example, 
Wen 2006). The structural problems include the over-dependence of economic 
growth on external demand, continuous decline of the consumption share of 
GDP, worsening income distribution and devastating pollution. The investment 
rate rose steadily from around 25 per cent at the beginning of economic reform, 
to close to 50 per cent after the global financial crisis.
One consensus view that is shared by most economists is that this growth 
model needs to change in order for China’s rapid economic growth to continue 
(Yu 2009; Huang 2010). Shortly after taking office in 2003, Wen vowed to take 
policy steps to improve growth quality; but general assessment is that those 
efforts achieved little in changing the growth model. In fact, many economists 
believe that the imbalance problems have become worse during the past decade 
(Lardy 2012). Some analysts argue that correction of such structural risks 
necessarily requires substantially slower growth, if not collapse, of the Chinese 
economy (Pettis 2013):
China will be the last major economy to emerge from the global crisis. … 
I think it is pretty clear that over the next few years China will be forced 
to address and reverse the high saving rate, … This may take a decade 
or more. … If the transition is not mismanaged, average Chinese GDP 
growth rates will drop to 3% for the 2010–20 decade.
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This chapter argues that important changes to the Chinese growth model are 
already underway. Evidence shows that the Chinese economy is transitioning 
toward the ‘new normal’, involving slower but more sustainable economic 
growth, although this process is still at an early stage (Huang 2012). Growth 
potential probably lowered from ten per cent during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, to six–eight per cent during the second decade. In the 
meantime, current account surplus narrowed significantly; the consumption 
share of GDP started to rebound; and even income distribution began to improve 
steadily.1
Second, we suggest that the primary drivers of the transition of the growth 
model are changes in factor markets, especially labour market changes. China’s 
economic reform approach is sometimes described as ‘asymmetric liberalisation’, 
which freed up the product markets but continued with distortions in the factor 
markets (Huang 2010). Such cost distortions included such examples as subsidies 
to the corporates, but taxes on households, which contributes to the imbalance, 
and inequality and inefficiency problems, as well as strong economic growth 
(Huang and Tao 2010; Huang and Wang 2010). Emerging labour shortages and 
associated rapid wage increases in recent years are largely responsible for the 
current transition to the ‘new normal’, with slower growth but more balanced 
structure.
And, third, we make some policy recommendations for the Chinese economy 
to complete transformation of the growth model and to avoid the ‘middle-
income trap’. The next-step reforms should focus on redefining the relationship 
between the government and the market. The first is to complete the transition 
to a market economy by liberalising the factor markets. The second is to establish 
macroeconomic policy frameworks that are compatible with emerging market 
economies. And the third is to change the government’s role from directly 
supporting production and investment to facilitating innovation and upgrading.
Slowing of GDP Growth
The Chinese economy has shown significant transformation in recent 
years, including the steady downward shift of trend growth and rebalancing 
of economic structure. Some structural changes, such as narrowing of the current 
account surplus, are well documented in official statistics. Some improvements, 
such as rising share of consumption in GDP, are not captured by the official 
data. Yet some other adjustments, such as improvement in income distribution, 
1  ‘Michael Pettis makes 12 Fearless Predictions about China’, 2012, Business Insider, 16 April, http://www.
businessinsider.com/michael-pettis-makes-12-fearless-predictions-about-china-2012-4
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are confirmed by official estimation but strongly rejected by many economists. 
We  think that the structural improvements are real and driven primarily 
by changes in factor markets.
GDP growth started to decelerate in 2011, partly due to the tightening 
of  policies by the authorities. Toward the end of the first quarter in 2012, 
however, it became clear that growth might soon fall below eight per cent. 
From March that year, the government undertook a number of steps to stabilise 
economic growth, including support to on-going infrastructure projects in areas 
of water, power and transportation. Despite this policy effort, GDP growth 
decelerated continuously from 8.1 per cent in the first quarter to 7.4 per cent in 
the third quarter. 
In retrospect, two special factors probably contributed to this continuous 
slowdown. One, export growth fell from close to eight per cent during the first 
half of the year to around two per cent during July–August period. And, two, 
housing purchase restriction (HPR), which was introduced in April  2011, 
led to slowing of residential property investment growth to below ten per cent 
during the third quarter of 2012, from above 30 per cent a year ago. Growth 
deceleration caused renewed fears among international investors for a hard 
landing of Chinese growth. Many financial market participants repeatedly 
called for aggressive policy actions to support growth. 
The policymakers, however, stayed relatively calm and appeared to be willing 
to tolerate somewhat slower growth for three reasons (Huang 2012). First, many 
government officials became reluctant to adopt aggressive measures supporting 
growth after implementation of the four trillion yuan stimulus package during 
the global financial crisis. The package was beginning to successfully turn 
around economic growth in 2009. Many economists, however, argued that it 
increased fiscal risks, created nonperforming loans, contributed to overcapacity 
in some infrastructure areas and caused inflation and asset bubbles. When 
growth slowed again from late 2011, the policymakers were cautious not to over-
stimulate the economy.
Second, economic studies estimate China’s current growth potential at six–
eight per cent. The World Bank’s estimates were 8.6 per cent in 2011–2015 
and seven per cent in 2016–2020 (WB & DRC 2012). Cai Fang and Lu Yang 
(2012) estimate China’s growth potential at 7.2 per cent during 2010–2015 and 
six per cent during 2016–2020 (Figure 3.1). In a recent multi-country review 
of growth performance, Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park and Kwanho 
Shin (2011) project China to grow by 6.1 to seven per cent in the 2011–2020 
decade and by five to 6.2 per cent in the period 2021–2030. Similarly, a joint 
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report by the Asian Development Bank and Peking University estimates the 
growth potential at eight per cent in 2011–2020 and six per cent in 2021–2030 
(Zhuang, Vandenberg and Huang 2012). 
Figure 3.1 Estimates of growth potentials (%)
Source: Cai and Lu (2012).
And, third, economic indicators such as employment and inflation also 
suggested no need for aggressive policy easing, despite deceleration of GDP 
growth to levels below eight per cent. CPI inflation first eased, from 4.5 per cent 
in January, down to the trough of 1.7 per cent in October, but then picked up 
slowly to above two per cent in the following months. The labour market was 
also surprisingly resilient. In 2012, the economy created 12.7 million new jobs, 
despite growth slowdown. The number of migrant workers reached 163 million, 
up 4.7 million from a year ago and the total number of farmers employed in non-
farm jobs increased to 263 million, with an increase of 9.8 million within the 
year. In 25 provinces, minimum wages were adjusted, lifting the national average 
by 20.2 per cent; and migrant workers’ monthly wages averaged 2290 yuan or 
US$363, up 11.8 per cent from a year ago.
Policymakers, therefore, are no longer keen in supporting above eight per 
cent growth. This is mainly because growth potential is already much lower, due 
to the higher level of economic development and tightening condition of the 
labour market. For instance, in 2012, the working-age population declined by 
3.5 million. The purpose of the cautious macroeconomic policy can be viewed 
as a strategy to allow growth to settle around its new potential. Of course, 
if unemployment rate rises unexpectedly, it is likely that the government will 
once again engage in more aggressive policies to support economic growth. 
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Rebalancing of the Economy
The so-called ‘new normal’, however, is more than growth slowdown. 
Recent  years have also indicated that the economy also shows clear signs 
of rebalancing. For instance, the current account surplus narrowed from 
10.8 per cent of GDP in 2007, to 2.8 per cent in 2011 and 2.6 per cent in 2012 
(Figure 3.2). Mainly because of this, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) Deputy 
Governor Yi Gang argued that the yuan exchange rate was near equilibrium, 
while US President Barak Obama’s former top economic advisor, Lawrence 
Summers, noted in January 2013 that the yuan was not as undervalued as it was 
five years earlier. In recent years, two-way movement of the exchange rate and 
two-directional capital flows started to emerge in China. 
Figure 3.2 Current account surplus as a share of GDP, 2006–2012 (%)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
Another rebalancing in recent years relates to regional disparity, with the 
rural–urban income gap narrowing notably (Figure 3.3). This is the result of a 
combination of stronger policy support to agriculture, more rapid increases in 
agricultural prices and steady improvement in rural productivity. In addition, 
China’s reform success was, until recently, a story of the coastal regions. 
Inland economies, however, are now growing faster than the coastal economies 
as a result of the government’s ‘go west’ policy, the migration of manufacturing 
industries, and rich resource endowments in western China (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.3 Urban–rural income ratio narrowed, 1987–2012 (%)
Source: CEIC Data Company.
Figure 3.4 Growth in eastern, central and western China, 2012 (%)
Source: CEIC Data Company.
In mid-January 2013, the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
reported estimates of Gini coefficients for 2003–2012, which show a steady 
deterioration of income distribution from 0.479 in 2003 to 0.491 in 2008 and 
steady improvement after that, to 0.474 in 2012 (Figure 3.5).2 This, if confirmed, 
could mark another important turning point in China’s economic development, 
although many Chinese economists remain sceptical about the results. 
2 The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality – the higher the estimate, the more unequal the 
income distribution.
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For instance, a recent study by Southwest University of Economics and Finance 
reported a Gini coefficient of 0.61 in 2010. One criticism of the official NBS 
finding was that is did not consider income equality in household wealth, such 
as property. Another was under-reporting of income at the high end.
Figure 3.5 Gini coefficients estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics, 2003–2012
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
Official data also suggest that the contribution of consumption to GDP growth 
increased from about one-third in 2007, to 52 per cent in 2012 (Figure  3.6). 
Two  Chinese economists, Tian Zhu and Jun Zhang of Shanghai, have gone 
further,  arguing that China’s consumption share is grossly underestimated 
as a result of underreported residential spending, consumption covered by 
institutional spending and technical issues in the household survey method. 
They note that the consumption share estimated by the Penn World Table was 
60.9 per cent in 2010, compared with the official figure of 47.4 per cent, and 
58.9 per cent in the Penn World Table in 1990.
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Figure 3.6 Contribution to GDP growth, 1995–2012 (%)
Source: CEIC Data Company.
Recent research finds that the consumption share of GDP began to rise after 
2008, although this is not yet fully reflected in official statistics (Huang et al. 
2012 and 2013). Huang and his collaborators find that it is difficult to reconcile 
accelerating retail sales and decelerating consumption in official statistics after 
2008. By calculating a new growth rate for consumption, which is a weighted 
average of consumption-related, retail sales growth and service sales growth, 
they reveal that the consumption share of GDP fell during much of the past 
decade, as suggested by official data, but rebounded from 48 per cent in 2008 
to 52 per cent in 2010, compared with the official estimate of 47 per cent in that 
year (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7 Total consumption share of GDP (%)
Source: Huang et al. (2012 and 2013).
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This analysis received sceptical reviews after its initial dissemination.3 
 Some commentators find it difficult to accept our finding, given their strong 
impression of increasing structural problems following the four trillion yuan 
stimulus package that was adopted in late 2008. Others argue that structural 
improvement is impossible, since the government has not undertaken more 
decisive reforms. The fact that Chinese consumption is probably underestimated, 
however, is a belief that is shared by an increasing number of Chinese economists. 
A 2012 study (Li and Xu 2012), for instance, concludes that the household 
consumption share rebounded from 36 per cent in 2007 to 38.5 per  cent in 
2011 (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.8 Household consumption share of GDP (%)
Source: Li and Xu (2012).
Driving Forces Behind the New Normal
Slower but more sustainable economic growth, and more balanced economic 
structure, are key features of what we call the ‘new normal’ of Chinese economic 
development. Although the government made serious efforts during the past 
decade, the key factors driving the transition of the Chinese economy are changes 
in the factor markets, especially in the labour markets. An emerging labour 
3  Some articles criticising findings of this study include: ‘Optimists’ View on China’s Economy Suffers 
from Fatal Flaws’ (South China Morning Post, 30 January 2012), ‘China is not Rebalancing a) Yet, or 
b) Enough’ (Financial Times, http://ft.com/alphaville), ‘China’s Rebalancing will not be Automatic’ 
(EastAsiaForum.com). Meanwhile, there were also articles with more sympathetic views, including ‘The 
Incredible Shrinking Surplus: At least One of China’s Economic Imbalance is Narrowing’ (The Economist, 
18 February 2012) and ‘All Hail the Chinese Shopper’ (Financial News, 27 February 2012 http://www.
efinancialnews.com/story/2012-02-27/hail-the-chinese-shopper).
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shortage leads to a rapid increase in wages, which, in turn, slows economic 
growth, raises inflation pressure, improves income distribution, rebalances 
economic structure and accelerates industry upgrading (Huang et al. 2011).
Economists have developed diverse analytical frameworks to explain 
changes in the Chinese economy during the past decades. Justin Lin, Cai Fang 
and Li Zhou argue that the key to this success was the transition from the heavy 
industry-oriented to comparative advantage-oriented development strategy 
(Lin et al. 1995). Barry Naughton introduces the term ‘growing out of the plan’ 
to describe China’s incremental growth of the market-oriented, private sector, 
while maintaining support for the old, state-owned enterprises (Naughton 1995). 
Jeffery Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, however, point out that Chinese economic 
success can be explained mainly by its convergence with the typical market 
system of east Asia (Sachs and Woo 2000). 
Despite the differences in their perspectives, these economists all agree that 
the key aspect to the reform is the transition from a centrally planned system to 
a market system. This is certainly correct, but may only be part of the story. In a 
series of recent research papers, we argue that the fundamental reason behind 
the combination of strong economic growth and increasing structural risks is 
China’s asymmetric market liberalisation approach (Huang 2010; Huang and Tao 
2010; Huang and Wang 2010). Free markets for products ensure that production 
decisions are based on demand and supply conditions in the economy, and 
resources are allocated efficiently. Distortions in factor markets are a way of 
providing incentives for economic entities and, sometimes, overcoming market 
failures.
Factor market distortions include the household registration system that 
limits labour mobility between rural and urban areas; direct controls of bank 
deposit and lending rates; setting of energy, especially oil, prices by state 
agencies; and, offering discounted land-use fees to investors. In most cases, these 
distortions depress input costs. Labour is a special case, however, as it is unclear 
if labour market segmentation lowers or increases labour cost. But labour cost 
was low for a long time because of abundant agricultural labour or unlimited 
labour supply, in a typical Lewis dual-economy. 
Low input costs, including low labour costs, are like subsidies to companies, 
but taxes on households. They boost production profits, increase returns to 
investment and improve the international competitiveness of Chinese exports. 
Low input costs also serve as a mechanism for the redistribution of income from 
households to the companies. Over the years, corporate profits grew much faster 
than household income, as household income was largely capped by stagnant 
wage rate.
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Over time, low input costs also contribute to structural problems. 
Firstly, extraordinary incentives lead to a continuous rise in the shares of exports 
and investment in GDP. Secondly, a rise of the share of corporate profit in the 
national income increases the national saving rate, as corporate saving rate is 
generally higher than household saving rate. Thirdly, income inequality among 
households deteriorates, as low-income households rely more on wage income 
while high-income households rely more on corporate profits and investment 
returns. Fourthly, the consumption share of GDP declines over time because 
household income grows more slowly than GDP. And, fifthly, the unusually 
low costs of energy, capital and other resources has also resulted in wasteful 
behaviour on the part of producers.
The recent transition to the ‘new normal’ of Chinese economic development 
is primarily attributable to changes in factor markets. A recent study argues that 
the distorted factor costs have already started to change (Huang et al. 2011). 
The labour market shows clear signs of supply shortage, which is evidenced 
by accelerating wage increases in recent years (Figure 3.9). The development 
of shadow banking businesses also opens the door for de facto interest rate 
liberalisation. The Chinese Government has also been trying to reform the price 
of energy, water and other resources.
The so-called Lewis turning point (LTP)—the transition of the labour market 
from surplus to shortage—has important implications for China’s macroeconomy 
(Huang and Cai 2010). Rapid wage growth, especially that at the lower end of 
the market, cuts into profit margin. Therefore, it reverses past redistribution of 
income from households to corporates. As these implicit subsidies for Chinese 
companies are reduced, export and investment activities soften and, therefore, 
the economy rebalances. Applying a computable general equilibrium model of 
the world economy, Huang and Jiang (2010) analyse detailed economy-wide 
consequences of the LTP in China.
Figure 3.9 Rapid rise of migrant workers’ wages
Source: Feng 2011. Original chart reflected growth up to 2010. Authors updated to 2012 using data from 
the National Bureau of Statistics.
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In a sense, it is relatively easy to understand why growth potential has 
declined in recent years. It is a universal phenomenon that growth slows as an 
economy develops; this is because the reduced distance from the technological 
frontier of the developed world means the economy can benefit less from 
backwardness (Lin 2012). But the growth slowdown is accelerated in China 
by changing demographics, including labour shortages and a diminishing 
working-age population. For the same reason, rapidly increasing wages also 
create inflation pressure, as rising costs can only be absorbed by higher output 
price, narrower profit margin or faster productivity growth, or a combination 
of the above.
So, what has contributed to the rising consumption share of GDP in recent 
years? The answer is household income. When an ‘unlimited labour supply’ 
exists, rapid industrialisation is accompanied by a stable wage rate and, 
therefore, a declining share of wage income in GDP. This is reversed when a 
labour shortage emerges: wages rise rapidly and the share of wage income in 
GDP starts to grow. In fact, labour income has also increased from 41 per cent 
in 2007 to 47.1 per cent in 2009 (Figure 3.10), which, in turn, has boosted 
consumption relative to GDP. This was also what happened in Korea and Taiwan 
in the mid 1980s, when their consumption shares started to recover following 
their respective LTP (Figure 3.11). 
Figure 3.10 Labour income and consumption share of GDP (%)
Source: Li and Xu (2012).
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Figure 3.11 Private consumption share of GDP in Korea and Taiwan (%)
Source: CEIC Data Company.
Rapid wage growth was probably also behind the recent improvements in 
income distribution highlighted by the NBS, since low-income households rely 
more on wage income and high-income households rely on investment returns 
or corporate profits. If the past trend was households subsidising corporations, 
then the new trend is redistribution of income from corporations to households, 
as rising labour costs increase wage income but squeeze corporate profits. This is 
probably why, in rapidly developing economies, the so-called Kuznetz turning 
point (when income distribution shifts from deteriorating to improving) often 
follows the Lewis turning point (Huang and Cai 2010).
What’s Next?
Clearly, rebalancing is still at an early stage. For instance, the consumption 
share of GDP, at 52 per cent in 2010, on our estimates, was significantly below 
the 70–90 per cent range in most developing and developed economies. This gap 
may be narrowed, in part, through continuous wage adjustment. Expected 
liberalisation of interest rates, which will likely lead to high deposit rates, at 
least, should further facilitate rebalancing. Further changes may also be required 
to transform the development pattern completely. This could involve measures 
to improve income equality beyond the primary round of income distribution, 
development of social welfare systems such as pension, medical insurance and 
education, and financial and capital account liberalisation.
The first wave of cost shocks—increases in wages—has caused significant 
economic restructuring. The labour-intensive manufacturing industry in the 
coastal region is either moving to the western provinces, or migrating to other 
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low-cost countries or upgrading along the value chain. Given rapid increases in 
production costs in inland provinces, it is likely that China will lose its labour-
intensive industries, especially those export-oriented sectors, faster than many 
anticipate.
The second wave of cost shocks—increases in costs of capital and 
energy—may bring about more profound changes to the Chinese economy. 
Again, normalisation of these costs could reveal massively misallocated resources 
in the Chinese economy, especially in heavy and highly leveraged industries. 
Most of these companies are state-owned and were built on a distorted incentive 
structure. Once costs of capital and energy rise, some of these seemingly profitable 
companies may become financially unviable. And  this would inevitably lead 
to major industry consolidation, which might bring the first recession to the 
Chinese economy since the beginning of its economic reform.
This will not, however, necessarily be the beginning of a period of growth 
stagnation, as some suggest (see, for instance, Pettis 2013). Taking financial 
repression as an example, it lowers cost of capital in the formal sector, especially 
for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). But it also raises the cost of capital 
outside of the formal sector. Therefore, normalisation of the cost of capital could 
result in a temporary shrinkage of economic activities in the state sector. At the 
same time, it might also boost economic activities of the non-state sectors by 
improving their access to credit and reducing the cost of capital. Importantly, the 
non-state sectors now account for almost 80 per cent of total industrial output.
Successful transition to the ‘new normal’ of economic development is only a 
first step in China’s long march toward becoming a high-income country. A bigger 
challenge facing the Chinese economy now is the so-called ‘middle-income 
trap’, as its GDP per capita reaches high middle-income level and its labour 
cost rises rapidly. The ‘middle-income trap’ may be defined as the situation that 
arises when an economy loses competitiveness in low value-added industries, 
but fails to move up to high value-added industries (Zhuang,  Vandenberg 
and Huang  2012). Chinese industries are already under significant pressure 
as the three important conditions that facilitate their extraordinary growth 
in the past—unlimited labour supply, low-cost advantage and rapid export 
expansion—all diminish steadily. According to the World Bank, only 13 out of 
88 middle-income economies succeeded during the past half-century in making 
the jump to high-income economies (World Bank 2012).
Scepticism about China’s ability to continue relatively rapid economic 
growth is based on several concerns. One main worry is its unsustainable 
growth model. If the imbalance, inefficiency and inequality problems are not 
reversed quickly, they could seriously dampen the outlook for the Chinese 
economy. Unfortunately, as some analysts argue, the policy efforts to improve 
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growth quality have achieved little, at least according to the official statistics 
(Lardy 2012). Others believe that change of the growth model is possible, but it 
necessarily requires substantially slower growth (Pettis 2013).
Another concern relates to the lack of progress in political reform, alongside 
market-oriented economic reform. This pattern of reform has led to what 
Wu Jinglian calls ‘state capitalism’.4 To a large extent, this explains the growing 
problems of monopoly, corruption and disparity. The SOEs, for example, are a 
typical example of extractive institutions—they extract monopoly profits by 
controlling cheap inputs and prohibiting entry into their trade or commerce 
by others. More importantly, China might be locked into following this path, 
as it will be hard to reverse, except through extreme social turmoil. Without 
necessary political reforms to improve political and economic institutions, 
Chinese growth will sooner or later collapse (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
A third difficulty is the potential for Chinese industry to innovate and 
upgrade. So far, Chinese growth has been driven mainly by low-cost advantage, 
increasing input and productivity gain through resource reallocation, such 
as rural–urban migration. But growth based on resource mobilisation is, by 
definition, not sustainable (Krugman 1994). But can technological innovation 
replace resource mobilisation to become the main driver of economic growth in 
China? One obvious hurdle is the low education level of hundreds of millions 
migrant workers. If they lose low-skill manufacturing and construction jobs, 
they might not be able to work in high technology and high value-added sectors. 
Foreign companies also complain that the Chinese legal environment is not 
conducive to technological innovation because of the lack of proper protection 
of intellectual property rights in China.
These three concerns are real issues, but they should not be overstated. 
Rebalancing of the Chinese economy is already underway, although it is not fully 
appreciated by investors and economists. Completion of rebalancing economy 
is subject to both further liberalisation of factor markets and additional policy 
reforms to improve growth quality.
Political reform will be necessary to eradicate corruption and maintain political 
stability. But it is unlikely that China will adopt a Western-style democracy in 
the near future, and the current political regime has already exhausted its growth 
potential. Institutions are vital to enduring growth. But optimal institutions are 
different for economies at different stages of development. The post-World War 
II experience of imposing on developing countries the institutions that are best 
4   Hu Shuli, ‘Fast-track China is on the Wrong Path’, 2011, interview with Wu Jinglian, Wall Street 
Journal, Asia Edition, July 28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576471393143
140106.html
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
50
suited to developed economies, such as was implemented by the Washington 
Consensus, was largely unsuccessful. One important reason could be that 
technological innovation and technological catch-up require different types of 
institutions—with GDP per capita at US$6,000, China still has huge potential to 
gain through technological catch-up.
Even in terms of innovation, China has been doing well. It saw science and 
technology takeoff much earlier than most other developing countries—it’s 
share of R&D expenditure of GDP reached one per cent, when its GDP per capita 
was only US$3,000, while, on average, other developing countries reached the 
same level of R&D expenditure when GDP per capita was US$8,000. Globally, 
China is already a leader in terms of total R&D spending, patent filing and 
R&D productivity (measured by the number of patent filing divided by R&D 
expenditure). Continuous technological innovation and industry upgrading 
are also observed in a large number of industries, including automobile, large 
machinery and information technology. Protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) is a key drag on progress, but China has a nationwide IPR court system, 
and the number of IPR cases is increasingly rapidly. According to international 
experiences, IPR protection will strengthen indigenous innovation so that it 
becomes a dominant phenomenon.
One major difficulty is to improve labour quality or human capital. As China 
moves towards becoming a high-income country, industrial upgrading will 
continuously shift employment from labour-intensive to capital-intensive to 
technology-intensive sectors. The Chinese experience suggests that shifting 
workers from labour-intensive to capital-intensive sectors in the secondary 
industries requires, on average, 1.3 years of additional education. Workers 
shifting further to technology-intensive sectors in the tertiary industry require 
4.2 years’ additional education, on average. Human capital accumulation, 
however, can take place only gradually. For instance, the average number of 
years of education for the population aged at 16 years and above increased from 
6.24 years in 1990 to 7.56 years in 2000, a net increase of 1.32 years. It further 
increased to 8.9 years in 2010, another net increase of 1.34 years.
Currently, China has a total of 260 million migrant workers, most of whom only 
finished junior high school. As wages rise rapidly, whether or not these migrant 
workers will be able to find employment in higher value-added industries will 
be a critical test for China’s ‘middle-income trap’ challenge. If not, China may 
end up in not only growth stagnation but also facing massive unemployment 
problems. Therefore, improving labour quality through education and training 
should be a policy priority in the coming decades.
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Policy Implications
Market-oriented economic reforms have been incomplete in China. 
This, particularly the widespread distortions to factor costs, has contributed to 
success in economic growth, but has created problems, such as structural risks. 
Recent changes in factor markets, including emerging labour shortages and 
rapid wage increases, already slow economic growth and rebalance economic 
structures, both of which are key features of the ‘new normal’ of economic 
development.
This rebalancing trend should not be mixed with some cyclical changes. 
For instance, while the overall trends are for the investment share of GDP to 
moderate while the consumption share of GDP rises, at the beginning of 2013, 
this pattern reversed. The government’s policy to stabilise growth inevitably 
boosts growth, as infrastructure spending is the only swing factor in the near 
term. Nevertheless, the target is much lower. At the same time, consumption, 
especially high-end consumer spending, is negatively affected by the 
government’s campaign to crack down on corruption.
These temporary disturbances should not reverse the overall rebalancing 
trends, unless the government again pushes for investment-led growth. 
While this is unlikely to happen, the risk is real. The new government is keen 
to accelerate the urbanisation process, which may lead to further investment. 
In the meantime, local governments are again planning on massive investment 
programs. Local investment programs, however, are mainly constrained by their 
funding capabilities. It is critical for Beijing to keep the brakes on local and 
central investment programs in order for the rebalancing process to continue.
But, in itself, this is not sufficient. Further policy reforms may be necessary to 
complete the transition toward the new normal and to avoid the ‘middle-income 
trap’. Former president Hu Jintao suggested that reforms in the next stage 
should be organised around the central theme of redefining the relationship 
between the government and the market (Hu 2012). In our view, this could 
include important policies in the following three areas. First, if China had a no-
market economy during the pre-reform period and a half-market economy 
during the first three decades of the reform period, it is now time to complete 
the transition to a market economy by removing all the remaining distortions, 
especially those in factor markets. 
Second, China needs to establish a macroeconomic policy framework 
compatible with an emerging market economy, including an accountable 
budget system and professional monetary policymaking mechanism. China’s 
macroeconomic policy framework remains administrative in nature. For instance, 
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many of the problems associated with the four trillion yuan stimulus package 
was not the central government’s expansionary policy, but investment programs 
supported or implemented by the banks, the SOEs and the local governments.
And, third, the government’s role should shift from directly supporting 
production and investment through resource mobilisation to facilitating 
innovation and upgrading via supporting physical and soft infrastructure 
development. These could include better support to the country’s education 
and research system and improve IPR protection. A critical test in the forseeable 
future is to upgrade the skills of the large number of migrant workers, most 
of whom have less than seven years school. It is important to devise training 
programs so that these workers can move to new industries when their current 
employers are phased out by rapidly rising costs.
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4 The End of China’s 
Demographic Dividend:
The Perspective of Potential GDP Growth
Cai Fang and Lu Yang
Introduction
The unprecedented economic growth in China over the past 30 years can 
be attributed largely to the demographic dividend. That is, growth of the 
working age population guarantees an adequate supply of labour; a decline in 
the dependence ratio (the ratio of the dependent population to the working age 
population) helps to maintain a high savings rate, which is the condition for 
capital formation; and an unlimited supply of labour prevents return on capital 
from diminishing, which allows heavy investment to be the main source of GDP 
growth (Cai and Zhao 2012). 
As is well documented (e.g. Bloom and Williamson 1998; Williamson 1998), 
the demographic dividend is not derived from population size or the growth rate 
of the population, but from a specific feature of the population age structure. 
Simply put, an increase in the proportion of the working age population in the 
total population, and a decline in the dependence ratio provide a country an 
opportunity to situate themselves so that a high savings rate, heavy investment 
and rapid economic growth can be obtained; the country thus benefits from 
the demographic dividend. Over the recent period of fast growth, few would 
consider the population age structure as a constraint of economic growth 
in China.
The population age structure is, however, ever-changing. As a result 
of population ageing, the working age population stops growing and the 
dependence ratio no longer decreases; eventually, the demographic dividend 
will cease to exist. While debating the Lewis turning point, Ross Garnaut (2010) 
suggests using the phrase ‘Lewis turning period’ instead of Lewis turning point, 
so that the feature of China’s regional heterogeneity can be captured. Accepting 
this advice, we consider 2004, the year in which labour shortages first appeared 
and migrants’ wages started to increase, as the starting time and 2010, in which 
working age population between 15 and 59 peaked, the ending time of the 
Chinese Lewis turning period (Figure 4.1). Since China has now passed such 
a period, all those things that are predicted by economic theories are becoming 
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a reality. That is, labour shortages, diminishing returns on capital, and a decline 
in the savings rate will lead to a slowdown in economic growth. This is what has 
occurred in China in recent years, particularly since 2004.
Figure 4.1 The Chinese Lewis turning period
Source: China Development Research Foundation (2012).
The potential GDP growth rate is determined by supply-side factors, including 
labour, capital and total factor productivity (TFP). In a growth accounting 
equation, holding the labour force participation rate (LFPR) and the natural 
unemployment rate (i.e. the non-accelerated inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU)) constant, a reduction in the working age population will directly 
reduce the potential GDP growth rate. In addition, the reduced supply of labour, 
which causes diminishing returns to capital, and the increase in the dependence 
ratio, which causes a decline in the savings rate, do not support the fast growth 
of capital formation. Therefore, holding the other factors constant, a reversal of 
the growth trend of the working age population in China will inevitably slow 
its economic growth. 
In fact, the process of demographic transition has taken place in China much 
more rapidly than anyone could have expected, and the number of people from 
ages 15 to 59 years has already decreased.1 Based on the data of the 6th national 
1   In this study, we assume that people aged 15 to 59 years make up the working age population, instead 
of people aged 15 to 64 years. The reason is twofold. First, the official retirement ages are 60 years for 
male workers and 55 years for female workers. Second, for China’s working age population, the older 
the person, the lower the educational level. For example, the average years of schooling drop from nine 
years for people aged 20, to six years for people who are aged 60 (Wang and Niu 2010). Both reasons 
indicate that, at present, there is little chance for people older than 60 years to successfully remain in 
the labour force.
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census, the China Development Research Foundation (CDRF 2012) predicts the 
trend of the population age structure to change, and shows that the working age 
population, when assumed to be aged 15 to 59 years, started to decline in size 
in 2011, while the population dependence ratio, which is calculated based on 
the working age population (aged between 15 and 59 years), began shrinking 
in the same year. This trend will not be reversed, even if there is a moderate 
relaxation of the one-child policy. Given that the population factor has had such 
far-reaching impacts on the determinants of China’s economic growth, including 
labour supply, the savings rate, the marginal return on capital and total factor 
productivity, such a change in the population age structure is bound to reduce 
the potential GDP growth rate in China.
Based on the latest population data, the chapter simulates a decline in the 
average potential GDP growth rate from 9.8 per cent over the period 1995–2009, 
to 7.2 per cent during the 12th five-year plan period (2011–2015) and 6.1 per cent 
over the 13th five-year plan period (2016–2020). Therefore, determining how to 
sustain economic growth is an important challenge facing China. In light of the 
properties of the potential growth rate and the experiences of China and the rest 
of the world, we make the following two suggestions.
First, the government should not seek an actual growth rate that exceeds the 
potential growth rate. Because the potential growth rate is fixed by assuming 
full employment of existing factors of production, artificial stimulus aimed at 
lifting the actual economic growth rate above the potential rate would have 
unhealthy consequences. For example, frequently implemented stimulus plans 
could cause inflation; overactive industrial policies might result in overcapacity 
by inappropriately protecting inefficient enterprises and backward production 
capacity; and, regional and industrial policies using heavy subsidies could 
lead to distortion of prices of production factors, and affect regional industrial 
structure by impacting comparative advantage. 
Second, the potential growth rate can be enhanced through the application 
of measures to enlarge the supply of labour and capital, and to improve 
productivity. This requires deepening reforms in various areas, such as reform 
of the household registration system, and institutional reform. That is, economic 
reform is the key to sustaining China’s economic growth. Homi Kharas (2011) 
points out that it would take ten years or more for China to see any obvious 
effects of such reforms, which implies that the Chinese Government should waste 
no time in initiating urgent reforms, while being ready to accept lower growth 
rates. There exist reform opportunities, however, that could enhance China’s 
potential growth rate fairly swiftly, which we discuss in the present chapter.
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While suggesting the slowdown of the potential rate of China’s future 
economic growth in accordance with the trend of population structure changes, 
the present chapter recommends that policy measures to stimulate economic 
growth so that it exceeds the potential growth rate should not be taken. Instead, 
two scenarios are simulated and the results suggest that an increase in the labour 
force participation rate and improvements in TFP can significantly expand the 
potential growth rate in the future.
Estimation of the Potential Growth Rate 
in China
We use a standard Cobb-Douglass production function to project potential 
GDP growth rate. This method was applied both by Louis Kuijs and Wang (2006) 
and Kuijs (2009).
 (1)
Where Y is real GDP, A is TFP, L is employment, and K stands for capital 
stock (in constant price).2 We deduce the labour productivity by dividing L on 
both sides of the equation (1). 
 (2)
In equation (2), labour productivity (represented by ) is a function of 
the TFP and capital–labour ratio (represented by ). That is . 
With some manipulation, labour productivity growth rate can then be rewritten 
and estimated from model (3):
 (3)
Based on equation (3), we can get the estimated value of return to capital 
 and return to labour  by using  as the dependant variable 
and  as the independent variable. 
2   Capital stock is almost always constructed by the ‘perpetual inventory method’. The well-known 
equation is Kt =It/pt+(1-δt)Kt-1, where Kt is the measure of the real capital stock at time t, Kt-1 is the 
measure of the real capital stock at time t-1, It is the normal investment in time t, Pt is the price index 
of investment in fixed assets in time t, and δt (=5%) is the rate of depreciation. The K1978 is calculated by 
Guo and Jia (2004). Note that Kt is a weighted sum of all past levels of investment and depreciated value 
of the initial real capital stock. 
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From time series of , , , the growth rate of total 
factor productivity  could be calculated 
by using equation (3). And then, can be estimated by applying the 
Hodrick–Prescott filter method to diminish error term .
All steps above are identical with the method which calculates the 
growth  rate  of total factor productivity. It is necessary to use potential 
employment  to calculate the potential GDP growth rate. Where 
,  is the working age population 
aged 15 to 59 years,  is the trends of labour participation rate which can be 
estimated by the Hodrick–Prescott filter method, and  is natural rate of 
unemployment. In this chapter,  (Du and Lu 2011).
Building on , ,  and capital stock , the potential labour 
productivity growth rate  could be calculated as follows:
 (4)
Where , , and is just the potential GDP in year t. 
Building on and , the following equation can be deduced:
 (5)
 is the potential GDP growth rate in year t. where is the 
growth rate of potential labour productivity, a function of the growth rate of 
TFP and the potential capital–labour ratio, and  is potential employment 
growth.3 From equation (4) and (5), three factors would influence the potential 
GDP growth rate, that is, potential growth rate of capital–labour ratio, potential 
growth rate of employment and potential TFP growth rate. The working age 
population will affect the first two factors directly.
Before estimating the potential growth rate, it is also necessary to make some 
assumptions regarding the capital formation and TFP growth rates in the period 
to come. The predicted employment growth, the assumed growth rates of capital 
formation and TFP, and the estimated potential GDP growth rate are presented 
in Figure 4.2. In what follows, we explain the reasons for such assumptions and 
present detailed results from the estimation.
3   For detailed explanations on the estimation procedure, see Lu (2012). 
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Figure 4.2 Trends of potential growth rate and of its factors in China: 1996–2020
Notes: K, assumed growth rate of fixed assets investment (capital formation); L, potential growth rate 
of employment.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
Assumption I: Capital Formation Growth will Slow Down 
in the Next Ten Years
Examining the historical data, we find that the annual growth rate of fixed 
asset investment, deflated by the price index of fixed assets, was 13.43 per cent 
in 1978–1994 and 16.89 per cent in 1995–2009. In the latter period, the annual 
growth rate of fixed assets investment reached 20 per cent between 2003 and 2007. 
In tackling the global financial crisis, the growth rate of fixed assets investment 
rose to 33.15 per cent in 2009. Even if the outlier of 2009 is eliminated, the rate 
was still as high as 15.64 per cent in the period from 1995 to 2008. 
Such rapid growth of fixed assets was not sustained in the years to come 
for three reasons. First, as a result of widespread labour shortages, marginal 
return to capital is declining at an accelerating pace (Cai and Zhao 2012), which 
will impede such a high speed of investment growth. Second, as population 
dependence ratios increase, the savings rate tends to fall, which results in 
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a slowdown of investment growth. Last, but not least, relatively slower 
growth of capital formation will help China transform its growth pattern that 
overwhelmingly relies on domestic investment, and move to a more balanced 
and sustained pattern of growth.
In an equation based on least squares regression, we incorporate return to 
capital (wK) as an independent variable to regress the dependent variable of the 
growth rate of total investment in fixed assets in the whole country (excluding 
state budgetary investment). Data used in the regression cover the years from 
1982 to 2005. The estimated results are as follows:
I = −6.1395 + 0.9459*wK
 (19.7312) (0.8422)
 R2 = 0.0542 D.W. = 0.9765
The average return to capital of 20.22 per cent in 1996–2005 estimated by 
Bai et al. (2006) is put into the estimated equation, thus obtaining an annual 
growth rate of investment of 12.99 per cent. The annual growth rate of investment 
in fixed assets in China is preset as 13 per cent in the period from 2012 to 2020. 
It is worth noting that the assumption is not made as a result of the above 
simulation, but in light of economic theory and China’s economic reality. 
That is, a rational response to the substantial fall in marginal return on capital, 
with an absence of government intervention, should be slower growth of capital 
investment. In fact, such a predetermined annual growth rate of 13 per cent is 
still higher than the actual growth rate in the period from 1996 to 2005.
Assumption II: Labour Force will Decrease in the Future
The demographic and economic trends have led to a changed relationship 
between labour supply and demand. Take the annual increase in the number of 
people between the ages of 15 and 59 on the supply side, and annual increase 
in the number of urban workers on the demand side. When the two trends 
are examined together, the changing dynamics of the labour market become 
obvious. Since the number of agricultural workers has been falling, while that of 
non-agricultural workers in rural areas is not expected to expand, the increases 
in the number of urban workers, migrant workers included, can be treated as 
representative of the magnitude of the overall labour demand of the Chinese 
economy.
Below is a closer examination of the general employment situation in 
China, by comparing the demand and the supply of labour for urban sectors. 
There  are two parts to the statistical data on urban employment in China. 
The first includes the total number of urban employees, which is published by 
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the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This number does not, however, cover 
most migrant workers in urban areas. According to estimates made on the basis 
of micro data from 2009, only 12.5 per cent of the total of 310 million urban 
employees were migrant workers. The second part includes the total number 
of people classifiable as migrant workers according to NBS official definition. 
According to that definition, an individual qualifies as a ‘migrant worker’ if s/he 
has been away from the town or township of their household registration for six 
months or more. Surveys have shown that of all migrant workers, 95.6 per cent 
work and live in cities of varying sizes. Factoring in the overlap between these 
two numbers, we can calculate the actual number of urban workers, inclusive 
of both registered urban residents and migrant workers. We can then compare 
this number with the total number of people of working age in the country 
(Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Increases in demand for and supply of labour force (million, %)







2001 236 – 80 – 844 –
2002 241 2.1 100 24.7 859 1.8
2003 246 2.0 109 8.8 872 1.6
2004 250 1.8 113 3.8 886 1.5
2005 254 1.7 120 6.4 900 1.6
2006 259 2.0 126 5.0 907 0.8
2007 265 2.1 131 3.7 912 0.6
2008 268 1.3 134 2.5 917 0.5
2009 272 1.4 139 3.5 920 0.3
2010 277 1.6 146 5.3 939 2.1
2011 280 1.0 152 3.7 939 -0.1
Source: Authors’ calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (various years), China Yearbook of Rural 
Household Survey (various years), China Population Yearbook (various years), and Du and Hu (2011). 
Between 2001 and 2011, the labour demand of urban sectors, which 
encompasses employment among both urban residents and migrants, grew at 
an annual rate of 3.2 per cent. During the same period, labour supply, measured 
by the number of people of working age, grew by an annual rate of only 
1.1 per cent. For the purpose of this study, we have excluded people older than 
60 from working age population because, given China’s retirement age—60 for 
men and 55 for women—they, by default, stand little chance of finding a job in 
the present labour market. A look at people between the ages of 15 and 59 shows 
that this population had begun to shrink by 2010. This suggests, among other 
things, that the problem of high rates of underemployment in both the rural 
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and the urban labour markets was finally easing. As such, constant surplus of 
supply relative to demand no longer accurately describes China’s labour market 
after the passage of the Lewis turning period.
Having observed that the working age population aged between 15 and 
59 years is in decline, it can be assumed that the natural unemployment rate will 
remain the same as it was in 2009, namely, NAIRU = 4.132% (Du and Lu 2011), 
and that the labour force participation rate will follow the trend of the labour 
force participation rate, which was calculated using the Hodrick–Prescott filter 
method. As the population aged between 15 and 59 years peaked in 2010, its 
annual growth rate will be –0.33 per cent in 2011–2015 and –0.31 per cent 
in 2016–2020. This means that the annual growth rate of employment will be 
–0.76 per cent during the 12th five-year plan period and –0.74 per cent in the 
13th five-year plan period. If the natural unemployment rate and the labour 
force participation rate remain unchanged in the following two five-year plan 
periods, the reduction in the size of the working age population will lead to a 
fall in the potential GDP growth rate.
Assumption III: Total Factor Productivity Growth will be 
Reduced but Remain Relatively High
Kuijs (2009) attributes the impressive increase in TFP during the period from 
1994 to 2009 to restructuring of the state sector, China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization, and the successful integration of manufacturing into the 
world economy. Those forces, however, will diminish in the years to come. 
Hence, he expects a reduction of 0.5–2.3 percentage points in TFP per year in 
the period from 2010 to 2020. Using a Hodrick–Prescott filter decomposition, we 
assume the trend annual TFP growth rate to be 3.10 per cent in 2011–2015 and 
2.70 per cent in 2016–2020.
Based on the assumptions made above on the decline in the labour force and 
TFP growth and the slower growth of investment, we can estimate the potential 
growth rate of the Chinese economy for the period of 2011 to 2020. Our finding 
that the potential growth rate will decline and the trend will continue is not 
surprising, because many others have reached the same conclusion (e.g. Kuijs 
2009; World Bank 2012). The predicted potential growth rate is much lower here, 
however, than that estimated by others (e.g. see Kuijs, 2009). The potential GDP 
growth rate we estimate is 7.2 per cent for the 12th five-year plan period, and 
6.1 per cent for the 13th five-year plan period (Table 4.2). This conclusion is not 
an exaggeration, given that the inevitable slowdown of mass labour migration 
from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors, which has been the main source of 
TFP growth, is not taken into account. 
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Table 4.2 Estimated results for potential inputs and outputs in China, 1978–2020
Growth rate (%) 1978–1994 1995–2009 2011–2015 2016–2020
Actual output 10.06 9.90
Potential output 10.29 9.83 7.19 6.08
Actual employment 2.45 0.97
Potential employment 3.23 0.90 −0.76 −0.74
Actual labour productivity 6.55 8.84
Potential labour productivity 6.85 8.86 8.02 6.87
TFP 0.78 3.89 3.10 2.70
K/L 10.38 13.29 18.21 15.43
Notes: K, assumed growth rate of fixed assets investment (capital formation); L, potential growth rate of 
employment.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
It is not proposed here that policy-makers pursue achieving actual GDP 
growth exceeding the potential rate, but rather ways are recommended to 
achieve enhanced potential growth rate through increasing the labour force 
participation rate and the TFP growth rate, which require a deepening of 
economic reforms.
Increasing the Labour Force Participation Rate
Data from the 6th national census show that the labour force participation rate 
was 70.80 per cent for population aged 16 years and above, and 77.26 per cent for 
population aged between 16 and 64 years in 2010. A further look at geographic 
distribution shows that the labour force participation rate for population aged 
16 years and above was 62.20 per cent in cities, 67.32 per cent in towns and 
77.62 per cent in rural areas. For population aged between 16 and 64 years, the 
labour force participation rate was 68.18 per cent in cities, 73.27 per cent in 
towns and 84.92 per cent in rural areas. The labour force participation rate at 
present is lower than in the 1990s, and it is likely to be even lower the following 
two factors are considered.
First, the exclusion of the agricultural labour force from the calculation would 
result in a lower labour force participation rate. Because there is no retirement age 
in agriculture, when the number of workers engaged in agriculture is counted, 
as is the common practice in statistics, the labour force participation rate tends 
to be overestimated. At the present stage of economic development in China, 
economic growth is accompanied by a constant decline in the agricultural share 
in terms of both output value and employment. Thus, the participation rate of 
the non-agricultural labour force is a better indicator of the real situation of the 
labour market.
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Based on data of the 6th census, here, the labour force participation rate is 
recalculated by excluding agricultural sectors, and it is found to be much lower 
than that calculated by including agriculture (Table 4.3). For example, for the 
20–25-year age group, the participation rate of the non-agricultural labour force 
is 72.55 per cent, which is 9.79 percentage points lower than the participation 
rate of the total labour force. This implies that, as the agricultural share of the 
labour force further declines in the future, the labour force participation rate 
will drop much faster than what previous statistics would suggest.
Table 4.3 Labour force participation rates in China by age group and gender (%)
Age groups
Total LFPR (including agriculture) LFPR of non-agriculture
Total Male Female Total Male Female
16–20 32.44 33.06 30.72 21.78 22.53 21.31
20–25 72.55 76.66 69.70 62.76 68.91 58.95
25–30 88.88 95.73 82.10 84.33 94.01 74.61
30–35 90.30 97.01 83.47 85.98 95.73 75.79
35–40 90.62 96.92 84.18 85.53 95.36 75.02
40–45 90.73 96.63 84.74 84.43 94.50 73.41
45–50 87.73 95.06 79.58 78.49 91.64 62.87
50–55 76.31 89.90 62.62 56.99 81.62 32.19
55–60 67.29 80.41 53.71 37.57 60.88 15.04
60–65 49.59 58.14 40.11 13.80 22.41 5.89
Source: Authors’ calculation based on 1‰ sampling data of 6th census.
Second, the extension of years of schooling would lower the labour force 
participation rate. As is shown in Figure 4.2, the labour force participation rate 
distribution by age can be characterised by a reverse U-shaped curve. That is, 
for lower age groups, more people are still in school, which makes labour force 
participation low; labour force participation substantially increases when people 
enter their 30s and 40s; and labour force participation declines as workers get 
older, because they have either a stronger desire to retire or less sought-after 
skills to meet the demands of the labour market. For all age groups, the labour 
force participation rate for men is higher than that of women, and the non-
agricultural labour force participation rate is lower than the total labour force 
participation rate.
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Figure 4.3 Labour force participation rate in China, 2010
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 6th census.
It is worth noting that although the present labour force participation rate in 
China is still high, it will change dramatically as population aging accelerates. 
As the size of the working age population is no longer increasing, labour force 
participation determines the labour supply and, therefore, constrains the 
potential growth rate. 
After 2011, the potential employment growth rate will become negative: 
–0.76 per cent in the 12th five-year plan period and –0.74 per cent in the 
13th five-year plan period. Because the root cause of this negative growth of 
employment, namely, the reduction of the total population aged 15 to 59 years 
in 2010 and the population aged 15 to 64 years in 2013, cannot be altered, the 
enhancement of labour force participation is the only way to increase potential 
labour supply and, in turn, to expand the potential output. 
To test such a hypothesis, Figure 4.4 simulates the impact of an increase in the 
labour force participation rate on the potential GDP growth rate. Based on the 
above-described growth accounting equation, a scenario is assumed in which 
the labour force participation rate increases one percentage point every year in 
the period from 2011 to 2020. This results in an average potential growth rate 
increase from 7.19 to 8.09 per cent during 2011–2015 and an average potential 
The End of China’s Demographic Dividend
67
growth rate increase from 6.08 to 6.94 per cent during 2016–2020. As a result, 
the potential GDP growth rate will increase by an extra 0.88 percentage points 
per annum in the period from 2011 to 2022 (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Effect of one percentage point increase in labour force participation 
rate on potential GDP growth rate
Source: Authors’ simulation.
There are three potential ways for China to increase labour force participation. 
The first is to postpone the retirement age so that the labour force participation 
rate of workers at older ages can be increased. Although this measure is widely 
used in developed countries, it is not equally relevant for China, because older 
Chinese workers are often not sufficiently educated to meet the labour market 
demand for skills, and are likely to be in a vulnerable position if they postpone 
retiring. Therefore, this policy option should not be chosen in the short run.
The second method is to further promote labour migration from rural to 
urban areas. Compared to countries with similar per capita income, China has a 
relatively larger share of labour in agriculture. The possibility exists for labour 
migration to occur so that labour force participation can be increased in non-
agricultural sectors. The existing household registration or hukou system that 
segregates the labour market between rural and urban areas still prevents rural-
to-urban migrant workers from settling down in urban areas legitimately and 
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permanently. Therefore, the hukou reform, which is aimed at legalising migrant 
workers’ citizenship in cities, will significantly stabilise supply of labour, tap 
into the potential labour force, and, therefore, increase potential output. 
The third approach is to raise the employment rate or to lower the 
unemployment rate. As China is moving away from possessing an unlimited 
supply of labour, and towards a neoclassical labour market framework, today’s 
employment problems show both neoclassical and dual economy characteristics. 
That is, while there is still surplus labour in agriculture, the more frequent 
emergence of cyclical unemployment, structural unemployment and frictional 
unemployment raises new challenges in regards to China’s macroeconomic and 
employment policies. The manner in which such challenges are responded to 
can reshape potential GDP growth in the future.
Improving Total Factor Productivity
In the face of a declining potential growth rate, the central and local 
governments would tend to adopt industrial policies, regional strategies and 
stimulus plans to pursue a growth rate exceeding the potential rate. The 
temptation is great because those policy measures are simple for governments 
to implement and they generate immediate effects. The lessons from China’s 
economic growth per se, however, and from its forerunners in economic 
development (e.g. Japan) show that those policies are likely to become 
distortionary, and eventually impact on the sustainability of economic growth.
In contrast, deepening economic reform in various areas to expand the 
potential growth rate would require considerable long-term effort. As the 
returns to capital diminish, the old pattern of China’s economic growth cannot 
continue, and the challenge to seek new sources of economic growth intensifies. 
According to the neoclassical theory of growth, such new sources must come 
from improvements in TFP. 
The residual output that cannot be explained by inputs of production factors 
comes from TFP growth, which includes technological advancement, resource 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, and institutional and managerial 
innovation. In a neoclassical model of economic growth, TFP growth is the 
dominant, if not the only, driver of potential growth of output. 
Based on the existing model, the scenario in which TFP grows at a rate that 
is one percentage point higher per year in the period from 2011 to 2020 can be 
assumed. That is, the annual TFP growth rate would increase to 4.01 per cent 
from the current 3.01 per cent. Our simulation shows that such a higher TFP 
growth rate would lift the annual growth rate of potential output to 8.19 per 
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cent in 2011–2015 and 7.07 per cent in 2016–2020 (Figure 4.5). Overall, if 
China could manage to accomplish an extra percentage point of TFP growth, its 
potential annual growth rate would increase by 0.99 percentage points in the 
period from 2011 to 2020. 
Figure 4.5 Effects of one extra percentage point of TFP growth on potential GDP 
growth rate
Source: Authors’ simulation.
Over the past 30 years of rapid economic growth in China, the impressive 
performance in TFP has been largely attributed to resource allocative efficiency 
through labour mobility from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors. In the 
course of the dual economy development, with an unlimited supply of labour, 
such productivity gains have been like low-hanging fruit. As the surplus labour 
force has become gradually absorbed by the unprecedented expansion of 
secondary and tertiary sectors, the mass labour migration has slowed down, and 
the opportunity to gain resource allocative efficiency has decreased. 
Furthermore, the arrival of the Chinese economy at a higher phase of 
development means that the gap in technology between China and developed 
countries has narrowed, which makes it relatively harder for China to increase 
TFP through technological advancement. 
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Therefore, China should search for new ways to improve TFP to expand its 
potential growth. In fact, as China’s economic growth follows more of a neoclassical 
framework, it will be difficult for China to add even one additional percentage 
point to its TFP growth rate. It is essential for the government to be determined 
to complete the task and is aware of where the extra productivity should come 
from. For China, apart from the traditional sources of TFP improvement, such as 
achieving technological parity with developed countries and labour migration 
from rural to urban sectors, there is tremendous opportunity to gain allocative 
efficiency in the following areas. 
First, given the large disparities in productivity among subsectors within, 
say, the secondary sector, the mobility of factors of production from the low 
productivity subsector to the high productivity subsector can improve the 
overall productivity of the economy as a whole. Second, the flow of factors 
of production among enterprises can also provide allocative efficiency because 
there are huge disparities in productivity performance among enterprises 
within narrowly defined sectors. A so-called creative destruction mechanism 
could be created, which allows for more efficient enterprises to survive, expand 
and develop, and causes long-term inefficient enterprises to be eliminated. This 
mechanism could generate the third resources allocative efficiency.
As is well documented in the economics literature, in a mature market 
economy like the United States, allocative efficiency relating to entry versus 
exit and expansion versus contraction of firms within narrowly defined sectors 
contributes one-third to a half of the productivity growth (e.g. Foster et al. 
2008). Based on an empirical and comparative study, Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter 
Klenow (2007) find that by reallocating capital and labour to equalise marginal 
products among plants to the extent observed in the United States, China’s 
manufacturing sector could gain a 30 to 50 per cent increase in its TFP.
To gain resource allocative efficiencies in the areas described above requires 
a policy environment within which factors of production can freely flow 
among regions, sectors and enterprises. There still exist institutional barriers 
preventing investors from freely entering certain sectors where state-owned 
enterprises dominate, resulting in a great loss of allocative efficiency. The Chinese 
Government should redefine the role and function of the state enterprises to 
keep them within necessary and limited arenas of economic activities, while 
creating equal competition opportunities for all sectors and enterprises.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
As a result of the changes in the population age structure, the working age 
population (aged 15 to 59 years) stopped growing in 2010. Meanwhile, economic 
growth continues to generate a large demand for labour, thus absorbing the 
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surplus labour force in agriculture. As the surplus labour force in agriculture is 
substantially decreasing, the Chinese economy is entering a phase of transition 
shifting from a kind of dual economic development to the pattern of neoclassical 
growth. 
According to the neoclassical theory of growth, it is unlikely that developed 
economies can realise growth rates comparable to their developing counterparts, 
which are still in the process of catching up. Accordingly, fast growth will 
eventually slow down as an economy moves to a certain turning point, as 
experiences worldwide suggest (Eichengreen et al. 2011). 
There is no need to fear the slowdown of the potential growth rate. The new 
stage of development, however, requires China to accomplish a fundamental 
transformation of its economic growth pattern, from sole reliance on inputs 
of capital and labour to greater improvements in TFP. Therefore, the key to 
sustaining economic growth through expanding the potential growth rate lies 
in supply-side factors. If the government policies wrongly focus on stimulating 
demand-side factors to reach a growth rate exceeding the potential capacity of 
production, long-term economic growth will not be healthy and will cause a 
great deal of distortions. Instead, sound policies should be implemented bearing 
the following in mind.
First, the central and local governments should accept slower economic 
growth. Policy decisions should be made by adjusting supply-side factors rather 
than demand-side factors. Even an undesirable fall in the growth rate, caused 
by shocks from demand-side factors, should not be a reason for policy-makers 
to introduce expansionary macroeconomic policy measures. Instead, policy-
makers need to determine whether growth rates have been reduced to below-
potential levels. If this is not the case, a situation where export demand and 
investment demand are weak could be taken as a chance for the economy to 
accelerate its transition towards a consumption-driven pattern of growth, and 
to sustain growth in a more balanced manner. 
Second, economic reforms should modify the traditional growth pattern. 
Reforms have been a major driving force of the unprecedented economic growth 
over the past 30 years. A competitive environment is vital for enhancing the 
potential growth rate in China over the next decade or so. 
Third, there is an important role for the government to play in helping 
improve China’s TFP. Paul Krugman (1994) was critical of Singapore’s growth 
model, to which the Singaporean Government responded by introducing 
a national goal of two per cent annual TFP growth (Felipe, 1997). It is worth 
noting that improving TFP will critically depend on how China adopts further 
measures to deepen its reforms in many areas, including its labour market, the 
financial sector, the enterprise system as well as the government system.
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Path Dependence and the Transition 
to a New Model
Huw McKay and Ligang Song
Introduction
China’s economic structure can be characterised as both over-industrialised 
and under-urbanised relative to its level of income per head. Further, for 
such a large economy, it is highly export oriented. The design of any new 
growth model will need to respect these major structural legacies. The ‘over-
industrialised’ assessment reflects a high proportion of secondary activity in 
gross value added relative to its peers; and the under-urbanised assessment 
reflects the fact that the policy framework has prevented internal rural–urban 
migration from progressing at the rate at which push and pull motivations alone 
would have predicted. Furthermore, the absorptive capabilities of the urban 
population are diminished by the underprivileged position of the migrant 
worker cohort. China  thus has both a considerable overhang of industrial 
capacity and considerable latent demand for further urbanisation, alongside 
huge potential for generating greater benefits from the degree of urbanisation 
already achieved. 
The fundamental inheritance of the current leadership is certainly mixed. Some 
aspects of this inheritance are an impediment to sustaining growth in aggregate 
living standards in an environmentally conscious way, while simultaneously 
promoting equality of income and opportunity. Others are advantageous for the 
pursuit of these basic national goals. Transitioning the economy in a direction 
that  reduces ‘over-industrialisation’, optimises urbanisation and increases 
domestic absorption at the expense of foreign sales will emphasise the positive 
aspects of the inheritance and de-emphasise the negative. We argue that 
the overall policy response to these major questions—both the threats and 
opportunities—can be inherently complementary. Furthermore, we argue that 
the policy decisions and guidelines issued over the last year or so indicate that 
the administration understands the need for a new model and has a good idea 
of what should be done to achieve it. Yet the leadership is not over-confident. 
Indeed, the State Council memorandum on income distribution reform, which 
cuts across all relevant aspects of macroeconomic decision-making, released 
on 5 February  2013, stated that ‘deepening the income distribution reform 
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is a  systematic project that is arduous and complicated and concerns the 
reallocation of various interests. There is no way to accomplish it overnight’ 
(Quoted in Xinhua News 2013a).
The first section of this chapter presents evidence that supports our 
characterisation of China’s current and historical economic structure as both 
over-industrialised and under-urbanised relative to its level of income per head. 
This discussion sketches China’s path to the present and its structural starting 
point as it attempts to transition towards a new model. The second section 
outlines desirable changes in policy structure to accommodate a new model, 
alongside a discussion of initiatives that have already been put in place to that 
end by the administration. Following this section we indulge in a political 
economic aside: noting that the many facets of path dependence present 
a material prima facie political–economic constraint on the Chinese leadership’s 
absolute freedom of choice and action. Even so, we conclude, optimistically, that 
these constraints should not be considered an insurmountable hurdle. Given the 
ultimate complementarity of the superordinate goals of China’s next transition—
reducing ‘over-industrialisation’ and optimising urbanisation—there is very 
good reason for the leadership to embark upon the process of deepening reforms 
with a high degree of resolve.
China’s Historical Industrialisation Path 
in Comparative Perspective
In 1995 China achieved the US$2,000 per capita level for purchasing power 
parity GDP. In 2011 it reached the US$8,000 per capita threshold, quadrupling 
the size of its economy per head in just 16 years.1 Leaving aside for a moment the 
speed at which this increase in living standards has been achieved, which was 
indeed remarkable, the attainment of a four-fold increase in living standards 
from a base of $2,000 per head is a notable feat for any late-industrialising 
economy in the post-Second World War period, and rarer than one might 
expect. Some of the notable nations in the Asian region that do not yet meet 
this criterion (although they may do so in the foreseeable future), despite some 
periods of impressive economic growth, are Indonesia, India, the Philippines 
and Vietnam. Given the relative exclusivity of the ‘club’ to which China earned 
1   All information on post-Second World War GDP and GDP per capita levels reported in this chapter are 
based on the Conference Board’s Total Economy Database™ as issued in January 2012, which is available 
from http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ Data for before 1950 and the world 
economy as a whole comes from Maddison, Angus, 2009, Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 




membership in 2011, it provides a neat guide for a comparative analysis of 
industrialisation and development patterns around the Asian region and around 
the world. Accordingly, we have selected a sample of economies that share this 
distinction with China to conduct a peer review of the broadest contours of its 
development drive.
Before we enter into that discussion, let us turn for a moment to the relative 
speed at which China executed a quadrupling of living standards. Consider 
Figure 5.1. The columns represent the number of years each economy took to 
achieve the feat. The line represents the compound annual growth rate during 
the relevant period. China is the latest country in the sample to reach the baseline 
income level, and it achieved the fastest growth rate; and, accordingly, required 
the least amount of time to increase living standards four fold. Japan  comes 
next, followed by the group of four precocious late industrialisers now known 
as the ‘Newly Industrialised Economies’, with Thailand and Malaysia also 
featuring. Two economies from outside the East Asian region—one from the Old 
World (Turkey) and one from the New (Mexico)—bookend an estimate of the 
experience of the world economy in total, before the figure moves into the first 
and second generation of European industrialisers and their colonial offshoots. 
Figure 5.1 Quadrupling living standards from a base of $2,000 PPP GDP per capita
Source: See footnote 1.
Table 5.1 indicates the year in which the countries in Figure 5.1 first reached 
the baseline level of $2,000 GDP per capita, going back to the Netherlands in 
1827. It also shows when the quadrupling of living standards was completed. 
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Table 5.1 Quadrupling living standards from a base of $2,000 PPP GDP per capita












Netherlands 1827 1960 133 1.0
United Kingdom 1839 1957 118 1.2
Australia 1848 1955 107 1.3
United States 1860 1941 81 1.7
France 1869 1962 93 1.5
Germany 1874 1962 88 1.6
Mexico 1950 2008 58 2.4
Hong Kong 1950 1977 27 5.3
Singapore 1950 1979 29 4.9
Japan 1951 1968 17 8.5
Turkey 1955 2007 52 2.7
Taiwan 1965 1985 20 7.2
South Korea 1969 1989 20 7.2
Malaysia 1969 2002 33 4.3
Thailand 1976 2005 29 4.9
China 1995 2011 16 9.1
memo item   
World 1950 2004 54 2.6
Source: See footnote 1.
The first generation of industrialisers took well over a century to quadruple 
GDP, expanding at a compound rate around one to 1¼ per cent per annum, 
while the second generation (here represented by France, Germany and the 
United States) achieved growth rates around 1½ to 1¾ per cent per annum; 
this enabled them to complete the task in an average of 87 years. 
The availability of national accounts data grew significantly after the 
Second World War. So too did modern economic growth, underpinned by the 
dissemination of the industrialisation meme.2 Five of the 16 economies listed in 
Table 5.1 were on the $2,000 GDP per head ‘starter’s blocks’ in the early 1950s: 
Japan, Turkey, Mexico and the entrepot-city states of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
The world economy as a whole was also in that category. Maddison estimates 
that global GDP per capita had reached $2,113 in 1950.
2   Bénétrix et al. (2012: 6–7) make a practical observation on the availability of historical time series of 
industrial output. They argue that the availability of data is itself an indicator of industrialisation, 
as a poor country without an industrial sector of note would not go to the trouble of computing such 
statistics. That is certainly a ‘reasonable surmise’, as they put it. 
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Moving forward to the 1960s, Taiwan (1965) and then South Korea and 
Malaysia (1969) reached the jumping off point, just as Japan was completing 
its drive to $8,000 (1968). Thailand reached the jumping off point in 1976. 
This group (excluding the special cases of Hong Kong and Singapore) of successful 
post-Second World War industrialisers are the peer group we have selected for 
China. As Japan was the first nation among the group to quadruple per capita 
income, it serves as the anchor for the comparative analysis. Thus in Figures 5.2a 
and 5.2b, Japan is set at 100 for every indicator, and the other countries are 
reported as a percentage of the Japanese level. For example, when Japanese GDP 
per head was at $2,000 in 1951, its urban population share was 53 per cent. 
When China’s GDP per head was at $2,000 in 1995, its urban population share 
was 31 per cent. China’s urban share is accordingly represented as 58 per cent 
of the Japanese level in Figure 5.2a.
In addition to the two major areas of interest to this chapter—industrial 
production as a share of total output and the urban population as a share of the 
total—we have selected proxies of human capital (average years of schooling for 
adults) and infrastructure (rail network length scaled by land area), in addition 
to life expectancy and the investment share of GDP. Export orientation is also 
considered, but relative scale factors make it difficult to represent in the same 
graphical framework as the variables considered above. As a consequence trade 
orientation is illustrated separately in Figure 5.3.
The most striking finding from Figure 5.2a is China’s very high industrial 
production and investment shares at the starting point of the analysis. Its 
investment share far exceeded all other economies in the sample and its 
industrial production share likewise. High industrial production and investment 
shares are closely associated with China’s high energy and resource as well as 
emissions intensities. It was close to its peers in terms of schooling and life 
expectancy, but it was weak in terms of infrastructure, and well behind its 
north Asian neighbours in terms of urbanisation. China’s export orientation was 
much higher than that of Japan, Mexico or Turkey at the $2,000 per head level, 
somewhat higher than that of South Korea, similar to Thailand, but much lower 
than Malaysia.
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Figure 5.2a Selected characteristics of successful future industrialisers 
at the $2,000 PPP GDP per capita level
Figure 5.2b Selected characteristics of successful future industrialisers 
at the $8,000 PPP GDP per capita level
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Notes to Figures: 
‘Schooling’ refers to average years of schooling per adult. 
Source: United Nations Development Program, available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103006.html 
‘IVA share’ and ‘GCF share’ refers to the percentage of GDP accounted for by industrial production 
and gross investment respectively. 
Source: World Bank Databank, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/
selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
‘Life expectancy’ is at birth.
Source: ibid.
‘Infrastructure’ is open rail network length scaled by 2010 land area. Land area comes from the CIA 
World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
Rail network length is from Mitchell (1982, 1975, 1993), Union of International Railways (1991, 2000), 
the CEIC database and the CIA World Factbook, with interpolations by the authors.
‘Urban share’ is the percentage of the population classed as urban by the United Nations in their 2011 
revision. 
Source: http://esa.un.org/unup/
Figure 5.3 Export orientation at $2,000 and $8,000 PPP GDP per capita
Note: Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP.
Source: World Bank Databank, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/
selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
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Moving forward to the $8,000 per head snapshot, and the initial impression 
is that there is a much greater degree of similarity between the economies in 
the sample at this stage of development than at the jumping off point. The main 
exception is in infrastructure, where Japan remained far ahead of the rest of the 
group. As for China itself, its raw relative rankings on most indicators remained 
similar to those seen at the $2,000 per head level, but it looked less extreme in 
terms of investment share and industrial production as a share of total output, 
and the degree to which it was lagging in terms of urbanisation declined. 
The decline in its lead was a result of rising shares in the other countries, while 
China maintained a high level. The improvement in China’s relative standing in 
terms of urbanisation was a function of rapid increases in China and less rapid 
gains elsewhere. As for export orientation, China retained substantially greater 
exposure to foreign demand than the larger economies in the sample (noting that 
Mexico’s participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
saw it narrow it the gap to a degree); South Korea caught China up; while the two 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies moved far ahead.
This investigation clearly shows that the characterisation of China’s economy 
as simultaneously over-industrialised, under-urbanised and more export 
oriented than is usual for large economies—all relative to development level—
is valid today, just as it was in the 1990s. That is, despite rapid urbanisation in 
China during the last two decades and despite rapid increases in the industrial 
production and investment shares of output, and export orientation of sales, in 
other successful industrialisers in the post-Second World War period. As of 2011, 
at a GDP per capital level of around $8,000, China is less atypical than it was in 
1995 as a $2,000 per head economy, but it retains a highly distinctive structure. 
Policy Parameters of the Current and Historical 
Systems
The previous section offered a simple description of the changes in the 
Chinese economy between the GDP per capita levels of $2,000 and $8,000 
within a comparative setting. This section established the ‘what’: the outcomes 
generated by the historical models of development adopted by successive eras of 
Chinese policymakers up to the recently installed fifth generation of leadership. 
We must now consider the ‘how’ and the ‘why’: the historical policy framework 
itself and the outcomes it attempted to facilitate.
To stylise heavily, China’s over-industrialised present state is a result of a 
complex array of price and incentive distortions that have worked to prioritise 
industrial development, both heavy and light, both domestically consumed 
and export oriented, over other potential uses of resources. These distortions 
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pervade both the real and financial spheres of the economy and create an 
unbalanced underlying structure. Key factor input costs—labour, land, energy 
and capital, plus the pricing of external diseconomies—have historically been 
suppressed (Huang and Tao 2010), which raises the return on investment, 
encourages capital accumulation over consumption and boosts international 
competitiveness. The result is an unusually high share of industrial value added 
in total output; an unusually high share of capital formation in total expenditure; 
unusually high gross savings across the three key institutional sectors (Ma and 
Wang 2007); and, unusually high export orientation for a large economy. 
China’s under-urbanised present state is the direct result of an overall 
policy framework that has prevented internal rural–urban migration from 
progressing at the rate at which push and pull motivations alone would have 
predicted (Song and Sheng 2005). The discrimination still exists as practised 
against migrant workers under the hukou system (Watson 2009, Song, et al. 
2010), uncertainty over land tenure, and a range of socio-economic factors, 
such as a social security system that is inaccessible to migrant workers, serve 
as effective barriers to unfettered rural to urban migration and systematic 
participation in off-farm work (Démurger 2012). Even so, the stock of migrant 
workers is large, numbering 253 million people in 2011 according to Andrew 
Watson (2012: Table12.1: 282), although the precise number remains contested. 
Migrant workers and their families are not yet full participants in the lifestyle 
enjoyed by non-migrant urban residents. The policy objective of optimising 
urbanisation is at its core a desire to converge the living standards of this large 
but underprivileged group with those of the rest of urban society, which are 
hardly standing still. 
In the introduction to the previous volume in this series (McKay and 
Song 2012: 2) we wrote the following: 
the pursuit of ‘balanced’ economic growth is best thought of as a broad 
policy objective that aims to limit risks to growth and to mitigate the 
negative impact on welfare. It should therefore not be expressed as a 
particular target, such as a reduction in the current account surplus or a 
rise in the labour share of income. The role of policy should be to design 
and implement a framework that reduces distortions, encourages and 
rewards innovation, equalises access to education, employment, a social 
safety net and capital for investment, while minimising rent-seeking 
opportunities. The desire to achieve such an environment will create 
demand for institutional reforms that can facilitate these processes of 
structural change in the least disruptive fashion.’ The proposals we 
advance below are put forward in that spirit. 
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
84
The recent remarks of the new premier, Li Keqiang, reported by official news 
agency Xinhua (2013b) are clearly in sympathy with this construct. Speaking at a 
macroeconomic seminar on 12 April 2013, which brought together policymakers, 
scholars and industry representatives, Li stressed that the deepening of reform 
was vital to the sustainability of growth and that any counter cyclical efforts 
would be considered in the context of their longer term structural implications 
and their impact on the reform path. The exact reporting was as follows:
‘While effectively coping with short-term problems and maintaining 
reasonable growth, more efforts should be made to improve the quality 
and benefits of development, with a focus on promoting economic 
restructuring and upgrading, expanding employment and increasing 
people’s incomes’, he said. 
He said the impetus for sustained development lies in deepening reform, 
urging targeted policies to cure not only ‘symptoms’ but deeply-rooted 
problems in the Chinese economy. 
‘If interim measures have to be carried out, they should not set up barriers 
for promoting market-oriented reform and development in the future’, he 
said. (Italics by the authors)
To take those principles and make them more practically actionable, 
a little taxonomy is desirable. Measures and recommendations can be usefully 
divided into those that a) directly tackle specific distortions that create 
rents and skew resource allocation (for instance energy pricing), b) those 
associated with addressing asymmetric opportunities that lead to and inflame 
imbalances (for instance the pension system), and c) those that seek to minimise 
macroeconomic risks, or enhance macroeconomic benefits, in a more general 
way (for instance financial system reform).
Huang and Tao (2010) put forward the proposition that China’s unbalanced 
economic structure (and the consequent rapid widening of the current account 
surplus in the 2000s) can be ascribed to what they term ‘asymmetric market 
liberalisation’. They argue that while the goods market is predominately 
liberalised in China, factor market liberalisation has lagged behind. They 
produce estimates of producer subsidy equivalents emanating from a range of 
factor market distortions at an annual frequency between 2000 and 2009. A 
summary of their results is reported in Table 5.2. This is a good place to move 
from the general to the specific.
The estimates of Huang and Tao show that material distortions exist in the 
‘markets’ for labour, land, capital, energy and the environment. Each of these 
distortions serves to lower input costs to business, allowing the estimation of an 
(admittedly crude) ‘producer subsidy equivalent’ in each area. These advantages 
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lead to greater international competitiveness and profitability in many sectors. 
These excess profits come at the expense of the providers of the good or service 
whose output price is suppressed, in essence an inter-sectoral transfer. It is 
principally migrant workers who are disadvantaged by suppressed labour costs; 
it is the indigenous private sectors who are disadvantaged by barring them from 
access to finance from the formal banking sector; it is upstream energy suppliers 
who are disadvantaged by suppressed costs to final users; it is the community 
of domestic savers who are disadvantaged by the suppressed cost of capital 
and financial repression more generally; it is the Chinese and global commons, 
today and into the future, that suffer from the lack of effective pricing of 
negative externalities such as the environmental degradation; and, it is foreign 
competitors of Chinese firms who are disadvantaged by the competitive edge 
bestowed by a suppressed cost base in China. Further, intra-sectoral distortions, 
such as preferential treatment for state-run or certain foreign invested firms, 
also serve to skew economic structures, as not all Chinese businesses are equal in 
terms of their access to cheap factors (especially land and capital), and barriers 
to entry in many key sectors create further rents for powerful incumbents. 
Table 5.2 Producer subsidy equivalents of factor market distortions in China,  
2000–2009 (% of GDP)
Land Labour Capital Energy Environ Total
2000 0.5 0.1 4.1 0.0 3.8 8.5
2005 1.3 2.4 3.0 1.7 3.0 11.4
2007 1.2 3.2 3.6 1.6 2.4 12.0
2009 0.9 2.7 3.5 0.7 1.8 9.6
Source: Huang and Tao (2010: Table 5.1).
Approaching the most transparent distortions first, a move towards 
market-based energy pricing for end users of electricity and petroleum 
products should be an immediate priority. Moving towards a system that 
prices negative externalities, thus endogenising a portion of the cost of 
environmental degradation into the bottom line of business, is a further obvious 
area for reform. Huang and Tao argue that the combined ‘prize’ of reform in 
these areas—the reversal of 2009 levels of producer subsidy equivalents—is 
around 2.5 per cent of GDP annually. There have already been a number of 
announcements in both areas, and China is by no means new to the taxing of 
pollutants (OECD 2013: 136), implying both awareness of the problems and a 
willingness to act on behalf of policymakers. Experimental programs that would 
price emissions have been initiated in selected administrative regions, while 
energy efficiency targets have been enshrined in the five-year planning process 
(OECD 2013: Box 2.1: 125), both nationally and at the large-firm and industry 
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level. Vehicle emission standards are monitored and enormous investments in 
renewable energy have been undertaken (Australian Government Department 
of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2013). 
In late March of 2013, some key announcements on energy pricing were made 
(Taplin and Yao 2013). The liberalisation of coal pricing arrangements inside 
China, and the administrative willingness to pass on changes in the market 
prices of energy inputs to end users more frequently and more completely than is 
currently the case, is an important step towards the use of price signals to guide 
more efficient energy use. Developments across these areas will help to address 
the ‘over-industrialised’ aspect of China’s present economic structure, but there 
is a great deal still to do. Even so, the taxation share of Chinese retail diesel and 
gasoline prices is low by international standards (OECD 2013: Figure 2.9.: 131) 
and household and industrial electricity costs are also low (ibid.: 133). 
Addressing the distortions associated with capital—where the direct 
‘prize’ is close to 3½ per cent of GDP annually and the total prize in terms 
of macroeconomic stability is arguably considerably larger in the long run—
requires a broader approach. Indeed, when Li urged ‘targeted policies to cure 
not only “symptoms” but deeply-rooted problems’, it is an acknowledgement that 
a redesign of the major parameters that describe the current capital allocation 
system ought to be on the agenda. Disentangling the complex web of the many 
tiers of the banking system, shadow finance, exchange arrangements and 
the exchange rate – monetary policy regime is no simple matter. It is not just 
that capital is too cheap for certain large firms. Household savers are poorly 
remunerated as a consequence of historically regulated deposit rates. A lack 
of financial market development and exchange arrangements that disallow 
personal outward portfolio flows provides a limited menu of alternative 
investment options. Small, private firms often pay too much for their capital. 
Chinese exporters are advantaged by the competitive exchange rate, thereby 
raising export orientation, while importers are disadvantaged by it, which 
lowers domestic absorption. 
As in the areas of energy and externality price reform, there has already been 
much activity in the field of financial liberalisation. Greater flexibility in setting 
deposit and lending rates has been introduced, although they are not yet fully 
free. The domestic bond market has been encouraged as an alternative source 
of both private and public financing. Loan securitisation has been encouraged. 
Exchange rate flexibility has been increased progressively after the peg to the 
US dollar was abandoned in 2005; reserve accumulation has levelled out; the 
supply of RMB now available outside the Mainland has increased rapidly as 
part of the trade settlement program, the centrepiece of the internationalisation 
initiative; the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program, the 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program and a new Renminbi 
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QFII program have been revamped or instituted; and, outward flows of direct 
investment have continued to enjoy policy sponsorship. Furthermore, since 
the middle of 2012, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has increasingly relied 
upon its open market operations to manage domestic liquidity and credit 
conditions, rather than the traditional administrative tools of required reserve 
ratios, window guidance and lending quotas. And, in a further move towards 
sophistication, rather than issuing or purchasing bills, reverse repurchase 
agreements dominated open market operations in 2012, when liquidity was 
being increased, while repurchase agreements have been used in 2013 so far to 
keep liquidity from expanding too quickly. 
All of this activity points in the right direction. Yet, moving more swiftly on 
interest rate liberalisation, particularly with regard to deposit rates, would be 
a welcome move. An unintended consequence of the slow movement towards 
deregulation of interest rates has been the rapid growth of off balance sheet 
activity by the banks and a rise in the market share of non-banks in total credit 
supply. While such developments are desirable as part of an effort to deepen 
domestic financial markets, extraordinary growth in lightly regulated areas of 
the financial system unavoidably comes with heightened systemic risks.
Moving on to the monetary policy – foreign exchange nexus, in concert with 
the moves to increase the power of market forces in setting the domestic cost of 
capital, exchange rate flexibility has increased in material fashion since 2005, 
to the extent that the currency is an accepted element of the counter cyclical 
toolkit. While the daily volatility of the currency within the present band 
of plus–minus one per cent remains low, there have been official statements 
that a further widening of the band is just a matter of time. To quote People’s 
Bank of China deputy governor Yi Gang directly, who spoke at an International 
Monetary Fund meeting in Washington DC on April 18, 2013: 
Last year we increased the band for the exchange rate from 0.5 per cent 
to one per cent. I think in the near future we’ll increase the floating 
band even further. …
In China, we all do this kind of reform in a gradual manner. The direction 
is clear  (quoted in People’s Daily online 2013). 
The desire to maintain a gradual approach to exchange rate flexibility 
emanates from China’s structural legacies, the most obvious of which in this 
context is its high degree of export orientation, and the psychological difficulty 
of changing a winning formula. The success of China’s gradual approach to 
financial reform through its transition era has been rightly celebrated. Yet when 
a new model is required, rather than a marginal evolution of business as usual, 
a bolder strategy is perhaps more appropriate. 
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It is possible to infer a relationship between macroeconomic stability, 
GDP per capita and financial reform in developing economies. Our abstract 
conception of this relationship is depicted in Figure 5.4. We have refrained from 
using actual values on the GDP per capita axis, as the precise point at which 
these hypothesised curves cross is unknowable, and may vary considerably 
based on the strategy individual economies take towards its financial system 
in the context of its industrialisation. That said, recalling the initial discussion 
and peer review of China’s industrialisation path and mode, in this framework 
it seems reasonable to pursue a gradual approach to financial reforms at a GDP 
per capita level of $2,000. At $8,000, however, the implicit cost-benefit analysis 
of that strategy, where macroeconomic stability is the ultimate objective, will 
be less clear cut. Cognisant as we are of the wisdom of the State Council, that 
‘deepening ... reform is a systematic project that is arduous and complicated 
... There is no way to accomplish it overnight’ (Xinhua News 2013a), which 
are especially relevant sentiments regarding financial matters, we respectfully 
submit that the China of today, in search of a new model, cannot be far from the 
crossover point in Figure 5.4, if it is not already there.
Deepening financial deregulation cuts across the three reform categories that 
we put forward above. It would tackle specific distortions that create rents and 
skew resource allocation (the low cost of capital for certain firms and industries), 
it would address asymmetric opportunities that lead to and inflame imbalances 
(improve entry conditions to boost competition, improve access to finance for 
private firms and households), and work to minimise macroeconomic risks, and 
enhance macroeconomic benefits, in a more general way (reducing systemic risk 
through increasing the market based allocation of capital).
Turning now to labour, the basic wages of migrant workers have been 
increasing rapidly in recent years, which is a joint consequence of the 
demographic tightening of the labour market and a policy focus on raising 
incomes. Historically, wage rises for this group may have been as little as half 
the rate of increase of the wages of other workers (Huang and Tao: appendix: 
27). They remain, however, an underprivileged group in a number of key ways:
1. access to public services in their place of residence for themselves and their 
families, rather than in their place of registration
2. access to social security in their place of residence, rather than in their place 
of registration
3. access to equivalent non-wage working conditions as urban residents.
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Figure 5.4 The relationship between macroeconomic stability, GDP per capita 
and financial reform in developing economies
Source: Authors’ own conception. 
Bringing about such access will do much to optimise the opportunities 
presented by current and future urbanisation. The increase in consumption 
that such optimisation implies, with an equivalent decline in savings rates, will 
raise domestic absorption, cushion the impact of excess capacity in industry 
and accommodate a re-orientation towards domestic demand rather than foreign 
sales. Like the financial reform question, the migrant labour question cuts across 
many fundamental policy areas. And also like the financial reform question, 
bringing about the access regime depicted above will feature initiatives that fit 
into each of three categories above—tackle specific distortions (the low non-
wage costs borne by firms employing migrants), it would address asymmetric 
opportunities that lead to and inflame imbalances (improve quality and quantity 
of education and health care), and work to minimise macroeconomic risks, and 
enhance macroeconomic benefits, in a more general way (providing the demand 
cushion for a re-orientation towards domestic sales, while helping to absorb 
excess industrial capacity). It is here that the ultimate complementarity of the 
twin goals of reducing the characteristic ‘over-industrialisation’ and optimising 
the benefits of urbanisation becomes extremely clear.
Employers are able to avoid considerable non-wage costs when they employ 
migrant workers rather than registered urban residents. These costs include 
social security contributions; unemployment, injury and health insurance; and, 
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housing and maternity benefits. This is essentially a transfer towards employers 
and away from the household sector, which sponsors capital accumulation over 
consumption. It is also a competitiveness issue, suppressing costs for Chinese 
labour-intensive manufacturing firms in the traded sector. Universal labour 
laws that do not recognise the hukou taxonomy will bring about an immediate 
and permanent increase in the labour share of income at the expense of excess 
profits. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for most rural migrants to achieve urban resident 
status, with all the advantages (or lack of disadvantages) that this bestows in 
terms of access to quality and quantity of education and health services. The 
qualifying points systems that prevail in key destination provinces, such as 
Guangdong, are weighted against rural migrants. These systems are biased 
against poorly educated, low skill workers, who comprise the majority of the 
migrant labour force (OECD 2013: 97). China’s average years of schooling at the 
$2,000 GDP per head levels was similar to both Japan and South Korea, but it 
has slipped behind them at the $8,000 per head threshold (Figures 5.2a and 
5.2b). And, as the quality of that education is regionally variable, and affected 
by hukou status (OECD 2013: 91), then perhaps China is further behind than the 
raw figure suggests. This raises a further question about the adaptability of the 
current work force to a new model that is focused less on heavy industry and 
more on the consumption of services.
Watson’s (2012) call for an integrated, centrally administered and funded 
and portable pension system available to all Chinese citizens is an appropriate 
template for social security reform. It is an obvious inefficiency in China’s 
fiscal system that the national government has effectively centralised taxation 
revenues, but that expenditure responsibilities have not been transferred in 
lockstep. 
The transition to a new model that de-emphasises manufacturing, investment 
and export sales and re-emphasises domestic household consumption cannot be 
brought about without fiscal reform. Indeed, fiscal policy is the key weapon 
at any government’s disposal for altering the relative prices of productive 
factors and the ultimate distribution of national income among key sectors. 
One example is the preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
terms of their dividend payments. The government can and should demand 
a higher rate of dividend payments from SOEs and redeploy the funds to 
accommodate the migrant welfare reforms considered above. The recently issued 
State Council guidelines for income redistribution set out such a policy. In a 
period when factor distortions that disproportionately benefit large, centrally 
controlled SOEs remain in place, it makes sense to redistribute their excess 
profits in a structurally beneficial way, rather than allowing further inefficient 
capital accumulation in the commanding heights. Competition policy can also 
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be brought to bear in this regard. Policies that boost competition in services 
sectors through foreign investment and those that constrain oligopoly pricing 
could have considerable benefits in rebalancing the growth model (Tyers 2012). 
Another relevant aspect of China’s historical path is the infrastructure–
urbanisation nexus. In the peer review we noted that our infrastructure 
proxy—the length of rail line open scaled by land area—implied that China 
may by over-industrialised, but it is not without infrastructure deficits. 
Looking more broadly at the infrastructure space, annual logistics costs were 
equivalent to 18.1 per cent of GDP in 2012, compared to approximately ten per 
cent in the United States.3 Regarding mass urban transit systems, the OECD 
argues that ‘A considerable deficit in provision needs to be overcome. In the 
ten largest cities, the average rail density per square kilometre is only one 
quarter that in the major urban areas outside of mainland China and the density 
per one million people is only one fifth’ (2013: 74). In terms of end-to-end 
international trade logistics, China ranks 26th worldwide in the World Bank’s 
Logistics Performance Index (World Bank 2012), ranking around 20 per cent 
less efficient than the frontier economies in the sample. Only 74 per cent of 
urban Chinese presently have access to sanitation, according to World Bank 
data (World Bank 2013). Against this evidence, it is not difficult to envisage 
the share of capital accumulation going into infrastructure rising, as China 
seeks to optimise its urbanisation opportunity, with the share going towards 
manufacturing capacity—particularly of the energy intensive and/or export 
oriented varieties—declining. Allocating investment to areas where the country 
continues to have a capital stock deficit, and reducing the emphasis on areas 
where capacity is already ample or excessive, will increase the efficiency of 
capital across the economy. 
A Political Economic Comment
All of the above policy proposals, both specific and general, have been 
normative in nature. Our recommendations do not take account of the likely 
resistance of vested interests within the Chinese system. Entrenched rent 
seekers—or distributional coalitions as Olson (1982) termed them—do not have a 
history of stepping gracefully aside when their privileges are attacked. It would 
be naive to ignore this possibility in China. Indeed, the current administration 
has not just inherited an expenditure and income structure, it has inherited a 
structure of interests that have benefited from the historical model that will 
3   The Chinese figure is calculated using data sourced from the CEIC data company. The figure for 
the United States is a personal communication from Access Asia, a Shanghai-based consultant to 
multinational retailers.
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seek to defend their accumulated gains and to retain their privileges. The new 
leadership recognises this challenge is a considerable one over and above the 
need to install a new growth model. Returning again to the State Council’s own 
words: ‘deepening the income distribution reform is a systematic project that 
is arduous and complicated and concerns the reallocation of various interests’ 
(Xinhua News 2013a, authors’ italics). 
Here again, a number of initiatives have been instituted to address certain 
issues in the rent seeking field. Symbolic moves—‘austerity begins at home’-
style policies, which have already been announced, include the capping of 
executive remuneration for state-appointed positions in SOEs, and income 
growth for executives must be slower than for rank-and-file employees; existing 
requirements for officials to report their income and assets will be implemented 
more strictly; the use of public funds for entertainment, automobile purchases 
and international travel will now be strictly monitored (anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the austerity required of officials over the Spring Festival in 
February 2013 reportedly led to substantially reduced turnover in high end 
restaurants); grassroots civil servants and those in underprivileged and remote 
locations will have their remuneration increased at higher rates than senior and 
better located state employees; and, cross-referencing of SOE average salaries 
across different sectors, with an aim of narrowing existing wage gaps; and a 
freezing of government staffing levels and a progressive reduction in the number 
of senior positions (Xinhua News 2013c).
Recently announced policy parameters with the potential to cut deep into 
current sources of imbalance and inequity are as follows:
1. Demanding that the proceeds from the use and sale of state resources—for 
example land, seas, water, minerals, forests—must be used for the provision 
of public services. 
2. Reforms to the taxation of property, notably the extension of the current 
experimental holdings taxes nationwide.
3. Dividend reforms for SOEs (increasing their payout ratio to the state by five 
percentage points by 2015) and listed companies (Xinhua News 2013c).
These three areas are vital for the deepening of reform and shifting the 
economy towards a new model that is more sustainable and equitable. Our 
comment is, however, that there is a large gap here: competition policy. While 
redistribution of rents is a useful transitional position, a long-term solution 
must look to minimise the rents themselves. The discussion of the previous 
section considered the policy options for tackling the factor market distortions 
that generate rents. Undue market power is another distortion that redistributes 
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income to domestic firms in oligopoly sectors, and away from households, the 
government, and firms paying inflated prices for inputs; and, foreign firms that 
lose market share to such firms at home and in third markets.
The fact that the leadership is clearly not complacent on this front gives 
us confidence that the promising policy framework that is presently emerging 
will be progressively carried to its logical conclusion with resolve. The initial 
challenge in this regard will come with the next cyclical downturn, when 
the new model of growth is not yet firmly established and the temptation to 
mobilise demand in well-established, structurally negative ways will be strong 
(McKay 2011). While Li’s sentiment on this future dilemma has already been 
quoted above, it is worth reviewing again:
‘While effectively coping with short-term problems and maintaining 
reasonable growth, more efforts should be made to improve the quality 
and benefits of development, with a focus on promoting economic 
restructuring and upgrading, expanding employment and increasing 
people’s incomes’, he said.
‘If interim measures have to be carried out, they should not set up barriers 
for promoting market-oriented reform and development in the future’, he 
said. (Xinhua 2013b, authors’ italics)
Conclusions
This chapter began by illustrating that China’s economic structure can be 
characterised as both over-industrialised and under-urbanised relative to its 
level of income per head, while maintaining a high degree of export orientation 
for such a large economy. This discussion was framed by the experience of a 
peer group of economies that have also succeeded in quadrupling their living 
standards from $2,000 GDP per head to $8,000 GDP per head in the post-Second 
World War period. 
Some aspects of China’s historical path and the resultant contemporary 
structure were positioned as an impediment to sustaining growth in aggregate 
living standards in an environmentally conscious way, while simultaneously 
promoting equality of income and opportunity. Others were seen as advantageous 
for the pursuit of these basic national goals. 
We then proceeded to outline desirable changes in policy to accommodate 
a new model, alongside a discussion of initiatives already put in place by the 
administration to that end. This discussion was initially conducted within the 
context of a direct effort to address specific factor market distortions, but was 
later broadened to macroeconomic policy writ large. Our recommendations 
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were to deepen and accelerate financial reform—domestic and international—in 
a holistic way; move swiftly on wholesale hukou reform; continue with the current 
momentum towards market-based pricing of energy and negative externalities; 
prioritise infrastructure investment over industrial capacity; and, address 
fundamental long-run fiscal questions to accommodate the desired reallocation 
of resources across the economy. We concluded this discussion optimistically, 
given our view that the superordinate goals of China’s next transition—reducing 
‘over-industrialisation’, optimising urbanisation and emphasising domestic 
absorption over foreign sales—are ultimately complementary. 
At this point we introduced a caveat: that the many facets of path dependence 
present a material prima facie political–economic constraint on the Chinese 
leadership’s absolute freedom of choice and action. We applaud the present 
direction of the policy regime and the objectives of the administration are sound. 
Yet, we believe that the absence of a well-defined approach to competition policy 
is a clear shortfall in the existing framework put forward by the new leadership. 
Further, we noted that the next cyclical downturn will be a strong test of the 
stoicism of the reformers.
Finally, the fact that the leadership is clearly not complacent gives us 
confidence that the required reforms will be carried to their conclusion with 
resolve, if not necessarily with alacrity. There is much to recommend in the 
policy contours that have already emerged in pursuit of those inherently 
complementary goals. Yet inside those contours, a political economic battle must 
still be fought. Reducing ‘over-industrialisation’, optimising urbanisation and 
emphasising domestic absorption over foreign sales are necessary conditions for 
a successful transition of China’s growth model. 
The board is set. The pieces are moving.4
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6 China’s Saving and Global 
Economic Performance1
Rod Tyers, Ying Zhang and Tsun Se Cheong
Introduction
During the past decade, China’s excess saving became a major source of 
finance for the high levels of net debt in the industrialised world. Indeed, after 
2005 and, particularly, in the immediate aftermath of the GFC it became the 
dominant single source. Yet China’s net saving abroad has been slowing as 
domestic debt rises and both its current account surplus and its rate of foreign 
reserve accumulation contract. The slower and more ‘inward focused’ growth 
prospects for China (Tyers 2012) will further reduce its excess saving over time. 
Combined with a similar trend in Japan, this brings an end to the era of the 
Asian ‘savings glut’,2 which, other things being equal, must raise the global 
cost of debt. Although the signs of an associated tightening in global financial 
markets seem beyond the horizon at present, this is because of the ‘quantitative 
easing’ (QE) being carried out by the central banks of the largest three economic 
blocs, the European Union (EU), the United States and Japan. Governments 
in these economies continue to issue new debt but this debt is increasingly 
acquired by their central banks rather than foreign institutions. Since the GFC, 
notwithstanding their liquidity traps, the central banks of these regions have 
expanded their balance sheets at least two-fold and these expansions continue.3
This increase in the global supply of the key currencies has only been 
possible because sustained uncertainties surrounding government finance in all 
the regions, combined with underlying deflation, have induced global portfolio 
holders to maintain unprecedented shares of ‘safe assets’, namely money and 
related short financial instruments. Yet this will change and, when it does, the 
major central banks will have a lot of liquidity to mop up. Because of their recent 
adoption of QE, their balance sheets are heavy with long-maturity financial 
instruments that must eventually come back to the market and, when they do, 
yields will rise quickly. This is significant since it is the long instruments that 
are both extensively traded internationally and close substitutes for equities in 
1   Funding for the research described in this chapter is from Australian Research Council Discovery 
Grant No. DP0557885.
2   See Bernanke (2005), Chinn and Ito (2007), Choi et al. (2008) and Ito (2009).
3   Until 2013, Japan’s expansion since 2000 was proportionally smaller.
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all three economic blocs. Once returned to markets these will likely create a glut 
of long instruments, curtailing investment financing more directly than would 
occur under a more conventional monetary contraction.
Given that newly cheap energy in the United States suggests it could lead the 
northern recovery, much then depends on the implications of slower Chinese 
saving growth for US capital markets and investment. It certainly means that 
the demand for long-maturity bonds will fall, exacerbating the glut in their 
markets and restricting investment credit. Moreover, China’s swapping of US$ 
reserve assets for central government bonds, and the ceding of the US$ assets 
to the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which began in 2007, changes 
the criteria driving outward financial flows, including and particularly FDI, 
shifting the distribution of China’s foreign asset portfolio away from the United 
States. In the end, this will mean the brunt of any continuation in the decline in 
Chinese savings will fall disproportionally on the United States, possibly stifling 
its recovery. Of course, the effects of this pessimistic scenario could be offset by 
effective fiscal consolidation in the United States and the other large economic 
blocs so that global debt falls as global saving falls, leading to a soft landing for 
private investment.
In this chapter these issues are quantified and analysed using elemental 
macroeconomics. The next section reviews the trends in domestic economic 
structure and growth policy in China and their consequences for excess saving 
there. Section 3 then examines the pattern of China’s excess saving through time 
and the underlying trends behind our expectation that it will decline over time. 
The focus turns to the global economy and its recent performance in Section 4. 
The rise in China’s international significance in relation to the corresponding 
scale and performance of the United States, the European Union and Japan is 
discussed. It also offers a macroeconomic analysis of the effects of further declines 
in Chinese excess saving and their likely interaction with the unwinding of 
QE policies in those economic blocs. Conclusions are summarised in Section 5.
China’s Economic ‘Rebalancing’ and its 
Excess Saving 
There is wide agreement outside China, and more recent concurrence inside, 
that China’s growth will, and should, be increasingly underpinned by rising 
home consumption rather than exports.4 The foreign viewpoint is mercantilist 
4   For the foreign, and particularly the US, perspective see Bergsten et al. (2008) and Lardy (2006, 2012). 
For the Chinese official line on the ‘rebalancing’ of its economy, including its external accounts, see 
Wen (2007, 2011) and Yi (2011).
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and is taken notwithstanding the considerable contributions of China’s export-
led growth to improvements in the foreign terms of trade and to cheaper 
financing of investment and government spending. In China’s large trading 
partners, the dominant political force behind this view seems to be concern over 
declining overall economic performance, at least compared with China, high 
unemployment and the visible nature of ‘offshoring’.5 Moreover, the mutual 
benefits from China’s heretofore export-led growth strategy (Dooley et al. 2004) 
do appear now to be short-lived because of its sheer size. As Figure 6.1 shows, 
China’s exports have grown rapidly since the turn of the century and now 
dominate world trade in light manufactures.
Figure 6.1 China is no longer small in global trade
Source: World Bank http//:data.worldbank.org
5   Foreign animus toward China’s economic policy regime has been further inflamed by the large current 
account surpluses of the last decade and the perspective of some in the West that China’s political system 
denies basic human rights or, of others, that its large government and defence forces represent a strategic 
threat. See Tyers (2012).
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‘Looking Inward’ for Further Growth
Superficially, it would seem that a switch to domestically driven growth 
should be possible, just by consuming more and exporting less. But this 
simple idea is problematic for two reasons. First, the export-led growth 
strategy focuses production on light manufacturing, while China’s growing 
middle class demands motor vehicles and high quality services that include 
transport, telecommunications, health and education. Its existing industries 
cannot suddenly diversify their output toward these products. Second, rising 
consumption implies reduced saving and this could tighten the global financial 
capital market at a time when it would be least opportune to do so.
Beyond this, there are further risks associated with a ‘looking inward’ 
strategy. Too rapid change in structure and ethos could be destabilising within 
China, where it is argued there looms the threat of the ‘middle-income trap’, 
which is widely ascribed to other developing regions.6 Contractionary forces 
include the tightening of labour markets—foreshadowing a Lewis ‘turning 
point’,7 associated with the depletion of mobile labour in rural areas and the 
demographic contraction stemming from China’s ‘one child policy’, shown in 
Figure 6.2. In addition, there are the high environmental costs associated with 
China’s manufacturing expansion, which are not yet fully covered, and the 
increased income inequality that is associated with rents in the state-owned 
sector.8 This inequality coincides with socioeconomic stratification in China’s 
periphery, which has precipitated increased class, ethnic and regional conflicts.
6   Key elements of a growing literature include Easterly (2001), World Bank (2010), Eichengreen et al. 
(2011), Riedel (2011) and Robertson and Ye (2013).
7   The timing of China’s Lewis turning point is a subject of controversy, as suggested by the contrasts 
between the views expressed by: Cai (2010), Garnaut (2010) and Golley and Meng (2011), and these are 
only a sample of a substantial literature. There is, however, little doubt that the turning point is on its 
way, even if there is little agreement as to whether recent real wage rises suggest its presence.
8   For a discussion of the institutional and industrial reform agenda and its difficulty, see for example 
Tyers and Lu (2008), Riedel (2011) and Deer and Song (2012). 
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Figure 6.2 The demographic origins of China’s slowdowna
a Indices of mainland China’s labour force and its population, model projections.
Source: Golley and Tyers (2012).
There are, nonetheless, substantial potential gains from further industrial 
reform, stemming mainly from reductions in rents in protected sections of the 
economy and the associated reductions in costs and prices. These extend across 
the comparatively protected services and heavy-manufacturing industries that 
continue to be dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Alternative inward-
focused policy approaches include expanded government service provision 
(which could imply less government saving), accelerated human capital growth 
to reduce costs in services and heavy manufacturing and the revitalisation 
of stalled industrial reforms in these same sectors. Included are further pure 
privatisation, the fragmentation of SOEs to induce more competitive pricing, 
price cap regulation and greater access to services and heavy manufacturing by 
foreign investors. Because the oligopoly rents earned in these sectors are linked 
to corporate saving (Kuijs 2006, Song et al. 2011), the latter is comparatively large 
in China, last measured at about one-fifth of GDP. Industry policy reforms that 
foster further privatisation, or that otherwise reduce oligopoly rents, are readily 
shown to reduce the aggregate level of Chinese saving by amounts sufficient to 
eliminate its current account surplus and hence its provision of excess saving 
to the global economy (Tyers 2012).
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The Components of Saving and China’s External Accounts
National saving includes that by households, corporations and government. 
Savings that exceed the value of domestic private and public investment result 
in a current account surplus and the net acquisition of foreign assets. The excess 
saving is therefore the value of the net foreign acquisitions as is clear from 
the identity:
(1) 
Where SHH is household saving, SC is corporate saving, (T-G) is government 
saving or the fiscal surplus, SD is total domestic saving, I is investment 
(including public investment), CA is the current account balance and N is net 
foreign factor income.9 FI signifies foreign investment, inflows or outflows. 
In China’s case these terms are dominated by FDI since cross-border portfolio 
investments are restricted (though not eliminated) by its capital controls (Ma and 
McCauley 2007).
Thus, to explore the implications for external accounts we must consider 
changes to household, corporate and government saving and compare these 
with changes in investment. Numerous measurement issues arise. The first 
is that there are inconsistencies between China’s GDP estimates based on 
expenditure accounts on the one hand and production accounts on the other. 
We use expenditure accounts to estimate overall saving, but draw on flow 
of funds data, which come from the production side, to separate household 
from corporate saving. Second, there are at least three additional measurement 
issues that could inflate the overall saving rate (Ma & Yi 2010). These include 
a) a consistent pattern of positive inventory accumulation, which arises 
because consumption expenditure is survey based with inventories calculated 
as residual, suggests final consumption is underestimated; b) an apparent 
underestimation of imputed housing rent reduces both income and saving levels, 
possibly inflating the saving rate by a per cent or so; and, c) understatement of 
the retained earnings of foreign firms operating in China, causing some foreign 
corporate saving to be counted as domestic corporate saving. Recent evidence 
that Chinese household consumption is understated in official statistics is 
further explored by Jonathan Garner and Helen Qiao (2013) who conclude that 
household incomes are underestimated (mostly because consumption surveys 
don’t capture the very wealthy, who further understate their incomes) and that 
consumption expenditure may be larger than official estimates by as much as a 
tenth of official GDP.
9   This identity is readily obtained by combining the expenditure identity, Y=C+I+G+X-M with the 
disposal identity for GNP, Y+N=C+T+S, where S=SHH+SC.
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Beyond the assessment of the trend in the surplus of total domestic saving 
over investment, there is the matter of the international destinations of China’s 
excess saving. It is important to note the recent pattern of substituting reserve 
accumulation for outward FDI and the associated changes in regional distribution 
of China’s excess saving. We consider each of these components in turn.
Household Saving
The pattern and time trend of household saving in other Asian economies 
is analysed by Charles Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2012). They point out 
that the three main determinants of rates of measurable household saving 
are the age structure of the population and the levels of income and financial 
sector development. Saving rates follow a concave path, rising in the early 
stages of development and subsequently declining with ageing and financial 
development, which lowers credit constraints. They suggest that private saving 
in China could remain stable, affected by offsetting, opposing forces—ageing 
and financial development tend to reduce it and higher incomes tend to raise it. 
Changes in this projected pattern might be expected, however, in the aftermath 
of the GFC and with the commencement of China’s inward-focused strategy. 
Moreover, the projections of Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara neither include 
corporate nor government saving, and changes to these are yet more likely. 
Official estimates of household saving through 2010 are shown in Figure 6.3. 
For the reasons discussed above, these are subject to question, with household 
saving very likely having followed a lower path, at least more recently.
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Figure 6.3 Trends in Chinese private, household and corporate saving, % GDP
Sources: From national accounts statistics private saving is S = YN-C-T and SH=S-SC, where corporate 
saving, SC, is from ‘flow of funds’ data. These data are inconsistent (Ma and Yi 2010), though the latter is 
the only source for corporate saving. Flow of funds data on household saving suggests its value in 2009 
was about 25% GDP.
Corporate Saving
The trend to 2010 in corporate saving is also illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
The estimates are from national accounts ‘flow of funds’ data that are not yet 
updated beyond this point. Looking forward, changes in total corporate saving 
might be anticipated for three reasons. First, to the extent that slower global 
growth since the GFC has affected profitability in the state sector, corporate 
savings might be expected to have also declined in recent years. Second, ongoing 
industrial policy reforms, which include the subdivision of some SOEs, are 
likely to have further reduced profitability and hence corporate saving. Finally, 
financial development and the integration of formal and informal financial 
markets across the country have been proceeding apace. With more options and 
more security in the management of funds, it might be expected that the trend 
of corporate saving would be downward from its extraordinary heights of three 
years ago.
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Figure 6.4 Chinese Government revenue and expenditurea
a Revenue, expenditure and nominal GDP are indices, 1994=1.0.
Sources: China NBS, Statistical Yearbook 2012. 
Government Saving
Since the implementation of China’s tax law in 1994, the domestic economy 
has gradually integrated, with an increasing share of economic activity taking 
place in the ‘formal sector’. This has meant that central government tax revenue 
has grown steeply, as shown in Figure 6.4, at a rate that is notably faster than 
GDP. Along with this, central government financial surpluses have expanded 
continuously. At the same time, however, with the maintenance of capital 
controls, financial integration has caused China’s high-saving households and 
firms to deposit their savings in domestic commercial banks. These banks have 
a long tradition of lending to SOEs and provincial governments, where debt has 
been effectively underwritten centrally. The comparatively recent development 
in this lending is an expansion in the share directed to provincial governments 
to finance local public investment.10 As shown in Figure 6.5, this has grown 
significantly since 2002 and it accelerated with the onset of the GFC and the 
government’s plan to increase public works expenditure when export demand 
temporarily fell away. After 2007, the sum of the provincial deficits exceeded 
10   This is notwithstanding central government sharing of national revenue with the provinces at a 50–50 
rate in 2011.
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the central surplus, leading to a return to overall deficits with magnitudes 
expanding to unprecedented levels. Thus, government saving is also shifting in 
the negative direction in the post-GFC years.11
Figure 6.5 Chinese Government net surpluses, US$ billions
Sources: Government debt and general government gross debt position, IMF Fiscal monitor; External debt 
outstanding, Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2012.
Implications for Overall Chinese Excess Saving Relative 
to Investment
The above discussions suggest that there has been a diminution of China’s 
total domestic saving since 2010, though this may not be fully represented in 
the official statistics, which only show a slight decline in 2011. At the same 
time, total (private and public) investment rose to nearly half of GDP. Indeed, 
the growth rate of completed investment in fixed assets was 24 and 20 per cent 
in 2011 and 2012, still much faster than recorded GDP growth. This underlies 
the continuously rising investment share of GDP shown in Figure 6.6 and it 
confirms that investment has made the greatest single contribution to China’s 
11   Government saving is here defined as T-G, where G is total government spending, including transfers.
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‘rebalancing’ in recent years.12 The result has been a contracting current account 
surplus in the post-GFC period, particularly since 2010. A full current account 
figure for 2012 is not yet available, though an estimate is offered in the figure. 
Although China’s surplus sank below the aggregate of the rest of the world in 
2012, it remained the single largest surplus across individual countries.13
Figure 6.6 Saving, investment and the current account in China, % GDP
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics yearbook 2009–2012; IMF IFS data base. The value for the current 
account in 2012 is based on the trade balance and the authors’ estimate of net factor income from abroad 
in that year.
Looking ahead, it is difficult to imagine a higher rate of investment without 
the prospect of increasingly wasteful projects. Moreover, the recent boost in 
public investment has stemmed from, first, national, post-GFC stimulus policy; 
second, the preference on the part of commercial banks to lend to protected 
provincial government and SOEs; and, third, the substantial excess supply of 
saving, bottled up in the home market by capital controls. We expect all three 
conditions to fade through time, so that the implications for future excess saving 
then depend on the differences between the rates of decline of total domestic 
saving on the one hand and investment on the other. In our view, a continued 
decline in excess saving appears the most likely future course, not just because 
12   This pattern was foreshadowed by Lee and McKibbin (2007).
13   IMF, IFS Database.
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
108
this is the apparent path since 2010, but also considering the trend toward 
financial deepening and the mounting evidence that consumption expenditure 
is growing faster than officially estimated.
Reserves and Outward FDI
A key element of China’s excess saving is its rate of official foreign reserve 
accumulation. Effective capital controls have been retained notwithstanding 
progress toward the ‘internationalisation’ of the RMB. These restrict, though 
they do not eliminate, all private financial flows other than officially sanctioned 
inward and outward FDI. The persistent excess of home saving over investment 
engenders a correspondingly persistent excess of foreign exchange revenues from 
net exports. This surplus foreign exchange is deposited with China’s commercial 
banks yet the capital controls prevent it from being used in international asset 
transactions by bank deposit holders and so the common practice has been for 
it to be acquired by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) in exchange for newly 
printed Yuan. In the absence of full convertibility, these funds have then had to 
be deposited abroad, mainly via purchases of government bonds in the United 
States and Europe.14 In 2007, the US$ domination of the PBC’s assets began to be 
addressed by swaps with central government debt that deposited the US$ assets 
with the China Investment Corporation (CIC), via which the early part of China’s 
outward FDI was financed. Since then it has been possible for the CIC to directly 
acquire foreign exchange from the commercial banks. Combined with slower 
growth in private saving and an associated contraction in the trade surplus, this 
has seen slower accumulation of official foreign reserves and their reduced role 
on the PBC’s balance sheet, as indicated in Figure 6.7.
Thus, while China’s reserve accumulation has been large by international 
and historical standards, its scale has primarily been a consequence of outward 
capital controls. In effect, while the law prevents ordinary citizens from holding 
substantial assets abroad, the PBC, and more recently the CIC and the mainly 
state-owned foreign direct investors, have been holding foreign assets on 
their behalf. What is of importance with regard to reserve accumulation and 
other outflows is their international distribution and the extent to which it is 
changing through time. The substitution between reserve accumulation, which 
takes the form of low-yielding foreign government bonds and likely better 
yielding portfolios of the CIC and the outward-investing SOEs may be causing a 
redirection of China’s excess saving abroad.
14   The resulting monetary expansion was originally sterilised via the sale by the PBC of ‘sterilisation 
bonds’ (Tyers and Zhang 2011). More recently, the approach has been to reduce money creation by the 
commercial banks via measures such as high reserve to deposit ratios.
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Figure 6.7 Components of the People’s Bank of China balance sheet, % GDPa
a DC is domestic credit, R is official foreign reserves, Mb is monetary base, SB is sterilisation bonds issued 
by the PBC.
Source: People’s Bank of China, Balance Sheet of Monetary Authority 1999–2012.
The CIC maintains a portfolio worth a half US$ trillion which is spread 
widely, with the largest shares in US, Australian and other Asian assets.15 Change 
through time is led by new FDI, however, as shown in Table 6.1. The annual 
outflow of FDI amounted to US$75 billion in 2011, destined primarily for 
other Asian investments. By contrast, the addition to official foreign reserves 
in that year was US$128 billion destined, it is widely presumed, for bond 
acquisitions in the United States. The outward FDI was therefore a considerable 
offset. This  compares with 2006, in which new outward FDI amounted only 
to US$18 billion and reserves grew by US$247 billion. This suggests a strong 
redistribution of China’s outward financial flows away from the United States 
toward other Asian destinations.
15   Some detail on outward FDI is available from the NBS Statistical Yearbook of 2012. A summary, slightly 
at variance with the official statistics, is offered by the Economist (2013).
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2006 17.6 43.5 2.9 3.4 48.0 1.5 0.7
2007 26.5 62.6 5.9 5.8 18.5 4.2 2.9
2008 55.9 77.9 9.8 1.6 6.6 0.7 3.5
2009 56.5 71.5 2.5 5.9 13.0 2.7 4.4
2010 68.8 65.2 3.1 9.8 15.3 3.8 2.7
2011 74.7 60.9 4.3 11.1 16.0 3.3 4.4
FDI stock at the 
end of 2011
71.4 3.8 5.8 13.0 3.2 2.8
Value of 2011 
stock, US$ billion
425 425 303 16 24 55 13
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 2012.
Global Financial Interdependence and 
Macroeconomic Policy
Global financial markets continue to be dominated by the United States, 
which has sustained a structural current account deficit since the 1990s. Though 
much that has been unpalatable since 2007 has been blamed on the GFC, the 
broad pattern of international finances did not appear to be permanently 
changed by it. Critically, it brought about a reversion by the private sectors in 
the United States, the European Union and Japan to net saving positions, while 
all three governments assumed net borrowing positions, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
It therefore replaced private debt, some of which had been unsustainable, with 
sovereign debt, some of which is also unsustainable, leaving heightened global 
uncertainty as to sovereign financing.
A key change took place around 2005, before which the large US deficit had 
been financed by surpluses in Japan and the oil-producing countries. Thereafter, 
however, the burden of this financing rested increasingly with China, as shown 
in Figure 6.9. By 2010 China had joined the club of major economies (Eickmeier 
and Kuehnlenz 2013) and was the dominant supplier of finance to the rest of 
the world, while the regions other than China and the United States were in 
approximate current account balance. The international financing game had 
become one between China and the United States. After 2010, though, China’s 
relative role as surplus financer began to diminish with the shifts in its domestic 
saving–investment balance already discussed. It remains a substantial buyer of 
US debt and equities, however, highlighting the potential for disruption in US 
financial markets should China’s excess saving continue to decline.


































































































































China: A New Model for Growth and Development
112
Figure 6.9 Excess annual saving (current account balances) by key region, US$ 
billions
Source: IMF IFS database; China NBS; Japan, BOP and Ministry of Finance; EU27, Eurostat; US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.
Global Finance Over Two Decades
Some insight into the macroeconomic events leading up to the GFC is offered 
by Figure 6.10, which shows the yields on short and long term US Treasury 
bonds since the beginning of the 1990s. Consistent with the market segmentation 
theory of the yield curve, we imagine that the transaction cost of financing long 
via a succession of short contracts to be prohibitive, allowing short- and long-
maturity instruments to trade at substantially different prices. Moreover, short 
bonds are instruments of conventional domestic monetary policy and they are 
traded little between countries, or at least between the major economic blocs we 
are considering. Long bonds, by contrast, are instruments of private saving and 
investment.16 They are substitutes for equity holdings and are extensively traded 
internationally. Long-bond yields are therefore more stable through time than 
short yields and reflect movements in the equilibrium between global saving 
16   While this is true as a rule of thumb, housing investment can be sensitive to short rates in economies 
where most mortgage contracts have variable rates. The assumption that investment financing depends 
on the long maturity market is accurate in a comparative sense and it is a useful simplification in 
modeling international financial behaviour.
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and investment. Short yields, on the other hand, reflect monetary easing and 
tightening through business cycles that have often been specific to particular 
economies. Considering this, Figure 6.10 clearly shows the two large US cycles 
that preceded the GFC and the tightening that led up to it in 2004–2005, when 
petroleum prices rose. It was this tightening that exposed those investors who 
expected short rates to remain low, precipitating the GFC.17 Beyond 2008, of 
course, the United States entered a liquidity trap, as did Europe, and Japan had 
been in one for at least a decade.
Figure 6.10 US Treasury bond yields over two decades
Source: US Treasury.
What is also notable from Figure 6.10 is the continuous and smooth downward 
trend in long-bond yields. This is as clear an index as any of the Asian savings 
glut. After the 1980s the great majority of the world’s incremental growth took 
place in Asia, where saving rates were, and continue to be, substantially higher 
than in the rest of the world. Long yields, which had risen prior to the mid 
1980s, have fallen continuously since. Though it is not shown in the figure, this 
long-run pattern is also observable in European, Canadian and Australian long-
bond yields. Importantly, and this is clear from the more recent data on yields 
represented in Figure 6.11, the downward trend in long yields persists beyond 
the GFC in all three economic regions. Yet the evidence is building that the 
Asian savings glut is over, led by declining net saving in both Japan and China. 
What, then, explains the continuing decline in long yields?
17   Its origins in petroleum markets are analysed by Arora and Tyers (2011).
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Quantitative Easing (QE)
The most likely explanation is unconventional monetary policy, or QE, 
whereby money expansions are achieved via the large-scale purchase of long 
bonds, and related instruments, by central banks. For economies that have 
been stagnant in real terms since 2007, this has led to substantial expansions in 
central bank asset holdings, as indicated in Figure 6.11. These raise the prices 
of long bonds and related instruments and suppress their yields. Unlike more 
conventional monetary policy, the QE focus on widely traded instruments 
projects the domestic monetary cycle beyond national borders with immediacy. 
In part for this reason, the policy is being matched in the United States, Europe 
and Japan, causing financial outflows as investors seek out better yields abroad.18 
Recent expansions in central bank balance sheets are shown in Figure 6.12.19 
So what purpose does such unconventional monetary policy serve?
Figure 6.11 US, European and Japanese government bond yields since 2000
Source: US Treasury.
18   Of course, one clear rationale for QE on the part of the US Federal Reserve is that the substitution will be 
away from US bonds to US equities. And this has happened too. Much less is said by the Federal Reserve 
about the international effects.
19   It is notable that China’s monetary base is large compared with the others, which is likely due to reduced 
money creation by China’s commercial banks in response to such restrictions as high reserve to deposit 
ratios.
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Source: European Central Bank.
Source: European Central Bank, Reuters.
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Figure 6.12 Central Bank assets, US$ trillions
Source: EU, ECB; United States, Japan: St. Louis Federal Reserve Database; China, National Bureau 
of Statistics.
The three large economic blocs have, each by their own historical standards, 
high unemployment and governments with extraordinary sovereign debt 
overhangs. Further fiscal expansion seems unwise yet their liquidity traps 
prevent conventional monetary expansions. QE offers an alternative stimulatory 
course. Acquisitions by central banks offer the convenience of additional leeway 
for further government deficit spending. Governments continue to spend 
beyond their revenues and, even if there is less buying of their debt by Asian 
surplus economies, their own central banks acquire it. Importantly, the new 
abundance of regional currency depreciates the exchange rate against non-QE 
implementing economies and, at least in theory, this stimulates traded sectors.
The Global Game
In an important sense, QE policies are part of a strategic game within the small 
club comprising the major economic regions, of which China is now a member. 
A substantial monetary expansion by one region requires a matching response 
from the others to avoid appreciations that would reduce competitiveness. 
In the other transitional economies and the resource exporting economies like 
Australia, outside the club, the result has been accelerating inflation, or more 
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substantial nominal appreciations relative to the United States.20 The notable 
thing about movements in the major currencies since 2000, shown in Figure 
6.13, is that the US$ has gradually depreciated against all. Beyond that, the 
Yen, the Euro and the Yuan have tended to move together, particularly in 
the aftermath of the GFC, when they appeared to stabilise around their 2000 
relativities, albeit all appreciating by one-third against the US$. Very recently, 
there has been a break from this pattern with Japan’s more aggressive QE causing 
a substantial depreciation relative to the others. Since the Japanese economy is 
now the smallest of the economic regions, it is possible that its departure from 
equilibrium could be sustained at minimum cost to the others.
Figure 6.13 Nominal exchange rate indices vs the US$
Source: IMF IFS and Eurostat.
20   The A$ is the resource currency of an outsider economy that is not a default risk and that has not 
engaged in aggressive monetary expansion. Return-seeking financial flows from the QE economies 
have therefore boosted its value.
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The Global Economy in Prospect: The Effects 
of Still Less Chinese Saving
Private portfolio holders around the world see extraordinary risk in 
apparently unsustainable sovereign debt and, so, are holding the additional 
money that is created by QE, rather than investing in new plant and equipment. 
Investor confidence will not return until the sovereign debt issues are resolved, 
or unless there is an unexpected shock that suggests higher future productivity. 
Failing the latter, much depends on political struggles to reassign debt or 
selectively default.
Yet, there is just such a positive shock in the United States in the new 
availability of large quantities of energy from natural gas at comparatively low 
cost. This could draw portfolio holders into new private investment and lead 
them to shed liquidity. As they do this they will issue new debt and equity, 
pushing down bond prices and raising yields. Central banks will seek to 
prevent inflation by soaking up the shed liquidity. Much will depend on their 
approach to this. If they unload their holdings of long bonds first this will 
further raise long yields. In the past, the Japanese and Chinese governments, 
the oil exporting countries, or their central banks, would have been there to 
acquire the shed bonds. This time, if China’s excess saving does decline and if 
the new abundance of energy holds down petroleum prices, this rescue will not 
occur and, unless some inflation is allowed, a credit squeeze could develop that 
strangles the recovery.
Elemental Analysis of a Short-run Chinese Saving Shock
To see how important China’s excess saving is, we apply the standard intuitive 
model of macroeconomic behaviour21 to the short-run effects of a unilateral fall 
in China’s saving on its own economy and on its partner economies. To begin 
with, reduced Chinese private saving would shrink the demand for home assets 
and this drives up home yields. If capital controls were perfect, this would have 
no effect on private flows abroad22 but it would reduce the current account 
surplus as home consumption would absorb goods that were once exported. The 
foreign exchange available to purchase international goods would fall, switching 
Chinese demand toward home goods and raising their relative prices, thus 
appreciating the real exchange rate. In the financial sector, higher home yields 
21   This is a flex-price version of the standard Mundell (1963) – Fleming (1962) approach, that still underlies 
modern macroeconomic intuition. In a forthcoming more extensive quantitative analysis we use the 
model of Tyers and Cheong (2013) to address the issues of this chapter.
22   Imperfect capital controls mean that a greater proportion of what internationally mobile, yield-chasing 
investors there are in China would choose to hold home rather than foreign assets, reducing private 
outflows on the capital account.
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would raise the opportunity cost of holding money and contract the demand 
for real balances. The real appreciation requires either an inflation, a nominal 
appreciation or a combination of both and it is a matter of monetary policy to 
decide which. Let us assume the Chinese Government opts, as they have in the 
recent past, for the combination of both.
Now consider China’s economic partners in aggregate. They face three 
shocks. First, there is a contraction in the external demand for their assets that 
places upward pressure on domestic long-bond yields. Second, there is inflation 
abroad, so the price level there is higher and with this comes a deterioration 
in their terms of trade. Third, related to this but more advantageous, there is 
a real depreciation. In the home financial market, reduced foreign demand raises 
yields on home assets, reducing home investment. The curtailed financial inflow 
contracts the capital account surplus and hence also the current account deficit, 
by providing less foreign currency to spend on foreign goods over and above 
export earnings. In effect, there is a contraction in aggregate demand and since 
the supply of goods from abroad is more elastic than from home the relative 
prices of home goods fall, causing the real depreciation.
Higher home yields reduce home demand for real money balances and a 
monetary contraction is required to prevent inflation.23 This is where the history 
of QE makes a difference. Central banks are loaded with long maturity assets and 
their inflation-targeting policy directives would dictate contractions in their 
balance sheets. If they first dump long assets on internationally open markets 
for long instruments, say with a view to returning to conventional monetary 
policy, this would exacerbate the home asset glut and further raise both home 
and foreign yields, contracting home investment even more substantially.
In the end, the partner economies face inferior terms of trade and substantially 
higher investment financing costs, though their real exchange rates are reduced 
relative to China and they export more. Some of the negative aspects of these 
circumstances can be offset by the controlled release of long assets by central 
banks and a departure from their practice of the past two decades to allow some 
inflation. Indeed, a period of inflation might seem politically attractive, both as 
a buffer against exacerbating the rise in long yields in the short run and as a 
means of diminishing sovereign debt burdens. Yet, if this inflation is anticipated 
it will precipitate a private sell-off in bond markets in any case, driving up long 
yields consistent with the expectations theory of the yield curve. Very steady 
hands will be required at central banks during this period.
23   Given our faith in the market segmentation theory of the yield curve, and the likelihood that the PBC 
holds long maturity US bonds, it would the long bond yield that would rise in the United States. But, 
because the collective portfolio comprises mainly long-maturing assets or their equivalents, it is the long 
rate that is the opportunity cost of holding money.
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On net, the circumstances of the economic regions other than China are 
inferior to an extent that depends on the scale of the rise in financing costs and 
of the real depreciations relative to China. It is the coincidence of timing that is 
important—Chinese and Japanese excess saving reductions, coming after years 
of QE in the other economic blocs. For the United States in particular, this could 
be made much worse by the combination of reduced Chinese saving with its 
redistribution away from investments in US assets. Since, as Figure 6.8 confirms, 
even quite standardised ten-year government debt contracts are differentiated 
across the major economic blocs. This means that redistribution away from US 
assets will exacerbate the associated financial contraction in the United States 
in particular.
Conclusion
The slower and more ‘inward focused’ growth to which the Chinese 
Government is now committed will contract its excess saving. Rises in 
consumption will reduce household saving, reduced oligopoly profits and 
further financial development will reduce corporate saving and the recent rise 
in provincial debt has already eliminated government saving. This coincides 
with reduced Japanese saving and, hence, the end of the ‘Asian savings glut’, 
and it must eventually raise the global cost of debt, which has recently been 
suppressed by QE in the United States, Europe and Japan. In the major economic 
regions, the monetary reaction to reduced Chinese saving, will see higher long-
bond yields that are readily transmissible globally, raising debt-service costs 
everywhere and causing a new headwind against investment worldwide.
Given that the United States appears to be leading the northern recovery, 
aided by reduced energy costs, much then depends on the implications of 
slower Chinese saving growth for US capital markets and investment. It is 
likely that the effect on the US economy will be disproportionate, not only 
because the two economies are already highly interdependent but also because 
China’s financial outflows are shifting away from reserve accumulation, which 
is intensive in US bonds, and toward FDI that goes primarily into other Asian 
economies. A  comparatively large rise in the cost of financing in the United 
States could stifle the recovery there and hence globally. The effects of this 
pessimistic scenario could be offset by fiscal consolidation in the large regions, 
so that global debt falls as global saving falls, leading to a soft landing for private 
investment. Without fiscal consolidation, however, the consequences could be 
serious global contraction.
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The critical need is to induce real investment from global portfolio holders 
who are currently soaking up money and avoiding what they see as systemic 
risks associated with ever higher sovereign debt. Achieving this will build 
new industries, create new employment and demand new exports from China 
and other Asian exporters. China’s turn inward is sensible given its export 
environment but, contrary to the popular view, its timing could be unfortunate. 
Those excess savings will come in especially handy when the inevitable return 
to conventional monetary policy occurs. Their disappearance is a key negative 
global shock that is only temporarily disguised by QE in the larger economic 
regions.
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7 Growing into an Innovative 
Economy: 
Evidence from Chinese Firm-Level Data Analysis
Yixiao Zhou
Introduction
Since initiating market reforms in 1978, China has undergone a significant 
economic transformation (Lin 2011). A more recent development is that China 
now aims to become a knowledge-intensive economy. This goal may constitute a 
part of the force that drives the redistribution of knowledge in the international 
market (Serger and Breidne 2007). The following question, proposed by Jones 
and Romer (2010: 231), may become increasingly relevant: 
China’s population is roughly equal to that of the United States, Europe, 
and Japan combined. Over the next several decades, the continued 
economic development of China might plausibly double the number of 
researchers throughout the world pushing forward the technological 
frontier. What effect will this have on incomes in countries that share 
ideas with China in the long run?
On 9 February 2006, the State Council published the ‘The National Medium- 
and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–
2020)‘, which reflects China’s ambition to be transformed into one of the world’s 
most important knowledge sources.1 In this program, the Chinese Government 
emphasises the role of indigenous innovation and also the importance of R&D 
activities performed by business enterprises. The guiding principles for science 
and technology work over the next 15 years are, ‘Innovate independently, achieve 
development in selected areas by leaps and bounds, support development and 
guide the future’ (Sun and Du 2010).
While there are intricate relationships between education, institutional 
quality, science and technology performance and economic growth, this 
chapter is focused on one question: how will institutional quality affect China’s 
innovation performance? 
1   Plans related to science and technologies are not new to China. For an introduction to China’s innovation 
policy, Hutschenreiter and Zhang (2007), Serger and Breidne (2007) and Sun and Du (2010) provide good 
references. 
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This question is fundamentally important. There has long been debate 
about how China has grown fast, despite its relatively low institutional quality 
(Huang 2008). While much of the economic growth literature views institutional 
quality as a fundamental determinant of economic growth and development 
(Acemoglu & Johnson 2005; Hall and Jones 1999), and views factors such as 
physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and technological 
progress as growth itself, China’s growth performance in the past three decades 
seems to be an outlier of what the theory predicts. In fact, some analysts regard 
China as a counter-example to the existing literature on law, institutions, and 
growth (Allen et al. 2005). The reason why China has been able to be an outlier 
in the past 30 years could be, however, that the development stage of this period 
is one that relies less on institutional quality, compared with an economy that is 
nearer to the world technology frontier, and strives to innovate by itself. 
The spectacular growth of China up till now has been driven by the reallocation 
of labour and capital across manufacturing firms (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti 
2011) and mainly by export-oriented, labour-intensive manufacturing activities 
(Wu 2010). The success of such an economy could rely much less on institutional 
quality, compared with an economy that relies on R&D investment from firms 
as the major source of technological progress and productivity growth. This is 
because R&D investment is a long-term investment process, the returns of 
which take time to realise. And, compared with physical capital investment and 
technology imitation or technology imports, R&D investment is also intrinsically 
more risky and costly. If, for example, the protection of property rights, and 
especially the protection of intellectual property rights, is weak, firms may be 
too short-sighted to invest in R&D due to the high risk of losing the fruit of 
their costly R&D efforts. Therefore, if China is to continue to converge towards 
the world technology frontier, and become increasingly knowledge intensive, it 
may not in the long run be possible to be an outlier in terms of the importance 
of institutional quality for economic growth. 
This chapter adds to the understanding of China’s innovation prospects by 
examining how variations of institutional quality within China impact on the 
R&D efforts of firms located in provincial regions. While there exist studies that 
regard China as a whole and look at how its institutional quality is related to its 
economic growth in a cross-country context, this study explores the issue inside 
China. The identification strategy exploits regional variation in the quality of 
institutions to answer the question: how will institutional quality impact on 
China’s innovation performance? More concretely, will firms invest more in R&D 
where the institutional quality is higher? This is the main research question of 
this study. If the answer is positive, institutional quality will certainly be a key 
to the realisation of China’s science and technology take off. 
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To identify the effect of institutional quality, it is necessary to control other 
factors that could influence firm-level R&D efforts in the analysis. Therefore, in 
addition to its focus on institutional quality, this study will provide a thorough 
analysis of the determinants of R&D activities by Chinese firms. 
R&D Investment: Provincial Variation
As shown in Figure 7.1, China’s national R&D expenditure (current prices) 
has experienced a continuous and accelerating growth in the last two decades. 
While China’s annual GDP growth rate during the period 1990–2010 was 
10.4 per cent (Lin, 2011), the growth of national R&D expenditure has been 
faster and, therefore, the national R&D intensity of China has been increasing as 
well (Figure 7.2). The ‘National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Scientific 
and Technological Development (2006–2020)’ sets an R&D intensity goal of 
2.5 per cent by 2020, a level similar to that of the higher-income countries such 
as the United States, Japan and South Korea (Fisher-Vanden and Ho 2007). 
One interesting angle for examining the ‘science and technology take-off’ 
(Gao and Jefferson 2007) of China is to look more closely at performance at the 
provincial level. Through the analysis of variation in regional R&D performance, 
it is possible to better understand the forces behind changing R&D intensity, 
and thus help design policies that regions, with weaker R&D performance, 
could adopt to boost that performance. 
Figure 7.1 National R&D expenditure
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (various issues).
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
128
Figure 7.2 China’s national R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure in GDP) 
from 1995–2010
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (various issues).
Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 show the intramural R&D expenditure in 31 
provincial regions in China in 1999 and 2010 respectively. While there are 
considerable variations among the Chinese regions in their R&D expenditure 
in both years, one interesting observation is that, compared with 1999 in 
which Beijing is the single pole of R&D expenditure, several provinces such 
as Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong and Zhejiang have caught up with Beijing. 
Jiangsu province has even overtaken Beijing in terms of R&D expenditure. 
While Figure 7.3 and Figure  7.4 inform us of the changing amount of R&D 
expenditure in various regions, Figure 7.5 presents the R&D intensity change 
in various regions from 1999 to 2010. During this period, China’s national R&D 
intensity increased by about one per cent (Figure 7.2), but with significant 
variation across provinces (Figure  7.5). Tianjin, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Shandong realised a rapid increase in R&D intensity of about 1.5 per cent. In 
contrast, the R&D intensity in Hainan decreased, and that in Shaanxi barely 
changed. 
In China’s ‘National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Scientific and 
Technological Development (2006–2020)’, not only is the growth of R&D 
intensity emphasised, it is also proposed that business enterprises should become 
an increasingly important entity in conducting R&D. How do various regions 
perform in this regard? To answer the question about business enterprises’ 
R&D performance, statistics are given for large and medium-sized enterprises 
in China, which are reported in the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology. 
Figure 7.6 illustrates the share of large- and medium-sized enterprises’ 
intramural R&D expenditure in total regional R&D expenditure in year 1999 
and year 2010 respectively, and also the change of the share from 1999 to 2010. 
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Among the 31 regions, 25 regions saw their large- and medium-sized enterprises’ 
intramural R&D become more important in total regional R&D. In  Hubei, 
Tianjin, Henan, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, the share of large- and medium-
sized enterprises’ intramural R&D in total regional R&D grew by more than 
20 per cent during 1999 and 2010. In contrast, in Hainan, this share decreased 
significantly from 50 per cent to as low as 26 per cent; in Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Guizhou, Fujian and Guangdong, the respective shares began from more than 
70 per cent in 1999, and yet shrank from the original high level. Interestingly, 
large- and medium-sized enterprises’ R&D share in Beijing is very low, at only 
13 per cent in 2010, and higher only than the share in Tibet. 
Figure 7.3 Intramural R&D expenditure of 31 provincial regions in 1999 (billion RMB)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (various issues).
Figure 7.4 Intramural R&D expenditure of 31 provincial regions in 2010 (billion RMB)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2000, 2011).
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Figure 7.5 Change of intramural R&D intensity in 31 provincial regions from 
1999 to 2010
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2000, 2011).
Figure 7.6 Share of large and medium-sized enterprise R&D expenditure in regional 
R&D expenditure in 1999 to 2010 and changes of this share from 1999 to 2010
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2000, 2011).
In order to simultaneously stimulate the growth of regional R&D intensity 
and promote the importance of enterprise R&D, it is fundamental that business 
enterprises allocate a larger share of resources towards R&D activities. 
Figure 7.7 represents the changes to the share of the R&D intensity of large- and 
medium-sized enterprises from 1999 to 2012. The focus of this chapter is on 
the determinants of R&D intensity of large- and medium-sized enterprises in 
China using a firm-level dataset. Researchers have already investigated various 
factors that may induce Chinese firms to carry out R&D activities. This literature 
has not, however, provided a rigorous study of the impact on R&D activities 
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of the institutional quality of the economic environment in which the firms 
are located. Hence, this chapter examines whether institutional quality plays a 
critical role in enhancing the R&D investment of Chinese firms. 
Figure 7.7 Change of R&D intensity of large and medium-sized enterprise (the 
share of R&D expenditure in gross output) from 1999 to 2010
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2000, 2011).
Institutional Quality and Firm Research and 
Development Activities
In the existing literature, several channels through which institutional 
quality could impact on a firm’s innovation activities have been identified. 
Firstly, in terms of external financing, some studies show that sound legal 
systems and efficient financial infrastructures can facilitate the access of firms 
to external finance and, thus, their ability to fund investment projects (La Porta 
et al. 1997, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999, Beck et al. 2006). Secondly, in 
terms of internal financing, Cull and Xu (2005) find that Chinese firms exposed 
to a greater risk of expropriation by government have a lower reinvestment rate. 
Lin and Wong (2012) also provide evidence that the provision of good-quality 
institutions and services by government is positively associated with a firm’s 
investment and sales growth. 
Thirdly, the characteristics of innovation activities as a form of investment 
make them particularly sensitive to institutional quality. Jorde and Teece (1990) 
argue that ‘Innovation … involves uncertainty, risk taking, probing and re-
probing, experimenting, and testing. It is an activity in which “dry holes” and 
“blind alleys” are the rule, not the exception’. Other analysts also regard risks 
and uncertainties as defining characteristics of innovation, since technological 
development is full of unforeseeable contingencies; and they emphasise the 
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importance of formal laws and regulation introduced by the state to help reduce 
the risk and uncertainty that is faced by firms engaging in innovation (Kaasa, 
Kaldaru and Parts 2007). 
In terms of the specific institutions that matter for innovation activities, Eicher 
and García-Peñalosa (2008) suggest that the key institution that determines 
sustained growth in R&D-based or innovation-driven growth models is the 
strength of intellectual property rights. In the Romer model (1990), firms engage 
in R&D in order to invent new varieties of intermediate goods and obtain their 
patent rights. When the patent is enforced, the innovation is produced by the 
inventor under monopolistic conditions and the inventor enjoys monopolistic 
profit from the innovation output; if the patent is not enforced, the commodity 
can be imitated and produced by firms on a competitive fringe and, in this case, 
the innovator receives no profits. 
While the Romer model applies to countries at the world technology 
frontier that rely on innovation for economic growth, there is also literature 
that pays attention to how an economy moves from a pure imitation regime to 
an equilibrium with private R&D. Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008) show that 
those countries with initial institutions above a threshold, converge to the high-
growth/strong-institutions equilibrium with private R&D, and those starting 
below the threshold will move to the no-growth/ no-IPR protection equilibrium. 
Moving from the no-growth to the high-growth equilibrium with private R&D 
is shown to require the adoption of sufficiently strong institutions that overcome 
the institutional threshold defined by the low-growth equilibrium.
Other Determinants of Firm-Level R&D 
Intensity
It is recognised in the literature that government subsidies play a role in 
firms’ innovation activities. For example, it is maintained by some that the use 
of public funding to foster private research and development (R&D) activities 
is common in many countries. Statistics from Eurostat (2009) have been used 
to illustrate that the public share in R&D activities from the mid 1990s to the 
mid 2000s was about 35 per cent in the EU27, 30 per cent in the United States 
and 18.5 per cent in Japan (Zúñiga-Vincente et al. 2012). And a sizable amount 
of these public R&D funds is used to subsidise R&D activities undertaken by 
private enterprises. Hence, the share of subsidy in industrial sales is a potential 
determinant of Chinese firms’ innovation activities as well.
While this study examines whether Chinese firms’ R&D investment is 
associated with government subsidies, assessing the economic impact of 
government subsidies for firms’ R&D investment thoroughly, however, requires 
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the following two questions to be considered. First, will R&D activities that 
are supported via government subsidy be economically rational and efficient? 
Will a firm’s R&D activities, if funded by government subsidy, bring about 
market value? Public policies should be aimed at supporting only those private 
R&D projects that are socially desirable and which would not otherwise be 
undertaken. The major justification for the public support of R&D is that 
market failures, such as the incomplete appropriability of R&D returns and 
the problems of information and incomplete markets, would otherwise hamper 
firms from reaching the socially optimal level of R&D. Nevertheless, identifying 
the target projects to which public effort should be devoted is not a simple task. 
Second, what is the relationship between a government subsidy for R&D and 
a firm’s actual R&D expenditure? Will government subsidies act as a stimulant 
for R&D or, contrarily, exert a crowding-out effect on private R&D investment 
and be dissipated in higher R&D wages, instead of stimulating real private R&D 
spending (Lokshin and Mohnen 2012)? These two problems are critical for the 
role of government subsidy in promoting firm R&D activities and will need 
further research to be addressed fully. 
The availability of financial funds will impact on R&D activities of firms as 
well. Financial constraints may be particularly restrictive for R&D investment 
compared with other forms of investment. Firms with high R&D expenditure 
tend to have few tangible assets that can serve as collateral for credit (Brown 
et al. 2009). R&D expenditures largely go to salaries and wages for scientists and 
researchers, which is human capital investment that cannot be collateralised. 
Furthermore, due to the need to protect their proprietary information over 
innovation, firms may be unable or unwilling to offer sufficient information about 
their intended R&D programs to potential funding providers (Maskus, Neumann 
and Seidel 2012).
Basic alternatives for innovation financing include internal finance (out 
of profit) and external finance (credit-based or equity-financed systems) 
(Unger and Zagler 2003). Prior work on investment financing at the firm level 
has demonstrated that firms first resort to internal funds in order to maintain 
control rights over their innovations. When additional capital to fund R&D 
expenditure is needed, they turn to external funds, first accessing bank credit 
and then equity markets (Maskus, Neumann and Seidel 2012). 
In order to examine the effect of financial constraints on firms’ innovation 
activities, the share of profit in industrial sales, total debt to total assets ratio and 
the share of interest payment in industrial sales are included in the regression as 
potential determinants of R&D activities. 
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
134
Closely related to the financial constraints problem are the issues about the 
size, market structure and innovation activities of firms. Joseph Schumpeter 
argued that large firms operating in a concentrated market are the main engines 
of technological progress. The seven reasons behind Schumpeter’s argument 
include the ability of large firms to cover the fixed costs of R&D projects, scale 
and scope economies in the production of innovations, the better position of 
larger firms to exploit unforeseen innovations, their stronger ability to spread 
the risks of R&D by undertaking many projects at one time and better access 
to external finance (Symeonidis 1996). As to firms with greater market powers, 
these firms are in a better position to finance R&D from their own profits. 
They also have more incentive to innovate because they can appropriate the 
returns from innovation more easily. In this study, the number of employees, 
share of sales in the total sales of firms in the same four-digit industry and 
the four-digit, industry-level Herfindahl index are included in the regression as 
proxies for firm size, market power and market structure respectively.
There is evidence in the literature that R&D-intensive firms have, on average, 
higher wages. Four possible explanations for how the positive relationship 
between R&D intensity and wages should be understood include the demand 
for workers in particular occupations or with particular skills in firms with 
higher R&D intensity; the need for more educated workers with innate ability, 
or other unobserved characteristics, in firms with higher R&D intensity; quasi-
rents generated by R&D intensive firms to be shared with workers with certain 
characteristics; and, wage premiums are related to firm size (Mishra and Smyth 
2012). The size of R&D-intensive firms is larger because investing in R&D is 
likely to involve more fixed costs. Therefore, the average wage of employees is 
included in the regression analysis. 
The age of a firm can exert two distinct impacts on R&D. Although Loderer 
and Waelchli (2009) are not focused on the relationship between age and R&D, 
the effect of a firm’s age is clearly explained by them. One the one hand, age 
allows firms to become more efficient as they discover what they are good at, and 
learn how to do things better over time. On the other hand, older age may also 
make knowledge, abilities, and skills obsolete and induce organisational decay. 
On balance, it is therefore unclear whether older firms experience increased 
prosperity, or whether they are burdened by their age, which could result in 
an insignificant estimate of the coefficient of the variable age in the regression 
analysis. 
A firm’s export participation may affect its R&D activities as well. This could 
be because exporting requires prior R&D innovation (Yu and Dai 2013), and 
innovation can help a firm maintain a competitive advantage in international 
markets (Porter 1990). The causality could also be reverse. It could also be 
because firms that export to international markets are more likely to be exposed 
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to the stock of world knowledge, and enjoy larger knowledge spillovers, which 
in turn promotes R&D activities. As one of the largest exporting countries in 
the world market, the relationship between trade participation and innovation 
performance is vital for China’s growth prospect. This question will be fully 
addressed in the next chapter where firm-level production data will be merged 
with transaction-level trade data. In that merged dataset, it is possible to 
observe the trade activities of different firms, such as the number of imported 
intermediate and capital goods, unit value of imported goods, geographical 
diversification of export markets and forms of trade. The various channels 
through which trade activities impact on a firm’s innovation performance are 
illustrated in the next chapter. 
Data 
The analysis is based on a firm-level panel dataset of the Chinese 
manufacturing industry for the period 2005–2007. The data were obtained 
from the Annual Census of Chinese Industrial Firms compiled by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). This census provides detailed firm-level 
financial and operational information for state-owned enterprises and all firms 
with annual turnover of over five million RMB. The NBS has requested all these 
firms to report information to the local statistical offices that report to the NBS. 
The NBS has the final responsibility to process the data and produce the census. 
This census is considered to be the most comprehensive firm-level dataset ever 
compiled by the NBS, accounting for about 90 per cent of total output in most 
industries. The NBS has endeavored to maintain consistency in data collection 
across time, industries and regions (Yi, Wang and Kafouros 2013). Table 7.1 and 
Table 7.2 provide a description of the R&D activities of the firms in the dataset 
from 2005 to 2007. 
To measure institutional quality of provincial regions in China, I adopt the 
National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s 
Provinces (Fan, Wang and Zhu 2011). The NERI index is an assessment system 
for relative progress in marketisation for China’s provinces (Wang, Fan and Zhu, 
2004). It assesses marketisation performance in five fields by a total of 23 basic 
indicators. For a certain field, a field index is calculated as the arithmetic average of 
a few basic indices. And the arithmetic average of the five indices constitutes the 
overall marketisation index. The five fields covered are government and market 
relations, development of the non-state enterprise sector, development of the 
commodity market, development of factor markets, market intermediaries, and 
the legal environment for the market. In this study, two measures of institutional 
quality are used and they are both from the NERI index system. One measure is 
the overall marketisation index from the NERI index system. The other measure 
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is the basic index for the protection of intellectual property rights, which is one 
of the basic indices that compose the field index for market intermediaries and 
the legal environment for the market in the NERI index system. Specifically, 
this basic index for the protection of intellectual property rights is based on 
numbers of patent applications and patent grants per technical personnel in 
various regions. 
On the one hand, intellectual property protection receives considerable 
attention in the discussion about incentives for a firm engaging in innovation 
and, on the other hand, overall institutional quality will affect the production 
process and a firm’s ability to enjoy the fruits of R&D investment. Therefore, 
these two measures of institutional quality are both examined in the regression 
analyses below.
Table 7.1 Number of all firms and number of firms that engaged in R&D expenditure
Year N Number of observations with nonzero R&D Percentage
2005 243994 26051 0.106769
2006 271002 29804 0.109977
2007 304936 34232 0.1122596
Source: Annual Census of Chinese Industrial Firms compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of the sample for regression
Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max
R&D intensity 0.0018 0.0146 0 0.9906
size 4.66 1.08 2.2 12.1
age 9.2 9.12 1 180
k 87.97 231.3 –4.78 26,818.19
herfindahl 0.015 0.027 0.00099 0.92
marketshare 0.0017 0.0089 0 0.88
wage 2.72 0.57 –5.3 8.39
profitability 0.0102 8.88 –7710.8 628.8
exportintensity 0.17 0.34 0 1.4
debtratio 0.57 0.44 –24.3 270.5
interestpayment 0.015 4.62 –28 4130
subsidy 0.0028 0.036 –0.24 17.24
intellectual property 
protection 13.22 10.59 0.02 41.47
overall institutional quality 8.47 1.58 0.29 10.92
percapitaGDP 26,329.84 12,033.13 5052 66,367
Source: Annual Census of Chinese Industrial Firms compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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Empirical Specification and Estimation
 
i denotes an individual firm in a certain four-digit industry, j denotes a certain 
four-digit industry, k denotes a certain province, t denotes a certain year. 
is the share of a firm’s R&D expenditure in its industrial sales. 
This is a measure of input into the innovation process. Measures of innovative or 
technological activity can be classified as measures of either innovative inputs 
or output. Measures of output include the number of patents, the number 
of significant innovations, and indices of the market value of innovations. 
The most frequently used measures of inputs into the innovation process are 
R&D expenditure and personnel involved in R&D (Symeonidis 1996). There is 
no information about the number of patents and the personnel involved in R&D 
in our dataset, and therefore R&D intensity is adopted.
 is the natural logarithm of a firm’s number of employees.
 is the number of years of a firm’s existence.
 is the share of profit in a firm’s industrial sales.
 is the share of export value in a firm’s industrial sales.
 is the average wage of the firm’s employees; i.e. the sum of wage 
compensation and welfare compensation divided by the number of employees. 
 is the share of a firm’s industrial sales in the industrial sales of 
all firms in the same four-digit industry. 
 is the four-digit, industry-level Herfindahl Index. This is calculated 
as the sum of squared market shares of all the firms in the same four-digit 
industry. The range of Herfindahl Index is between 0 and 1 with 0 denoting 
perfect competition where each firm’s market share is infinitesimally small and 1 
denoting monopoly, where one firm takes up the whole market.
 is the share of a firm’s total liabilities in its total assets.
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 is the net value of a firm’s fixed assets per employee.
 is the share of subsidy in a firm’s industrial sales.
 is the share of interest payment in a firm’s industrial sales.
 is the measure of institutional quality (overall or focused 
on the protection of intellectual property rights) of the province in which a firm 
is located.
 is the per capita GDP of the province in which a firm is located. 
The difficulty of the estimation of Equation (1) lies in the concentration of the 
dependent variable  on the zero value. It is known that if one 
uses ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the non-zero part of the original 
variable  the results could be biased due to the sample selection 
problem. This problem is made more complex when firms may have unobserved 
heterogeneity, such as the ability of the entrepreneur. The coexistence of the 
concentration of independent variable on the zero value and the necessity to 
take into account fixed effects at the firm level, requires an estimation strategy 
that can tackle these two problems at the same time. Previous studies on the 
determinants of the R&D intensity of Chinese firms resort to the random-effects 
Tobit model for panel data. Although this approach pays attention to the fact 
that the dependent variable is left-censored at zero value, it also assumes that 
the, possibly omitted, firm-specific variables are not correlated with variables 
included in the empirical specification. This assumption is problematic if, 
for example, the omitted variable is the ability of the entrepreneur, which 
influences the R&D intensity of the firm and is potentially correlated with 
other independent variables such as profitability and market share of the 
firm. Therefore, this study adopts an estimation strategy (Kyriazidou 1997). 
This estimation strategy solves the sample selection problem and the omitted 
variables problem due to unobserved firm heterogeneity at the same time. 
Empirical Results
Table 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample for the regression. 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 report the regression results. Table 7.3 examines how 
intellectual property rights protection influences the R&D intensity of firms, 
and Table 7.4 illustrates the effect of overall institutional quality. It can be seen 
that the results based on these two different measures of institutional quality 
are qualitatively similar. All other things being equal, a firm with a larger size is 
more likely to do R&D; a firm that pays higher wages, enjoys higher profitability 
and has higher export intensity is more likely to do R&D; a firm with a higher 
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debt burden is less likely to do R&D; a firm where received subsidy is of a 
larger proportion in the industrial sales is more likely to do R&D; lastly, when 
the protection of intellectual property rights (or overall institutional quality) 
is stronger in the province where a firm is located, the firms is more likely to 
do R&D. 
Table 7.3 Regression results
Likelihood of conducting 
R&D activities
R&D intensity (share of R&D 
expenditure in total industrial sales)
Regressors Coefficients Standard error Coefficients Standard error
size 0.48*** 2.6E-02 –2.3E-03 1.6E-03
age -0.0034 3.3E-03 –1.8E-05 3.9E-05
k 6.2E-05 7.2E-05 4.1E-06 6.4E-06
herfindahl –0.27 0.71 0.057*** 2.0E-02
marketshare 0.16 2.1 –0.073*** 2.6E-02
wage 0.38*** 2.1E-02 6.5E-04 1.3E-03
profitability 0.055** 2.6E-02 –0.010 5.6E-03
exportintensity 0.29*** 6.4E-02 –3.0E-03 3.2E-03
debtratio –0.15 *** 4.7E-02 –3.5E-03 2.2E-03
interestpayment 0.22 0.15 0.080*** 3.0E-02
subsidy 0.56** 0.26 0.074 5.2E-02
intellectual property 
protection 0.029*** 4.3E-03 –7.9E-05 2.0E-04
percapitaGDP –7.70E-07 8.5E-06 4.6E-07 3.6E-07
year2006 0.075 2.5E-02 6.1E-04 8.7E-04
year2007 0.15 4.9E-02 –1.6E-03 1.7E-03
Note: ***, **, * indicate that the level of significance is 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: Author’s own estimations.
The influences of these variables on the R&D intensity of a firm that indeed 
conducts R&D activities are as follows. If the four-digit industry to which a 
firm belongs becomes less competitive, the more R&D intensive a firm becomes. 
The higher the market share of a firm in the four-digit industry, the less R&D 
intensive the firm becomes. The larger the share of interest payment in the 
industrial sales of a firm, the more R&D intensive the firm becomes. 
Comparing how the variables impact on the likelihood of doing R&D and 
the R&D intensity of firms, one can see the following two points. First, the 
market share of a firm, the industrial concentration of the industry to which a 
firm belongs and the share of interest payment in the industrial sales of a firm 
exert influence on the R&D intensity of a firm that conducts R&D activities, 
but not on the decision whether to do R&D. Secondly, the size of a firm, wage 
rate, profitability, export intensity, debt burden of a firm, received subsidy and 
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intellectual property rights protection positively influence the likelihood to do 
R&D, but do not significantly impact on the R&D intensity of a firm that has 
already decided to do R&D. 
Table 7.4 Regression results
Likelihood of conducting 
R&D activities
R&D intensity (share of R&D 
expenditure in total industrial sales)
Regressors Coefficients Standard error Coefficients Standard error
size 0.48*** 2.62E-02 –1.2E-03 1.3E-03
age –0.0034 3.21E-03 –2.4E-05 4.6E-05
k 6.34E-05 7.23E-05 –1.1E-06 7.1E-06
herfindahl –0.27 7.08E-01 0.068*** 2.6E-02
marketshare 0.27 2.09E+00 –0.10*** 3.5E-02
wage 0.38*** 2.05E-02 1.3E-03 1.4E-03
profitability 0.055** 2.56E-02 –0.015* 8.3E-03
exportintensity 0.30*** 6.37E-02 4.7E-04 2.7E-03
debtratio –0.15*** 4.64E-02 –1.5E-03 2.5E-03
interestpayment 0.22 1.55E-01 0.094*** 3.8E-02
subsidy 0.55** 2.55E-01 0.10 6.2E-02
Overall institutional 
quality 0.022*** 5.17E-02 9.3E-04 1.8E-03
percapitaGDP 2.28E-05*** 6.34E-06 4.0E-07 3.0E-07
year2006 –0.0751** 2.87E-02 9.4E-04 9.6E-04
year2007 –0.093* 4.81E-02 –1.1E-04 1.7E-03
Note: ***, **, * indicate that the level of significance is 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: Author’s own estimations.
On the one hand, the finding that a firm of larger size and a firm with higher 
profitability are more likely to do R&D, but may not be more R&D intensive, 
reflects the complex relationship between firm size, firm profitability and 
innovation activities; on the other hand, the finding that a firm in a more 
concentrated industry and a firm with smaller market share are more R&D 
intensive shows the links between market power and innovation activities. 
However, the evidence found in this study is not consistent with Schumpeter’s 
argument, and it requires further research on the channels behind the results to 
provide a convincing explanation. 
As to the relationship between financial constraints and innovation 
activities, the finding that a firm with a larger debt burden is less likely to do 
R&D supports the hypothesis that internal funds are a critical funding source 
for a firm’s R&D activities, and a firm with more equity will conduct more R&D 
activities. When R&D intensity is considered, the significant role of the share 
of interest payment in the industrial sales of a firm suggests the importance of 
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the availability of external funding sources, such as bank loans to fund R&D 
activities. Interestingly, the share of subsidy in total industrial sales is found to 
increase the propensity of a firm to do R&D. This finding suggests that the role of 
government in the ‘science and technology take-off’ of China may be important, 
and how government subsidy influences a firm’s investment in innovation and 
innovation output is a question that requires further research. Also, the fact 
that institutional quality matters for engaging firms in R&D activities, but not 
for R&D intensity once firms opt in to R&D activities, further points to the 
importance of other potential determinants of R&D intensity. 
Stronger intellectual property protection clearly boosts the possibility that a 
firm will invest in innovation. This finding suggests that China is no exception 
in terms of the importance of institutions that provide protection for the R&D 
fruit. If the Chinese Government hopes to achieve the goal, set in the ‘National 
Medium- and Long-Term Program for Scientific and Technological Development 
(2006–2020)’, that firms should become the major agents of R&D activities, one 
helpful strategy that the government could adopt is to build up institutions 
that facilitate market operations and strengthen the protection of intellectual 
property rights that increase the expected return to R&D investment of firms. 
Interestingly, intellectual property protection does not significantly influence 
the R&D intensity of a firm that has already decided to do R&D. This empirical 
finding suggests that the importance of the protection of intellectual property 
rights probably lies mainly in inducing a phase change of firms from technological 
imitation to innovation. Once this phase change is completed, the continuous 
growth of innovative capability may rely on other determinants and dynamics. 
The real per capita GDP of the province where a firm is located is included in 
the regression to act as a control for the influences from the stage of development. 
Provinces with higher real per capita GDP may enjoy better infrastructure, 
more human resources, or a generally more mature business environment. These 
factors could be conducive to a firm’s R&D activities and could also be correlated 
with institutional quality. Therefore, real per capita GDP is controlled in the 
regression. We can see from the results that real per capita GDP is not significant 
in explaining the likelihood of a firm to perform R&D, and the R&D intensity of 
firms that have already decided to perform R&D. This finding further confirms 
the importance of institutional quality itself. 
Lastly, a firm that has higher export intensity is found to be more likely to 
conduct R&D activities, although, for a firm that is doing R&D, export intensity 
is not significantly associated with R&D intensity. 
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Policy Implications
As China continues to draw level with countries on the world knowledge 
frontier, the need has intensified for the economy to become more knowledge-
intensive and innovative in order to sustain the growth momentum. While some 
studies argue that China has been able to grow fast despite its relatively low 
institutional quality (Huang 2008, Allen et al. 2005), the findings in this chapter 
suggest the institutional quality is critical for China’s innovative performance 
and hence for the economy’s future growth. 
This study employs a firm-level panel dataset which covers the period 
2005–2007 and covers all state-owned enterprises and all enterprises with 
annual turnover of over five million RMB. Based on an estimation strategy 
(Kyriazidou  1997) which takes into account the sample selection problem 
and the firm-level fixed effects at the same time, the study shows that higher 
levels of overall institutional quality and higher levels of intellectual property 
rights protection that exists in the province where a firm is located increase 
the likelihood that a firm will conduct R&D activities, when other potential 
determinants of a firm’s R&D participation are controlled. The two measures 
of institutional quality are not, however, found to be significantly related to a 
firm’s R&D intensity once the firm has already decided to invest in R&D. 
These findings suggest that institutional quality at the provincial level 
positively affects the decision of firms to enter into R&D activities. But, once 
firms start to do R&D, the subsequent expansion of firm-level R&D intensity 
depends on other factors. Therefore, improving domestic institutional quality is 
just the first step towards the goal of building a knowledge-intensive economy, 
becoming a global R&D player and contributing to the world pool of knowledge 
and technology. Better understanding of other factors that influence the R&D 
intensity of firms after they begin to have R&D investment is important for 
ensuring continuous growth of the firms’ innovative capabilities. For example, 
trade-related factors could be very important for the R&D intensity of firms, 
since there are complex relationships between trade and innovation suggested 
by the existing literature. Although export intensity, the only trade-related 
factor in this study, is found to enhance a firm’s likelihood of doing R&D, but 
not the R&D intensity of the firm, more trade-related measures will need to be 
considered in a complete study on the effects of firm-level trade or innovation. 
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The development of the agricultural sector plays an important role in the 
Chinese economic transformation during the reform period (1978–2012). First, the 
rural reform centring on the household production responsibility system has 
increased agricultural output and productivity, lifting millions of people out 
of absolute poverty since the late 1970s. Second, increased productivity in the 
agricultural sector, coupled with institutional reform allowing the mobility 
of rural labour force, has led to unprecedented and large-scale rural–urban 
migration, permitting China to enjoy the effects of a tremendous ‘resource shift’ 
to enhance its economic growth.1 Third, in the past 30 years, the seemingly 
unlimited supplies of labour flowing from the rural to the urban sector have 
contributed positively to China’s industrialisation process. Finally, development 
of the agricultural sector, in terms of rising outputs and productivity, helps 
China to confront the food security challenges arising from meeting the food 
demand of one-fifth of the world population using only seven per cent of the 
world’s arable land. 
The agricultural sector, however, faces some important challenges with 
respect to reform and management of the land system, economy of scale in 
agricultural production, technological development in agriculture, fertility of 
farmland, the rural social protection system, and rural community management. 
These challenges indicate that further development of the agricultural sector 
is crucial for China in implementing the new growth strategy. This chapter 
reviews the major achievements in China’s agricultural development to date, 
and discusses the key challenges now facing the sector. The chapter points out 
how China can confront these challenges by deepening the agricultural reform, 
including reform of the land system; enhancing technological progress in 
agricultural production; providing the necessary social support and protection 
for farmers as part of the government’s effort to address China’s rural and 
1   The effect of the ‘resource shift’ is defined as the efficiency gains resulting from moving resources 
(labour) from low (rural) to high (urban) productivity areas of the economy.
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urban income inequality; and, changing the consumption patterns of certain 
agricultural products in order to improve people’s health and reduce the waste 
of agricultural resources. 
Achievements in Agricultural Development
Steady Growth of Agricultural Outputs Resulting from 
Reform and Policy Change 
Agricultural production over the period from 1978 to 2012 demonstrated 
a pattern of stable growth, much due to the impact of economic reform in rural 
areas and changes in government policies towards agricultural production and 
farmers’ wellbeing. For example, from 1978 to 2012, China’s grain production 
nearly doubled and its milk production increased by 41.1 times. More recently, 
from 2000 to 2012, milk production increased 3.5 times, while vegetable oil 
production increased by 17.64 per cent. The difference in the growth rates 
during the two periods has obviously narrowed, but the outputs of all the major 
agricultural products continue to increase (Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1).
An important criterion that can be used to measure progress in agricultural 
development is output per capita, which is increasing. Grain output per capita 
was 435.4 kilograms (kg) in 2012, substantially higher than the 116.4 kg and 
69.3 kg observed in 1978 and 2000, respectively. Pork, beef and lamb per capita 
production in 2012 was also higher than the 45.5 kg and 17.0 kg observed in 
1978 and 2000. The aquatic products per capita in 2012 were higher than the 
38.7 kg and 14.2 kg observed in 1978 and 2000. The milk per capita in 2012 
is higher than the levels of 27.7 kg and 21.1 kg observed in 1978 and 2000. 
The oils per capita in 2012 are higher than the observed levels of 20.2 kg and 
2.3 kg in 1978 and 2000. The cotton per capita in 2012 is higher than the levels 
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Figure 8.1 Outputs of major agricultural products during 2000–2012
Eggs

























1978     2000    2001   2002    2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012
Source: Data for 1978–2011 is from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, data in 2012 is from Statistical 
Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China 2012.
Table 8.2 Key agricultural output per capita since 1978 (kg)
Year Grains Cotton Oils Pork, beef & lamb Aquatic products Milk
1978 319.0 2.3  5.5  9.1  4.9
2000 366.1 3.5 23.4 37.6 29.4 6.6
2001 355.9 4.2 22.5 38.0 29.9 8.1
2002 357.0 3.8 22.6 38.5 30.9 10.2
2003 334.3 3.8 21.8 39.5 31.6 13.6
2004 362.2 4.9 23.7 40.4 32.8 17.4
2005 371.3 4.4 23.6 42.0 33.9 21.1
2006 379.9 5.7 20.1 42.7 35.0 24.4
2007 380.6 5.8 19.5 40.1 36.0 26.7
2008 399.1 5.7 22.3 42.4 37.0 26.8
2009 398.7 4.8 23.7 44.4 38.4 26.4
2010 408.7 4.5 24.2 45.8 40.2 26.7
2011 425.2 4.9 24.6 45.4 41.7 27.2
2012 435.4 5.1 25.7 54.6 43.6 27.7
Increment 
(1978–2012)
116.4 2.8 20.2 45.5 38.7 27.7
Increment 
(2000–2012)
 69.3 1.6  2.3 17.0 14.2 21.1
Source: Data for 1978–2011 is from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, data for 2012 is from Statistical 
Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China 2012.
Conditions of Agricultural Production have Improved
During the period 1978–2012, the agricultural sector witnessed increases 
in the level of integrated mechanisation, which rose by almost two times from 
18.8 per cent to 56 per cent. The level rose by 10.2 percentage points during 
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1978–2000 and 27 percentage points during 2000–2012. As shown in Figure 8.2 
and Table 8.3, the level has risen more quickly since 2000. This rising level of 
integrated mechanisation has become an important factor underlying the steady 
growth of agricultural production. 
Table 8.3 Changes in the level of integrated mechanisation (%)
Year % Year % Year % Year % Year %
1978 18.8 1993 23.5 1998 27.0 2003 32.0 2008 45.0
1985 20.0 1994 24.2 1999 27.7 2004 33.5 2009 48.8
1990 20.7 1995 24.9 2000 29.0 2005 35.9 2010 50.0
1991 22.1 1996 25.6 2001 30.0 2006 38.0 2011 52.3
1992 22.8 1997 26.3 2002 31.0 2007 42.5 2012 57.0
Source: Data for 1978–2011 is from China Agricultural Yearbook 1979, 1986, 1991–2012; and data for 2012 
is from a speech given by Taolin Zhang, Vice Minister of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) at the national 
working conference on agricultural machinery purchase subsidy in Hangzhou on February 26, 2013.
Figure 8.2 Changes in the level of integrated mechanisation (%)
Source: Data for 1978–2011 is from China Agricultural Yearbook 1979, 1986, 1991–2012; and data for 2012 
is from the Ministry of Agriculture.
Over the same period, the agricultural sector also witnessed a continuous 
expansion of effective irrigation areas. Table 8.4 shows the effective irrigation 
areas during the past decades, from which one can see that the area has expanded 
by over one-third from 45 million hectares (ha) in 1978 to more than 60 million 
in 2011.
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1978 44,965.0 1994 48,759.1 2000 53,820.3 2006 55,750.5 
1985 44,035.9 1995 49,281.2 2001 54,249.4 2007 56,518.3 
1990 47,403.1 1996 50,381.4 2002 54,354.9 2008 58,471.7 
1991 47,822.1 1997 51,238.5 2003 54,014.2 2009 59,261.4 
1992 48,590.1 1998 52,295.6 2004 54,478.4 2010 60,347.7 
1993 48,727.9 1999 53,158.4 2005 55,029.3 2011 61,681.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012.
Fertilisation based on soil testing started to be used in 2005. Since then, 
the project has been implemented in all the agricultural counties (including 
state-owned farms). By 2012, the technology was being used on over 87 million 
ha, benefiting over two-thirds of the rural households in the country (Figure 
8.3). A sampling survey at the household level shows that the technology could 
increase the production of wheat, rice and corn by 3.7 per cent, 3.8 per cent, 
and 5.9 per cent per ha, respectively; increase the sale income of grains, and 
vegetables and fruits by 450 yuan/ha and 1,500 yuan/ha, respectively. By 2011, 
fertilisation based on soil testing saved over seven million tons of fertiliser, by 
which the agricultural sector has saved the equivalent of 18.2 million tons of 
coal and reduced carbon dioxide emissions by 47.3 million tons.
Figure 8.3 Areas fertilising based on the soil tested (million ha)
Note: The areas in 2005 and 2006 are estimated based on the data in 2007.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture.
One can see from Table 8.5, because of the improvement in fertilising 
technologies, that the share of nitrogen in the total fertiliser used declined from 
73.6 per cent in 1980 to 41.8 per cent in 2011, while the share of compound 
fertiliser (which improves the utilisation rate of nitrogen fertiliser) rose from 2.1 
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As shown in Figure 8.4, plastic-covered areas more than doubled over this 
period, from less than 6 million ha in 1993 to over 16 million ha in 2010. Also, 
the coverage of improved varieties of grains, cotton and oils expanded from 90 
per cent in 2005 to 96 per cent in 2012.
Figure 8.4 Expansion of plastic-covered areas during 1993–2010 (1,000 ha)
Source: Ministry of Agriculture.
The agricultural sector has also demonstrated a tendency to increase regional 
concentration in the production of major agricultural products. As shown in 
Table 8.6, the share of grain production in the 13 major provinces (regions) rose 
from 69.21 per cent during 1949–1959 to 75.15 during 2000–1009 and further to 
77.78 per cent during 2010–2012, increased by 5.94 and 8.57 percentage points, 
respectively. Zones have been created for the production of soybeans and corn 
in the north-east, nuts and wheat in the Huang–Huai–Hai region, oilseeds in 
the Yangtze watershed, and cotton in the Yellow River watershed and the north-
west. In addition, pork produced in the 13 major provinces accounts for over 
75 per cent of the country’s total production and the milk produced in the seven 
major provinces accounts for over 60 per cent of the country’s total production.
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Hebei 4.79 4.92 5.21 4.91 5.40 5.50 5.47
Inner 
Mongolia
1.99 2.09 1.70 1.52 2.57 3.33 4.12
Liaoning 3.48 3.26 3.76 3.25 3.28 3.35 3.42
Jilin 3.21 3.01 3.12 3.47 4.41 4.94 5.45
Heilongjiang 4.51 4.25 4.53 4.10 5.72 5.99 9.52
Jiangsu 6.57 6.95 7.15 8.02 7.01 6.21 5.78
Anhui 5.05 4.67 5.35 5.56 5.25 5.67 5.54
Jiangxi 3.41 4.03 3.81 3.87 3.49 3.62 4.07
Shandong 7.21 6.50 6.90 7.66 8.44 8.04 7.73
Henan 6.61 5.82 6.42 7.02 7.54 9.55 9.68
Hubei 5.21 5.63 5.47 5.54 5.18 4.51 4.16
Hunan 5.85 5.94 6.30 6.59 5.70 5.62 5.12
Sichuan 11.32 10.21 9.26 10.12 9.32 8.82 7.72
Total 69.21 67.28 68.98 71.63 73.31 75.15 77.78
Source: Data for 1949–1999 is from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China; 
data for 2000–2011 is from China Agricultural Yearbook 2001–2012; and, data for 2012 is from National 
Statistics Bureau, Grain Production Communiqué, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-11/30/content_2279385.htm
Agricultural Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is Rising
Current research shows that the annual growth rate of China’s TFP in 
the agricultural sector rose by around one percentage point during 1985–
2010. According to information released by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the contribution of technological progress to China’s agricultural growth 
is 54.5  per  cent in 2012 (Table 8.7). During 1985–2010, the annual growth 
rate of China’s TFP was 3.8 per cent on average, of which the annual growth 
rate of  agricultural technological progress is 5.1 per cent, while the annual 
growth rate of agricultural technical efficiency is –1.2 per cent. Obviously, the 
technological progress promotes the growth of China’s TFP, while the decline 
in the technical efficiency partly offsets the effects of technological progress in 
enhancing productivity. 
Productivity growth in China’s agriculture is further estimated by dividing 
the whole period into four sub-periods (1985–1989, 1990–1995, 1996–2003, and 
2004–2010) and by dividing the whole country into different regions (the major 
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and non-major agricultural production regions and the eastern, central and 
western regions), and the results are the same. China’s TFP growth in the 
agricultural sector during this period, therefore, is mainly technology induced. 










1986/1985 0.964 1.086 1.048 2001/2000 0.986 1.027 1.012
1987/1986 0.997 1.000 0.996 2002/2001 1.006 0.990 0.996
1988/1987 0.978 1.077 1.053 2003/2002 0.976 1.092 1.066
1989/1988 1.008 1.039 1.047 2004/2003 0.997 1.125 1.122
1990/1989 1.007 1.025 1.033 2005/2004 0.970 1.055 1.023
1991/1990 0.972 1.014 0.986 2006/2005 1.208 1.050 1.269
1992/1991 0.939 1.052 0.987 2007/2006 0.808 1.074 0.868
1993/1992 0.988 1.165 1.150 2008/2007 0.997 1.103 1.100
1994/1993 0.979 1.120 1.097 2009/2008 1.021 1.030 1.052
1995/1994 1.047 1.096 1.147 2010/2009 0.992 1.028 1.020
1996/1995 0.989 1.061 1.049 1989/1985 0.983 1.058 1.036
1997/1996 0.954 1.030 0.982 1995/1990 0.988 1.077 1.064
1998/1997 0.992 0.952 0.944 2003/1996 0.987 1.015 1.001
1999/1998 1.025 0.970 0.994 2004/2010 0.993 1.066 1.059
2000/1999 0.966 1.008 0.973 2010/1985 0.988 1.051 1.038
Note: The national index is the geometric mean of the provincial indexes. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1986–2011; Li and Zhang (forthcoming).
The question is, then, whether the agricultural sector has room for further 
improving technical efficiency, rather than continuously relying on the 
expansion of economies of scale. As shown in Table 8.8, technical efficiency in 
China’s grain production is 0.795, which shows that significant room remains 
for further improvement. On the other hand, the economies of scale is already 
0.957, and room for further improvement is not substantial. Increasing total 
land areas may, however, help with increasing farmers’ income. There are almost 
no remarkable economies of scale in the production of wheat, rice and corn 
(Xu et al. 2011). Expanding the land scale would have a significant effect on 
the reduction of production costs. Each additional mu (1/15 ha) in the scale 
expansion could reduce the cost by two to ten per cent. That means that the 
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Farmers’ Contributions to Growth of Agricultural 
Production 
Under the planned economic system, famers are required to live in rural 
areas, be engaged in agricultural production, and participate in collective 
production. Agricultural productivities are low under that system because of 
the absence of incentives for farmers to work hard. The key to rural reform 
is to empower farmers through institutional and policy changes. During the 
early stage of reform, farmers were granted the right to make decisions on their 
own production. This had tremendous incentive effects and farmers quickly 
solved the problem of agricultural shortages. During the mid 1980s, farmers 
were empowered with the right to be engaged in non-agricultural industries. 
This allowed farmers to engage in substantial off-farm opportunities, and they 
created the miracle of township and village enterprises (TVEs), which occupy 
half of the country’s industry. Since the 1990s, farmers have been empowered 
with the right to be employed in the urban areas; this has led to large-scale 
rural–urban migration, with farmers soon becoming the major force in China’s 
working class. For the next period of development, farmers should be empowered 
with the right to be integrated into urban life, and to participate in managing 
urban affairs. 
Table 8.9 shows that the number of farmers employed in non-agricultural 
sectors more than quadrupled from 59.6 million in 1985 to 262.61 million in 2012. 
Table 8.10 illustrates that, of the total farmers employed outside agriculture, 
almost half leave the land individually, while the other half are those who are 
employed in the local areas or with their families in other areas. These statistics 
underline social problems arising from rural–urban migration, as many migrant 
workers have moved to the cities on their own, leaving their families in rural 
homes. 
With the expansion of employment opportunities, the contribution of farmers 
to China’s national economy has extended from agricultural to non-agricultural 
sectors and from rural to urban areas. As shown in Table 8.11, from 2008 to 
2012, the share of GDP created by farmers employed outside agriculture in the 
country’s GDP rose from 32.1 per cent to 38.6 per cent, 6.5 percentage points 
increase in four years. The farmers’ contribution to GDP would be bigger 
if one takes into account the income earned by selling cheap farmland to the 
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Farmers’ Income is Rapidly Increasing
From 1978 to 2012, farmers’ per capita income increased from 133.6 yuan 
to 7,917 yuan, a 10.77 times increase at constant prices. During the same 
period, urban residents’ per capita disposable income rose from 343.4 yuan to 
24,565 yuan, a 10.46 times increase at constant prices. This means that farmers’ 
and urban residents’ incomes are growing at basically the same rates over the 
entire reform period. Judged by this statistic, it may not be accurate to argue 
that the income difference between rural and urban residents has expanded, 
even though the absolute levels of per capita income between rural and urban 
residents are different. In recent years, the growth rate of rural incomes has 
been faster than that of urban incomes. There are a number of factors which 
have lead to a more rapid increase in farmers’ incomes.
First, distortions in agricultural prices have been eliminated through reform 
and price liberalisation, which enables farmers to work harder to benefit more 
from market prices. Agricultural taxes were abolished in 2005. At the same 
time, government agricultural subsidies are increasing. These changes have 
substantially increased farmers’ incomes and contributed to narrowing the 
difference between urban and rural incomes. 
Second, the income of farmers employed in non-agricultural sectors 
is underestimated. Farmers usually regard the money that they take back home 
as their income, but ignore the money that they have spent in the urban locations 
in which they are employed. In total there are 160 million Chinese farmers 
employed outside their hometown. If one of them spends 2,000 yuan a month 
in their place of employment, then the living costs for those 160 million farmers 
is 320 billion yuan per month. This money can be converted to an average per 
capita income of 300 yuan for all the farmers in China, but this amount is not 
currently included in calculating the total income of farmers. 
Third, calculations of the income of urban residents includes government 
subsidies for housing and medical treatment, and this inflates the urban income. 
As a result, estimates based on provincial-level data show that the ratio of urban 
to rural nominal income goes down (Table 8.12 and Figure 8.5). Because of this, 
increasingly, farmers prefer to maintain their administrative status as rural, 
rather urban, residents. This change in attitude on the part of farmers reflects 
the narrowing of the difference between rural and urban incomes, and that 




Table 8.12 Comparison of the incomes of farmers and urban residents since 1978
Year 
Farmers’ net income 
(per capita)











1978  133.6  100.0  343.4  100.0 2.6
1980  191.3  139.0  477.6  127.0 2.5
1985  397.6  268.9  739.1  160.4 1.9
1990  686.3  311.2  1,510.2  198.1 2.2
1991  708.6  317.4  1,700.6  212.4 2.4
1992  784.0  336.2  2,026.6  232.9 2.6
1993  921.6  346.9  2,577.4  255.1 2.8
1994 1221.0  364.3  3,496.2  276.8 2.9
1995 1577.7  383.6  4,283.0  290.3 2.7
1996 1926.1  418.1  4,838.9  301.6 2.5
1997 2090.1  437.3  5,160.3  311.9 2.5
1998 2162.0  456.1  5,425.1  329.9 2.5
1999 2210.3  473.5  5,854.0  360.6 2.6
2000 2253.4  483.4  6,280.0  383.7 2.8
2001 2366.4  503.7  6,859.6  416.3 2.9
2002 2,475.6  527.9  7,702.8  472.1 3.1
2003 2,622.2  550.6  8,472.2  514.6 3.2
2004 2,936.4  588.0  9,421.6  554.2 3.2
2005 3,254.9  624.5 10,493.0  607.4 3.2
2006 3,587.0  670.7 11,760.0  670.7 3.3
2007 4,140.4  734.4 13,786.0  752.5 3.3
2008 4,760.6  793.2 15,781.0  815.7 3.3
2009 5,153.2  860.6 17,175.0  895.4 3.3
2010 5,919.0  954.4 19,109.0  965.2 3.2
2011 6,977.0 1,063.2 21,810.0 1,046.3 3.1
2012 7,917.0 1,177.0 24,565.0 1,145.7 3.1
Source: Data for 1978–2011 is from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, and data for 2012 is from Statistical 
Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China 2012.
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
162
Figure 8.5 A fitting curve of the ratio of urban to rural per capita incomes using 
provincial-level data during 1978–2010
Source: Data for 1978–1999 is from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, 
and data for 2000–2010 is from China Agruculture Yearbook 2001–2011.
Farmers’ Welfare is Improving
Besides rapid increases in income, farmers’ welfare is also improving. 
First, development of the economies of the central and western regions and the 
counties has created more opportunities for farmers to be employed in their 
local areas. This might not raise farmers’ incomes to the same level that can be 
earned in the cities, but the quality of life of the farmer and the extended family 
is significantly improved by remaining in the local area. Changes in government 
policies in favour of the agricultural sector have accordingly improved the 
welfare of farmers.
Second, the outsourcing of agricultural production is now substituting for 
the work of farmers’ families. Contracting out farm work to others increases the 
family’s production expenditures, but reduces the family’s labour intensity on 
farm and household work, thereby improving their welfare and quality of life. 
Third, the market-oriented services that are increasingly available to farmers 
are substituting for housework. This substitution obviously raises the family’s 
spending on food and other consumption items, and inhibits the decline 
of the Engel coefficient, as one would normally see with rising income. As a 
result, however, families have more leisure time and consequently experience 
a remarkable improvement in their welfare.
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Major Achievements in the Rural Development
For the past decade, 2002–2012, with the improvement of China’s agricultural 
policies, there have been notable achievements in rural development, especially 
in terms of farmers’ income, agricultural production, the environment and social 
change. 
From Collecting Agricultural Surplus to Supporting 
Agricultural Development
Before tax and fee policy reform in 2005, village committees and local 
governments collected 150–160 billion yuan per year from famers in agricultural, 
livestock, special agricultural product taxes, and ‘three retained fees’, 
‘five overall planned fees’, and unwanted pooling of funds.2 Agricultural taxes 
accounted for around one-third of the total taxes collected by the government. 
Since 2004, the central and provincial governments issued a series of policies, 
including the provision of direct subsidies for grain production, improved 
varieties of agricultural products, purchases of large-scale farm machinery, 
and agricultural production inputs. As shown in Table 8.13, only the direct 
subsidies for grain production have remained stable since 2007, while the others 
have increased to the significant benefit of farmers.
Table 8.13 The central government’s subsidies to agriculture (billion yuan)
Year Total Subsidies for 
the input







2003 13.00 – – – –
2004 14.52 – 11.60 2.85 0.07
2005 17.37 – 13.20 3.87 0.30
2006 30.95 12.00 14.20 4.15 0.60
2007 51.36 27.60 15.10 6.66 2.00
2008 103.04 71.60 15.10 12.34 4.00
2009 127.45 79.50 15.10 19.85 13.00
2010 122.59 70.59 15.10 20.40 16.50
2011 140.6 86.00 15.10 22.00 17.50
2012 166.4 107.80 15.10 22.00 21.50
Source: Ministry of Finance.
2   The Chinese Government started reforming agricultural and rural tax and fee policies in 2003 and the 
reform task was basically completed by the end of 2004, leading to the abolition of agricultural tax in 
2005. 
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From General Support to Key Specific Support by 
the Governments
From the start of the reform process, the central government’s policies were 
general and applied consistently across the country. Later, in order to promote 
the formation of agricultural production zones, some key support policies were 
implemented. For instance, since 2005 a policy has been implemented to reward 
the governments of counties for meeting grain-production targets (Table 8.14). 
Since 2007 the policy has been expanded to include a target for the sale of 
hogs outside the county (1.5 billion yuan per year) and, since 2008, a target 
of 2.5 billion yuan per year has been set for the production of oils. Guided by 
industrial policies, agricultural production is concentrating on these favoured 
areas, and the zoning production of the key agricultural products is more and 
more obvious. 
Table 8.14 The central government’s special funds for rewarding the governments 
of counties where a certain amount of grains are produced 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Funds (billion yuan) 5.5 8.5 12.5 14.0 17.5 21.0 22.5
Source: Ministry of Finance.
From Promoting Production to Protecting the Environment 
In the past decade, the Chinese Government began to pay more attention to 
ecological protection and addressing environmental concerns, issuing policies 
to protect forest, grassland and wetland systems. 
In order to eliminate the negative impacts of deforestation on the 
environment, in 1998 the Chinese Government implemented a natural forest 
protection project. The project was implemented in the upper Yangtze River, the 
middle and upper Yellow River, the north-eastern regions and Inner Mongolia, 
and other state-owned natural forest areas. The project will be implemented 
in different phases, the first of which was divided into two stages. The first 
stage, from 2000–2005, had the major tasks of stopping deforestation of natural 
forests, constructing ecological forests, and redeploying individuals who lost 
jobs because of the policy. The second stage ran from 2006 to 2010 and the 
major tasks were to protect the natural forests, recover vegetation, and promote 
sustainable development. The total investment in the project is 96.2 billion 
yuan and it has resulted in the protection of 56 million ha of natural forests, 
the establishment of 15.27 million ha of afforestation, and an increase in forest 
stocks of 460 million cubic metres. 
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In 2011, the project entered into the second phase with a planned investment of 
244 billion yuan. The main goals are to, by 2020, increase the ecological forests 
by 7.7 million ha and other forests by 5.2 million ha, forest stocks by 1.1 billion 
cubic meters, and carbon sequestration by 416 million tons. The project also 
aims to increase biodiversity significantly, and to maintain social stability in 
forest areas.
The project of converting cropland to forestland started in 1999. In all 
China’s ecological construction projects, this one has received the greatest 
investment and  covers the most extensive areas. The investment for the first 
phase is 224.5 billion yuan and involves planting trees on croplands and barren 
areas and closing the hillsides to facilitate the growth of forests. Forest areas 
have been increased by 24.27 million ha and forest coverage has risen by over 
two percentage points on average. In 2007, when the government policy of 
subsidising grains and living costs expired, the government added 206.6 billion 
yuan to subsidise the farming households that are involved in implementing 
the project. The total investment is 431.1 billion yuan during the two phases 
of project implementation.
In addition, China also implemented projects involving forest shelter-
belts, dust-storm source control around Beijing, wildlife conservation, natural 
reserves, and fast-growing and high-yield timber forests. Promoted by these 
projects, China’s forest area has increased by 60.4 per cent from 121.86 million 
ha to 195.45 million ha, the stumpage volume has increased by 56.5 per cent 
from 9.53 billion m3 to 14.91 billion m3, and the forest-coverage ratio rose from 
12.70 per cent to 20.36 per cent over the period 2000–2010.
Table 8.15 shows the results of the six major forest projects. One can see 
that carbon sequestration increased by 338.22 million ton per year, of which 
175 million tons is produced by the new forests, accounting for over 50 per cent 
of the total carbon sequestration.
China has also amended development strategies for pastoral areas and 
changed the focus from agricultural production to preservation of grasslands and 
animals. The goal is to increase agricultural efficiency and preserve the natural 
environment by limiting grazing areas and fencing grasslands. This policy 
shift has helped China to complete the transformation from focusing purely on 
economic growth to focusing on ecological systems and economic development. 
By so doing, China has given a higher priority to the environment. 
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Table 8.15 Area and carbon sequestration of the six major forest projects 
during 2000–2010


















49.4 11.13 31.7 7.13
Natural forest 
protection
388.8 94.99 83.9 18.99
Forest 
shelterbelts




133.3 40.20 133.3 40.20
Natural reserve 9.74 22.98 0 0
Total 133.27 338.22 66.46 175.00
Source: State Forestry Administration.
During 2003–2010, the total investment in the protection of grasslands 
was 14.3 billion yuan, of which 10 billion yuan was subsidised by the central 
government and 4.3 billion yuan was matched by local governments. The policy 
subsidises ranchers with a seasonal payment of 82.5 kg/ha per year of grains 
(around 74.25 yuan/ha per year) for nine months, and 20.625 kg/ha per year 
of grains (around 18.56 yuan/ha per year) for  three months. The ranchers are 
subsidised with a payment of 247.5 yuan/ha for fencing. The subsidy period 
runs for five years. 
In order to intensify conservation of grasslands, China also aims to change 
the style of animal husbandry, to promote the ranchers’ continuous increase 
in income, and to maintain the country’s ecological safety. Since 2011, the 
central government has allocated 13.6 billion yuan/year to subsidise and reward 
grassland conservation in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, 
Gansu, Ningxia, and Yunnan. The activities and reward standards are:
1. A 90 yuan/ha subsidy to ranchers for stopping grazing in heavily degraded 
grassland areas.
2. Ranchers who graze within an established grazing capacity are rewarded 
with a payment of 22.5 yuan/ha.
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3. Ranchers who produce on the 6 million ha artificial grassland within the 
eight provinces are subsidised with a payment of 150 yuan/ha for their 
use of improved varieties of livestock and grass. The two-million rancher 
households in the eight provinces are subsidised with a total payment of 
500 yuan/household for their production inputs. 
In total, the area in which grazing is forbidden now covers 29.3 million ha. 
According to results provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, the coverage, 
height and production of grass in the project area has increased 29 per cent, 
64 per cent, and 78 per cent than those in the non-project areas, respectively. 
During the 1950s–1970s, a large number of lakes in China were converted 
to farmland, as a result of concerns about grain shortages. Since the mid 1980s, 
China reached food self-sufficiency and the government started to implement a 
policy of converting cropland back to lakes, which altered China’s 1,000-year 
history of converting lakes to farmland. 
The Plan of National Wetland Conservation (2002–2030) proposes that over 
90 per cent of natural lakes would be effectively conserved and protected by 
2030, enhancing wetland systems and reaching the target of sustainable use of 
wetland resources. 
From Economic to Social Development
With the increasing strength of the national economy, China has 
strengthened the implementation of the free and compulsory education system, 
and cooperative medical care in rural areas. The government has also tried to 
realise equalisation in financing infrastructure supply, providing minimum 
living security, and a social pension system in rural areas. 
The free and compulsory education system started to be implemented in 
2006. The system includes that, during the compulsory education period, all 
rural students’ tuition and fees are waived, students from poor families are 
provided with textbooks and the living expenses of boarders from poor families 
are subsidised. Public funds for rural primary and secondary schools have 
increased and funds for the maintenance and reconstruction of rural primary 
and secondary schools, and teachers’ salaries, are guaranteed. 
This system was implemented in parts of the western and central regions 
in 2006 and extended to the whole country in 2007. Government payments for 
the ‘two exemptions and one subsidy’ reduced the over-230 billion yuan being 
spent by rural families on education, cutting 250 yuan/year in education costs 
and 390 yuan/year of expenses for families with a student at a primary and 
secondary school.
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At present, the net enrollment rate in China’s primary schools is 99.5 per cent; 
the gross enrollment rate in the secondary schools is 98.5 per cent, 13 and 
20 percentage points higher than the world average level, respectively, and close 
to the levels in the developed countries. 
Since 2003, a new type of cooperative medical care has been promoted. By the 
end of 2011 the program covered 832 million rural residents in 2,637 counties, 
accounting for 97.5 per cent of the rural population. The total fund raised for 
the program reached 204.76 billion yuan in 2011, with the per capita level 
reaching 246.2 yuan. The total payments were 171.02 billion yuan, with the total 
beneficiaries numbering 1.315 billion person-time. Of the beneficiaries, hospital 
treatments were provided for 700 million person-time; general outpatients 
numbered 1.167 billion person-time, effectively reducing the economic burden 
on farmers for medical treatments. 
By 2012, the participation rate in cooperative medical care has risen to 98.1 
per cent. In the beginning, the standard payment was 30 yuan per capita, of 
which the government subsidised 20 yuan, while the participants paid 10 yuan. 
In 2012, the payment rose to 300 yuan per capita, of which the government 
subsidised 250 yuan. 
As for the provision of the rural infrastructure, a key focus is the provision 
of safe drinking water. There are two objectives in this plan. The first, which 
was achieved in 2000, related to quantitative security whereby rural residents 
always have ready access to drinking water. The second objective is to achieve 
qualitative security. In 2000, there were 379 million rural residents without 
access to safe drinking water. During the tenth five-year plan period, conditions 
were improved for 67 million rural residents. During the 11th five-year plan 
period, another 213 million rural residents could access safe drinking water. 
It is anticipated that the second objective will be achieved in 2013. 
Rural infrastructure extends to electricity supply, for which there are three 
objectives. The first objective, which was achieved in 1997, was the provision of 
electricity to all counties, almost all the townships and villages, and 95 per cent 
of the country’s rural households. The second objective, achieved by the end 
of the 11th five-year plan period, was to improve the reliability of electricity 
supply in rural areas and lower the cost of electricity for rural consumers. 
The third objective is that rural residents experience parity with urban residents 
for supply and cost of electricity. This will be achieved by updating the rural 




The objective of rural road construction has been regularly updated. The first 
objective, which was achieved by the end of the 20th century, involved the 
provision of roads suitable for motor vehicles. The second objective, basically 
achieved during the 11th five-year plan period, is that all towns and villages 
would have all-weather road access. The present objective is about the integration 
of urban and rural road networks. 
The government has also focused on the provision and improvement of rural 
communication infrastructure by the construction of television, telephone, and 
internet infrastructure. 
In 1996 China started implementing pilot projects to address minimum living 
security in a couple of provinces and cities. In 2007, the project extended to all 
the country’s rural areas (Table 8.16). The procedure involves a farmer submitting 
an application to a village committee, which considers the candidates’ financial 
conditions. The application from approved candidates is sent to the township 
government for verification and the result is sent to the county bureau of civil 
affairs, which approves or rejects the application. In order to guarantee fairness 
and transparency, all levels of assessment are responsible for publicising the 
results of their deliberations.
During 2006–2010, the country started providing the social pension 
system to rural aged people aged over 60. By 2011, in the pilot project areas, 
around 326 million rural aged residents participated in the project, of which 
85.25  million received the pension. The implementation of the rural social 
pension system  reflects two fundamental changes: one is a shift from relying on 
farmers’ posterity and land to their family income; and the other is a shift from 
aged people relying on their families to depending on the society. 
Overall, the government’s expenditure on agriculture and rural development 
is rapidly increasing over time. Figure 8.6 shows the increasing trend of the 
central government’s total expenditure on agriculture, farmers and rural areas. 
One can see that, since 2002, expenditure has been continuously rising. The 
amount increased from 190.5 billion yuan in 2003 to 1,238.7 billion yuan in 
2012, a rise from 13.7 per cent to 22.1 per cent of China’s total expenditure. 

































































































































































































































































































Figure 8.6 Central government’s expenditure on agriculture, farmers, and rural 
areas: 2002–2012 (billion yuan)
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs.
New Challenges Faced by the Rural Sector 
Despite these tremendous achievements in rural sector development, 
the agricultural and rural sector in China faces important challenges. Confronting 
these challenges will determine the way by which the agricultural sector will 
further develop and, more importantly, how agricultural development will 
contribute to China’s future economic growth and social development and 
stability. These challenges are outlined below. 
Coping with the Decline in Agricultural Competitiveness 
In recent years, China’s net imports of agricultural products has increased. 
Locally grown soybean, a land-intensive product, is largely substituted by 
foreign supplies. Corn imports are also increasing, as are imports of rice and 
cotton, which are labour-intensive. There are three reasons for the decline in the 
competitiveness of China’s agriculture. The first is the rising cost of agricultural 
labour. In reality, young adults are employed outside agriculture or local areas, 
and those left to undertake rural labour are the elderly, women and children. 
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The rural population is also made up of landlords, who contract out their lands to 
professional farmers. Most of the mechanical ploughing, sowing and harvesting 
is conducted by professional farmers who provide outsourcing services.3 
Table 8.17 shows that the production of rice, wheat and corn in China only 
needed 177.8, 121.5, and 149.6 working days per ha in 2004, respectively. 
The amount of labour for producing these three crops declined to 117.3, 84.6 and 
110.0 working days per ha in 2010, respectively. During the same period, labour 
costs rose from 2,571.6, 1,677.6, and 2,107.4 yuan per ha to 3,998.7, 2,682.5, 
and 3,526.5 yuan per ha. The cost of land also continues to increase. With the 
expansion in the scale of land transfer, particularly because the demand for 
land transfer is greater than the supply, land transfer costs have risen to 9000–
12000 yuan/ha. The costs of other production inputs have also risen over time. 
As these three factors may persist, it will be a challenge for China to manage the 
decline in its agricultural competitiveness. 
Table 8.17 Labour and labour costs in the production of rice, wheat and corn per ha
Labour (days) Cost of labour (yuan/mu)
2004 2010 Decline (%) 2004 2010 Increase (%)
Average 149.6 104.0 30.5 2,118.9 3,402.6 60.6
Rice 177.8 117.3 34.0 2,571.6 3,998.7 55.5
Wheat 121.5 84.6 30.4 1,677.6 2,682.5 59.9
Corn 149.6 110.0 26.5 2,107.4 3,526.5 67.3
Source: Materials of Agricultural Costs and Returns, China Agricultural Production Cost and Benefit data 
Collection 2005, and 2011.
Reducing Farming Intensity
China’s agriculture is moving from a traditional to a modern system. 
Traditionally, agriculture pursued maximum productivity, and additional 
inputs stop at the point where the marginal product is zero. Modern agriculture 
pursues maximum profit, and additional inputs stop at the point where they 
equal marginal revenue. Comparing modern with traditional agriculture, 
marginal inputs tend to be higher than marginal outputs. For this reason, the 
decline in farming intensity is typical of modern agriculture and is observable 
in China in the decision of farmers to change from double to single cropping on 
two-quarters of the agricultural land. 
3   Rural households make the logical decision to encourage their young adult members to seek employment 
outside agriculture; at present, land holdings are too small for farmers to be fully employed. Productivity 
levels under a reformed agricultural system need to be determined over time and, that being the case, 
outsourcing arrangements can help farmers to be fully employed, which is a win-win system. 
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Changing from double to single cropping has three advantages. First, the 
farmer’s income increases, resulting from higher prices caused by reduced 
output. In 2006, the net profit of double-cropping rice was 3,813.7 yuan/ha, 
while the net profit of single-cropping rice was 4,504.5 yuan/ha. Second, single 
cropping saves inputs, such as irrigation, fertiliser and pesticides. Third, one 
season fallow is conducive to maintaining the fertility of the land. Clearly, the 
disadvantage in single cropping is the decline in the total output on a unit of 
farmland, but the extent of decline in the total output is less than the extent of 
decline in the seeded area. During 1998–2006, in two-quarters of the agricultural 
area, the area of double-cropping rice decreased by 13 per cent, while the total 
output of rice decreased by only 5.4 per cent. Considering the fact that less 
seeds are needed in single cropping, there is an impact on the volume of grain 
available for consumption. It is unlikely that there will be a reversal of the 
current trend in agricultural production intensities. 
The fertility of land is limited both physically and ecologically. The intensity 
of farming and multiple cropping indexes is not, therefore, a case of more being 
better. At the early stage of reform, some places even practiced triple cropping, 
which was a response to profit incentives. In the future, the traditional 
concept that planting should be practiced in any crop growing season must be 
abandoned. The traditional thinking that while a fallow season maintains soil 
fertility but leaves the land uncultivated for no income, must be changed. When 
food is relatively scarce, the country could subsidise farmers to produce grains 
by double cropping; when food is relatively abundant, the choice to single crop 
must be respected. 
Promoting the Economy of Scale in Production
The promotion of scale operations in agricultural production by transferring 
rights to farmland between farmers and/or between farmers and enterprises 
should be an important part of agricultural transformation, and also a key 
measure to enhance the competitiveness of China’s agriculture and the economies 
of scale. Farmers, however, pay some attention to the economies of scale, but 
also are concerned about the risk involved in sharing the benefits derived from 
increased economies of scale. That is the major reason why a lot of economies 
of scale have not developed. In addition, the obstacles faced by farmers in 
migrating to cities and non-agricultural industries have not been completely 
eliminated; the social security system has not been fully established. These are 
the factors that currently restrict land transfer. The challenge is to ensure that 
farmers do not risk losing their land rights, that they are provided with a stable 
source of income should they choose to be employed in non-agricultural sectors, 
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and that social security can be regarded as an adequate substitute for land 
security. Before this happens, it is not realistic to expect farmers to recognise 
the advantages of increasing scale operation in production.
As mentioned earlier, for grain production, the major benefits of land scale 
operation are reducing the costs and increasing the income, but the role of raising 
grain production to increase farmers’ income is limited. In reality, most land 
transfer is related to land that is not used for grain production. The operation 
scale must be considered in the context of particular locations, including their 
economic, social and institutional conditions, instead of taking the agricultural 
operation scale in other countries or regions as a benchmark for China.4
Besides the scale operation, there are other measures that could increase 
agricultural efficiency:
• actively guiding famers to cooperate in the purchase of production 
factors, land consolidation, construction and maintenance of agricultural 
infrastructure
• adopting advanced agronomic measures
• establishing and improving agricultural equipment and outsourcing services 
• optimising industrial patterns and updating industrial structures. 
The difficulties in implementing these measures are smaller than those 
related to the issue of land transfer practices. These measures should, therefore, 
be the first choices for the government to adopt in order to increase agricultural 
productivity. 
Promoting Cooperation between Farmers
In theory, at least, there are many advantages in farmers working in 
cooperation. In reality, however, there are many obstacles to hamper such 
cooperation. First, rural so-called elites will use government policies to 
generate personal benefits, but they are unwilling to help other farmers. This is 
the major reason why it is difficult for farmers to cooperate with each other. 
Second, outsourcing of services could meet the farmers’ demand for mechanical 
ploughing, sowing, and harvesting. This is a form of cooperation on which 
a farmer can rely that is based on a market mechanism. Third, agricultural 
enterprises are based on enterprises + households, and this structure has the 
effect of making farmers’ cooperatives redundant. The challenge is to coordinate 
cooperative arrangements for the benefit of famers. 
4   In general, agricultural scale is larger in immigrant societies, such the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Brazil, Argentina, and north-eastern China and Xinjiang, and smaller in non-immigrant societies. 
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Strengthening the Management of Food Consumption
In 2012, China’s production of grain, meat, and aquatic products were 435 kg 
per capita, 54.6 kg per capita, and 43.6 kg per capita, which is higher than the 
world average (332.7 kg per capita, 42.1 kg per capita, and 22.1kg per capita) by 
30.7 per cent, 29.7 per cent, and 97.3 per cent, respectively. China’s production 
of vegetables and fruits per capita is also higher than the world average level. 
Nevertheless, because management of production is not well developed, 
there is significant waste and excessive consumption, which leads to waste of 
agricultural resources. The challenge is to how effectively solve these problems 
and ensure the sustainable development of China’s agriculture. 
The measures that need to be taken include improvement of equipment for 
and conditions of grain storage (to reduce loss), establishing standards for grain 
processing, and raising awareness of the relationship between both diet and 
health, and agriculture and environmental degradation.
Protection of Farmers’ Land Rights following Urbanisation 
In the early phase of urbanisation in China, new cities and towns were 
mainly built on farmland. Fearful of losing too much farmland, the central 
government has been strengthening the management of farmland, and 
construction of the urban areas has been focusing more on transformation of old 
cities and towns. The space in established urban areas is limited, and the costs 
of transformation are high; thus, construction of urban areas has been moving 
towards consolidation of construction (non-farm) land in rural areas. There are 
key policy implications related to the further development of urban areas on 
rural land so as to accommodate more migrants. 
First, the construction of urban areas on consolidated rural land should be 
undertaken in stages. According to our survey, however, some local government 
officials in a number of local areas have been eager to complete consolidation 
in rural areas within their appointed terms to boost their performance and 
achievements. Second, it is advantageous that consolidation relates to demand; 
thus, urbanisation is a result of, rather than a prerequisite for, development. 
For  this reason, farmers should be encouraged to move to non-agricultural 
sectors and/or urban areas, and the government should establish a social 
security system for rural residents to increase their employment opportunities 
in non-agricultural sectors. Only under these circumstances will social security 
be seen as a fair substitute for land security. By so doing, farmers’ interests will 
be guaranteed rather passively lost without full compensation. It is a challenge 
for China to find appropriate ways to solve problems arising from further 
urbanisation. 
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Establishing New Systems of Community Management 
for Social Stability
To strengthen the rural community management system, organisations 
supporting farmers should be strengthened. The major tasks of rural community 
management include: to strengthen the cohesion of rural communities, promote 
the development of rural communities, and mediate conflicts in order to 
maintain the stability of rural communities. It is also important to build channels 
of communication between farmers and different levels of government, so that 
the needs and interests of the rural sector can be addressed democratically. 
In order to promote the democratic management of rural communities, the 
government must accept the supervision of farmers’ organisations, and there 
must be systems to facilitate participation and influence from the rural sector. 
The first step is to improve the system of ‘one project one discussion’ that 
dominates public affairs and public finances at the village level, and improve 
the method of providing rewards and subsidies to farmers in order to promote 
public welfare at the village level. The participation of farmers (or their 
organisations) in public affairs will change the way that government functions 
in local communities and will have a direct effect on improving farmers’ welfare. 
The challenge for governments is to transform current management techniques 
by empowering farmers’ collective actions.
Conclusion
In short, the issues relating to farmers, agriculture, and rural areas are 
the weak links on the chain of China’s economic development. It is crucial 
to resolve these issues in order to promote the development of the national 
economy. Rural  China is undergoing rapid economic and social changes, 
which have impacted on the ways in which farmers, traditional communities 
and governments operate. To  confront these challenges, it is important for 
government policies to complement market mechanisms in facilitating the 
ongoing process of urbanisation, and creating more employment opportunities 
for both migrant workers and farmers, while maintaining rural social stability 
at time of rapid social change. It is also important for the government to adopt 
measures that conform to or respect farmers’ own choices through developing 
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9 Rural–Urban Migration: 
Trend and Policy Implications (2008–2012)
Xin Meng
Over the past 20 years China has experienced unprecedented economic 
growth. During this period rural to urban migration has increased from 
39 million in 1996 to 159 million in 2011 (NBS 2012). Migrants have contributed 
significantly to China’s economic miracle. It is foreseeable that rural–urban 
migration in China will continue to grow, together with China’s economic 
maturity in the next decades to come. A systematic record of the migration 
movement has, however, been lacking. As an exception, over the past five years 
the Rural–Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) project has been monitoring the 
changes in the rural–urban migration process. This chapter intends to present 
the dynamic progress of rural–urban migration in terms of migrant demographic 
composition, labour market outcomes and their access to social welfare.
The RUMiC survey was initiated in early 2008 and has since received five 
waves of data. The survey is conducted in 15 cities located in nine provinces. 
These cities include major exporting regions such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Dongguan, Shanghai, Wuxi, Nanjiang, Hangzhao, and Ningbo; as well as major 
cities in interior regions: Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Hefei, Bangbu, 
Zhengzhou and Luoyang. Between 2008 and 2010, two companion surveys 
of rural and urban households were also conducted. The rural survey was 
conducted in the rural areas of the provinces where the 15 cities are located, 
while the urban household survey was conducted in the same 15 cities as 
the migrant survey, plus four additional cities. The rural and urban surveys 
both used the National Bureau of Statistics Annual Household Survey sample. 
A comparison between the migrant survey and these two samples allows us to 
identify the distinctive features of migrants.1 After 2010, due to lack of funding, 
the rural and urban household surveys were discontinued, but the city migrant 
survey has been continued. 
RUMiC is designed to be a longitudinal survey, which follows migrants over 
time. In 2008 a random sample of 5,000 migrant households was selected from 
the 15 cities. The attrition rate in the 2009 wave was extremely high (63 per cent), 
however, due to the nature of the sample: frequent mobility and the effects 
of the global financial crisis, which reduced China’s exports by 20  per  cent 
1   For detailed information on RUMiCI, see http://rse.anu.edu.au/rumici/ or Gong et. al. (2008). 
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and, as a result of which, many migrants returned home. The attrition rate has 
been reduced gradually since 2009 from 63 per cent to 35 per cent in 2012. 
To maintain the original sample size, each year we re-sample a number of new 
households. Thus, apart from 2008, in subsequent years the RUMiC city migrant 
survey has two sub-samples: one traces part of the previous year sample (labeled 
old sample) and one draws a new random sample (labeled as new sample). The 
new sample gives a representative picture of migrants in general, while the old 
sample presents a dynamic picture of migrant life and work.
Demographic Structure of Rural–Urban 
Migrants and China’s Future Labour Supply
Understanding the demographic structure of rural–urban migrants is an 
essential part of understanding China’s unskilled labour supply. Because of the 
introduction of the One Child policy in 1979, and the fact that the policy has 
been strictly enforced in urban areas but less so in rural areas, China’s future 
labour supply depends primarily on the rural hukou population. This can be 
seen clearly from the population pyramid in Figure 9.1.2
Figure 9.1 clearly indicates that China’s urban hukou population is shrinking. 
The urban ‘pyramid’ is a diamond shape. The rural hukou population has also 
reduced, but the absolute numbers are far larger than the urban population. 
Furthermore, the reduction in rural population is related to the famine that 
occurred during 1959–1961, which generates the zigzags in the pyramid, 
indicating future birth cohorts may increase again. Thus, the future city labour 
supply depends predominantly on the rural hukou population.
2   The same graph was presented using the 2000 Population Census data in Meng (2012).
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Figure 9.1 Population pyramid by hukou status
Source: China 1% Population Survey, 2005.
The above figures, however, do not distinguish the extent to which some 
rural hukou population are already working in cities. To establish the size of the 
potential future additional labour supply to cities, it is necessary to understand 
the demographic structure of the current urban labour supply, including urban 
hukou population and rural–urban migrants in cities. This calculation must also 
include the size of the potential source of future supply: the current rural hukou 
labour force that has not yet migrated.
To do so, we use RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, 
and City Migrant surveys. Note that ‘migrants’ in the city migrant survey are 
defined as individuals with rural household registration (hukou), but who are 
currently living and working in one of the 15 cities included in the survey. 
The Rural Household survey also records the migration experience of any rural 
household members in previous years. In that survey ‘migrants’ are defined by 
the responses to the following three questions: a. Last year how many months 
did the person live out of his/her own village/township? (if less than one month, 
record as one month); b. If the person lived outside his/her own village for 
three or more months last year, where did he/she live? (1) rural areas within 
own county; (2) rural areas outside own county in own province; (3) rural areas 
in other provinces; (4) county town; (5) other city in own province; (6) city in 
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another province; (7) other (please explain); c. If the person lived outside his/
her own village for three or more months, what was the purpose? (1) going to 
school; (2) joined army; (3) work; (4) visit relatives or friends; (5) other (please 
explain). We thus define a ‘migrant’ as a rural household member who spent 
three or more months working (Question C, answer (3)) in an urban area outside 
his/her own county of residence (Question B, answers (5)–(7)). 
Figure 9.2 examines the age and gender distribution of migrant and non-
migrant labour force (individuals aged 16 to 65 and are employed or unemployed) 
in urban and rural areas. The left figure in Panel A takes all urban hukou labour 
force as 1 and examines the share of each age and gender group in the total 
urban hukou labour force. Similarly, the right figure of Panel A takes the sample 
of migrant labour force in our 15 city sample as 1 and examines the age–gender 
distribution of the migrant labour force. Panel B takes the labour force in the 
rural survey (including non-migrants and migrants) as 1 and examines the 
age–gender as well as migrants–non-migrant distribution of the rural hukou 
labour force. 
The figures in Panel A of Figure 9.2 suggest that majority of migrant workers 
in cities are aged between 16 and 30, and there are more males than females. 
Relative to the urban hukou labour force, it is clear that migrant workers are 
much younger than their urban counterparts. 
The two figures in Panel B of Figure 9.2 indicate that migrants still account 
for a small portion of the total rural hukou labour force: 21 per cent in 2008 and 
22 per cent in 2010. By including those who migrated to their own counties, 
this proportion increases to 24.3 per cent; by relaxing the restrictions on the 
length of migration last year from three or more months for work purposes to 
everybody who ever migrated for any length of time and any reason, the ratio 
increases to 29.2 per cent. Thus, no matter how we define ‘migrant’, it still only 
accounts for a small proportion of rural hukou labour force. 
The figures show, however, that more than half of the young rural hukou 
workers (aged 16 to 30) have migrated to cities outside of their home county 
(the basic story stands if cities within the home county are included) and this is 
especially so for men rather than women. Nevertheless, the majority of the rural 
labour force between 16 and 64 years has not migrated, and this is true in 2010. 
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Figure 9.2 Age and gender distribution of labour force by hukou and migration status
Source: RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant surveys.
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It is important to note that many of the non-migrant workers at the time of 
the survey are in fact return migrants. For example, of the total rural workers 
who have ever migrated in 2010, 34 per cent had returned home at the time 
of the survey. Figure 9.3 present the age and gender distribution of the rural 
hukou labour force for migrants, return migrants and non-migrants separately. 
The figure clearly indicates that a significant proportion of rural labour force, 
of all ages, return home. This has an important implication for the urban labour 
supply, which is discussed later in the chapter.
Figure 9.3 Age and gender distribution of rural hukou labour force, 2010
Source: RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant surveys.
The averages show that, in general, migrants are more likely to be male and 
are relatively younger than their counterparts who still live in rural villages 
and those with urban hukou. Panel A of Table 9.1 indicates that urban hukou 
labour force is on average around 40 years of age and 55 per cent of them are 
male workers. On average, the rural hukou non-migrated labour force is 43 years 
of age and 52 per cent of them are males. In contrast, migrants in cities are, 
on average, ten years younger (31 years of age) and 60 per cent are men.
The next question is whether the age–gender distribution of the migrant 
workforce in cities has changed over the past five years. Table 9.1 columns 
1 and 2 in both Panels B and C present the average age and proportion of male 
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migrant labour force for the full sample and the new sample, respectively. 
The data for the full sample, which include individuals who are being tracked 
over the years, indicate that there is less than a one year increase in age in 
each subsequent years and the proportion of male workers has reduced slightly. 
The full sample, however, may provide misleading information regarding age 
changes as the age of the individuals examined annually will increase each year. 
When we examine the age change for the new sample, though, the increase in 
the mean age becomes very small. Over the five years the average age of migrants 
increased from 31.2  to 32.9 years, an average of 0.34 year increase annually. 
The most significant change seems to have occurred between 2011 and 2012.
Table 9.1 Summary statistics of different samples
Panel C: Rural, urban, and migrant sample: 2008 survey No. of obs.
Age (1) Males (2) Year since first 
migration (3)
Schooling (4)
Urban hukou 40.24 0.55 10.28 7,813
Migrant in cities 31.18 0.60 8.83 6,749
Rural hukou non-mig 42.96 0.52  6.89 15,352
Panel B: Migrant full sample No. of obs.
Age Males Year since first 
migration 
Schooling 
2008 31.18 0.60 7.81 8.99 6,749
2009 32.19 0.58 8.59 9.05 7,399
2010 32.50 0.58 8.54 9.15 7,155
2011 33.12 0.56 9.60 9.01 7,793
2012 34.32 0.56 10.55 8.96 8,068
Panel C: Migrant new sample No. of obs.
Age Males Year since first 
migration
Schooling
2008 31.18 0.60 7.81 8.99 6,749
2009 31.57 0.59 7.96 9.12 4,594
2010 31.20 0.58 6.67 9.30 3,308
2011 31.78 0.56 8.09 8.97 3,083
2012 32.88 0.57 8.95 9.02 2,647
Source: Calculated based on Rural, urban, and migrant sample: 2008 survey.
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Figure 9.4 The change in age and gender distribution of migrant labour force: 
2008 vs 2012
Source: RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant surveys.
Figure 9.4 presents the age–gender distribution of the migrant labour force 
for the years 2008 and 2012. The new sample panel shows that, over the past 
five years, the proportion of migrant workers over 40 years old has increased, 
while the proportion of under 20 years old has declined. This is particularly 
true for the female labour force. This may suggest an interesting trend: perhaps 
the young generation of rural hukou population are more likely to go to school 
now than five years ago, and those who are aged 40 and over are now more likely 
to move to the city. Labour force pyramids alone, however, will not provide the 
answer to these questions. 
To examine this issue, we turn to data for those who are new arrivals. In the 
RUMiC migrant survey, we ask each migrant worker the year in which they 
first migrated. Using this information we can identify individuals who migrated 
in the period 2006–2010,3 and examine whether the change in aggregate age 
structure is due to the change in age structure of the migrant inflow or not. 
Table 9.2 presents the results. It shows that since 2006, the proportion of newly 
3   The number of migrants who migrated in 2011 and 2012 is small (<200 observations for each year). 
To avoid the problem of lack of representative, we do not include data from these years.
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arrived migrant workers who are aged between 16 and 25 years has increased 
year by year, from 57 per cent in 2006 to 78 per cent in 2010, whereas the 
proportion of those aged 36 and above has reduced year by year. This trend 
does not coincide with the picture observed from the cross-section comparison 
presented in Table  9.1 and Figure 9.4. One possible explanation for this 
inconsistency is that migrant workers are staying in the city longer than before. 
Thus, those we observed in cities are gradually getting older.
Table 9.2 Proportion of each age group among the new arrivals by year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Aged 16–25 56.54 63.14 66.64 68.91 77.53
Aged 26–35 21.4 15.32 13.64 14.39 8.49
Aged 36–45 13.9 13.55 9.97 9.76 7.31
Aged 45–55 6.02 5.02 6.8 5.86 4.93
Aged 55–65 2.14 2.96 2.95 1.08 1.74
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant surveys.
Employment and Wages
Migrants’ employment and wages are affected mainly by market conditions. 
Given that they have no, or very limited, access to minimum living allowances 
and unemployment benefits, migrants who lose their jobs normally go back to 
their rural home. Thus, the measured unemployment rate for migrants in cities 
is very low. In the five years of our survey, the unemployment rate for migrant 
workers has never exceeded 1.8 per cent. This, however, does not mean that 
migrants do not lose jobs, but is simply an artifact of data collection and migrant 
geographic mobility. Had we able to track down all the migrants surveyed, we 
would have observed a larger proportion who returned home or changed cities 
due to unemployment. In this subsection we focus mainly on hours worked 
and wages.
Hours Worked
Migrants have very limited work protection and they do not see a future 
in settling down in cities due to the various institutional restrictions that they 
face there. Thus, they come to cities and work as hard as they can to make 
money and then go home. As a result, while in cities, they work extremely long 
hours. In 2008, for example, the average number of hours worked by migrant 
wage-salary workers was 60 hours per week, while the number for urban hukou 
workers was 43 hours, a difference of 17 hours. Figure 9.5 presents the weekly 
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working hours distribution for the two groups. It shows that while the majority 
of urban workers worked 40 hours a week, more than half of the migrants 
worked above 50 hours weekly.
Figure 9.5 Weekly hours worked for urban and migrant wage-salary workers, 2008
Source: Calculated based on Rural, urban, and migrant sample: 2008 survey.
Studies have found that working long hours is bad for mental health. Our data 
certainly indicates such a correlation (Figure 9.6, also Frijters, Johnston and 
Meng 2011). In particular, migrants who worked over 50 hours clearly have 
a higher incident of mental health problems. This, in the long run, may have 
significant implications not only for the human capital of China’s most important 
workforce, but also for China’s future healthcare costs.
The good news is that there seems to be a slight reduction in hours worked. 
In 2008 the average wage and salary workers worked 60 hours per week. 
Since then, this total has reduced slightly and, in 2012, the average was 58 hours. 
The reduction, though, has been very slow. 
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Figure 9.6 Relationship between hours worked and mental health problems
Source: Calculated based on Rural, urban, and migrant sample: 2008 survey.
Wages
Over the past five years, wages of migrant workers have increased significantly. 
This may reflect, to some extent, the tightening of the unskilled labour market, 
and it may also be a result of government policy. 
The increase in monthly and hourly earnings for wage-salary earners 
between 2008 and 2012 is 12 and 14 per cent per annum, respectively. 
In particular, between 2010 and 2011, the real hourly earnings increased by 
23 per cent. During the same period, minimum wages also increased dramatically. 
For  example, between 2010 and 2011, the average minimum wage  in the 
15 sampled cities increased by close to 19 per cent. For cities located in Pearl 
River Delta and Yangzi River Delta, the average increase is around 20 per cent 
(data for minimum wages in the 15 cities are from various city government web 
pages). This may indicate that many local governments are using minimum 
wages to influence the industrial structure. In recent years, cities in the more 
developed regions have been talking about the importance of moving up the 
value-added chain and trying to reduce labour intensive industry. Perhaps, 
instead of directly picking industry winners, they are trying to use minimum 
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wage as a policy device to achieve the objective of pushing the low profit 
industries out of the cities. This, however, requires more in-depth research 
to confirm.
It is interesting to note, though, that wage growth of such significant 
magnitudes seems to have stopped in 2012. The real hourly wage growth 
between 2011 and 2012 is only 3.7 per cent (see Figure 9.7).
Figure 9.7 Monthly and hourly real wages, 2008–2012
Source: RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant surveys.
The above mentioned wage-growth data do not take into account that for 
each additional year migrant workers work in the city, they accumulate more 
work experience and, hence, become more skilled and earn more. The issue may 
be handled by estimating an earnings regression to control for individual human 
capital and other wage-related characteristics and include the year dummy to 
examine the wage changes arising mainly to the change in market price for the 
same quality workers. To do this, earnings data can be used in two different 
ways. In addition to the monthly earnings of current employment, the RUMiC 
survey also asks migrants to report the year when they first migrated and the 
earnings they received in the first month of the first job. This variable increases 
the time period under review and it directly teases out the wage increase due to 
the accumulation of work experience. The earliest year of migration is restricted 
to 2000 and the real first month earnings equation is estimated by controlling 
for age, education, city of employment and a gender dummy variable. The result 
of the estimated two different earnings equations for wage-salary earners 
is reported in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.3 Results from earnings regressions
VARIABLES Log real monthly 
earnings
Log real hourly 
earnings
Log real monthly 
earnings for 1st 
month of 1st job
Age 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.021***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years of schooling 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.028***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Dummy for males 0.195*** 0.162*** 0.054***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.011]
Years since first migration 0.019*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.002]


















2009 0.196*** 0.223*** 0.569***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.031]
2010 0.329*** 0.362*** 0.639***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.037]
2011 0.523*** 0.564*** 0.868***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.050]
2012 0.569*** 0.611*** 0.885***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.068]
City dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.224*** 0.459*** 5.787***
[0.031] [0.039] [0.078]
Observations 23,522 23,449 12,864
R-squared 0.394 0.341 0.167
Source: Author’s own estimations.
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The resulting average annual increase over five years (2008–2012), using the 
current monthly earnings data as the dependent variable, is 9.7 per cent per 
annum, but the for 20011–2012 is much lower, at 4.6 per cent. Using the first 
month of first pay data, the annual average increase over the 13 year period 
is five per cent per annum. If we only examine the period of 2008–2012, the 
annual change is 7.5 per cent. Figure 9.8 presents the year-to-year wage change 
in the first month of the first job, and the data confirm that the period after 2008 
has had a high wage growth, but, between 2011 and 2012, the growth rate has 
dropped to 1.7 per cent. It is important to note, however, even in 2010 (the last 
year for urban household survey data), migrant wage-salary workers were only 
making 52 per cent of the hourly earnings of the urban wage-salary workers.
Figure 9.8 Annual change in real wages for the first month of the first job
Source: Calculated based on RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant 
surveys.
The substantial reduction in real wage growth may be an indication of the 
slowdown of the Chinese economy.
Social Welfare Access
Inability to access social welfare is one of the most important remaining 
deterrences for migrants to stay in cities. Due to the lack of social insurance 
for health, pension, work injury, and unemployment, migrants cannot sever 
their connections with rural villages. Whenever they are sick, injured at work, 
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unemployed, or become old, it is necessary for them to return to their rural 
hometown. This, to a large extent, reduces the duration of migration, which, 
in turn, puts significant strain on the migrant labour supply. Thus, improving 
migrant social welfare access not only benefit migrants themselves, it is an 
important measures to lift the pressure on the migrant labour supply.
During the past five years, some improvements have been made on this front 
(Figure 9.9). For example, the proportion of migrant workers with unemployment 
insurance increased from 11 per cent in 2008 to 21 per cent in 2012. Similarly, 
those with health, pension, and work injury insurance increased from 13, 18 
and 17 per cent in 2008 to 27, 31 and 23 per cent in 2012, respectively. The large 
majority of migrant workers, however, still work in cities without any financial 
or health protection. In addition, in recent years, the proportion of migrant 
workers with some type of contract seems to have reduced sharply. There was 
significant improvement in this regard during the period 2008 to 2010, but, 
since then, the proportion has dropped from 66 per cent in 2010 to 59 per cent 
in 2012. This trend can be observed in both total sample and new sample. 
Figure 9.9 Migrant social welfare access: 2008–2012
Source: Calculated based on RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant 
surveys.
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Duration of Migration and its Impact on Migrant 
Labour Supply
Part of the reason for the recent significant increase in migrant wages is the 
tightening of the migrant labour market. This, to a large extent, is related to the 
issue of duration of migration. The lack of access to social welfare significantly 
reduces migration duration. If migrants stayed in cities for a longer period, 
migrant labour supply would increase by the same amount.
In a normal case scenario, a healthy worker starts working in their late teens 
or early 20s, and retires in their late 50s to early 60s. Thus, a normal working life 
is around 35 to 40 years. Due to restrictions on migration, however, migrants on 
average currently only work in cities for eight–nine years. 
Column 3 of Table 9.1 shows the average number of years since our sample 
migrants first came to the cities (see column 3 of Table 9.1). This measure may 
overstate the duration of migration, as it does not take into account whether 
migrants have returned to their rural hometown for a substantial period since 
they first migrated to cities, which happens very often. It does, however, 
give a  rough indication of the trend. The more reliable measure is from the 
new sample, as the total sample includes people who have been tracked over 
time, and their ‘year since first migration’ is supposed to increase over time. 
The new sample data indicate that the average years since first migration has 
increased from 7.8 years in 2008 to almost nine years in 2012. Imagine, if cities 
are becoming more welcoming to migrant families and the average duration 
of migration increases from nine years to 18 years, this will be equivalent to 
double the current supply of migrant workers. If this happens, any foreseeable 
tightening of the migrant labour market should disappear.
Human Capital Accumulation
In addition to the gain in increase in labour supply, the increasing duration 
of migration is extremely beneficial for human capital accumulation and, hence, 
for productivity gains. Using the regression results reported in column 1 on 
Table 9.3, a city work experience – earnings profile is plotted (Figure 9.10). The 
figure shows that for each additional year migrants work in cities, their earnings 
increase by two per cent, controlling for other characteristics. This indicates that 
through learning-by-doing and on-the-job training, migrants are accumulating 
significant productivity improvements. Such gains peaks in the 24th year since 
migrants first migrated to cities. Only after that year does the productivity gain 
begin to wear out. In every wave of our survey, however, less than three per cent 
of the migrants have stayed in cities for 24 or more years. That the current 
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average duration of migration is approximately nine years, which is far from 
the maximum return the economy can receive from its labour force, suggests 
a significant waste of human capital. 
Figure 9.10 Rate of return to city work experience
Source: Calculated based on RUMiC 2008 samples of Rural Household, Urban Household, and City Migrant 
surveys.
The other side of the human capital accumulation is related to formal 
schooling. Migrants on average have 8.8 years of schooling, which is two years 
more than the rural hukou non-migrated workforce, which has only 6.9 years. 
Migrants, however, are less educated than their urban hukou counterparts who, 
on average, have 10.3 years of schooling (see column 4 in Panel C of Table 9.1). 
Over the past five years, the average education level of migrants has not 
changed significantly. Column 4 in Panel B of Table 9.1 indicates that the 
average education level of migrants only increased very slightly from nine years 
to 9.02 years.
Table 9.3 also shows that rate of return to education for migrant workers 
is low. The highest estimate is obtained when estimating an hourly earnings 
equation in which a four per cent return is observed for each additional year of 
schooling. This rate of return has not changed substantially over the past five 
years. Using urban household survey data, it is found that the rate of return to 
years of schooling is 7.2 per cent, more than 80 per cent higher than returns 
to years of schooling for migrants. The significant difference in rate of return 
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to education may be the result of a lower quality of education obtained from the 
rural areas. It could also be related to the fact that migrants are denied better 
paid jobs, in other words, a result of labour market discrimination. 
The low rate of return to education, in turn, may deter rural children from 
obtaining a higher level of education.
The issue of the large disparity between the quantity and quality of 
education between rural and urban areas is a considerable concern for China’s 
future labour supply. As noted earlier, in the next few decades, the main labour 
supply in Chinese cities will come from the rural hukou population. If rural 
education does not improve, the quality of Chinese future labour supply will 
drag down economic growth. 
Conclusions
Using RUMiC survey data 2008–2012 and the 2005 one per cent Population 
Survey data, this chapter presents important features of the rural–urban 
migration during this period. These features have long-lasting policy implications 
for China’s future labour market development.
In the next few decades, the main addition to the labour force of Chinese 
cities will come from the rural hukou population. Less than 30 per cent of the 
rural labour force has migrated to cities to work. Hence, there is still large 
proportion of them who could potentially migrate. Whether they will do so, 
however, depends largely on government migration policy. Currently, the lack 
of social welfare for rural migrants has deterred many people from migrating to 
cities, or remaining there for long periods. On average, migrants stay in cities 
for eight–nine years. If this duration can be doubled, migrant labour supply 
in cities could be doubled. In addition, we find, based on the current rate of 
return to migrant city work experience, that migrant productivity improvement 
reaches a peak at the 24th year. The current average duration of migration, 
however, is far from the productivity peak, indicating a significant productivity 
loss due to the short duration of migration. Once again, duration of migration to 
a large extent depends on migration policy.
As a result of the restrictions on migration, the shortage of migrants in cities 
is apparent when the economy is doing well. For example, between 2010 and 
2011, there was a 23 per cent increase in the monthly earnings for migrant 
wage-salary workers. During the same period, however, minimum wages also 
increased by 20 per cent. It is possible that the sharp increase in wages in this 
period is partially due to government policy, and wage increases seem to have 
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come to an end in 2012. Between 2011 and 2012, raw monthly earnings growth 
was only 3.7 per cent, down from 23 per cent in the previous year, suggesting 
perhaps an economic downturn.
Some long-term and unintended consequences of migration, due mainly 
to institutional restrictions, are also observable. Because of these restrictions, 
migrants do not have long-term expectations and they regard themselves as 
temporary workers in cities. The objective is to earn as much money as they 
can over a short period and then build a life for themselves when they return 
to their rural hometown. Thus, while in cities, they work extremely long hours, 
which also indicates the lack of work protection for migrant workers. The long 
work hours are identified as related to migrant mental health problems.
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10 Reforming China’s Public 
Finances for Long-term Growth
Christine Wong
Introduction
In a modern state, the government performs three main functions: resource 
allocation—including the provision of public goods such as national defence, 
internal order and a legal system; the redistribution of income—including the 
provision of social protection and safety nets; and macroeconomic stabilisation. 
To finance these functions, the government raises revenues, and its ability to do 
so fluctuates with the size of the economy and its rate of growth. Since the global 
financial crisis in 2008, the general public has gained a greater appreciation of 
how important public finances are to a nations’ well-being, affecting both its 
economic growth prospects and the welfare of citizens.
In the course of its transition from a planned to a market economy, China has 
had to rebuild the existing system of public finances, since the previous one 
was embedded in the central planning institutions and wholly unsuitable for 
a mixed economy. When administrative prices and monopoly state ownership 
of industry—two pillars of central planning—were gradually dismantled in 
the 1980s, government revenues went into a freefall, bottoming out in 1996 at 
just 11 per cent of GDP—one-third of their former size. This fiscal decline was 
reversed only after the Tax Sharing System reform of 1994 brought in a new tax 
system and created a national tax administration (Wong and Bird 2008).
In addition to the creation of a new revenue mechanism, rebuilding public 
finances required the reform of budget institutions. In China’s centrally planned 
economies, the budget was mostly a bookkeeping function subordinated to the 
physical planning of inputs and outputs, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
had a low status among central government agencies. With the end of economic 
planning, the budget became increasingly the government’s primary tool for 
allocating resources, and major reforms were needed to build a system of budget 
management to support this new role. This process has proved trickier—and 
far from complete, because it required the elevation of the role of the MOF in 
managing public resources.
In this chapter I examine the current state of China’s public finances and 
discuss the reforms necessary to improve their capacity for supporting the 
long-term growth of the economy. The focus of this chapter will be on the 
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macroeconomic stabilisation role of the budget. Along the way I will note the 
prominent role played by local governments in making macroeconomic control 
more difficult, but reform of the intergovernmental fiscal system has been 
discussed elsewhere and will not be the main focus in this chapter.1 
In the next section I will briefly review the reforms that have been implemented 
to date. In the following two sections I will focus on two critical areas where 
reforms have conspicuously failed—the persistence of extra-budgetary resources 
and fragmented control of the budget, and the government’s inability to curb 
the tendency toward excessive public investment. Both are important parts of 
public financial management, and they have remained stubbornly resistant to 
the reach of reform. In the final section, I discuss the macroeconomic challenges 
faced by the new Xi Jinping – Li Keqiang administration, and propose some 
urgent fixes that will be required for the public finance system.
Incremental Reform of the Fiscal System 
Since embarking on its transition in 1978, China has come a long way 
toward building a new fiscal system to support the growth and operation of 
an increasingly decentralised, complex market economy. The list of reforms is 
impressive, and covers virtually all aspects of the fiscal system.
Tax System Reform2
Since restoring fiscal health was of the utmost urgency, tax reform came first. 
As noted earlier, a new system of taxes has been put in place since 1994, centred 
around the value-added tax, a business tax, a corporate income tax, a personal 
income tax, and several taxes on property, land transactions, and land use. 
These are broad-based taxes with uniform rates of levy that have facilitated tax 
administration and the monitoring of tax capacity across regions. The system 
still has significant room for improvement. Currently, revenues are overly 
dependent on productive activities rather than income, which distorts resource 
allocation as localities compete to attract industry and businesses; and the heavy 
dependence on turnover taxes and small share of income taxes means the tax 
structure lacks progressivity, to name just two examples. Overall, though, the 
tax system is highly income-elastic, and has produced buoyant revenues that 
have grown at roughly 1.5 times the rate of GDP growth over the past decade.
1   See, for example, Wong 2009, 2010 and 2013.
2   A more detailed discussion can be found in Wong and Bird (2008), and World Bank (2002).
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Public Financial Management Reform3
With revenues recovering, the government began in the late 1990s to 
turn to financial management reform. Since then, a broad package has been 
introduced that includes reforms in budget preparation, budget classification, 
treasury management, government procurement, and the installation of new 
fiscal information systems. Until then, the budgeting process had changed 
little from the planned economy. A World Bank team found in 1997 that the 
budgeting process was passive and incremental, provided inadequate time for 
preparation, had little focus on strategic priorities, and was unable to shift 
expenditures to emerging needs or to adequately track how public funds were 
spent, or even how many people the government employed (World Bank 2000). 
As the budget gained importance as the key instrument for resource allocation 
and macroeconomic management, reforms were urgently needed to improve 
the effectiveness of the budget as a policy instrument for managing public 
expenditures. 
Since 1999, the MOF has introduced new procedures for budget preparation 
and approval, and strengthened budget reporting to the National People’s 
Congress (NPC). To adjust to the new budget procedures, the MOF underwent a 
radical restructuring in 1999 so as to streamline budgeting work (Wong 2005). 
The centrepiece of reform in budget preparation was the introduction of 
departmental budgets that clearly identify all resources and expenditures for 
each government department, the first step toward building a system whereby 
spending units could be held accountable for the public monies that they receive.
A treasury single account was created to manage the government’s cash 
receipts and payments. Before this reform, expenditure monitoring was one of 
the weakest links in the budget process, and the MOF had no information on 
when and how money was spent. Although much effort was spent on ex ante 
allocation, actual expenditures could not be monitored, and diversion and other 
abuses could be exposed only by audits, which took place only occasionally. 
With the general ledger of budget appropriations linked to the treasury single 
account, the government could, at least in principle, track the government’s 
fiscal position in real time.
To support treasury reform and improved budgeting, the MOF began 
work on a new government financial management information system. A new 
budget classification system was rolled out in 2006 to improve the tracking of 
expenditure by functional categories. Standardised procedures for government 
3   For more details of public financial reform, see Wong (2005, 2012) and World Bank (2000).
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procurement were introduced to improve cost efficiencies and reduce the scope 
for corruption, adopting many of the procedures of international organisations 
for tendering large-scale purchases of equipment and services. 
With these reforms, China has over the past decade put in place the basic 
infrastructure for a modern system of budget management. Great strides have 
also been made in budget transparency and reporting to the NPC. The annual 
reports to the NPC are providing far more detail than in the past; starting from 
just a few pages in the 1990s, the report for 2012 and draft budget for 2013 
included 23 supplementary tables and 12 figures, which provide many details 
on revenues and expenditures as well as central transfers. At the last count, 
91  central government departments had put their budgets on the web for 
public scrutiny by 2012, including the MOF’s, whose departmental budget was 
32 pages in length. This year it has grown to 38 pages.4 
Intergovernmental and Tax Sharing Reform
China’s fiscal system is among the most decentralised in the world in terms of 
budgetary expenditures. The central government itself spends less than a quarter 
of the national budget, and this share has fallen from more than 50 per cent 
at the outset of transition to 17 per cent in 2011. This decentralisation was 
driven mainly by the changing composition of budget expenditures. With the 
government withdrawing from directly funding economic activities during the 
course of market transition, expenditures became more weighted toward public 
services. This has shifted expenditures toward local governments since nearly 
all public services, including some of the costliest, including basic education, 
health care, social security, and infrastructure, are assigned to local governments, 
often at the grassroots level. Counties and districts, for example, the fourth tier 
of government, account for a majority of the total national expenditures on 
education and health (Wong 1991, 2009; World Bank 2002). 
Given the important role of local governments, getting the intergovernmental 
fiscal system ‘right’ should have been a priority focus of fiscal reform, but this 
area received little attention through the 1990s. Indeed, since the 1994 reform 
was aimed principally at stemming fiscal decline and especially the erosion of 
central government control over resources, it imposed a reform that recentralised 
revenues and gave the central government control over roughly half the budget. 
With expenditure assignments unchanged, local governments were left with a 
huge fiscal gap. With the central government unwilling or unable to provide 
financial assistance, they faced severe fiscal difficulties that resulted in pervasive 
4   These can be downloaded at http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/201304/
t20130416_825081.html
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shortfalls and large regional disparities in public services (Wong 2007). By the 
late 1990s, many local governments were in arrears in pension payments, and 
wage arrears for teachers and civil servants were common. The  rural sector 
bore the brunt of these deprivations, since they are at the lowest levels of 
the administrative structure and last in line to fight for resources (Fock and 
Wong 2008).
From the turn of the century, and especially over the past few years, the 
central government has made strenuous efforts to gradually address these 
funding problems. Under the government’s ‘three rurals’ policy5—a signature 
program of the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration, fiscal resources have 
poured into rural services. Many new programs were introduced with central 
government subsidies, including the rural fee reform that abolished all fees 
and agricultural taxes, the ‘new education funding guarantee mechanism’ that 
ensured school fees would be eliminated and funding standards improved in 
rural compulsory education, the new rural cooperative medical schemes that now 
provide health insurance coverage to virtually all farmers, and income support 
for farmers under the rural dibao program. (Wong 2010). With these programs 
‘tilting’ the balance, the share of the county and township governments has 
risen from 28 per cent to 40 per cent of total national budgetary expenditures 
since 1998. 
A salient feature of the policies of the Hu–Wen administration is that they 
were implemented largely within the existing framework of intergovernmental 
assignment of revenues and expenditures, and relied heavily on the use of 
transfers. While the beneficial effects of increased funding for public and 
especially rural services are clearly visible, so are many of the distortions 
and inefficiencies common to the use of transfers. Moreover, the heavy use of 
transfers imposes an administrative burden on the central bureaucracy that 
seems mismatched to its small size, and the government’s capacity to monitor and 
evaluate the use of central transfers is conspicuously lacking (Wong 2010, 2012).
In the longer term, it is likely that reforms will be considered to the 
expenditure assignments to improve efficiency and equity. Over the past decade, 
three reforms were implemented to adjust the intergovernmental fiscal system, 
all of them at the sub-provincial levels: the province-managing-counties reform, 
the county-as-key link reform, and the counties-managing-township-finances. 
Implementation of the county-as-key link reform began around 2002 and 
moved the responsibilities for providing education, health care and other key 
services upward from the township to the county level. Contemporaneously, the 
counties-managing-township-finances moved the accounting and disbursement 
5   The ‘three rurals’ are ‘agriculture, rural villages and farmers’. For earlier papers on the three-rurals 
policies, see Fock and Wong (2008), Lin and Wong (2012).
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functions of township finances upward to counties. They were followed by 
the province-managing-counties reform, which removed the municipality 
as an intermediate level of management to allow a direct pass-through of 
fiscal resources and authorities from the province to the counties. Officially, 
these reforms are said to be aimed at enhancing the counties’ fiscal capacity 
and improving financial management at the grassroots levels of government 
(Xie 2011). In practical terms they were equally important for facilitating the 
flow of central transfers by reducing the number of administrative layers from 
five to three.
Extra-Budgetary Revenues and the 
Fragmentation of Budget Control
In the budget report presented to the NPC in March in 2013, then finance 
minister Xie Xuren reported on three ‘budgets’ that include four types of fiscal 
revenues: the ‘public finance budget’ comprising tax revenues and nontax 
revenues, the ‘government funds budget’, and the newly created ‘revenues 
from state capital operations’ comprising remitted profits from large state-
owned enterprises (SOE). He also announced that, starting from the 2013 
budget, MOF will also report on the ‘social insurance funds budget’. In the 
draft budget presented for 2013, he reported, for the first time, the sum of social 
insurance contributions and fiscal subsidies as ‘social insurance fund revenues’ 
(MOF 2013).
Table 10.1 Composition of fiscal revenues in the comprehensive budget, 2012
Billions ¥ Shares
Public finance budget 11,721 64.2%
Tax revenues 10,060 55.1%
Non-tax revenues 1,661 9.1%
Government funds 4,136 22.6%
Land revenues 2,889 15.8%
Other government funds 1,248 6.8%
Revenues from state capital operations 157.3 0.9%
Social insurance funds (contributions only) 2,255 12.30%
Total 18,270
Source: 2013 Budget Report to the NPC, 5 March.
Table 10.1 presents the revenues for each of these fiscal resources, 
including contributions to the social insurance fund (SIF), in what I term 
the ‘comprehensive budget’ for 2012. Because of the size of land revenues, I 
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have listed them separately from government funds. It can be seen that tax 
revenues of ¥10.1 trillion were equal to 55 per cent, or just over half of the total 
¥18.3 trillion in the comprehensive budget. The other components include:
From Extra-Budgetary to Non-Tax Revenues
The rise of extra-budgetary funds (EBF) can be dated to the retreat of the 
budget in the 1980s and 1990s, when support for public services fell across 
the board. Public service providers, including primary and middle schools, 
received, on average, only one-half of their operating revenues from the budget, 
and had to find the rest through fees and ‘other incomes’.6 Even local police 
departments typically received only budgetary support for salaries, and had 
to buy their uniforms, batons and other equipment from revenues collected 
through fines and penalties (Bai 2004). To keep services going, local governments 
and public agencies were encouraged to find supplementary sources of revenue 
(Wong 2009). With incentives that allowed the collecting agencies to use a part 
of the receipts for bonuses and topping-up salaries, they obliged by levying 
fees, user charges, fines and penalties (World Bank 2005, Wong 2009). Fees and 
other levies proliferated; by the late 1990s revenue from these sources totaled 
eight to ten per cent of GDP, and they were reportedly financing half or more of 
local government expenditures (Fan 1998, and Wong 1998, 2001). 
Since 1998, the government has taken a number of measures to reverse this 
trend. The strategy was to clamp down on unauthorised fees and levies, bring 
administrative fees collected by government departments and agencies into the 
budget as much as possible, improve monitoring of revenues and expenditures 
of the major items of the reported EBF, and to gradually convert them to taxes.
The efforts have achieved some measure of success. Many fees have been 
abolished and replaced by budgetary support—including, most famously, all 
rural levies under the Rural Fee Reform campaign that was implemented during 
2001–2003. Administrative fees continued to grow, but are now incorporated 
into budget accounting, though not unified budgeting. Reclassifying and 
removing some of the biggest sources of EBF (see below) also helped the 
government whittle down what is reported in the formal category of EBF. 
Finally, in 2010, the MOF renamed them ‘non-tax revenues’ (NTR), ending the 
existence of ‘extra-budgetary funds’ as an official category. In 2012 NTR were 
¥1.66 trillion, equal to 3.2 per cent of GDP.
6   For details of how public service providers were funded, see World Bank (2005).
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Government Funds
The category of ‘Government Funds’ (GF) was created in 1996 from 
reclassifying 13 of the largest items from EBF as government funds, including 
the road maintenance fee, the vehicle purchase fee, the railroad construction 
fund, electric power fund, the Three Gorges Dam fund, and airport management 
fees and construction fund, which together accounted for more than one-fourth 
of the EBF in 1997. The intent was to improve the reporting of fund receipts, as a 
first step toward converting some of the items into taxes and extending budgetary 
control over them. While this has happened with some—the road maintenance 
fee and the vehicle purchase fee, for example, government funds have grown 
steadily, with the addition of some large and rapidly growing sources of revenue. 
In 2010, it comprised more than 50 funds, with revenues of ¥3.7 trillion (9.2 
per cent of GDP), compared to ¥7.3 trillion in tax revenues.7 The biggest funds 
are ‘user fees on newly developed (urban) land’, ‘railroad construction fund’, 
‘water conservancy construction fund’, and ‘local education surcharge.’ These 
are essentially quasi-taxes; they are authorised by administrative agencies, and 
do not require approval by the NPC. In other words, they are but a new name 
for the EBF of old.
Land Transfer Revenues 
Aside from charging user fees and imposing quasi-taxes, monetising state 
assets was another avenue for supplementing the budget, and land is the principal 
asset of local governments.8 In addition to existing city land, local governments 
earn revenues from the conversion of farmland into non-agricultural use—a 
profitable activity over which local governments have a constitutional monopoly, 
and where the law fixes the procurement price of farmland at a low level so that 
the bulk of the rising values of urban land accrues to local governments.9
Local governments began to tap this rich source of revenue in the early 1990s 
(Wong 1997, Guan and Peng 2011). With accelerated urbanisation boosting land 
values, it has grown to be a key source of revenue for municipal governments: in 
2011 revenues reached ¥3.11 trillion nationwide, but fell back to ¥2.89 trillion 
in 2012. In 2007 the government designated land revenues as GF, and required 
them to be remitted to the treasury and budget management. 
7   MOF final accounts for the 2010 budget, July 2011, accessed 18 February 2012, http://yss.mof.gov.
cn/2010juesuan/201107/t20110720_578448.html
8   The 1982 constitution specifies that urban land is owned by the state while rural land is owned 
by the collectives. 
9   See Cao et al. (2008) and Tao et al. (2010).
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Revenues from State Capital Operations
This category is at present a misnomer as it comprises only the remitted 
profits of the 117 giant state-owned companies (enterprise groups) controlled 
by the central government and reporting to the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), an agency created in 2003 under the 
State Council. At present the remittances are a fraction of the total profits of 
these companies, in 2012 they were just ¥97.1 billion, compared to combined 
revenues of ¥26.06 trillion, equivalent to half of China’s gross domestic 
product.10 It is likely that this budget component will grow in the future, as the 
new Finance Minister has vowed to extract a greater share of SOE profits for 
government coffers. 
Social Insurance Funds
The SIF was created in 1996, with the introduction of insurance schemes for 
urban employees that provide coverage for pensions, work injury, unemployment, 
maternity and health.11 City-level pooling of pension obligations had begun in 
the 1980s—shifting from the system where enterprises had borne the pension 
costs of their retirees. The change was formalised in 1991, when the State Council 
introduced universal pooling of pension burdens and placed them at the city 
level—be they provincial, prefectural or county-level cities.12 Through the 1990s, 
the system was adjusted in several steps, creating the framework that exists today. 
Under the new system, each city is responsible for collecting the employer 
and employee contributions to each scheme and managing the fiduciary 
responsibilities for the SIF. Although the framework is based on regulations issued 
by the central government, many details of the schemes are left to the discretion 
of the provincial and municipal governments (Hussain 2007). To minimise fiscal 
risks, cities were permitted to set contribution rates and benefit levels to balance 
receipts and payouts, though, in recent years, there have been some efforts to 
harmonise contribution and benefit levels across pension pools. 
Even though cities are the budget unit for social security, the SIFs are 
managed by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) 
and its subnational counterparts outside the budget.13 With urbanisation, 
10  http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/03/27/chinas-new-captain-of-industry/?utm_
source=Sinocism+Newsletter&utm_campaign=e1a48e008c-Sinocism03_28_13&utm_medium=email
11   For the creation of the SIF and its component schemes see, for example, Hussain (2007), Wang (2005), 
and Watson (2009).
12   State Council decision on the reform of the pension insurance system for urban enterprise employees, 
June 1991.
13   The ‘social security and employment assistance’ expenditure item in the budget comprises expenditures 
on social welfare, disaster relief and fiscal subsidies to the SIF to cover shortfalls, while the main 
expenditures on social security are made under the SIF. 
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an ageing population, and with recent policies that have significantly expanded 
social insurance provisions, the SIF has grown rapidly. Coverage has grown from 
the initial pension scheme for SOE workers and an unemployment insurance 
program to include a pension program for residents who have never held a formal 
sector job, as well as a basic medical, work injury and maternity insurance 
programs. Contributions to the SIF have grown to 5.4 per cent in 2011.
Fragmentation of Control
Although these various types of fiscal (extra-budgetary in the broad sense) 
revenues have been in existence since the 1990s, or even earlier, they will be 
presented to the NPC together, in a single report, for the first time in 2014. 
Indeed, a salient feature of these extra-budgetary revenues is that information 
is scattered in different channels. Under China’s decentralised statistical system, 
for example, information on the SIF are reported by the MOHRSS, separately 
from fiscal data. Until recently there was little public information about the 
aggregate size of land transfer revenues because they accrue almost entirely to 
local governments, and the central government has struggled to gain access.14 
Moreover, until 2001, land transfers were mostly made by administrative 
allocation and negotiation, and the real value of the transactions was largely 
hidden. The Ministry of Land Resources has published national and provincial 
data back to 2001. The data were incomplete, however—an audit conducted by 
the National Audit Office (NAO) of 11 municipalities including Beijing, Tianjin, 
Chongqing and Guangzhou found that during 2004–2006, land transfer revenues 
were under-reported by 71 per cent.15 With their designation as a government 
fund in 2007, reporting seems to have improved. The same NAO audit found 
that for 2007–2008, the 11 municipalities under-reported land transfer revenues 
by a much reduced 20 per cent.
The fragmented reporting is symptomatic of the fragmentation of control. 
Among the components, only tax revenues are fully under unified budget 
management by the MOF and its subnational counterparts. Even for NTR and 
GF, which are reported to the budget and partially remitted to the treasury, 
their ‘ownership’ and hence allocation rights remain with the collecting agency. 
Land revenues belong to local—mostly municipal—governments, and are 
allocated outside of the budget. As noted earlier, SIF are managed separately in 
the local SIF pools, also outside the budget. In other words, the pool of revenues 
allocated through the budgeting process, guided by the government’s strategic 
14   The difficulty of gaining information was made more so because, until recent years, the central 
government was continually asserting its right to share the revenue.
15   See Fu (2010).
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priorities, includes only tax revenues and to some extent the nontax revenues. 
Virtually everything else is earmarked for specific purposes and allocated by 
different agencies and local governments. Most importantly, the MOF (and its 
subnational counterparts) lacks the authority to impose aggregate discipline 
over the comprehensive budget. 
Figure 10.1 shows the trend for the comprehensive budget based on all 
known fiscal resources excluding borrowing. (One caveat to keep in mind is that 
these data are somewhat soft—they are collected by different agencies using 
definitions that are not always consistent, and are often subject to revision and 
adjustment.) Nationwide, the comprehensive budget has grown rapidly, from 
30.1 per cent of GDP in 2006 to a peak of 36.2 per cent in 2010 before retreating 
to 35.1 per cent. This upward drift can be attributed to decentralised forces 
in the economy—each component grew (or shrank) according to its internal 
objectives and the economic environment it faced. Most of the growth came 
from land, a notoriously volatile revenue source. The public finance budget (tax 
revenues plus NTR) also grew steadily through these six years, from 18.9 per 
cent to 22.6 per cent, as has the SIF through steadily growing coverage and 
participation. The rapid growth of the overall envelope—by nearly one per cent 
of gross domestic product per year, should be alarming to policy makers. 
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Source: Author calculations based on data from MOF final accounts, Chinese Statistical Yearbook (various 
years), and China Land and Resources Communique (various years). ‘Others’ includes government funds 
other than land, and state capital revenues.
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Public Investment Management
Among the most important changes in the role of government through the 
transition are those affecting investment, where reform has seen the government 
curtail its role and attempt to shift from directing the overall pattern of 
investment to ensuring adequate support to economic growth and public 
services. Negotiating the reduction in the scope of government has proved 
tricky, and progress in reforming the system of public investment management 
has been uneven. 
On the upside, China’s record in investing in public infrastructure has been 
outstanding. From having less than 10,000 kilometres of expressways a decade 
ago, the country now has more than 65,100 kilometres, second only to the United 
States in total length. During 2006–2010 alone, the road system was expanded 
by 639,000 kilometres, including 33,000 kilometres of expressways. China has 
also expanded the railway system by 16,000 kilometres over the same period. 
The country has some of the world’s biggest and most modern airports, and 
has invested heavily in container port facilities. Chinese cities are remarkably 
well-served by urban facilities and services given the rapid rate of urbanisation 
over the past three decades, where some 500 million people have moved into 
cities (Wong 2013). In 2010, China was ranked 27th among 155 countries in the 
World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI)—a measure of how efficiently 
a  country gets its goods into the global trading system. With an overall LPI 
score of 3.49, China is within striking distance of the average of 3.55 for High 
Income Countries, well ahead of its peer group of middle income countries. 
On the financing side, though, reforms have been problematic.
Under market reforms, the financing of public investment has changed 
dramatically (Wong 2011a). By far the most important was the rapid withdrawal 
of budgetary inputs to investment that was driven by fiscal decline. Except 
for a small spike under the fiscal stimulus programs in the late 1990s and again 
in 2008–2010, the share of budgetary inputs has been below 5 per cent of 
total investment since 1993 (Table 10.2).16 ‘Self-raised’ funds have always been 
large, and now finance more than three-quarters of total. Their composition is 
amorphous, however, and ill-defined.
16   For the 2008–2010 fiscal stimulus and its impact on public investment, see Wong (2011b).
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Table 10.2 Sources of finance for fixed investment: 1982–2010 (%)
 1982 1993 1995 2000 2003 2007 2010
Budget 22.7 3.7 3.5 6.8 4.8 3.9 4.7
Domestic credit 14.3 23.5 21.7 23.6 23.0 15.3 15.2
Foreign 4.9 7.3 13.1 5.8 4.5 3.4 1.6
Self-raised and other 58.1 65.5 61.7 63.8 67.6 77.4 78.5
Note: Self-raised funds are own receipts of enterprises or institutions. ‘Other’ includes capital from bond 
issue by enterprises or banks, levies, own capital and donations.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, New China 55 Years Statistical Compendium, and National Bureau of 
Statistics, Chinese Statistical Yearbook.
The second important change was that investment became decentralised. 
Figure 10.2 shows the local governments’ share of budgetary investment rising 
in line with their share of budgetary expenditures.17 An additional aspect of 
the decentralisation of investment responsibilities is that, just as higher level 
governments were offloading them to local governments, fiscally constrained 
local governments often devolved the responsibilities to public institutions 
such as schools and hospitals, and likewise encouraged them to find their 
own resources.
Figure 10.2 Local governments’ share of budgetary expenditures and investment (%)
Sources: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2011, and MOF data.
17   In 2007 the MOF changed budget classification systems, and stopped reporting capital spending 
separately from recurrent expenditures.
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Along with financing, the authorities for investment decisions were also 
progressively devolved. Under the planned economy, investment projects went 
through a formal process of preparation that included feasibility studies, technical 
reviews and appraisals before approval. Project approval authority was vested 
with the State Planning Commission (now renamed the National Development 
and Reform Commission, NDRC) and its subnational counterparts, the DRCs. 
This was a key part of the macro-coordination function performed by the NDRC, 
since project approval was a precondition for application for land, raw materials, 
and funding including bank loans. Through the transition, project approval 
was progressively decentralised to lower level governments. The decisive reform 
came in 2004, when the government limited the requirement for administrative 
approval to only projects financed by public funds and mega projects with 
investments exceeding a specified threshold or in strategic sectors.18 Given the 
diversified funding of public investments and a lack of clear definition on 
what constituted ‘public funds’, this decision was widely interpreted by local 
governments to mean that only projects funded by the budget were required 
to go through the approval framework. The vast majority of public investment 
was considered exempted from 2004 onward, and the gatekeeper function of 
the NDRC and DRCs has been severely eroded. Anecdotal information collected 
in fieldwork conducted in several provinces during 2008–2010 indicates that, 
even in localities where administrative approval procedures were retained, the 
exercise was largely pro forma, since approval was always granted if funding 
was assured.19
With market reforms unleashing rapid economic growth and accelerating 
urbanisation, local governments have faced tremendous pressure for investment 
in public infrastructure. They have managed to achieve and maintain high levels 
of investment, despite inadequate fiscal resources, partly by making extensive 
use of extra-budgetary resources. Many of the EBFs, and later, the GFs, were 
created to help provide funding for investment in infrastructure, such as the 
airport maintenance and construction fee, the railroad construction fund, 
and the Three Gorges Dam fund. In addition, local governments came to rely 
heavily on land revenues, which are mostly earmarked for investment in urban 
development. My estimates are that land transfer revenues comprised almost 
one-third of the comprehensive budget revenues of prefectural level cities, on 
average, in 2010 (Wong 2013).
Equally, or perhaps even more important, were the special financial vehicles. 
To work around the prohibition on direct borrowing, starting in the 1980s local 
governments—mostly at the municipal and provincial levels—turned to the 
18   State Council document on Reform of Investment Institutions (2004). See Wong (2011a).
19   See Mikesell et al. (2011) for practices in Guangdong. I conducted fieldwork in Shandong, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
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creation of corporate entities to undertake the task of raising funds to finance 
public investment. They were initially created as financially independent, 
single-purpose entities, often for the purpose of taking on loans from 
international financial institutions. Being financially independent restricted 
their undertakings to those with the capacity for debt servicing and repayment, 
and these corporations were prevalent in the construction and operation of toll 
roads, power companies, water companies and utilities.
Shanghai created the first broad-based investment corporation in 1992 
to undertake investment in urban infrastructure, the General Corporation 
of Shanghai Municipal Property, and gave it the mission to coordinate and 
provide for the construction of facilities such as water supply, sewerage, roads 
and utility hook-ups. To finance these tasks, the corporation was assigned 
earmarked revenues from the municipal budget and authorised to borrow from 
banks and issue corporate bonds. Its creation made possible a quantum leap 
in the financing available for investments in infrastructure to support urban 
renewal and expansion in Shanghai. This model was widely emulated. By the 
turn of the century, most cities had established local investment corporations 
(LICs)—sometimes called urban development investment corporations (UDICs), 
and they came to play a key role in financing urbanisation in China (Wong 2013). 
As they became more accepted, the separation of LICs from local public 
finances was relaxed, and local governments began to guarantee bank loans 
for LICs. Typically, the LICs raise and bundle together bank loans and other 
financing, using municipal assets including budgetary and extra-budget 
revenues as equity and collateral. Increasingly, with urbanisation bringing 
rising land values, land became the principal asset backing LICs, and many 
municipalities have pledged future receipts from land revenues as collateral for 
bank loans.20 
The extent to which the growth and development of LICs occurred ‘below the 
radar’ of central authorities was revealed only in 2010–2011. Because LICs were 
local experiments that lacked formal endorsement by the central government, 
they operated in the interstices of China’s mixed economic system. They were 
never assigned a supervisory agency, and were not required to file regular 
reporting of their activities. During 2008–2010, asked to finance three-quarters 
of the 4 trillion ¥ stimulus program, local governments were invited to set up 
financial platforms from which to borrow. The response was overwhelming: LICs 
proliferated and grabbed large portions of investment funding and bank credit. 
Central authorities finally took notice, and found that no agency had systematic 
20   The 2011 survey of LICs conducted by the NAO found that future land revenues were pledged as 
collateral for bank loans in 309 prefectures and 1131 counties, equal to 93 per cent and 56 per cent of the 
those administrative units, respectively (NAO 2011, p.11).
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information on LICs—not the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the People’s 
Bank, the MOF, the Ministry of Construction, or the NDRC (Wong  2011b)!21 
Even after a massive nationwide audit in 2011 with 41,000 auditors led by the 
NAO, the picture remains clouded by the lack of consensus on what an LIC is, 
how much of their investments are ‘public infrastructure’, and what portion 
of their debts should be assigned to local government responsibilities.22 Given 
the prominent role played by local governments and LICs in financing public 
investment, this is a clear indication that the government has lost aggregate 
control over public investment. 
In borrowing to finance infrastructure, China is following common practice 
in other parts of the world, and borrowing to finance capital spending is 
considered good public policy when it matches the economic life of expenditure 
to its financing. By stretching out the payment period to match the long stream of 
benefits from infrastructure such as bridges, subways or schools, this financing 
method adheres to the user-pay principal and promotes greater efficiency and 
intergenerational fairness. Where China differs is in the unsupervised nature 
of the borrowing, not only by national authorities, but apparently at the local 
level as well. In a trenchant critique, researchers in the NDRC Investment 
Research Institute described the current system of local investment finance as 
operating under ‘the three nos’: with no guiding framework, no limit, and no 
accountability.23 
In fact, the critique can be applied more generally to public investment over 
the past decade, where there is no overall framework that defines the scope of 
public investment. Municipalities often lack an investment plan that includes 
consideration of total debt levels. LICs often do not compile an assets and 
liabilities account, and they are so closely linked to local governments that it 
is difficult to separate out and define their responsibilities. In China’s immature 
financial system, banks are ill-equipped to provide the discipline expected from 
capital markets, especially when local government finances are so complex and 
non-transparent. In any case, after more than 20 years of hyper-growth, there 
was a widespread belief that land values will always rise, and government can 
make good on guarantees.
21   LICs grabbed nearly one-third of all new loans issued in 2009, and in the first quarter of 2010 they 
accounted for 40 per cent of all new bank loans (Investors Bulletin, 2010; Wei, 2010). 
22   According to Zhang and Batson (2011), estimates diverged significantly across agencies:
  
23   Wang et al. (2010). 
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Today it is not possible to fully identify and account for total public 
investment in China and its configuration. Clearly, in the absence of an effective 
system of monitoring and evaluation, the unsupervised borrowing by local 
governments and public institutions created a soft budget constraint that 
encouraged excessive borrowing and investment, and wasteful and inefficient 
use of both land and capital.
Macroeconomic Challenges and Next Steps 
in Public Financial Reform
Over the past three decades, China has harnessed a process of gradual, 
incremental reform to achieve spectacular economic growth and development. 
Through this transition, the public finance system—albeit with many problems, 
appears to be doing its main job in providing support for government functions. 
By focusing on the fragmentation of budget control and the decentralised and 
extremely problematic management of public investment, I have traced the 
roots of the government’s current macroeconomic problems to weaknesses in 
the fiscal system.
To support sustainable, long-term growth of the Chinese economy, the 
government must regain control over macroeconomic management. The technical 
part of the work would start with curbing local government borrowing and 
investment, a process already begun in 2010, when administrative controls were 
placed on bank lending to LICs.24 While the immediate, short-term task is to 
clarify the size of local government debt and devise a plan for its resolution, 
reforms must aim to change the incentives for decentralised investment and 
borrowing, to avoid reverting to what Yu Yongding has called the Groundhog 
Day cycle that has characterised Chinese economic growth over the past two 
decades.25
This process could start with putting in place a framework for managing 
subnational borrowing. Having seen that the prohibition on local government 
borrowing served only to push it underground and out of the purview of national 
authorities, the reform should explicitly endorse local government borrowing 
24   This began in June 2010, when the State Council issued a circular on enhancing the management 
over subnational government financial platforms (Guo Fa [2010] no. 19).
25   Yu describes a pattern where ‘high investment supported by expansionary policy drives growth; 
inflation follows after lag; policy is tightened; growth drops away, but inflation is still high; more 
tightening; inflation falls at last, but growth falls away more than desired at the same time; policy is 
shifted from tight to expansionary; again, led by investment, growth rebounds,’ and the whole cycle 
starts again (2013).
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for the purpose of financing long-term infrastructure. In most countries, local 
governments are permitted borrow for capital spending, but this process has to 
be carefully managed to minimise fiscal and financial risks. 
To manage the potential fiscal risks, in 2011 the MOF introduced a monitoring 
and regulatory framework that requires local governments to report on their 
debt. This merely continued a decade-long effort by the MOF to build a national 
monitoring system for local debt, and is likely to prove no more effective than 
past efforts unless it is bolstered by support from additional measures, such 
as annual audits and legal requirements for local governments to make regular 
public disclosure of key fiscal data including their direct and contingent 
liabilities (including LICs), loan servicing, as well as their borrowing plans. 
The government also needs to regain control over aggregate fiscal discipline 
by assigning the oversight authority and responsibility over the comprehensive 
budget with all of the components to a single institution: most suitably the MOF. 
The high degree of reliance on extra-budgetary revenues in China is unusual 
but not unique. For example, the public finance system of Singapore consists 
of four ‘pillars’: the budget itself, the Central Provident Fund, the government 
investment agencies, and various special funds that are not consolidated into 
the budget. The budget process, however, is indisputably managed by the 
MOF, and is characterised by close inter-ministerial cooperation and the use of 
constitutional fiscal rules (Blondal 2006).
For these reforms to ‘stick’, they require political support from leaders to 
adjust the distribution of authorities across central institutions so as to elevate 
the MOF and put it firmly in charge of all fiscal resources. Support should also 
be given to enhance the capacity of the NPC to play its supervisory role over the 
budget—and hence the MOF—that is assigned by the constitution. The NPC 
should also be asked to empower the NAO to expand its auditing over budget 
implementation—as it has done several times since the mid 1990s (Wong 2012), 
to include the comprehensive budget as well as public debt management.
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11 Changing Business 
Environment in China: 
A Regional Context and Policy Implications
Xiaolu Wang, Jingwen Yu and Fan Gang1
Introduction
China’s business environment is constantly changing in response to 
developments in markets, external conditions and government policies that have 
resulted from China’s move towards a market-oriented economy. Improving the 
business environment is a key policy objective, as changes in that environment 
affect the behaviour and operations of firms, especially those private firms that 
are subject to policy and institutional constraints. A much improved business 
environment in terms of the market and legal environment, fair competition, 
access to finance, supply of human resources, taxation and infrastructure 
development will, therefore, not only facilitate business activities, but also, in 
an important way, nurture much needed entrepreneurship in China. It remains 
an important task for different levels of government, through their policy 
changes, to improve the business environment. This chapter reports changes 
and regional differentials in the business environment in China’s provinces 
in recent years, and discusses some of the policy implications. The study is 
based on four enterprise surveys that were conducted in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
2012 respectively; each survey covers more than 4,000 enterprises located in 
29 provinces (including several ethnic autonomy regions and administrative 
municipalities at the provincial level). 
Classification of the total 4,020 sample enterprises in the 2012 survey, 
according to their ownership is as follows: 418 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(including shareholding companies with controlling shares that are held by 
the state), which account for 10.4 per cent of the total samples; 3,082 private 
enterprises, stock companies and limited liability companies without controlling 
shares held by the state (76.7 per cent), 257 foreign-funded enterprises and 
enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (6.4 per cent); and, 
263 collective-owned enterprises, shareholding cooperatives, and other non-
state enterprises (6.5 per cent). 
1   This chapter results from the Business Environment Project that is run by the National Economic 
Research Institute and the Entrepreneur Survey System, and is a continuation of our earlier reports 
(Wang, Fan, and Liu 2008; Wang, Fan, and Li 2012). Our surveys were supported by many enterprises, 
government and non-government organisations as well as individuals. We thank all those who, in many 
different ways, contributed to this study.
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Sample enterprises, classified according to scales, are as follows: 365  large 
enterprises (9.1 per cent), 1,415 medium enterprises (35.2 per cent), 2,035 small 
enterprises (50.6 per cent), 190 micro enterprises (4.7 per cent), and 
15 unclassified enterprises (0.4 per cent).
Enterprises classified by sectors include: 2,808 manufacturing (69.8 per cent), 
350 agriculture, mining, power generation, gas, water supply (8.7  per  cent), 
516 transport, storage and post, information transmission, computer services and 
software, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and catering services (12.8 per cent), 
and 346 other services (8.7 per cent). 
Compared with statistical data (see, The State Council Office and National 
Statistical Bureau 2009 and National Statistical Bureau 2012), the sample 
distribution in terms of ownership type and scale of enterprise is balanced and 
generally consistent with the nationwide distribution, only micro enterprises 
are much fewer, the proportion of manufacturing enterprises is higher, and 
service enterprises are lower, but this is not problematic in reviewing the 
business environment in different provinces/regions. 
The sample enterprises are located in 29 out of a total of 31 provinces in 
mainland China. Tibet and Qinghai are excluded in this study, due to insufficient 
samples. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are also excluded. 
On the basis of the surveys, we constructed a Business Environment Index for 
China’s Provinces (BEIFCP). The index assesses the business environment that 
exists in eight areas: government administration, legal environment, tax and 
non-tax burdens, financial services, supply of human resources, infrastructure 
conditions, market intermediaries and technical/export services, and ethical 
business environment. We evaluate the business environment using a score 
of 1–5, with 5 indicating ‘very good’, 3 indicating ‘average’, and 1 indicating 
‘poor’. Thus, an index above 3 is a positive score, and below 3 is a negative 
score. 
In the first section of this chapter, we report the general situation, changes, 
and rankings of Chinese provinces in terms of the business environment, 
measured by BEIFCP. The second section reports on China’s business environment 
divided into eight areas. The third section analyses differentials of BEIFCP for 
both SOEs and private enterprises, differently scaled enterprises, enterprises in 
different sectors, and in different regions, including the east, north-east, centre, 
and west. The detailed structure of the BEIFCP, and the method of calculation, 
is explained in the Appendix. 
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General Situation and Provincial Ranking 
in BEIFCP
The Changing Business Environment in China
Indicated by our surveys, there was a general improvement in China’s business 
environment over the period 2006–2012 period (Figure 11.1). The overall score 
of BEIFCP, as a provincial average, was 3.05 in 2012, which increased by 0.17 
from 2.88 in 2006. The score deteriorated in the 2009–2010 period, however, 
and improvement in the 2011–2012 period did not fully offset that deterioration. 
Significantly, the score of 3.05 in 2012 is only slightly above the neutral score of 
3, and this should not be regarded with great optimism. 
Figure 11.1 Changes in the overall BEIFCP: 2006–2012
Source: Plotted using the data from the survey.
In the 2011–2012 period, the overall index increased in 19 provinces, and 
decreased in ten provinces. This indicates a general improvement in the business 
environment during these two years, although the trend is not persuasive. On the 
contrary, as is explained below, it decreased in 27 out of the total 29 provinces 
during the 2009–2010 period. 
Loose monetary policy, including government policy on bank credit, and 
expansionary fiscal policy, which developed in response to the global financial 
crisis (GFC) are at least partially responsible for deterioration of the business 
environment during the 2009–2010 period. Total bank credit increased 
dramatically, by 32 per cent in 2009, and then by 20 per cent in 2010. Credit 
is used predominantly for large government investment projects and has the 
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effect of crowding out market forces. Medium- and long-term loans increased 
by 86 per cent in these two years, whereas short-term loans increased only by 
33 per cent, of which, those extended to firms increased only by 17.6 per cent 
(People’s Bank of China, http://www.pbc.gov.cn). 
This had a contradictory effect on some enterprises, especially those small 
private enterprises that were affected by increasing input costs. In these two 
years, nominal GDP increased by 27.9 per cent, and the nominal wage rate 
increased by 26.4 per cent. This resulted in an adverse situation, particularly 
for small enterprises, as the banking sector in China is dominated by a few large, 
state-owned, commercial banks, which favour large enterprises over smaller 
ones in extending credit and providing bank loans. In this period, the area 
index for ‘financial services’ decreased from 2.90 to 2.82.
The situation improved in 2011 and 2012 when the number of short-term 
loans increased and medium- and long-term loans decreased. The financial 
service index indicates that the cost of obtaining loans from formal banks 
remained the same, but firms were obliged to pay less in extra charges besides 
the formal interest. In addition, over this two-year period, it was easier to access 
external finance from informal channels. 
The indexes indicate that both government administration and the legal 
environment for business deteriorated during the 2009–2010 period, as 
the scores of the two area indexes dropped by 0.04 and 0.14, respectively. 
This  was also related to the government’s expansionary macro policy, which 
saw expansionary investments and credits strengthen the role of government in 
resource allocation, and weaken the role of the market in allocating resources. 
During the 2011–2012 period, scores of the two area indexes, government 
administration and the legal environment, increased by 0.05 and 0.11, 
respectively, showing some improvement in these areas. 
In terms of infrastructure conditions and the supply of human capital, the 
scores decreased in 2009–2010, and increased in 2011–2012. This is related to 
large-scale investment in the first period, which caused a heavy increase in the 
demand for railway transport and power generation, as well as an increasing 
demand for labour. As an indicator to measure the strength of the economy, 
in 2010, the nationwide demand for electricity reached its highest peak since 
2004, and fell moderately in the second period. 
This analysis does not deny the need for, and rationality of, the expansionary 
macroeconomic policy that was applied during the GFC. When China’s export 
industry was hit by the crisis, the expansionary policy got the economy moving 
at a relatively high speed. In retrospect, however, some lessons may be drawn 
in terms of the extent, measure and implementation of the macro policies. It is 
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possible that the expansionary fiscal policy adopted in that period over-relied on 
government investments, and did not manage to sufficiently utilise measures that 
could mitigate the negative effect of this on the market, such as tax reductions 
for medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), public expenditure on education and 
social security, and protection of the environment. The government-led credit 
expansion was extensively bound to government investment projects. This had 
the effect of squeezing out normal business demand for credit and, therefore, 
had a negative affect on the non-state sector. 
In addition, when the government became powerful in resource allocation, it 
compromised its transparency, discipline, and public monitoring, which led to 
increased abuse of power, corruption, and misallocation of resources, and thus 
badly damaged the business environment. 
Provincial Ranking and Scores of BEIFCP
Based on the four enterprise surveys, provincial ranking of the overall index 
in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 is provided in Table 11.1. The province with the 
best business environment is ranked at the top. 
Table 11.1 Provincial ranking by business environment (2006–2012)
Rank/Year 2006 2008 2010 2012
1 Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Tianjin
2 Zhejiang Jiangsu Jiangsu Shanghai
3 Jiangsu Zhejiang Tianjin Beijing
4 Tianjin Beijing Zhejiang Zhejiang
5 Shandong Tianjin Beijing Jiangsu
6 Guangdong Fujian Anhui Chongqing
7 Fujian Anhui Henan Heilongjiang
8 Beijing Liaoning Guangdong Jilin
9 Liaoning Shandong Fujian Guangxi
10 Anhui Guangdong Shandong Shandong
11 Hebei Hebei Chongqing Guangdong
12 Sichuan Jilin Liaoning Fujian
13 Jilin Heilongjiang Sichuan Liaoning
14 Henan Henan Hubei Henan
15 Heilongjiang Guangxi Yunnan Sichuan
16 Xinjiang Sichuan Jiangxi Anhui
17 Inner Mongolia Chongqing Shanxi Inner Mongolia
18 Yunnan Hubei Hebei Hainan
19 Hubei Inner Mongolia Jilin Hubei
20 Chongqing Ningxia Heilongjiang Shaanxi
21 Shanxi Shaanxi Hunan Guizhou
22 Hainan Guizhou Inner Mongolia Hunan
23 Qinghai Jiangxi Hainan Ningxia
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Rank/Year 2006 2008 2010 2012
24 Guangxi Yunnan Gansu Hebei
25 Jiangxi Gansu Guangxi Jiangxi
26 Shaanxi Xinjiang Ningxia Shanxi
27 Guizhou Hunan Shaanxi Yunnan
28 Hunan Hainan Guizhou Gansu
29 Ningxia Qinghai Xinjiang Xinjiang
30 Gansu Shanxi
Source: Ranked using the data from the survey.
As shown in Table 11.1, Tianjin, Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
were ranked in the top five provinces in 2008, 2010 and 2012, according to the 
overall BEIFCP. Their relative ranks did, however, change. Shanghai was number 
one in 2006, 2008 and 2010, but was replaced by Tianjin in 2012. Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu both dropped in rank. After 2006, Shandong dropped out of the top 
five and was replaced by Beijing. 
Table 11.1 shows that provinces with a higher ranking are mainly situated 
in the east, and they have greater economic development. Their positions are 
relatively stable, with limited change over the years. There does not, however, 
exist a linear correlation between the business environment and the level of 
economic development. For instance, both Guangdong and Fujian have a much 
higher GDP per capita than Chongqing and Heilongjiang, but they are ranked 
significantly lower than the latter (11th and 12th versus 6th and 7th). 
Low-ranking provinces are mainly those from the western and central 
regions, with relatively lower economic achievement. Their ranking is, however, 
unstable, with large fluctuations over years. In 2012, the last five provinces, 
according to the overall BEIFCP ranking, are Jiangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan, Gansu 
and Xinjiang, but only one of them (Gansu) was in the bottom five in 2006. 
The  other four with the lowest ranks (26th– 29th) in 2006 were Shaanxi, 
Guizhou, Hunan and Ningxia, but they jumped to 20th–24th in 2012.
It is important to acknowledge that the dramatic change in the rank of 
some provinces does not necessarily mean dramatic changes in their business 
environment. Because index scores for some provinces are quite close, their 
rankings are sensitive to small changes of scores. Improvement in one province 
that is slightly more or less than others may result in a change in rank, which 
affects a number of provinces. 
In fact, changes in business environment at the provincial level are reflected 
more accurately by provincial scores rather than ranking. Figure 11.2 illustrates 
ranking and the overall scores for all the 29 provinces in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
2012 (30 provinces in earlier years) respectively. Their overall scores can be seen 
more clearly in Table 11.2. 
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Note: Provincial ranking is according to their 2012 scores. Bars for each province are arranged from high to 
low in the order of years 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Qinghai is placed at the low end in the figure because 
of missing values in 2010 and 2012, which does not mean lowest ranking.
Source: Using the data from the survey.
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As shown in Table 11.2, the 2012 scores of all the provinces, except Xinjiang, 
are higher than their 2006 scores, indicating improvement in the business 
environment of most of the provinces, although the scores of many of them are 
still lower than their score from 2008. Data in the table also indicates that some 
central and western provinces, which originally ranked low, improved more than 
most higher-ranking east coast provinces; thus, a general trend of convergence 
in the business environment, although not strong, may be observed. 
Table 11.2 Overall scores and changes in ranking by provinces (2006–2012)






Beijing 2.99 3.25 3.18 3.17 0.27 –0.08 –0.01
Tianjin 3.06 3.24 3.21 3.44 0.18 –0.03 0.23
Hebei 2.92 3.12 2.95 2.97 0.20 –0.17 0.02
Shanxi 2.82 2.93 2.96 2.94 0.11 0.03 –0.03
Inner 
Mongolia
2.83 3.06 2.91 3.01 0.23 –0.15 0.11
Liaoning 2.98 3.13 3.01 3.05 0.15 –0.11 0.04
Jilin 2.87 3.11 2.94 3.11 0.25 –0.17 0.17
Heilongjiang 2.85 3.11 2.93 3.11 0.26 –0.18 0.18
Shanhai 3.16 3.34 3.33 3.25 0.18 –0.01 –0.08
Jiangsu 3.08 3.27 3.23 3.14 0.19 –0.04 –0.08
Zhejiang 3.13 3.26 3.19 3.15 0.13 –0.07 –0.04
Anhui 2.96 3.13 3.09 3.04 0.17 –0.04 –0.05
Fujian 2.99 3.16 3.05 3.06 0.17 –0.11 0.01
Jiangxi 2.77 3.02 2.97 2.94 0.24 –0.04 –0.04
Shandong 3.00 3.13 3.05 3.07 0.13 –0.08 0.03
Henan 2.86 3.08 3.06 3.05 0.22 –0.02 –0.01
Hubei 2.83 3.06 3.00 3.01 0.23 –0.06 0.01
Hunan 2.75 2.97 2.91 2.98 0.22 –0.06 0.08
Guangdong 2.99 3.12 3.05 3.07 0.13 –0.07 0.01
Guangxi 2.80 3.07 2.87 3.09 0.27 –0.20 0.22
Hainan 2.81 2.95 2.88 3.01 0.14 –0.07 0.13
Chongq. 2.82 3.07 3.03 3.12 0.24 –0.04 0.09
Sichuan 2.89 3.07 3.00 3.05 0.18 –0.07 0.04
Guizhou 2.75 3.02 2.83 2.99 0.27 –0.19 0.16
Yunnan 2.83 2.98 2.98 2.86 0.15 0.00 –0.12
Shaanxi 2.75 3.02 2.86 3.01 0.27 –0.17 0.15
Gansu 2.64 2.97 2.88 2.84 0.33 –0.09 –0.04
Ningxia 2.66 3.06 2.86 2.98 0.40 –0.19 0.12
Qinghai 2.81 2.95 0.14
Xinjiang 2.84 2.97 2.76 2.80 0.13 –0.21 0.04
Average 2.88 3.09 3.00 3.05 0.21 –0.09 0.05
Note: The overall scores in the table are valued between one and five. Greater scores indicate better business 
environment. Numbers in the last three columns are changes in the scores between 2008 and 2006, 2010 
and 2008, and 2012 and 2010, respectively. Positive value indicates improvement, and vice versa.
Source: Calculated using the data from the survey.
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The Changing Business Environment 
in Eight Areas
Major Obstacles in Business Environment
In the 2012 survey, information was collected from enterprise owners or 
general managers about their views on the major obstacles that they encountered 
in their business environment. They were asked to indicate, from 28 external 
factors, the major obstacles for their business. 
A total of 3,285 firm owners or general managers responded to the question 
regarding the major obstacles to their business. Their selection was grouped 
into seven areas, which correspond to the seven area indexes, i.e., government 
administration, legal environment for business, tax and non-tax burdens, 
financial services, supply of human resources, market intermediaries and 
technical services, and ethical business environment. Infrastructure conditions 
were not included, but this is not problematic because it has the highest score 
among the eight area indexes. 
Perceptions of the primary obstacle to the conduct of business were as follows:
A. Government administration. A total of 33.7 per cent of the respondents 
treat factors in this area as the primary obstacle. Of them, most complaints 
concentrated on the aspect of ‘openness, fairness, and equity’ of policies and 
government administration. These problems include non-transparency of 
policies and government administration, unfair enforcement of regulations, 
and unequal treatment for different enterprises. There are also problems with 
the ‘inefficiency of government administration’, ‘unnecessary government 
intervention’ and ‘cleanness of government officials’. 
B. Tax and non-tax burden. Of the total effective samples, 30.3 per cent of those 
interviewed treat factors in this area as the primary obstacle. Most complaints 
relate to the tax burden, which possibly arises from efforts by local taxation 
bureaus to fulfill tax targets set by higher-level governments, and this may 
result in firms being over-taxed. Abuse of power by taxation officials may 
also be a problem.
C. Shortage of human resources. A total of 16.1 per cent of firms see this as 
the primary obstacle to their business. Respondents ranked the shortage of 
technicians as the most significant issue, followed by shortages of skilled 
workers and managers. 
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D. Financial services. This is treated as the primary obstacle by 14.3 per cent of 
the firms, with most complaining of difficulties in obtaining bank loans; but 
high interest, extra charges and the difficulties of obtaining informal sector 
finance were also noted. 
E. Legal environment. This problem is regarded as a primary obstacle by 
3.7 per cent of the firms. 
Table 11.3 ranks the distribution of complaints from the 2008 and 2012 
surveys for comparison. According to the 2008 survey, the primary obstacle 
was access to financial services (which accounts for 35 per cent of the sample 
firms, this ratio is reduced to 14.3 per cent). The second was government 
administration (29.3 per cent), and the third, shortage of human resources 
(21.3 per cent). This survey did not include the tax and non-tax burden, but 
included infrastructure conditions. In 2012, the first, second, third and fourth 
rankings became government administration, tax and non-tax burden, shortage 
of human resources, and financial services. 
This result indicates the necessity of government-sector reform, especially 
in terms of transparency, policy equity, self-discipline, and public monitoring 
in order to further improve the business environment. Tax policy, the supply of 
human resources and financial services are also key areas in the improvement of 
the business environment.
Table 11.3 Major obstacles to businesses by the sample firms: 2008 and 2012
2008 Rank 2012 Rank
Government administration 29.3% 2 33.7% 1
Openness,fairness, equity 11.4% 20.9%
Government efficiency 7.3% 5.6%
Government over-intervention 6.8% 5.8%
Government official cleanness 3.7% 1.4%
Tax and non-tax burden 30.3% 2
Tax burden 29.9%
Non-tax collection 0.6% 0.4%
Shortage in human resources 21.3% 3 16.1% 3
Technicians 6.2% 8.6%
Managers 6.7% 2.5%
Skilled workers 8.3% 5.1%
Financial services 35.0% 1 14.3% 4
Formal financial services 34.1% 13.2%
Informal sector finance 0.9% 1.1%
Legal environment 6.0% 4 3.7% 5
Enforcing law: fairness& efficiency 1.7% 0.9%
Legal right protection 4.3% 2.8%
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2008 Rank 2012 Rank
Infrastructure conditions 3.3% 5
Ethical business environment 3.1% 6 1.5% 6
Market intermediary & services 1.4% 7 0.4% 7
Market intermediaries 0.4% 0.4%
Technical & export services 1.0% 0.1%
100.0% 100.0%
Source: Calculated using the data from the survey.
Business Environment in Eight Areas
Figure 11.3 shows an improvement in the business environment over eight 
area indexes areas from 2006 to 2012 (data is collated in Table 11.4). Area 
rankings from low to high, according to the average scores are: supply of human 
resources, tax and non-tax burdens, market intermediaries and technical/
export services, financial services, ethical business environment for business, 
government administration, legal environment for business, and infrastructure 
conditions.
These areas all showed some improvement from 2006 to 2012, except 
infrastructure conditions. Three of the scores remain, however, in a negative 
interval in 2012. 
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Table 11.4 indicates that financial services made the biggest improvement 
during this period. The supply of human resources also improved, but still in a 
negative interval. Infrastructure condition is the only area since 2006 in which 
the score dropped.
Table 11.4 Eight areas of business environment: changes in scores
2006 2008 2010 2012 2006–2012 changes
Human resource 2.48 2.74 2.68 2.79 0.31
Tax and non-tax burdens 2.79
Market intermediary and 
technicalservices
2.83 2.96 3.01 2.98 0.15
Financial services 2.41 2.90 2.82 3.07 0.66
Ethical business environment 2.92 3.06 3.07 3.09 0.17
Government administration 3.00 3.15 3.11 3.16 0.16
Legal environment 2.99 3.24 3.10 3.21 0.22
Infrastructure conditions 3.54 3.57 3.19 3.29 –0.25
Overall 2.88 3.09 3.00 3.05 0.17
Source: Calculated using the data from the surveys.
One may notice the difference between indexing of the business environment 
here and the assessment of obstacles to business provided in last section. 
A major difference relates to government administration. In last section, it is 
assessed as the primary obstacle to business, although the score of this area 
index in Table 11.4 is not so disappointing, as it is above the neutral value of 
three. Its ranking among the eight area indexes is also not very low. The puzzle 
is that both categories of information come from the same sample enterprises. 
The difference is partially due to the outcomes from different emphases in 
assessment. The obstacle assessment focuses on the seriousness of problems, 
whereas the scores of indexes mainly reflect the extent of influences by factors.
Moreover, because of many influencing factors, the area index of government 
administration consists of four sub-indexes and more basic indexes. The average 
of a few basic indexes constitutes a sub-index, and the average of the four sub-
indexes forms the area index. Because each basic index only concerns a particular 
factor in the area, the probability that a firm will encounter problems relating 
to a single factor is usually low, whereas other firms, without experiencing this 
kind of problem, may give an average, or even above average, assessment for 
the relevant factor. This can result, to some extent, in a converging assessment 
towards the average.2 The situation is different in the obstacle assessment. 
Because problems relating to each factor may act as a major obstacle to a firm, it 
2   The same thing may occur when lower-level indexes are averaged for a sub-index or area index. This is 
to be a shortcoming of subjective assessment method in indexing. We have not yet found a solution for 
solving this problem.
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is necessary to calculate the rate at which each obstacle occurs so as to assess its 
impact in the same area, instead of taking the average. The sum of these rates in 
the area, 33.7 per cent, becomes a considerably high proportion. 
This suggests that the obstacle assessment on government administration 
provides more direct information and has higher creditability, whereas 
indexing for this area may provide a more or less over-evaluation. In spite of 
this shortcoming, the indexing method provides a useful and indispensable 
means of measuring the differences in the business environment among regions/
provinces, between different categories of enterprises, and over time. 
Environment Differentials by Type of Enterprises
Business Environment for SOEs and Non-State Enterprises
In this section we compare business environment for SOEs (including share-
holding companies with controlling shares that are owned by the state) and non-
state enterprises (NSEs) (including mainly private enterprises, stock companies 
and limited liability companies that are not controlled by the state, and all other 
non-state enterprises). 
Of the total 418 SOEs in our 2012 survey, large, medium, and small enterprises 
account for 30.7, 43.6, and 24.0 per cent, respectively. Micro enterprises account 
for only 1.7 per cent.
Of the total 3,602 NSEs, only 6.6 per cent are large enterprises, medium 
and small enterprises account for 34.4 and 53.9 per cent, respectively. 
Micro enterprises account for 5.1 per cent. Obviously, there are more large and 
medium enterprises in SOEs, and more small and micro enterprises in NSEs. 
This reflects the differentials in firm size between the two categories, but the 
proportion of micro enterprises in NSE samples is much less than in reality. 
In 2012, the average score of overall index for SOEs is 3.13, greater than 
the average of NSEs (3.08) by 0.05. The difference is significant at the five 
per cent level (t=2.25). This indicates a better business environment for SOEs 
than NSEs. This is abnormal since, when both SOEs and NSEs are operating 
in the same competitive market, their business environment should be equal. 
The unequal environment suggests that SOEs may enjoy favourable treatment 
by the government. 
Table 11.5 reports the overall index, area indexes and sub-indexes for 
both SOEs and NSEs, and the statistical significance of their differences. All 
differences that are significant at five per cent or higher are scaled out in 
bold. The environment scores in six out of the eight areas are greater for SOEs 
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than NSEs. Two of them are significant, and more are significant at the sub-
index level. For instance, ‘openness, fairness, and equity’ has a positive and 
significant difference (indicating SOEs experience more fairness than NSEs), 
but ‘unnecessary intervention’ has a negative difference (SOEs encounter more 
intervention than NSEs). The differences in two sub-indexes cancel out each 
other, so that the difference in area index becomes insignificant.
This reveals that there are discriminatory treatments that favour SOEs 
against NSEs, which, in general, has a negative effect on NSEs. It is, therefore, 
necessary to adjust relevant government policies to standardise the treatment of 
SOEs and NSEs. 
Table 11.5 Differences in business environment between SOEs and NSEs
SOE NSE Difference t-statistics P-value
Government administration 3.20 3.25 –0.05 –1.44 0.15 
Openness, fairness, equity 3.09 3.00 0.09 2.53 0.01 
Government efficiency 2.88 2.96 –0.08 –1.62 0.11 
Non-necessary intervention 3.34 3.57 –0.23 –5.48 0.00 
Government cleanness 3.51 3.47 0.04 0.64 0.52 
Legal environment 3.27 3.24 0.03 0.90 0.34 
Fairness & efficiency 3.04 3.01 0.03 0.64 0.52 
Legal right protection 3.50 3.46 0.04 1.22 0.22 
Tax and non-tax burden 2.88 2.75 0.13 3.29 0.00 
Tax burden 3.59 3.43 0.16 2.90 0.00 
Non-tax collection 2.17 2.07 0.10 2.47 0.01 
Financial services 3.15 3.10 0.05 0.74 0.33
Formal financial services 3.26 3.04 0.22 5.52 0.00 
Informal sector finance 3.03 3.17 –0.14 –2.45 0.01 
Shortage in human resource 2.98 2.77 0.21 4.46 0.00 
Technicians 2.94 2.71 0.23 4.49 0.00 
Managers 3.05 2.78 0.27 4.99 0.00 
Skilled workers 2.94 2.82 0.12 2.42 0.02 
Infrastructure conditions 3.32 3.33 –0.01 –0.27 0.79 
Power supply 3.95 3.89 0.06 1.29 0.20 
Railway service 3.11 3.15 –0.04 –0.88 0.38 
Other infrastructure 2.91 2.96 –0.05 –1.13 0.26 
Market intermediaries & service 3.06 3.02 0.04 1.09 0.28 
Market intermediaries 3.12 3.04 0.08 2.11 0.04 
Technical & export service 3.01 3.00 0.01 0.16 0.88 
Ethical business environment 3.18 3.16 0.02 0.63 0.53 
Overall 3.13 3.08 0.05 2.25 0.03
Source: Calculated using the data from the surveys.
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Business Environment for Enterprises of Different Scales
This section investigates the business environment for large, medium, small 
and micro enterprises. In 2012, scores of the overall index were 3.20 for large 
enterprises, 3.09 for medium enterprises, 3.07 for small enterprises, and 2.98 for 
micro enterprises. These differences are statistically significant; obviously, the 
smaller the enterprise scale is, the less-favoured business environment it enjoys. 
In Table 11.6, the overall index, area indexes and sub-indexes for enterprises 
of different scales are reported. Differences in significance at five per cent or 
higher are scaled out in bold. The t-ratios are listed in the second part of the 
table. Differences in five areas, out of a total of eight, are statistically significant 
at least between two categories of enterprises. The remaining three areas all 
have differences where some sub-indexes are statistically significant. 
Table 11.6 Difference in business environment between enterprise scales 
Score Difference
Large Medium Small Micro L–M M–S S–I
Government administration 3.25 3.24 3.26 3.15 0.01 –0.02 0.11
Openness, fairness, equity 3.14 3.04 2.98 2.84 0.10 0.06 0.14
Government efficiency 2.92 2.92 2.99 2.91 0.00 –0.07 0.08
Non–necessary intervention 3.42 3.51 3.59 3.48 –0.10 –0.08 0.11
Government cleanness 3.54 3.48 3.47 3.36 0.05 0.02 0.11
Legal environment 3.34 3.27 3.21 3.13 0.07 0.06 0.08
Fairness & efficiency 3.11 3.04 2.98 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.09
Legal right protection 3.58 3.50 3.43 3.37 0.08 0.06 0.07
Tax and non-tax burden 2.85 2.77 2.75 2.81 0.08 0.02 –0.06
Tax burden 3.59 3.45 3.42 3.45 0.14 0.03 –0.03
Non-tax collection 2.10 2.08 2.07 2.17 0.02 0.00 –0.09
Financial services 3.29 3.14 3.08 2.85 0.15 0.06 0.23
Formal financial services 3.39 3.11 2.99 2.77 0.28 0.12 0.22
Informal sector finance 3.20 3.16 3.16 2.94 0.03 0.01 0.22
Shortage in human resource 2.95 2.76 2.78 2.77 0.19 –0.02 0.01
Technicians 2.89 2.70 2.72 2.68 0.19 –0.02 0.04
Managers 3.01 2.78 2.79 2.77 0.22 –0.01 0.02
Skilled workers 2.94 2.79 2.82 2.87 0.15 –0.03 –0.05
Infrastructure conditions 3.36 3.33 3.33 3.29 0.03 0.01 0.04
Power supply 4.00 3.90 3.89 3.87 0.10 0.01 0.01
Railway service 3.15 3.16 3.14 3.04 –0.01 0.01 0.10
Other infrastructure 2.94 2.95 2.95 2.95 –0.01 –0.01 0.01
Market intermediaries & service 3.20 3.05 2.99 2.86 0.15 0.06 0.13
Market intermediaries 3.23 3.08 3.01 2.87 0.16 0.06 0.15
Technical & export services 3.16 3.03 2.97 2.86 0.13 0.06 0.11
Ethical business environment 3.33 3.17 3.13 3.01 0.16 0.04 0.12
Overall 3.20 3.09 3.07 2.98 0.11 0.02 0.09
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Table 11.6 Difference in business environment between enterprise scales (continued)
Difference t-ratio
L–I M–I L–M M–S S–I L–I M–I
Government administration 0.11 0.09 0.16 –0.15 1.61 1.38 1.50
Openness, fairness, equity 0.30 0.20 2.21* 2.42* 2.24* 4.28* 3.26*
Government efficiency 0.01 0.01 –0.02 –1.97* 1.01 0.10 0.12
Non-necessary intervention –0.06 0.03 –1.98* –2.92* 1.64 –0.92 0.34
Government cleanness 0.18 0.12 0.94 0.56 1.53 2.11* 1.73
Legal environment 0.21 0.14 1.44 2.52* 1.40 3.09* 2.46*
Fairness & efficiency 0.22 0.16 1.15 1.89 1.37 2.68* 2.17*
Legal right protection 0.21 0.13 1.74 2.67* 1.27 3.23* 2.43*
Tax and non-tax burden 0.03 –0.05 1.88 0.63 –1.25 0.37 –0.97
Tax burden 0.14 0.00 2.30* 0.92 –0.39 1.48 0.02
Non-tax collection –0.07 –0.09 0.51 0.06 –1.62 –1.01 –1.51
Financial services 0.44 0.29 3.07* 1.71 3.36* 5.51* 4.09*
Formal financial services 0.62 0.34 6.00* 4.31* 3.31* 8.57* 5.28*
Informal sector finance 0.26 0.23 0.49 0.13 2.60* 2.58* 2.61*
Shortage in human resource 0.17 –0.01 3.55* –0.61 0.11 2.14* –0.16
Technicians 0.21 0.02 3.29* –0.59 0.48 2.31* 0.22
Managers 0.24 0.02 3.67* –0.17 0.30 2.56* 0.23
Skilled workers 0.07 –0.08 2.54* –0.89 –0.59 0.79 –0.98
Infrastructure conditions 0.08 0.05 0.82 0.30 0.70 1.22 0.79
Power supply 0.13 0.02 1.95* 0.30 0.19 1.58 0.31
Railway service 0.11 0.12 –0.15 0.39 1.38 1.17 1.45
Other infrastructure –0.01 0.00 –0.23 –0.19 0.14 –0.10 0.05
Market intermediaries & 
services
0.34 0.19 3.77* 2.84* 2.60* 5.76* 3.67*
Market intermediaries 0.37 0.21 3.82* 2.74* 2.81* 6.18* 3.84*
Technical & export service 0.30 0.17 2.95* 2.28* 1.78 4.17* 2.69*
Ethical business environment 0.32 0.16 3.34* 1.51 1.94* 4.12* 2.56*
Overall 0.22 0.11 3.21* 2.24* 2.58* 4.97* 3.47*
Note: t-ratio with * are significant at five per cent or higher levels. L, M, S and I in the table stands for large, 
medium, small and micro enterprises, respectively. 
Source: Calculated using the data from the surveys.
Figures 11.4 and 11.5 illustrate differences between enterprise scales in legal 
environment and financial services, respectively. They show clear differences 
among different enterprises by size. 
Changing Business Environment in China
237
Figure 11.4 Legal Environment Index for enterprise scales
Source: Calculated using the data from the survey.
Figure 11.5 Financial Services Index for enterprise scales
Source: Calculated using the data from the surveys.
The evidence provided in this section clearly indicates that larger enterprises 
enjoy favoured treatment by the government, which leaves small and micro 
enterprises to face discriminatory conditions. It is a priority to improve the 
business environment for small and micro enterprises by standardising treatment 
by government and implementing laws and regulations fairly. 
In addition, some supportive policies may be needed; for example, promoting 
the development of guilds or chambers of commerce and other market 
intermediaries, to help small and micro enterprises in their business operations, 
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and improving vocational education and training programs so as to increase the 
numbers of technicians, managers and skilled workers that are needed by small 
and micro enterprises. 
Business Environment in Different Sectors
In this section, the business environment in 18 different industrial sectors 
is examined. The 2012 survey covers enterprises in 19 sectors. Only a few 
enterprises are engaged in ‘public management and social organisations’, which 
are excluded in the following study. 
From comparing business environment indexes in the 18 sectors, there is 
evidence of significant differentiation between them. They are grouped into three 
categories according to their overall environment scores and the eight area scores:
• The first group includes those sectors with overall scores falling below the 
average. This includes mining, construction, finance, real estate, education, and 
health, social security and social welfare. These sectors are found to have the 
following characteristics: dependence on natural resources that are not allocated 
via market, or monopolistic to certain extent (high concentration ratio), or 
having dual features of providing both public goods and private goods. 
• The second group includes those sectors with scores or indexes around 
the average. They are agriculture, manufacturing, transport, wholesale and 
retail sales, hotels and catering services, leasing and business services, and 
services to households and other services. These sectors are generally subject 
to relatively high market competition.
• The third group includes those sectors with index scores mostly above the 
average. They are information transmission, computer services and software; 
management of water conservancy, environment and public facilities; 
culture, sports and entertainment; scientific research, technical services 
and geologic prospecting; and production and supply of electricity, gas and 
water. Among them, only the electricity sector (including gas and water) is 
a monopoly, whereas the rest can be classified as newly developed services 
sectors. They have developed faster because of either technical innovation 
and progress, or a growth in consumption.
Table 11.7 shows the overall index and area indexes of these sectors. 
The electricity sector is reclassified into the first group according to the nature 
of its production. 
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Five out of eight area indexes in the first group of sectors reported in Table 11.7 
have significantly lower scores than the average, and the second group. They are 
government administration, legal environment for business, tax and non-tax 
burdens, financial services, and ethical business environment. Two area indexes 
are similar; that is, infrastructure conditions, and market intermediaries and 
technical services. Only one area index, supply of human resources, has a higher 
score than both the average and the second group. This may suggest that job 
seekers prefer this group of sectors over others, possibly because of the better 
pay and welfare that is offered in this group of sectors. 
Table 11.8 shows differences in the environment scores of the three groups and 
their statistical significance. Regressions show that both negative and positive 
differences between the first and second groups in six areas are statistically 
significant at one per cent or five per cent respectively. Although the difference 
in one area index is positive and significant, that of the overall index is negative, 
consistent with the five areas, and significant at the ten per cent level.
Table 11.8 also indicates that the overall index, and seven out of eight area 
indexes of the second group, are lower than the third group, and statistically 
significant. 
Sectors in the first group each have some characteristics which are different from 
others: 
1. Dealing with natural resources. This includes mining and real estate (construction 
also relates to real estate). Mineral resources and land are allocated by 
government at different administrative levels, or, at least, not entirely allocated 
in competitive markets, therefore, they have some features of a monopoly.
2. Monopoly or oligopoly. The financial sector, for instance, has a high 
concentration ratio, as the market is dominated by a few large, commercial 
banks. Financial institutions are also subject to government regulations on 
interest rates, and interventions on loan extensions. There are entry barriers 
that act especially against small, private financial institutions. This has 
weakened the mechanism of market competition. 
3. Dual producer. The education and health care sectors both provide public 
and private goods. Public institutions in these sectors normally have policy 
advantages as compared with private institutions, as they shoulder the 
responsibility for providing public services. They may also have disadvantages, as 
these sectors are subject to various kinds of government regulations. For example, 
the salary levels of doctors in public hospitals are restricted by government 
regulations, and are significantly lower than those in private hospitals, although 
they may have a better chance to obtain commissions from prescribing drugs 
to patients. In addition, due to information asymmetry between producers and 
consumers in these sectors, these sectors easily form a sellers’ market, thus they 
have some similarities with monopolistic or oligopolistic sectors.
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Although these sectors have different characteristics from each other, their 
common feature is that their market competition is naturally or administratively 
restricted. This has a negative effect on the business environment and the 
seriousness of this effect will depend on the extent to which government 
administration, particularly government transparency, policy openness, fairness 
and effectiveness as well as the legal framework apply, in those sectors. 
Among those sectors with a certain level of monopoly or oligopoly, 
the electricity sector is an exceptional case. It has a high level of market 
concentration, and has higher scores in business environment indexes. This is 
related to the following situation: firms in a monopolistic or oligopolistic sector 
are divided into two situations, some have monopolistic status and therefore 
have advantages over others; other firms, usually smaller ones, do not have this 
status and are, therefore, in a situation of disadvantage in market competition. 
Normally the latter accounts for the largest proportion of firm, even in a 
monopolised sector. If, however, those firms with the status of a monopoly 
account for a large proportion in the sector, this may better explain why this 
sector has high scores in business environment. To separate out the sample 
firms in the electricity sector, we find that they have another distinctive feature. 
The proportion of SOEs in this sector is much higher than others, they account 
for 66 per cent of the total, whereas in the other sectors the highest ratio is only 
37 per cent. As we have seen, the business environment assessments of SOEs are 
significantly higher than others, and this may explain why the difference exists 
between the electricity sector and others. 
Table 11.9 shows that the first group of sectors have a higher proportion 
of large and medium enterprises than the second and third groups, and also 
a higher proportion of SOEs, whereas the electricity sector has even higher 
proportions than the first group, particularly in terms of the proportion of SOEs. 
This shows that the higher scores in the electricity sector may be read 
negatively, especially if this occurred because the sector enjoys monopoly status 
or is treated favourably by the government.
Table 11.9 Scales and ownership types of the sample enterprises by sector groups
Large Medium Small Micro Sum SOEs NSEs Sum
All 9.1% 35.3% 50.8% 4.8% 100% 10.4% 89.6% 100%
Group I 11.9% 39.8% 43.9% 4.4% 100% 15.0% 85.0% 100%
Electricity 18.9% 45.3% 32.1% 3.8% 100% 66.0% 34.0% 100%
Group II 8.6% 35.2% 52.0% 4.3% 100% 8.9% 91.1% 100%
Group III 10.5% 25.0% 47.4% 17.1% 100% 13.2% 86.8% 100%
Note: Group I in the table does not include the electricity sector. 
Source: Calculated using the data from the survey.
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The results in Tables 11.7 and 11.8 also indicate that the third group of 
sectors has higher scores for the business environment than the second group. 
This is different from the situation of the electricity sector, as we do not see 
significant monopoly in the newly developed services sectors. Higher scores in 
the third group may be due to the following reason: product differentials that 
are often brought by technical progress or brand effects, may bring producers 
the status of a monopoly, and extra profits in certain periods; however, this kind 
of activity normally does not exclude market competition. Market competition 
can still work to push forward technical innovation and productivity 
growth. In addition, policy promotion in the areas of information technology, 
environment protection and R&D, may play positive roles.
The findings in this section show that sectors with sufficient market 
competition have better business environments than those monopolised 
sectors in general, showing the positive role of the market in allocating 
resources. Different kinds of monopolies have negative impacts on the business 
environment, however, this has different causes in different sectors. Therefore, 
countermeasures should accordingly be different, depending on the specific 
situation in a particular sector.
In those sectors that have high entry barriers and a high degree of government 
intervention, such as the financial sector, policy adjustment is required to limit 
those barriers and to promote the competitiveness of smaller private firms. 
In sectors dealing with mineral and land resources, particularly petroleum, 
the priority is to improve the regulatory and legal framework to make the 
process of allocation of resources more transparent, competitive and fair, so that 
irregular operations and rent-seeking behaviours can be prevented or eliminated. 
Moreover, taxation systems that target the gains from natural resources and 
profits from monopolies should be improved to guarantee a balanced and fair 
income distribution. 
In education, health care and other sectors producing both public and 
private goods, a double-track system with respect to both the market forces 
and government intervention should be well maintained to ensure that public 
services are effective, equitable and efficient. 
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Business Environment in Four Regions
The 29 provinces may be grouped into four regions, namely east, north-
east, centre and west, to examine regional similarities and differences in the 
business environment.3 Provinces in each region have some common features 
in terms of their level of economic development, and cultural traditions. Table 
11.10 provides both the overall index and area indexes in different years for the 
four regions. It is clear that the business environment in the east is better than 
in the north-east and centre, and that in the latter two is better than in the west. 
In 2006, the scores of the overall index for the east, north-east, centre and 
west are 3.01, 2.90, 2.83 and 2.78, respectively. In 2012 improvement was evident 
in all four regions, which increased to 3.13, 3.09, 2.99 and 2.97. The north-east 
and west regions performed slightly better (both increased 0.19) than the centre 
(0.16) and east (only 0.12), and this reveals a tendency of convergence, although 
weak, among regions. 
In terms of area indexes, all the areas, except infrastructure conditions, 
improved in all the four regions during the 2006–2012 period (tax and non-
tax burden is excluded as it was added in 2012). Regional ranking of the area 
indexes is basically consistent with that of the overall index. The east had the 
highest ranking in most area indexes, except in the supply of human capital and 
infrastructure conditions across some years. The west still has the lowest scores 
in most area indexes, but surpassed the centre in legal environment and ethical 
business environment. 
Table 11.10 shows that regional rankings are similar in most areas of the business 
environment. The relative patterns of scores in the four regions are also similar; 
in 2012, they all have the lowest scores for the supply of human resources, and 
the highest scores for infrastructure conditions. Compared with that in 2006, 
only financial services improved significantly faster than other area indexes, 
and all the rest of the area indexes achieved similar rankings in the four regions. 
These indicate that different regions in China face similar problems in their 
business environments, although their relative achievements with respect to 
improving their business environments differ. 
3   There are ten provinces in the east region: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan. Only three provinces are in the north-east: Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang. Six provinces are in the centre region: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. 
The west region consists of 12 provinces: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. In this study, Qinghai and Tibet are 
excluded due to insufficient sample firms. 
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Conclusions
Based on the four enterprise surveys conducted in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
2012, this chapter reports changes and regional differentials in the business 
environments of China’s provinces in recent years, and discusses some of the 
policy implications. On the basis of the surveys, we constructed the BEIFCP, 
which is used to assess changes in eight areas of the business environment.
The results show, first, a general improvement in the business environment 
of China during the 2006–2012 period. We also identified, however, some of 
the developments that could negatively affect that environment. For example, 
the expansionary fiscal policy adopted by the government in response to the 
GFC over the sample period had the effect of squeezing out normal business 
demand for credit and, therefore, affected the non-state sector negatively. 
An alternative approach could be to adopt those measures that could mitigate 
the negative effects on the market mechanism, such as tax reduction for SMEs, 
public expenditure on education and social security, and protection of the 
environment. 
Secondly, the top-ranking provinces in terms of business environment 
continue to be those in the eastern regions, even though the relative rankings 
change somewhat over the period. The survey data also show that there is a 
trend of convergence in the business environment across different provinces 
and this highlights the need, especially for those provinces in the central and 
western regions, to do more in improving their business environment. 
Thirdly, most of the complaints that were expressed by surveyed firms 
concentrated on the aspect of ‘openness, fairness, and equity’ of policies 
and government administration. The problems experienced with this aspect 
of administration include the non-transparency of policies and government 
administration, unfair enforcement of regulations, and unequal treatment 
for different enterprises. Other issues with this area arise from ‘inefficiency 
of government administration’, ‘non-necessary government intervention’ 
and ‘cleanness of government officials’. This result indicates the necessity of 
government sector reform, especially in terms of transparency, policy equity, 
self-discipline of the government, and public monitoring in order to further 
improve the business environment.
Fourthly, sectors with sufficient market competition are found to have 
a better business environment than those monopolised sectors in general, 
which illustrates the positive role played by the market in allocating resources. 
The  results also show that there are some kinds of discriminatory practices 
that distinguish between SOEs and NSEs, which, in general, have a negative 
effect on the operation and performance of NSEs. It is necessary to adjust 
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relevant government policies to ensure both kinds of enterprises experience 
equal treatment. It is also a priority for the government to improve the business 
environment for small and micro enterprises, to standardise practices and apply 
fair implementation of the laws and regulations governing business activities in 
China. 
Appendix: The Structure and Calculation 
Method of the Index
The BEIFCP consists of an overall index, eight area indexes, 19 sub-indexes 
and a total of 28 basic indexes. The overall index, area indexes and sub-indexes 
are available at the provincial, regional and national levels, and also for different 
types of enterprises and different sectors. 
All the original data are from the surveys with enterprise owners or general 
managers who were asked to assess different aspects of the local business 
environment. 
For developing the basic indexes, the percentage of each assessment in 
effective samples at the provincial level was used to derive weighted average 
scores. The average scores of a few basic indexes form a sub-index, and the 
average of a few sub-indexes constitute an area index. The overall index is an 
average of eight area indexes. 
There are different methods for calculating an index system, including 
expert assessment, principal component analysis, and arithmetic averages. 
The expert assessment method relies on a group of experts who assess the weight 
of each indicator according to their relative importance, and then derive the 
weighted average for indexes. The principal component analysis method utilises 
correlations among variables to reduce the number of variables. In empirical 
studies it usually chooses the first-principal component that is based on certain 
hypotheses. Unlike the arithmetic average method, these two methods evaluate 
variables of different weights in different ways. 
The following considerations led us to adopt the arithmetic average method 
in this study:
• The expert assessment method frequently exhibits arbitrary qualities, as 
evidenced by the same variables being given different weights by different 
expert groups, or the same expert group gives different weights to similar 
indicators on different occasions. This reduces the credibility of this method. 
• The method of principal component analysis relies on hypotheses, which 
may not be sufficiently rational. Moreover, in time series analysis, the 
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weights of variables generated by the principal component analysis method 
change over time and, thus, the calculation lacks comparability over years. 
The arithmetic average method does not have this shortcoming. 
• Some international studies, and our own research experiences (e.g.,  Fan, 
Wang and Zhu 2011), indicate that when the number of variables is 
sufficiently large, both principal component analysis and arithmetic average 
method produce similar results, which show that they have a relationship of 
substitution. 
Based on these considerations we believe that the arithmetic average method 
is a reasonable choice for this study. 
In Table 11.A1, we provide the entire structure of the BEIFCP, including all 
the area indexes, sub-indexes and basic indexes. 
Table 11.A1 The structure of the BEIFCP
Name of index Category of 
the index
1. Government administration Area index
1.1  Openness, fairness, and equity Sub-index
1.1.1  Transparency of policies and regulations Basic index
1.1.2  Fairness of regulation enforcement by administrative 
bodies
Basic index
1.1.3 Equal treatment of different enterprises Basic index
1.2  Government efficiency Sub-index
1.2.1 Convenience of obtaining administrative admissions Basic index
1.3  Unnecessary government intervention Sub-index
1.3.1 Over-intervention by the local government Basic index
1.3.2  Proportion of time spent by firm managers dealing with 
government officials
Basic index
1.3.3 If entering a market is over restricted Basic index
1.4 Government cleanness Sub-index
1.4.1 Cleanness of government officials Basic index
1.4.2 Informal payment of the form to gov. officials Basic index
2.  Legal environment for business Area index
2.1 Fairness and efficiency in enforcement of laws Sub-index
2.1.1  Efficiency of judiciary authorities Basic index
2.1.2  Fairness of judiciary act Basic index
2.2  Protection of the legal rights of business people Sub-index
2.2.1  Implementation of firm contracts Basic index
2.2.2  Security of the personal property of business people Basic index
2.2.3  Protection of intellectual property rights Basic index
3.  Tax and non-tax burden of firms Area index
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Name of index Category of 
the index
3.1  Tax burden of firms Sub-index
3.1.1  Tax burden of firms Basic index
3.2  Fees, collections and charges outside state regulation Sub-index
3.1.2  Proportion of fees, collections and charges to total sales Basic index
4.  Financial services Area index
4.1  Formal financial services Sub-index
4.1.1  Difficulty of obtaining bank loans Basic index
4.1.2  Extra charge for loans outside the interest Basic index
4.2  Informal finance Sub-index
4.2.1  Difficulty of borrowing money from informal channels Basic index
5.  Human resource supply Area index
5.1  Technicians Sub-index
5.1.1  Difficulty of finding technicians locally Basic index
5.2  Managers Sub-index
5.2.1  Difficult of finding managers locally Basic index
5.3  Skilled workers Sub-index
5.3.1  Difficulty of finding skilled workers locally Basic index
6.  Infrastructure conditions Area index
6.1  Power supply Sub-index
6.1.1  Power supply Basic index
6.2  Rail transport Sub-index
6.2.1  Rail transport Basic index
6.3  Other infrastructure Sub-index
6.3.2  Other infrastructure Basic index
7.  Market intermediaries and technical and export services Area index
7.1  Market intermediaries Sub-index
7.1.1  Local services of lawyers and accountants Basic index
7.1.2  Development of local guilds and their helpfulness to 
business
Basic index
7.2  Technical and export services Sub-index
7.2.1  Local conditions of technical and export services Basic index
8. Ethical business environment Area index
8.1 Local ethical business environment Sub-index
8.1.1 Local ethical business environment Basic index
Source: Authors’ summary.
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12 Will Chinese Industry 
Ever Be ‘Green’?
Shiyi Chen and Jane Golley
Introduction
In January 2013, as air pollution reached record levels in much of eastern 
China, Chinese multimillionaire Chen Guangbiao sold cans of air on the street 
in smog-ridden Beijing to send a simple message: ‘I want to tell mayors, county 
chiefs and heads of big companies: don’t just chase GDP growth, don’t chase 
the biggest profits at the expense of our children and grandchildren and at the 
cost of sacrificing our ecological environment’.1 As a temporary response to 
the ‘hazardous’ air quality in Beijing, with particulate matter readings reaching 
over 40 times those considered safe by the World Health Organisation, the 
municipal government temporarily shut down more than 100 heavily polluting 
factories and ordered 30 per cent of government vehicles off the roads.2 It is 
clear (pardon the pun), however, that these emergency measures are not long-
term solutions, with the transition towards a new model of economic growth 
now widely considered to be an imperative, not an option.
This imperative is reflected in the World Bank’s report China 2030, which states 
that: ‘It is clear that however global carbon budgets may be allocated via national 
actions and international negotiations over the next twenty years, there will never 
be enough carbon emission space for China to copy the past industrialisation 
model of developed countries’ (2012: 235). One of the six key characteristics of 
the report’s proposal for a ‘New Development Strategy for 2030’ is the concept of 
green development, ‘a pattern of development that decouples growth from heavy 
dependence on resource use, emissions and environmental damage, and promotes 
growth through the creation of new green products, technologies, investments, 
and changes in consumption and conservation behaviour’ (2012: 233). 
Given the dominance of industry in generating China’s aggregate carbon 
dioxide emissions (at 86 per cent of the country’s 8.2 billion tons in 2010), 
a  sustainable pattern of industrial growth will be a critical component of the 
transition towards a green, low-carbon economy. Traditionally, a rising share of 
total-factor productivity (TFP) in output growth has been taken as a signal of 
1   ‘Chinese Millionaire Fights Pollution with Thin Air’, 30 January 2013, Reuters, available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/us-china-pollution-cans-idUSBRE90T0LM20130130
2   ‘Beijing Shuts Factories, Removes Cars, but Pollution Stays High’, Reuters, available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/us-china-pollution-idUSBRE90S0AJ20130129
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the transformation towards a ‘sustainable’ development model based on quality 
rather than quantity; that is, on intensive rather than extensive growth (Solow 
1957; Krugman 1994; Young 1995). There have been many studies assessing the 
contribution of TFP to China’s economic growth since 1978, with ongoing debates 
about whether and when its development model has made this transformation.3 
Most of these studies use Solow residuals or regressions based on Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) or translog production functions to estimate productivity, while some 
use parametric stochastic frontier production functions and others utilise data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). In much of the existing literature, however, measures 
of productivity have been calculated using data that only includes the traditional 
inputs of capital and labour, neglecting both the energy inputs required for 
economic growth and their environmental impacts.4 Even if these measures were 
to reveal a rising and, at some point, dominant share of TFP in output growth, 
this neglect surely raises questions about the true sustainability of the evolving 
growth model. 
There is a range of alternative measures for evaluating a country’s 
development performance, which take these issues into account; for example, 
by incorporating energy as an intermediate input in the production process 
(as in the KLEM model of Jorgenson et al. 1987), or by treating emissions as 
an unpaid and unobservable input in the production function (Mohtadi 1996). 
In our view, however, none of these measures accurately accounts for the 
negative externalities associated with emissions generated in the production 
process. In contrast, the directional distance function (DDF), (Chung et al. 
1997), incorporates an emissions variable as an undesirable output directly into 
the production function, which enables an explicit evaluation of the negative 
impact of emissions growth on a country’s production frontier using DEA 
analysis. This results in a measure of TFP growth known variously as actual, 
total, environment-sensitive, or green TFP (henceforth GTFP), which can be 
separated into efficiency and technical change components. 
There have been wide applications of this approach outside China,5 but only 
a few on China to date. For example, one analysis (Hu et al. 2008) uses DDF to re-
rank the technical change and efficiency of Chinese provinces once energy and 
emissions are taken into account, and shows different rankings compared to the 
more traditional measures (e.g. Zheng and Hu 2005). A 2010 study (Wang et al.) 
estimates Chinese regional-level TFP and finds that changes in GTFP and TFP 
deviate from each other, with GTFP suffering mainly from the over-emission 
3   See Wu (1995, 2008); Woo (1998); Young (2003); Bosworth and Collins (2008); and, Jefferson et al. 
(2000, 2008) for a sample of a large list. Chen et al. 2011 provide a recent survey of this literature.
4   One exception is Chen (2009), who includes both energy and carbon dioxide emissions as input factors 
in China’s growth accounting to estimate the productivity growth of 38 Chinese industrial sectors for 
the period 1980–2006.
5   For examples, see Hailu and Veeman 2000; Jeon and Sickles 2004; and 2006. 
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of sulphur dioxide and chemical oxygen demand. Another study (Tu 2008) 
estimates only China’s regional environmental efficiency, but not productivity, 
while this chapter does both below. Furthermore, none of these studies conduct 
their analysis at this chapter’s high level of industrial disaggregation.
This chapter uses DEA and the DDF to estimate the changing patterns of GTFP 
growth of 38 industrial sectors during the period 1980–2010 to assess whether 
Chinese industry is on the path towards a sustainable form of low-carbon growth 
or not. Unfortunately, as will become clear below, it seems to have lost its way.
Method and Data
DEA is a nonparametric linear programming method for estimating a 
production frontier with multiple inputs and outputs. A comparison with the 
best-practice frontier enables the identification of each inefficient decision-
making unit (DMU) and its relative efficiency value, as revealed by its distance 
from the frontier.6 There are numerous different specifications of emissions7 
within the DEA framework, which rely on different distance functions to 
calculate productivity indexes that can then be separated into efficiency 
and technical change components. Below, three alternative specifications are 
considered: one in which emissions are ignored altogether (Model 1); one in 
which they are treated as a desirable output (or good), using the Shephard 
distance function (Model 2); and one that treats emissions as an undesirable 
output (or bad) using the directional distance function (Model 3). 
We use a panel dataset of 38, two-digit industrial sectors between 1980 
and 2010, classified according to the 2002 version of the National Standard of 
Industrial Classification (GB/T4754) and developed by Chen (2011). Each sector 
is classified as a DMU, which produces a desirable output (measured as industrial 
value added (IVA) at 1990 prices) and an undesirable output (carbon dioxide 
emissions) using three inputs, capital, labour and energy. The capital stock cannot 
be obtained directly and is estimated using the perpetual inventory approach, 
depreciated at constant 1990 prices of investment in fixed assets. The  labour 
input is annual average employed workers and the energy input is total energy 
consumption, measured in tons of coal equivalent (TCE). Total energy is sourced 
from coal, petroleum, natural gas and electricity, each of which has a different 
emission factor. The quantity of emissions (measured in tons) for each sector is 
calculated by multiplying the quantity of each energy source by its emission 
factor and summing across all sources.
6   See the pioneering work of Farrell 1957 and Charnes et al. 1978.
7   We focus on carbon dioxide emissions in this chapter, although the approach can readily be applied 
to other emissions as well. For ease of reference, we use ‘emissions’ to refer to carbon dioxide emissions 
for the remainder of the chapter.
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Figure 12.1 illustrates the DEA method for models 2 and 3 (but not Model 1, 
since it does not measure emissions). Technology is represented by the output 
set P (x) to which the output vector of point (y,b) belongs, where y is the good 
(IVA) and b is the bad (emissions). Linear programming is used to calculate the 
value of the distance function for each DMU (i.e., sector) at a fixed point in time. 
In the case of Model 3, the directional distance function (DDF) increases IVA and 
simultaneously reduces emissions for a given level of inputs, by scaling from 
point A in the direction along AB, represented by the direction vector g=(y,-b). 
In contrast, the more commonly used Shephard distance function (SDF) used in 
Model 2 radially scales the original vector from point A proportionally to point C to 
describe the simultaneous increase in both IVA and emissions. The key difference 
between the two models relates to their assumptions about the disposability of bads. 
In particular, the assumption of strong or free disposability of bads in SDF implies 
that disposing of them costs nothing, whereas the weak disposability assumption of 
bads in DDF implies that the disposal of bads is costly (i.e., requiring the diversion of 
inputs to achieve this end, or non-zero mitigation costs). The latter seems a far better 
representation of reality, which is why Model 3 is our preferred model.
Figure 12.1 The directional and Shephard distance functions
Source: Authors’ schema.
In models 1 and 2, TFP is estimated by computing the Malmquist 
productivity index whereas, in Model 3, GTFP is estimated by calculating 
the Malmquist–Luenberger productivity index, which explicitly credits 
an increase in good outputs and a proportional reduction of bad outputs. 
Both productivity indexes (PI) can be decomposed into an efficiency index 
(EI) and a technical change index (TI). If there have been no changes in either 
inputs or outputs between two points in time, then PI=1, while an improvement 
(deterioration) in productivity is signaled by PI>1 (PI<1). EI measures the change 
in output efficiency between two periods, reflecting the movement of each DMU 
either towards (EI>1) or away from (EI<1) the frontier. TI measures the shift in the 
production frontier between two time periods. If technical change enables higher 
production of goods and lower production of bads (i.e., a shift of the production 
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frontier towards the north-west), then TI>1; whereas TI<1 implies a shift of the 
frontier in the direction of fewer goods and more bads. All of these indices can be 
converted to average annual growth rates to provide a more familiar indication of 
the performance of Chinese industry over time in terms of productivity, efficiency 
and technical change. Positive (negative) growth rates in all cases correspond to 
indexes greater (less) than one.
Figure 12.2 China’s aggregate industrial energy and emissions, 1980–2010
Source: Industrial dataset described in the text and authors’ calculations.
Before presenting these estimates, Figure 12.2 illustrates the aggregate trends 
in levels of energy consumption and emissions, along with their intensities (with 
aggregate IVA in the denominator), as revealed by our dataset. This combination 
of trends reflects the rapid growth of industrial output, which has resulted in 
a dramatic rise in emissions in the last decade, despite the steady reduction in 
intensity over time.
Table 12.1 presents the IVA, emissions and emission intensities of each 
industrial sector in 2010 and the growth rates of IVA and emissions for the period 
1980–2010. Not surprisingly, there is substantial heterogeneity across sectors. The 
largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2010 is the electric- and heat-power sector, 
generating over three billion tons. Another five heavy-industrial sectors emitted 
over 400 million tons each—petroleum, coking and nuclear fuel processing (listed 
in the table as petrol processing); ferrous metal smelting and pressing; non-metal 
manufactures; coal mining; and chemicals—compared with ‘just’ 900,000 tons 
for the lowest emitting sector, cultural, sports and educational articles. Of course, 
high emissions do not necessarily imply high emission intensity, as they may, 
instead, be due to high levels of output. The overlap is significant, however, with 
the top five emission-intensive sectors being petroleum, coking, and nuclear 
fuel processing; electric and heat power; coal mining; petroleum and natural gas 
extraction; and gas production and supply. 
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Table 12.1 Levels and growth of key variables by sector
Sector Levels (2010) Growth (1980–2010, %) 
IVA Emissions Emission 
intensity
IVA Emissions
Total industry 11,333 7,188.6 634 12.6 6.4 
Coal mining 152 438.5 2,881 8.7 5.5 
Petrol. extraction 26 71.0 2,766 2.0 4.0 
Ferrous metal mining 59 3.0 51 14.7 3.4 
Non–F. metal mining 50 1.8 37 10.1 -0.2 
Non–metal mining 63 14.5 231 7.3 5.5 
Logging 7 1.3 181 1.1 -2.5 
Food processing 331 33.8 102 13.2 3.8 
Food manu. 162 20.7 128 13.9 2.7 
Beverages 221 15.7 71 13.3 3.1 
Tobacco 260 1.8 7 12.1 1.6 
Textiles 450 46.4 103 9.1 1.7 
Apparel 212 4.2 20 14.3 6.5 
Leather 106 1.7 16 13.3 0.2 
Wood processing 177 8.9 50 16.6 3.2 
Furniture 79 0.6 8 13.6 -0.1 
Paper 172 82.2 479 12.2 5.9 
Printing 89 0.9 10 11.2 -1.6 
Cultural articles 59 0.4 7 13.5 1.0 
Fuel processing 44 1,688.7 38,181 2.6 6.7 
Chemicals 628 416.4 663 11.3 4.1 
Medicine 370 14.0 38 16.5 3.6 
Fibers 85 14.3 168 13.9 1.8 
Rubber 108 9.1 84 10.9 2.0 
Plastic 260 8.7 33 15.4 6.2 
Nonmetal manu. 550 492.6 895 11.1 6.2 
Ferrous smelt/press 437 576.4 1,319 10.6 5.3 
Non–F. smelt/press 248 58.3 235 12.8 6.8 
Metal products 327 7.1 22 12.2 1.4 
General machines 641 9.6 15 12.6 -1.7 
Special machines 404 12.9 32 12.2 0.6 
Transport equip. 1,018 19.7 19 17.9 1.2 
Electrical equip. 865 12.4 14 15.9 3.4 
Electronic equip. 2,014 4.4 2 24.3 1.5 
Measuring inst. 166 0.6 3 14.0 -1.0 
Electric & heat power 301 3,059.7 10,152 9.9 8.6 
Gas 18 27.2 1,517 11.4 3.3 
Water 7 0.5 63 6.7 4.1 
Others 164 8.7 53 12.5 -1.0
Note: IVA - billions of yuan, emissions - millions of tons, intensity - tons/million yuan.
Source: Industrial dataset described in text and authors’ calculations.
One piece of good news here is that none of the top five sectors in terms 
of  emissions levels or intensities are in the top ten fastest growing, or the top 
ten largest sectors in terms of IVA. Another is that in only two of the 38 sectors 
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(petroleum processing and petroleum and natural gas extraction) did the growth of 
emissions exceed that of IVA over the period, suggesting that the downward trend in 
emission intensity shown in Figure 12.1 has been industry wide, not sector specific. 
Emissions growth, however, was only negative in a handful of sectors, providing an 
early indication that GTFP is likely to be higher, not lower, than the more traditional 
TFP estimates. More generally, the data summarised in Figure 12.2 and Table 12.1 
highlight the magnitude of the challenges facing China as it attempts to decouple 
the rapid growth of industrial production from that of energy use and emissions. 
China’s Industrial GTFP Growth, 1980–2010
The average annual growth rates of Chinese industry’s productivity, efficiency 
and technical change between 1980 and 2010, weighted by the IVA share for 
each sector and averaged geometrically over the sample period for each of the 
three models specified above, are reported in Table 12.2. 








Productivity 5.5*** 4.4** 1.8
Efficiency 0.9** 0.8* -0.1
Technical change 4.7 3.7* 2.0
Note: Null hypothesis of the t test is that the estimated productivity, technical progress and efficiency of 
models 1 and 2 are identical to those estimated by model 3. ***, **, * indicate that the level of significance 
is 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: Industrial dataset described in text and authors’ calculations.
According to Model 1, the growth of TFP, efficiency, and technical change 
were 5.5 per cent, 4.7 per cent and 0.9 per cent, respectively. Productivity is lower 
when emissions are included as a good in Model 2, and this reduction is almost 
entirely due to lower technical change, indicating that the inclusion of emissions 
impacts mainly on the location of the production frontier, rather than on the 
movement of individual sectors towards or away from the frontier over time. 
Based on our preferred model, Model 3, the average annual growth rates of 
GTFP, technical change and efficiency between 1980 and 2010 were 1.8 per cent, 
two per cent and –0.1 per cent, respectively. Like TFP, this indicates that 
improvements in China’s GTFP have resulted from technical change rather than 
efficiency improvements, which is consistent with findings based on traditional 
measures (e.g., Wu 1995 and Zheng et al. 2003). Indeed, at this aggregate 
industry level, there appears to have been a backwards step in terms of latter 
(indicated by EI< 1, or the negative growth rate seen in Table 12.2). The GTFP 
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growth estimated by Model 3 is less than the estimates of models 1 and 2, and all 
the measures surveyed by Chen et al. (2011), apart from the 1.8 per cent estimate 
by Wing Thye Woo (1998). The estimates of efficiency and technical change 
contained in Model 3 are also smaller than those of models 1 and 2, although 
the difference between the technical change estimates of models 1 and 3 is not 
statistically significant (see note under Table 12.2). 
Figure 12.3 illustrates the change in aggregate industrial GTFP growth and its 
components over time. Through the 1980s, GTFP growth remained low, and was 
even negative at times, before experiencing a long and steady increase through 
the 1990s to peak at 4.2 per cent in 2002, followed by a continuous decline since 
then to reach just half a per cent in 2010. As the figure illustrates, the rise and 
fall of China’s GTFP has been driven by the rise and fall in technical change, 
while efficiency has fluctuated at low levels throughout the period of analysis.
Figure 12.3 Growth rates of GTFP, efficiency and technical change 
Source: Industrial dataset described in the text and authors’ calculations.
Table 12.3 takes a closer look at the aggregate-level productivity results for 
the entire period and for three distinct sub-periods. Following Chen et al. (2011), 
and because of the varying patterns of energy consumption and emissions, the 
reform period is classified into three sub-periods: ‘slow and steady’ (1980–1995), 
stagnant (1996–2002), and rapid growth (2003–2010). For each period we report 
the average annual rate of growth of IVA, emissions, capital, labour, energy and 
productivity (TFP or GTFP) from each of the three models, averaged over the 
38 sectors. Over the entire period, and for each sub-period, capital and energy 
are the dominant contributors to growth in terms of inputs. During the period 
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1996–2002, energy consumption and emissions grew by their lowest annual 
rate (hence ‘stagnant’) while labour growth was negative. These figures contrast 
starkly with the rapid growth of energy and emissions in the most recent period, 
at over ten per cent each. 
Table 12.3 Average annual growth rates of outputs, inputs and productivity (%)
Period IVA Emissions Capital Labour Energy
Productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
























Note: For each period, the numbers in brackets report the contribution share of each productivity estimate 
to IVA growth, equal to 100 minus the share of all inputs.
Source: Industrial dataset described in the text and authors’ calculations.
The first key message from Table 12.3 is that, by accounting for the negative 
impact of energy-related emissions in Model 3, productivity estimates in all sub-
periods are below the traditional estimates. Similar to the findings in Table 12.2, 
for each period the estimates of productivity growth for models 1 and 2 are 
greater than the corresponding estimates for Model 3, with the only exception 
being Model 2 in the first sub-period. 
The figures in brackets in Table 12.3 indicate the percentage contribution of 
TFP (for models 1 and 2) and GTFP (for Model 3) to the growth of IVA, revealing 
the second key message of Table 12.3. According to the traditional estimate of 
Model 1, TFP accounted for 80 per cent of output growth between 1996 and 
2002, and one half of it between 2003 and 2005, supporting claims that growth 
has been predominantly intensive, rather than extensive since the mid 1990s. 
When emissions are included in Model 3, however, GTFP accounted for only 
32 per cent of IVA growth in the second period, falling to 10 per cent in the 
third. Furthermore, the productivity contribution estimated by all three models 
decreased between the second and third periods.
The first two columns of Table 12.4 present the average annual growth 
rates of TFP, and GTFP and its components for each sector between 1980 and 
2010. The combination of growth rates of IVA and emissions for each sector 
shown in the final two columns of Table 12.1 are useful for understanding the 
differences between the TFP and GTFP results reported in Table 12.4. Each 
sector’s productivity growth depends on both the change in that sector’s 
input–output combination between two points in time, and the shape of the 
production frontier near that combination at the initial point in time. As long 
as frontier production of the good increases when output of the bad increases 
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(as we would typically expect), the relative values of TFP and GTFP depend not 
only on the growth in emissions between the two points in time, but also on 
this growth relative to that of output (Jeon and Sickles 2004). The standard and 
most intuitive case is where GTFP growth rates are less than TFP growth rates 
because emissions growth is positive: simply put, emissions growth is penalised 
in the ‘green’ estimate. This was the case in coal mining, ferrous metal mining, 
and another 27 sectors, and in aggregate in Table 12.3. The other intuitive case, 
in which GTFP growth is higher than TFP growth because emissions growth is 
negative, occurred in just two sectors, logging and ‘others’. 
In another five sectors (non-ferrous metal mining, furniture, printing, 
general machines and measuring instruments), even though emissions growth 
is negative, GTFP is still lower than TFP because the fall in emissions growth is 
small relative to the increase in IVA growth (for example, –0.1 per cent versus 
13.6 per cent respectively for furniture). Finally, there is one perverse result, the 
petroleum extraction sector, in which emissions growth exceeds IVA growth and 
yet GTFP is greater than TFP (0.1 per cent compared with –1.3 per cent). As one 
study explains (Jeon and Sickles 2004), this might happen because of limited 
data in the neighbourhood of this sector (which is likely, given its high ranking 
in terms of emission intensity) and because the production frontier in that 
neighbourhood does not necessarily expand in the direction of more IVA, even 
with an increase in emissions. 
Table 12.4 also presents the growth rates of efficiency and technical change 
for each sector between 1980 and 2010. As for the aggregate results illustrated in 
Figure 12.3, technical change is the dominant source of GTFP growth in virtually 
all sectors, peaking at an average annual rate of 6.3 per cent in the electronics 
sector, and recording positive values in all but one sector (petroleum, coking 
and nuclear fuel processing). In contrast, efficiency recorded negative growth in 
28 sectors and was greater than one per cent in just two sectors (electronics and 
electric and heat power).
In amongst the pessimistic news is the slightly consoling fact that GTFP 
growth was positive in all but three sectors over the first three decades of reform. 
But, does this signal the transformation of industry towards a sustainable, low-
carbon, intensive model of growth? The answer is an emphatic no. The final three 
columns of Table 12.4 show the contribution of GTFP to output growth in each 
sector for the three time periods. Between the first two periods, this contribution 
increased in 28 of the 38 sectors, and in the second period GTFP accounted for 
more than half of IVA growth in five sectors, and for more than 20 per cent in 
another 12 sectors. Between the second two periods, however, the contribution of 
GTFP fell in 34 of the 38 sectors and, in the third period, it only exceeded a half in 
one sector (tobacco) and was greater than 20 per cent in just another three. This, 
combined with the other evidence presented in this section, signals a setback in 
the low-carbon transformation of Chinese industry in recent years.
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Table 12.4 TFP, GTFP, Efficiency and technical change across sectors and time
Av. annual growth
(1980–2010, %)
Share of GTFP in IVA growth
(%)
Sector TFP GTFP Effic. Tech 1980–95 1996–2002 2003–10
Coal mining 2.7 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.0
Petrol. extraction –1.3 0.1 –0.7 0.8 15.5 –1.4 0.2
Ferrous metal mining 4.1 0.7 –0.2 0.9 7.4 7.5 1.7
Non–F. metal mining 3.7 0.8 –0.4 1.1 5.8 24.8 4.2
Non–metal mining 1.5 –0.1 –1.0 0.9 –4.2 –4.4 0.6
Logging –0.4 0.1 –0.6 0.7 –4.6 19.8 –9.0
Food processing 1.7 0.3 –0.2 0.5 2.1 3.6 1.5
Food manu. 3.2 0.3 –0.1 0.4 2.2 4.2 0.9
Beverages 1.4 0.5 –0.2 0.8 3.7 12.7 1.9
Tobacco 5.6 2.6 -0.0 2.6 –12.4 44.3 68.7
Textiles 0.3 0.3 –0.4 0.7 5.0 7.1 1.1
Apparel 5.9 1.7 –1.5 3.3 13.4 24.4 5.3
Leather 6.6 2.1 –0.2 2.3 16.8 31.0 8.2
Wood processing 5.5 1.0 –0.1 1.1 7.1 15.9 1.9
Furniture 7.1 2.6 –0.1 2.7 19.0 30.7 15.2
Paper 2.2 0.1 –0.1 0.2 1.0 1.3 0.2
Printing 9.1 2.7 –0.3 3.0 32.0 27.0 15.3
Cultural articles 8.4 3.7 –0.6 4.3 23.6 53.3 20.9
Fuel processing –0.6 –2.4 –1.5 –0.9 315.5 56.1 –42.3
Chemicals 3.3 0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.2
Medicine 4.2 2.5 0.0 2.5 4.8 34.8 14.6
Fibers 8.9 0.4 -0.0 0.4 1.6 4.4 3.9
Rubber 1.0 0.4 –0.3 0.7 4.7 6.9 1.4
Plastic 7.1 1.4 –0.7 2.1 7.4 29.8 1.2
Nonmetal manu. 2.6 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.2
Ferrous smelt/press 3.1 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 –0.4
Non–F. smelt/press 3.4 0.1 –0.3 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.4
Metal products 6.6 1.4 –0.5 1.9 13.2 24.9 5.2
General machines 9.1 1.7 0.0 1.7 16.7 25.3 7.6
Special machines 8.1 1.0 –0.2 1.2 14.2 13.4 3.2
Transport equip. 9.7 1.5 0.1 1.4 10.6 8.6 6.3
Electrical equip. 9.4 3.3 –0.2 3.5 20.8 36.2 12.2
Electronic equip. 19.3 8.4 1.9 6.3 30.7 54.8 21.9
Measuring inst. 11.2 5.4 0.2 5.2 25.3 64.4 39.0
Electric & heat power 7.5 1.5 1.3 0.2 29.5 43.6 –10.0
Gas 5.5 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1
Water 1.1 –0.1 –2.2 2.1 –1.9 50.4 3.3
Others 2.4 2.5 0.1 2.4 6.9 109.3 15.2
Source: Industrial dataset described in text and authors’ calculations.
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Policy Implications
It is worth noting that the average annual growth of aggregate industrial 
output (measured by IVA) was 12.6 per cent between 1996 and 2002, a period in 
which the vast majority of sectors recorded their lowest output growth but also 
enjoyed their highest rate of GTFP growth. In contrast, aggregate output grew 
at a whopping 21.2 per cent in 2003–2010, with virtually all sectors recording 
their highest output growth in this period but also reduced rates of GTFP 
growth. Do these results imply that low-carbon growth can only be achieved by 
slower economic growth or, conversely, that rapid economic growth can only be 
achieved by incurring high, and increasingly intolerable, environmental costs?
According to the World Bank (2012: 233), the answer is no: The world’s 
development process is at a crossroad. Given the unsustainability of current 
economic growth both in China and the world, a new approach is needed. 
The concept of green development is such an approach. Green development 
can become a potentially transformative process for the economy, society, the 
environment, and the role of government. It is an opportunity: an open door. 
The report outlines the mix of market incentives, regulations, public 
investments, industrial policy and institutional developments that China plans to 
use in order to seize the opportunity to ‘go green’, including ways to ‘encourage 
new investments in a range of low-pollution, energy- and resource-efficient 
industries that would lead to greener development, spur investments in related 
upstream and downstream industries and services and build international 
competitive advantage in a global sunrise industry’ (World Bank 2012: xvi). 
Within this new growth strategy, emerging green industries, including 
clean energy markets (solar-, wind-, and hydro-power), biotechnology, high-
end manufactures and clean-energy vehicles, will be supported by new 
incentives for innovation and research that are intended to make China a world 
leader in key green technologies and products. Almost 40 per cent of China’s 
RMB4,000 billion (US$584 billion) fiscal stimulus package, which was launched 
in November 2008, was allocated to green themes, while Chinese investment 
in renewable energy became the world’s largest in 2009, reaching more than 
US$20 billion (Robins et al. 2009). These are just two examples of steps that 
could result in the significant expansion not only of China’s own production 
frontier, but of the global frontier as well, enabling technical progress to become 
a strong driver of productivity growth and putting China’s industrial GTFP 
back on track in the years ahead. The Chinese leadership’s ongoing commitment 
to green, low-carbon development, as evidenced by the adoption of these and 
numerous other energy-saving and emission-abating policies and regulations 
in recent years, will be absolutely critical for turning this potential into reality.
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The ‘green transformation’ of traditional sectors is another crucial component 
of the green growth strategy, with the focus on energy-efficient investments 
that will yield high economic returns. For example, the report cites the fact 
that, although Chinese cement makers have reduced their energy intensity by 
30 per cent between 1998 and 2009, they are still 30 per cent less efficient than 
global best practice, while China’s iron and steel industry could potentially 
save more than 100 million tons of coal per year. In combination, these two 
industries could save an average of US$9.9 billion per year between 2008 and 
2030 by using the best energy-saving technologies currently available, with even 
greater savings given future possible energy price trajectories and technological 
advances. In other words, there is potential for efficiency gains that will move 
individual sectors towards both China’s and the global production frontier, 
raising their GTFP in the process. 
Conclusions
Any effort to account for the environmental costs of economic growth 
comes with practical challenges, including how to weight carbon dioxide 
(and other) emissions in the absence of prices and/or reliable estimates of the 
costs of the damage they inflict. The directional distance function (DDF) uses 
the Malmquist–Luenberger productivity index to overcome this problem 
by penalising emissions growth in proportion to rewarding output growth, 
with the underlying presumption being that ‘consumers have preferences for 
reducing bad outputs regardless of the actual damage resulting from those 
outputs’ (Färe et al. 2001: 382). This may appear to some as an extreme way of 
assessing a country’s economic—or industrial—growth performance. But then, 
desperate times call for desperate measures, and the image of Chen Guangbiao 
selling canned air to masked customers in Beijing is a powerful symbol of the 
desperate extent of China’s environmental problems. 
This chapter uses DEA analysis and the DDF to estimate ‘green’ TFP and its 
components for 38 Chinese industrial sectors between 1980 and 2010, focusing 
on the damage caused by high and rising carbon dioxide emissions. The results 
reveal that China’s industrial GTFP growth estimated in this way is significantly 
lower than productivity estimates that do not account for the negative impact of 
carbon dioxide emissions generated in the production process. Throughout the 
sample period, both in aggregate and for the majority of sectors, GTFP growth 
has been predominantly shaped by technical change, which increased steadily 
from the mid 1990s to the early 2000s, but which has declined continuously 
since then, in contrast with fluctuating but generally low rates of efficiency 
growth. GTFP growth was positive in the majority of sectors and in aggregate, 
both over the entire period and in each sub-period. The most worrying sign, 
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however, was that between 2003 and 2010 GTFP growth was not only low 
(and well below the 50 per cent level that is often taken to signal the transition 
to ‘sustainable’ growth), but also lower than it was in the preceding decade. 
This trend is not in the direction that the Chinese leadership, or anyone else, 
is hoping for. GTFP and its components offer a useful tool for assessing whether 
China is progressing towards its goal of becoming a green, low-carbon economy. 
With the most recent evidence indicating that Chinese industry seems to have 
lost its way on what remains a long road ahead, some may wonder whether 
it will ever be green? It is far from guaranteed, but there is definitely hope. 
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In 1978, after over 100 years of decline, China embarked on a journey to 
restore its status as the world’s largest economy. From the early 1500s until the 
early 1800s, China’s economy was the world’s largest. By 1820, it accounted for 
one-third of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The next two centuries, 
however, were tumultuous for China. The country experienced catastrophic 
decline between 1820 and 1950 and then, starting in 1978, it experienced 
meteoric rise (Maddison 2001). After reform and opening up in 1978, China 
started to catch-up with the western world with an  average of 10 per cent 
annual growth rate over the past three decades. It now takes the second place in 
the world, with its per capita GDP increasing from US$154 in 1978 to US$6,060 
in 2012. It is widely expected that around 2020, China’s economy will overtake 
that of the United States and regain its first place in the globe if the economic 
boom continues, or even if it slows down a little. As such, China is likely to 
become a high-income society with per capita earning reaching the average 
level of the OECD by 2030 (WB/DRC 2013: 3).
Nonetheless, China faces unprecedented challenges resulting from its 
unsustainable traditional growth model, which is characterised by high 
resource consumption and severe environmental degradation. To successfully 
accomplish its modernisation, China must achieve the following two significant 
transformations. First, China must rebalance its development between economic 
and social undertakings, internal and external demands, urban and rural areas, 
as well as different regions.  In this regard, China can draw on best practices 
from developed countries. Second, China has to take a green growth path that 
represents the future trend. The first transition, to a large extent, is an internal 
issue for China, while the second transition is a common issue shared by all 
nations of the world. China needs to make the two above transitions at the same 
time, as it is no longer feasible for China to achieve its modernisation target 
by simply continuing along the pathways previously taken by industrialised 
countries. China should jump over the current unsustainable development 
mode and instead directly modernise its economy in a green way, in order 
to be a frontrunner in international competition as it joins the high-income 
nations club.
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Green growth could play a significant role in China’s modernisation. 
The barriers for China to achieve green growth do not stem from investment 
or technology, but instead from its distorted market system. China has unique 
advantages to achieve green growth and leapfrog to modernisation in a green 
way, but it also has many institutional obstacles to overcome. This chapter aims 
to identify the opportunities, advantages, barriers to, as well as the path for 
China to accomplish green growth. The second section introduces new thinking 
on how to understand green growth; the third section focuses on opportunities 
for green growth in China; the fourth section analyses the advantages and 
disadvantages of green growth in China; and, the fifth section elaborates upon 
the unfinished reforms aimed at achieving green growth in China.
New Thinking on Green Growth
Understanding Green Growth in a New Way
It’s vital to understand green growth in a new way. Green growth is an 
unprecedented new development pattern which decouples growth from a heavy 
dependence on use of material resources, carbon emissions, and environmental 
damage, in order to promote growth through the creation of new green products 
markets, technologies, and investments, as well as changes in consumption 
and conservation behaviour. It is based on three key concepts. The first, that 
economic growth may be decoupled from rising greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental degradation. Secondly, that the process of ‘going green’ can 
itself be a source of growth and, thirdly, that ‘going green’ is part of a virtuous 
circle which is mutually reinforcing with growth. Green growth is the means 
by which green development is achieved (WB/DRC 2013: 217). Green growth 
represents enormous opportunities and is the inevitable trend that China must 
follow. That said, the opportunities behind green growth are not evident to 
everyone. To comprehend the opportunities, a new thinking is needed.
First, it is difficult to understand the opportunities behind green growth in 
conventional industrialised thinking. Traditional industrialisation, which began 
with the Industrial Revolution, has been based on material resources input, 
and has been coupled with high carbon emissions, high-energy consumption 
and environmental damage. Consequently, ‘going green’ seems to contradict 
economic growth in nature and is bound to be a burden of growth. Some 
think green growth is merely an issue related to the need for energy efficiency 
improvement, renewable energy utilisation or cutting-edge technology 
development. This type of understanding of green growth is too narrow to fully 
recognise the opportunities behind it.
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Second, it is hard to understand green growth when using the analytical 
framework of marginal analysis focusing on optimising resource allocation in 
a given economic structure. Under a given economic structure, emission reduction 
is largely dependent on cutting resource input, and it seems to inevitably result 
in decreased output. In fact, ‘going green’ refers to changes that occur when 
an economic organisation jumps to a more competitive structure of division 
of labour, which is likely to accelerate economic development. According to 
Adam Smith (1776) and Allyn Young (1928), evolution of division of labour is 
the spring of economic growth. The insight was revived by Xiaokai Yang (2001) 
with inframarginal analysis, which is particularly powerful for investigating 
green growth driven by changes to economic structures. 
A typical example may explain how the two misunderstandings above stop 
us from understanding green growth properly. A popular argument questioning 
green growth is that there does not exist sufficient evidence proving the 
feasibility of green growth. In this case, government is not convinced to take 
serious action in promoting green growth before sufficient evidence emerges. 
Nonetheless, the problem is that green growth is a self-fulfilling process, and 
the evidence and actions are interdependent. If the government does not take 
serious action on reducing emissions and protecting the environment, it is very 
hard for green growth evidence to become apparent. And this is the biggest 
dilemma for green growth. If the government and public take muscular action 
with confidence, then resources will be allocated in the green direction and the 
economy would jump from a non-green structure to a green structure, yielding 
green growth. Otherwise, economic development will never jump to the new 
model and instead it will lock on to the traditional non-green path. Nevertheless, 
the analytical framework of conventional marginal analysis fails to predict the 
inframarginal changes arising from the structure of division of labour.
It is difficult to fully understand the essence of green growth and see the 
opportunities behind it if green growth is understood in a traditional sense. 
Green growth perhaps represents the most profound and comprehensive 
transformation since the Industrial Revolution, and could bring about changes 
in all aspects of society including production, living, consumption, organisation 
and business models.
New Context for Green Growth
Aside from the new thinking, green growth can’t be sufficiently understood 
unless it is put into the larger picture of new revolutions including the rapid 
development of information and communication technology (ICT), big data, 
new materials (like nano technology), or high-speed railway. In essence, the core 
of all the changes is the unprecedented improvement of transaction efficiency. 
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As  Smith (1776) pointed out, the spring of economic growth is the division 
of labour that is determined by the extent of the market, while the latter is 
determined by transaction efficiency. As Coase (1937) notes, the key to determine 
economic organisational structure is transaction efficiency. Specifically, the 
dramatic improvement of transaction efficiency is reflected as follows:
• Changes of information flow: Information dissemination is growing 
exponentially in terms of speed and content with the fast development of 
ICT, big data, and cloud data.
• Changes of people flow: People move much more conveniently and faster 
than ever before with the progress of high-speed railway, highways, aviation 
and the increased popularity of private cars.
• Changes of logistics: Transportation speed of goods is significantly boosted 
with quick and convenient logistics systems.
Consequently, the dramatic enhancement of transaction efficiency results in 
two outcomes, First, it gives birth to many new business, Second, it brings 
about many new business models or economic organisations. The function of 
entrepreneurs is to maximise profits through efficiently organising division 
of labour by using product market or factor market. With higher transaction 
efficiency, the room for businessmen to organise division of labour is largely 
expanded and a higher level of division of labour can be developed, which 
represents economic growth potential (Yang 2001).
In practical terms, the world is witnessing enormous changes that differ from 
those of traditional industrial society. The changes are not only to the context 
in which green growth develops, but the changes are themselves green growth. 
First, the definition of resources is changing. Old resources may become 
valueless while some resources, previously seen as useless, may become 
valuable. For example, individual information is not valuable if it is scattered, 
but, once connected by ITC and big data, it forms part of an invaluable resource 
and, as a  result, varieties of new business models appear (see examples such 
as Twitter and Facebook). Natural environment is another example. Due to 
underdevelopment, the ecological environment in poor regions is conserved 
and it now becomes a vital resource and can be translated into wealth. It’s the 
same case for fossil fuel, which became more valuable during the Industrial 
Revolution.
Second, the business model is shifting. The function of entrepreneurs is to 
find the most efficient way to organise division of labour in the market. As the 
dramatic increase of transaction efficiency driven by the development of ICT, 
big data, high-speed railway, transportation systems and logistics systems, the 
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room for them to organise division of labour is dramatically increasing as well. 
Under the same resource scarcity, a more efficient structure of division of labour 
means higher productivity. 
Third, consumption patterns are also changing. As smart phones and 
internet become common, people’s demands for goods and services are 
changing significantly. For instance, internet-based requirements for new, non-
material services are dramatically increasing. The change of consumption means 
a decrease in the scarcity of natural resources.
Fourth, the production model is shifting and the so-called third industrial 
revolution is emerging. In the future, manufacturing is likely to turn from 
a centralised and massive production model into a distributed and individual 
model. It is not impossible for countries with poor manufacturing capacities 
to leapfrog to the era of digital manufacturing. And traditional agriculture 
promises to be a profitable business. When it comes to services, changes are 
also significant. For example, the internet-based revolution in educational 
models, such as Courser or Khan Academy, enables everyone to access to the 
best educational resources in the world. Thanks to the non-competitive nature 
of educational resources, the cost does not increase with the rise in the number 
of users. This internet-based educational model provides opportunities for 
building the knowledge-based economy, which is conducive to improvement in 
the environment. 
The changes elaborated above are just part of the comprehensive changes that 
are happening. A striking feature of the changes is that they all have the effect of 
decreasing scarcity of resources and emitting less pollution per unit of output. 
That means that green growth cannot be narrowly understood as the stories of 
new energy, or a few cutting-edge high technologies. In fact, green growth is the 
most profound and comprehensive transformation of development mode since 
the Industrial Revolution, and the potential for green growth is much bigger 
than many thought. Nonetheless, the opportunities of green growth can only be 
comprehended if its nature is properly understood.
Opportunities of Green Growth in China
Green growth is likely to not only be a new engine for economic progress, 
but also to improve the quality of growth in China (WB/DRC 2013).
First, ‘going green’ can be a new source of economic growth. In the process of 
green transformation, the upgrading of traditional industries and the emergence 
of new green industries, including green services, provide new drives for 
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economic progress. Moreover, it will consume fewer resources, emit less carbon, 
and become more environmental friendly per unit of output. The sources fall 
into three categories. 
Green Transformation of Traditional Sectors
Many existing techniques and management patterns will not only help 
in conserving energy and reducing pollution, but also increasing profit. 
For instance, according to estimates by McKinsey & Company (2009), installing 
light-emitting diodes (LEDs) for lighting in buildings could generate US$25 billion 
in annual financial savings by 2030, compared to business as usual (measured 
in 2009 dollars). Improving passive heating through design modifications could 
provide another US$6 billion. Together, the potential for direct savings through 
efficiency gains in China could be as high as US$65 billion per year by 2030, 
if the full technical and economic potential of these so-called ‘no-regret’ options 
can be realised (WB/DRC 2013: 224).
Though these figures are estimates only, it is certain that traditional sectors 
have great potential for ‘going green’. Though the effects of upgrading traditional 
sectors are not as dramatic and revolutionary as the effects of a few cutting-edge 
green technologies, its potential for ‘going green’ is huge due to its massive 
scale.
Expansion of Emerging Green Industries
Green industries involve all industries with low levels of pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions. In the narrow sense, it refers to industries represented 
by clean energy sectors, mainly solar energy, wind energy and related device 
manufacturing and electric vehicles. Cost reductions and technological progress 
in renewable energy technologies in China have exceeded expectations, mostly 
due to a massive scaling-up in the industry. In renewable energy, the cost of both 
wind energy and solar photovoltaic (PV) equipment has decreased dramatically 
during the past five years (Feng & Wang 2011).
Expansion of Service Sectors
Ecosystem service has become a big industry in some countries. Instead of 
making money through selling wood, farmers in some economically poor regions 
in China now make their living by providing ecosystem services. There are also 
other new green services, such as carbon asset management, carbon trade, energy 
performance management, environment assessment, climatic-risk disclosure, 
and integrated solutions for urban management. Certainly, most traditional 
service industries are green, and China has great potential in these sectors.
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Second, green growth can improve the quality of growth in China. 
The benefits for improving the environment are numerous—it not only enhances 
people’s welfare and health conditions, but also mutually reinforces economic 
growth. Japan’s experience also shows that, even under stringent environmental 
policies, its economy has been expanding more rapidly without environmental 
policy. Moreover, preventive environmental policy is even more economically 
rewarding (Kobayashi 2011).
Green growth also promises to solve other problems, such as energy 
security, urban livability, and agricultural output augmentation. Rapid energy 
consumption will affect China’s energy security. It’s predicted that, under current 
energy policies, China is likely to be dependent on imports for 75 per cent of 
its petroleum (making it the world’s largest oil importer) and 50 per cent of 
its natural gas requirements by 2030 (WB/DRC 2013). Traffic congestion and 
energy consumption can be relieved by strengthening land management for 
higher efficiency of use. Agricultural output can be enhanced by impeding the 
decrease of land fertility and water pollution.
Advantages of China in Achieving 
Green Growth
China has lots of advantages in promoting green growth (see WB/DRC 2013). 
Fundamentally, green growth relies on market forces. Nonetheless, the 
prerequisite for the market to function well in promoting green growth is 
that the government should play its role in reducing carbon emissions and 
forcefully protecting the environment. The determination of senior levels of 
government on green growth and effective decision-making mechanisms, as 
well as strong government execution, will, therefore, play a vital role for the 
country to promote green growth. In this respect, China has evident strengths. 
The Chinese Government has the ability to mobilise action on high priority 
issues and its senior leaders have already reached a consensus on the importance 
of green development. This commitment is also evident in the Work Program 
to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions during the 12th five-year plan, in which 
the State Council makes clear that ‘addressing climate change will accelerate 
economic restructuring and the reform of economic development, driving 
forward the opportunities of the next industrial revolution’. The following 
paragraphs outline an additional seven advantages that benefit China in seeking 
green growth.
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First, China enjoys the advantage of being a relative latecomer to 
industrialisation. Its relatively lower level of development gives it a room to 
meet its new demands by developing green productivity and infrastructures. 
In contrast, developed countries will have to shut down some old capacities in 
order to go green.
Second, a large domestic market allows China to scale-up its green sectors. 
As the world’s second largest market, China is likely to embrace an even more 
rapid market expansion of green products and services over the next few years, 
since its domestic green market is still underdeveloped. As expected, the income 
of urban and rural residents will double by 2020, based on the 2010 level. 
Third, China enjoys the advantages of abundant capital (including human 
capital) available to invest in its green sectors. Thanks to its high investment 
ratio, green industries are set to grow rapidly. In respect of human capital, in the 
20 years to come, about 200 million Chinese students will graduate from school, 
providing green innovation with sufficient human resources (WB/DRC 2013).
Fourth, there is a huge potential for traditional sectors that are burdened 
with overall low efficiency to upgrade techniques. For example, it’s promising 
to use coal in a clean way, given coal accounts about 70 per cent of total energy 
consumption in China.
Fifth, China has the potential to avoid lock-in effects of higher levels of non-
green urbanisation. Twenty years from now, China’s urbanisation level will rise 
from 51 per cent to 65 per cent, with over 200 million farmers swarming into 
cities. That will bring about great potential for economic growth, and thereby 
green city construction will benefit from the avoidance of the lock-in effect.
Sixth, China has an abundant natural endowment of resources for clean 
energy including wind power, solar power, shale gas and methane, making the 
country less dependent on fossil fuels and freer to improve its energy security.
Lastly, with all of the above advantages, coupled with its strong manufacturing 
capacity as a ‘world workshop’, China is likely to be a major destination for 
commercialisation of green technologies worldwide. Green technologies can be 
produced, applied and sold in China no matter wherever they are invented. 
Green growth, therefore, not only provides opportunities for China, but also 
means opportunities for the rest of the world.
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Unprecedented Challenges and Unfinished 
Structural Reforms
Unprecedented Challenges for China
China has achieved remarkable progress in promoting green growth. At the 
moment, China is the world’s largest renewable resources investor. Nonetheless, 
China has not given full play to its potential given that enormous challenges 
are yet to be overcome. The changes discussed in this chapter have two 
prominent features that act as an unprecedented challenge to China’s current 
development model.
First, the changes challenge China’s traditional government-led development 
model. Green growth that is based on ICT, big data and renewable resources is 
highly decentralised. Different from the conventional model driven by large 
and medium-sized companies, green growth is driven by networked small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). This means the government-led model is not viable 
for green growth. 
Second, the changes challenge the imitative model of China. As a catching-
up economy, China has been copying Western economic models and is not 
innovatively creating its own. In the past all the models of economic organisation, 
industrial structure, and business models in industrial countries have been 
copied in China. Now, all of a sudden, green growth has become a global trend. 
In the case of green growth, China stands at the same frontier as the United 
States and Europe. 
China must conduct in-depth reforms to meet the two challenges above. 
In essence, green growth is an institutional competition in which only those 
with creativity can stand out. Facing this pressing challenge, it is impossible 
for China to adopt a ‘wait and see’ strategy. Waiting for a mature green model 
to be developed by Western countries first in order to be copied by China is 
problematic.
There is no way for China to achieve modernisation with the existing 
unsustainable growth model (WB/DRC 2013). Furthermore, China would stay 
on the back foot even if it accomplished modernisation with the current model. 
Of course, higher prices must be paid in transferring to a green growth model 
from a lock-in status. China takes a long time to develop new industrial chains 
and business models and, in terms of green growth, early action is rewarding. 
For China, the window of opportunity is no longer than the next 20 years as this 
is the key period for China to become a high-income society. Once the window 
of opportunity is missed, China will have to pay a high price to in ‘going green’.
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Necessary Structural Reforms 
Enormous transitions are required for China to achieve green growth. 
The biggest barrier for China to promote green growth is not from capital 
or technology, but the failure in building effective market mechanisms. 
The following are the major reforms that need to be undertaken:
Type I reforms: transformation of government function. The biggest 
barrier is that the traditional pattern of governmental behaviour contradicts 
the inherent requirements of green growth. Green growth requires not only the 
development of green industries, but also that those industries be developed 
in a green way. Taking new energy industries as an example, China is now 
the largest new energy investor in the world. The so-called green industries, 
however, are not developed in a green way, but in a traditional high-pollution 
and high-emission way. Enjoying strong government support, those industries 
expanded too fast without sufficient innovation and risk resistance ability. 
Besides, domestic demand has not yet been fully developed. In the case of PV, 
95 per cent of products were exported in 2012. The problem lies in the defective 
market economy and distorted government behaviour, which is a result of 
the existing GDP-oriented official performance evaluation system, and of the 
existing fiscal and tax system.
Type II reforms: consolidating the market economy. The most urgent 
reform related to green growth should be improving the pricing mechanism for 
resource products such as coal, electricity, gas and water to fully reflect their 
external hazard to the environment and health in exploitation, production and 
use, as well as to reflect their scarcity in the market. Meanwhile, the government 
should review and gradually remove the subsidies to the producer of resources 
and fossil fuel, and charge high royalties on natural resources (mineral products, 
oil, natural gas, shale gas, and coal bed methane) occupied by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, it is also very important to break the monopoly 
and stimulate private investment in the resources and energy sector.
Type III reforms: tougher policies and regulations on emission 
reduction and environment protection. The prerequisite for green growth 
is that the government must control carbon emissions and forcefully protect 
the environment so as to reduce the social and coordination cost to the whole 
society, thereby allowing the market to function well. This kind of governmental 
action is actually a new public service and is consistent with the market 
economy. The government is obliged to make strict emission and environment 
policies. Moreover, the government should introduce flexible and effective 
policy implementation mechanisms, including market-based emission reduction 
mechanisms (e.g. emissions trading scheme, ETS).
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In terms of environmental protection, it is necessary to introduce market-
oriented incentive mechanisms such as well-defined water rights that are 
enforced, ownership of land and forest, a water-rights market, emission-trading 
scheme, and land-use quota-trading markets. For example, farmers in poor 
areas would actively enhance the efficiency of land use if additional farmland 
quotas could be sold to developed regions. Another beneficial mechanism 
would be the improvement and expansion of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES), especially in poor regions. The farmers would have the motivation to 
improve and protect the local ecological environment if they could get sufficient 
economic returns through providing ecosystem services.
In terms of laws and regulations, government should introduce tough 
standards for environmental protection, carbon emissions and energy efficiency 
improvement. For instance, introduction of a clean air Act; new standards 
for lighting  and high fuel-efficiency for vehicles; new national standards for 
urban design and energy efficiency and emissions from transportation; and, 
identifiable green standards and labelling for products, services and techniques 
for consumers. Some outdated regulations, such as limits to the production of 
low-speed electric vehicles, need to be revised.
Type IV reforms: offsetting the negative impacts of green growth. 
In addition to the institutional factors, the resistance to green growth also comes 
from its inevitable negative impact on some industries, regions and groups. 
Businesses that have benefited from traditional growth models are likely to 
have originally opposed the ‘going green’ strategy. Since the comprehensive 
green strategy needs to reshuffle the power of some ministries, and some of their 
interest might be affected, they may oppose green strategy. In addition, though 
green strategy would bring prosperity in the long run, it may challenge some 
economic targets (e.g., industrial output targets) in the short run. To offset the 
negative impact of green growth, an incremental reform approach should be 
adopted, and some policy tools (e.g., subsidies and training programs for the 
affected individuals) should be put in place. 
Type V reforms: fostering green industries. ‘Going green’ is 
a comprehensive and profound process. The government should employ various 
measures, including tax, finance, trade, standards and public investment, to 
foster the sources of green growth. For example, in the early stage, key green 
industries could be exempted from taxes for a limited period as part of the 
ongoing policy of structural  tax cuts in China. In contrast, high-pollution, 
high-emission-and-resource products should be imposed with heavy taxes and 
gradually removed from the list of export tax rebates and limited for export. 
Meanwhile, the share of green products that enjoy rebates should be increased. 
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Green enterprises should also be provided with preferential policies for loan, 
debt and financing. Also, green standards should be introduced in government 
procurement.
Conclusion
Green growth, as the most profound and comprehensive transformation 
of the development model since the Industrial Revolution, represents great 
opportunities, as well as formidable challenges for China. To seize the 
opportunities, we first need to understand what green growth really means. 
The opportunities of green growth cannot be seen in traditional industrialised 
thinking. We should understand the concept of green growth in new thinking 
and discuss it in the dynamic context of the new technology revolution.
China has many unique advantages in promoting green growth. At the same 
time, there are some major obstacles to be removed by deepening structural 
reform. The biggest barrier is not in the form of investment or technology, 
but instead in the form of institutional barriers. To seize the opportunities, 
the barriers should be overcome through structural reform. Moreover, the 
decentralised green growth model substantively challenges the traditional 
government-led centralised development model. For China, its strategic period 
of opportunities only exists in the coming 10 to 20 years. Once this opportunity 
period has passed, China will have to pay a much higher price for ‘going green’. 
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14 China’s Climate Change 
Mitigation in International 
Context:
Issues for Australia and China
Ross Garnaut1
Introduction
As the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
observes in its first survey of Chinese climate change policies, ‘China is one 
of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change’ 
(NDRC 2012).
It shares that reality with Australia, for which the extreme heat and bushfires 
of early 2013 join increasingly common extreme weather events that carry 
a climate change footprint.
We are two of the most vulnerable countries, but we share vulnerability with 
the whole of humanity. Extreme weather events have become more common and 
severe on all continents. Some of the manifestations of more common and severe 
extreme weather events—for example, as higher global food prices—have been 
felt everywhere. 
The association of extreme weather events with climate change is 
complicated and confusing, because natural climate variability would anyway 
have introduced damaging extreme weather events from time to time. We can 
characterise the way that global warming has affected weather in probabilistic 
terms by thinking of any particular extreme outcome as being the result of the 
throwing of a standard dice with six faces. Natural variability would sometimes 
have generated a one or a six from the roll of the dice, and the average would 
have settled around three and a half. The early stages of global warming—the 
increase of a bit below one degree Celsius in average temperatures so far since 
1   An earlier version of this chapter was presented as the opening address to the National Development 
and Reform Commission—State Information Centre Carbon Market Beijing International Workshop, 
Beijing, 31 January 2013. I am grateful for help from staff members of NDRC, Ian Davies for data for 
the paper and, Frank Jotzo, Stephen Howes and Ian Davies, for extensive comments. Remaining errors 
and misjudgements are my own.
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the concentrations of greenhouse gases began to build up strongly in the middle 
of last century—can be represented as having removed the one and replaced 
it with a seven. In the absence of effective global mitigation, we will replace the 
two by an eight, and then the three by a nine, with other replacements to follow. 
When the nine has replaced three, the average outcome from the throw of the 
dice will become six and a half. What once were one in 200-throw events—
an average of six over three throws—will have become average occurrences. 
We may still throw a four from time to time, but we will now sometimes see 
a nine, we will never again see a one and, the average outcome will be higher 
than the most extreme at the beginning.
This is the probabilistic sense in which climate scientists should be 
understood when they say that no particular extreme event can be said to be 
caused by global warming, but that extreme events will happen more often and 
the worst will be more extreme than before.
Climate change takes us into unknown territory for human civilisation.
Human civilisation emerged along the Yellow River and other great river 
valleys of Eurasia and North Africa over these past 12,000 years of equable 
temperatures, which scientists have called the Holocene. During this long 
period, average temperatures varied within a relatively narrow range—a range 
whose upper limits we are now breaching. 
During the Holocene, human civilisation grew through the long accumulation 
of experience in governing populous states, of knowledge of many kinds, and 
much sharing of experience through friendly trade and deadly conquest. 
Sometimes the deadly conquest and trade came together: the Mongol conquerors 
destroyed state structures and disrupted ordinary life across much of Eurasia. 
They also brought the experience of the Persian state to China, and facilitated 
the long-distance trade that took the technological genius of Song China to 
Europe and provided building blocks for the industrial revolution. 
Many people in many states contributed to the knowledge and institutional 
arrangements that lay the foundations for the emergence in Britain a quarter of 
a millennium ago of what we now recognise as modern economic growth.
Modern economic growth eventually delivered great bounties to people who 
embraced it. The bounties came with cost, disruption and pain. The cost and 
disruption caused hitherto successful societies like old China to be cautious and 
slow in embracing it. Its uneven distribution across humanity conferred great 
power upon its early hosts, giving rise to the phenomenon of imperialism, with its 
manifold iniquities. But, in the end, modern economic growth delivered higher 
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living standards, more secure food and shelter, healthier and longer lives, more 
knowledge and experience of life for people who joined it. Modern economic 
growth came to be wanted by people all over the world. 
Over the past quarter century humanity became aware that modern 
economic growth came with costs that had not been recognised in earlier times. 
There were incidental or external costs, which had to be managed and contained 
if they were not to destroy the natural conditions that nurtured the emergence 
of human civilisation and modern economic growth. One of these costs, the 
most urgent and dangerous, is human-induced climate change.
Modern economic growth draws on huge amounts of energy. The cheapest and 
most convenient way of securing much of the necessary energy was by burning 
fossil fuels. Fossil fuel combustion returned to the atmosphere some of the 
carbon dioxide that had once made the earth too hot for human life. The natural 
capture of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through photosynthesis and 
its natural sequestration in the earth over hundreds of millions if not billions 
of years established the climatic conditions under which human civilisation 
emerged and prospered. 
The accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere raises temperatures 
on earth. Humans are now creating the climate in which we must make our 
lives. Humanity has entered the anthropocene. 
The brilliant species of which we are members has come an amazing distance 
in building civilisation over these last 12,000 and, especially, 250 years. 
The question is whether humanity can manage the external costs of its success. 
Can humanity manage the anthropocene?
People everywhere want the benefits of modern economic growth, built on 
high levels of energy use. When I discussed these matters with Deng Xiaoping 
over a quarter of a century ago, he said that by the middle of the twenty first 
century the people of China would enjoy the living standards of a middle income 
country, and that he hoped that they would then be satisfied. These were wise 
thoughts; but people in China, like people everywhere, are not easily satisfied, 
and want the best and the most that available technology and resources can give 
to them.
People everywhere want the living standards that are enjoyed by residents 
of the high-income economies. But if we seek to achieve those living standards 
by using energy in the quantities and forms that underpinned modern growth 
in the economies that are now developed, we will change the earth’s climate 
in ways that are unlikely to be compatible with stable states and sustainable 
prosperity. 
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The idea that the finite nature of fossil fuel resources would limit economic 
growth is an old one. It was a discussed a long time ago by some of the biggest 
names in economics and the other social sciences. W.S. Jevons discussed the 
coal-imposed limits to British growth one-and-a-half centuries ago (1865). 
Max  Weber saw the wellsprings of capitalist economic growth running dry 
when ‘the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt’ (1905). In his classic ‘Conditions of 
Economic Progress’, which pioneered modern quantitative analysis of economic 
growth, Australian economist Colin Clark opined that we can calculate the 
likely amount of fossil fuel from the carbon that was once in the atmosphere. 
‘However, we must not set out to burn them up too fast, even if we do find them, 
at any rate not faster than the rate at which carbon dioxide can be stored by 
photosynthesis’. But, Clark added, economic growth itself need not be limited 
by the availability of fossil fuels: ‘there is an abundance of solar energy falling 
on the earth if we know how to tap it’ (1940). 
Clark’s view that economic growth can be sustained by shifting from fossil 
to renewable energy has been confirmed by contemporary economic analysis. 
Elaborate quantitative studies by Nicholas Stern (2007) for the world as a whole 
and myself (2008) for Australia showed that carbon emissions could be reduced 
to the low levels necessary to stabilise global temperatures at moderate costs—
costs that would slightly slow the growth in living standards in the early decades, 
and be much lower than the costs of unmitigated climate change after that.
The question of whether we can manage the anthropocene will be answered, 
yes or no, for humanity as a whole. It will not be yes for people living within 
some states and no for others. If rising temperatures and changing climate in 
the anthropocene corrode the physical foundations for human civilisation, there 
will be no pockets of respite in Hohot or Hobart, Jinan or Geelong, Beijing or 
Binalong, Xian or Xi Ao.
Stern called the absence of constraints on emissions of climate-changing gases 
the greatest market failure the world has ever known (2007). The challenge is to 
have all humans take into account the external effects on global climate of all of 
the decisions that they take in pursuit of economic growth. Collective action is 
required through all of humanity. 
No state governs the whole of humanity to define the collective action that 
is required and to enforce rules that correct the market failure. Humanity can 
manage the anthropocene only if it can build mechanisms within which global 
collective action can be effective.
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The Emergence of a Global Climate 
Change Regime
China and Australia have been active participants in the international 
community’s work to build a basis for international cooperation on climate 
change since the beginning at Rio de Janeiro, two decades ago. In 1992, there 
seemed to be lots of time, and the problem seemed to be overwhelmingly that of 
excessive emissions from the developed countries. 
Those impressions guided the meeting of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997 and the resulting Kyoto 
Protocol. By then there had been considerable progress in sharing perspectives 
within a uniquely ambitious and successful effort in international scientific 
cooperation, through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Understandings were reached on which gases would be covered by efforts to 
reduce emissions, and on how they should be measured. An agreement was 
reached that all developed countries would accept constraints on emissions, 
and that there would be penalties for breaches of commitments. There would 
be opportunities to reduce the costs of mitigation through joint implementation 
among developed countries (where countries that were falling below their 
emissions reduction targets would be able to buy entitlements from countries that 
were reducing emissions more than was required by their targets). There would 
be opportunities for reducing the costs of mitigation in developed countries 
through a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which would certify carbon 
reduction ‘offsets’ generated in developing countries for sale to developed 
countries. Developing countries undertook to make efforts to reduce emissions; 
developed countries to contribute funding to these efforts and also to climate 
change adaptation in developing countries.
The Kyoto arrangements were damaged when the US Congress refused to 
ratify the agreement to which the US Government was a party. The Republican 
government under George W. Bush, elected in 2000, announced that it would 
not seek ratification for the agreement. The Australian Government followed the 
lead of the United States and continued to do so until policy was reversed in 
2007. But both Australia and the United States remained parties to international 
discussions. Progress was made on some issues in conferences of the UNFCCC 
in Bali (2007), Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), Durban (2011) and Doha 
(2012), including on a global objective of holding the human-induced increase 
in temperatures to two degrees Celsius. 
These early efforts in collective action on climate change contained elements 
of success and failure. It is important to preserve the success (the scientific 
cooperation, the shared objective, the agreements on how to measure and later 
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
286
to account for and verify emissions, the mechanisms for international trade in 
entitlements and for transfers of financial resources to developing countries) 
while correcting the causes of failure. 
Time has passed and times have changed. 
We no longer have time: the concentrations of greenhouse gases are already 
approaching levels that are likely over time to generate two degrees increase in 
average temperatures. Emissions have grown more rapidly since the turn of the 
century than was suggested by the most widely used scenarios developed in 
the 1990s, largely because growth was stronger and more energy-intensive and 
energy more emissions-intensive than had been anticipated (Garnaut et al. 2009). 
If temperature increases are going to be kept to two degrees, there must be an 
early and large reduction in global emissions trajectories. Global emissions must 
be reduced by half or more by mid century by putting them on a downward 
path now. Delays in turning down the trajectories will require an earlier end 
point for the emissions reductions and a more rapid rate of decline. The practical 
requirement that all parts of humanity see the distribution of the global 
mitigation effort as being fair points to movement towards similar per capita 
emissions entitlements in all countries—at levels more than 90 per cent lower 
than those present today in developed countries and more than 50  per  cent 
lower than today in China.
In contrast to the world up to the Rio de Janeiro summit, emissions growth 
in the twenty first century was overwhelmingly concentrated in developing 
countries. My own calculations on ‘business as usual’ emissions for the Climate 
Change Review Update (Garnaut 2011a, 2011b) suggest that, in the absence of 
policy action to change established trends, developing countries would account 
for the whole of the increase in global emissions from 2005 to 2030; developed 
country emissions as a whole were expected to remain steady between 2005 and 
2030. In the absence of policy action, China would account for 41 per cent of 
global emissions in 2030 and developing countries 70 per cent. Whatever weight 
were given to the requirements of historical responsibility and justice, effective 
global mitigation would require major and early reductions from business as 
usual emissions in China and other developing countries. 
The Kyoto arrangements had envisaged a comprehensive ‘top-down’ 
agreement in which responsibility for constraining emissions would be allocated 
across countries and enforced internationally. This ideal would provide a firm 
basis for international trade in entitlements, to allow reductions in emissions to 
occur where they could be achieved at lowest cost. Such an agreement would 
provide each country with assurance that others were contributing their fair 
shares of the global effort, so that its own emissions reductions would be part 
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of an effective global effort. It would provide each country with assurance that 
other countries’ emissions-intensive industries were gaining no competitive 
advantage in international markets against its own as a result of differences in 
mitigation effort. 
The international community has learned slowly and painfully that such an 
agreement is not within reach for the foreseeable future. This reality came within 
view at Copenhagen in 2009, and crystallised in Cancun in 2010. It was not 
possible because the major powers, first of all the United States but also China, 
were willing to bind themselves domestically to strong mitigation outcomes, 
but not to enter international agreements to the same end. It was not possible 
because there were no effective sanctions against breaches of commitments—
as demonstrated by Canada walking away without penalty from its Kyoto 
Protocol pledges. 
Subsequent developments raise a question about whether a comprehensive 
‘top-down’ agreement is even desirable. In anticipation of a legally binding 
agreement, governments settle into negotiating mode and seek to minimise 
commitments. By contrast, when considering a domestic commitment, 
governments are prepared to look more openly at the realistic boundaries of 
action and to go further in defining mitigation targets. 
A different approach to setting national targets began to emerge at 
Copenhagen, took firm shape at Cancun and was elaborated in subsequent 
UNFCCC meetings in Durban and Doha. 
The new approach carries some important features over from the early 
international discussions. The scientific cooperation remains centrally important 
to the collective effort. The two-degree objective, mechanisms for measurement 
and verification of emissions, and instruments for international trade in 
entitlements have been developed or strengthened. Ideas about mechanisms 
for transferring resources for mitigation and adaptation from developed to 
developing countries have been given substantive shape (although still little 
money). It must be said that additional steps need to be taken on verification of 
emissions: while a case can be made for developing country mitigation targets to 
be expressed in different ways from developed country targets (intensity rather 
than absolute reductions), there is no case for differentiation in measurement 
and verification.
The biggest departure from the old regime is in the setting of country 
targets for constraining emissions. It has been accepted that substantial 
developing countries will make commitments to constrain emissions, in the 
form of reductions in emissions intensity or ‘business as usual’ emissions. 
(Intensity targets are strongly preferred to business as usual, as they are capable 
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of objective and unambiguous calculation). It is accepted, if only by default, that 
these and developed-country commitments to absolute reductions in emissions 
are voluntary and represent serious domestic undertakings and are not binding 
under international law. The voluntary targets are set domestically rather than 
within a comprehensive international agreement. The pressures to make them 
ambitious come from domestic politics and review and commentary from other 
countries—a process that is known as ‘pledge and review’. 
I describe the new process as ‘concerted unilateral mitigation’. 
It is a feature of the Kyoto arrangements carried over into the concerted 
unilateral mitigation regime that each country is free to use whatever instruments 
it chooses in meeting its targets. It is free to acquit its commitments through the 
purchase of international abatement to the extent that it chooses, or not at all. 
It is free to introduce carbon pricing in the form of an emissions trading system 
or a carbon tax, or not at all. Whether or not it places a price on carbon, it can 
choose to regulate emissions-intensive activities and subsidise low-emissions 
substitutes to the extent that it chooses. International comparisons of mitigation 
effort are made in terms of the outcomes in reductions in emissions below defined 
baselines, and not in terms of how the emissions reductions are achieved.
For concerted unilateral mitigation to be effective, one major gap in the 
international regime needs to be filled. The regime needs some framework for 
guiding assessments of the level of mitigation in each country that amounts to a 
fair share of an international effort to achieve the agreed global effort. It would 
be useful and probably necessary for heads of governments committed to 
strong global mitigation outcomes to appoint an expert group to develop such a 
framework for allocating the global effort among countries. Within the context 
of concerted unilateral mitigation, each country would be free to accept or 
reject guidance provided by such a framework. The framework would become 
a focus of international review of each country’s effort, and evolve over time in 
response to discussion and experience. 
The Durban conference of the UNFCCC in late 2011 agreed to launch ‘a process 
to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force’. The process, legal instrument or agreed outcome would be settled by 
2015 in the Conference of the Parties in Paris, and come into effect in 2020. 
Developed and developing countries would all accept obligations, although the 
form of those obligations could vary across countries.
The Durban decision was sometimes interpreted as a commitment again 
to seek a binding, top-down agreement, although the words allow other 
interpretations. At least there is no suggestion that we should return to seeking 
comprehensive agreement on the allocation of the required global mitigation 
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effort across countries. While there would be advantages in an internationally 
binding agreement, if it were possible to achieve one without reducing mitigation 
ambition, the practical barriers to a good binding agreement remain as strong 
as they were at Copenhagen. It is important that we do not allow the search for 
excellent form to distract the international community from grasping immediate 
prospects for excellent substance. 
To conclude the discussion of the evolution of the global climate change 
regime, we should acknowledge that trade in emissions entitlements has struck 
some large practical problems. Within the European emissions trading system, 
the many regulatory and fiscal interventions are forcing much larger reductions 
in emissions than carbon pricing. These, together with slow growth in economic 
activity and the realisation of unexpected opportunities for low-cost abatement, 
have caused permit prices to fall to levels that are well below the economic cost 
of emissions and the value of abatement. The low prices raise questions about the 
effectiveness of the emissions trading system. Although controlled in quantum, 
use of offsets at very low prices from the CDM has pushed prices even lower. 
Low European and CDM prices would, if uncorrected, introduce low prices into 
other emissions trading systems with which Europe is linked, notably Australia 
from 2015. Already New Zealand’s emissions trading scheme has prices close to 
zero through allowing unlimited access to credits from the CDM. 
It is understood by economists that broadly based carbon pricing achieves 
more carbon emissions reduction at similar cost, or similar abatement at lower 
cost, than large numbers of separate regulatory and fiscal interventions. 
Considerable emissions reductions have been achieved in recent years in many 
countries through regulatory and differentiated fiscal interventions. The cost 
advantages of general carbon pricing become more important, however, as 
mitigation targets become more ambitious, and are likely to be essential to 
achieving the reductions in emissions that will be necessary to achieve the agreed 
global objective. The contemporary problems of uneconomically low prices in 
domestic and international trading schemes can therefore be seen as a threat 
to achievement of long-term global mitigation goals. A tightening of emissions 
reduction targets is necessary to restore prices that relate appropriately to the 
cost and value of abatement in a world that is meeting its emissions reduction 
targets.
The CDM has emerged as the most important locus for international trade in 
carbon units and, for a number of years, contributed substantially to incentives 
for investment in emissions reduction in developing countries. The NDRC has 
recently reported that to August 2012, Chinese certified emissions reduction 
under the CDM had reached 730 million tonnes per annum (NDRC 2012), a bit 
over half of the global total. 
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As analysed in the recent report of an independent review panel, the CDM 
is experiencing chronic oversupply of abatement units. Prices have fallen to 
levels that barely cover transaction costs. With recent and prospective reforms, 
the CDM is a legitimate offset mechanism with a potentially valuable place 
in a global system of climate change mitigation (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012). 
The review panel concluded that a major tightening of emissions reduction 
targets and widening of access on the demand side would be necessary to 
correct the chronic oversupply. I would suggest as well a tightening of access 
on the abatement supply side, with only least developed countries having 
unconditional access. Other developing countries would have access if they 
accepted domestically binding emissions constraints and were living within 
those constraints without double counting of abatement for which CDM 
credits had been awarded. If this approach were adopted by the international 
community, international mechanisms would need to be developed (perhaps 
through the established arrangements for joint implementation) to monitor 
double counting of emissions.
The Cancun Pledges 
Within the framework of concerted unilateral mitigation, all substantial 
economies placed pledges before the international community that they would 
reduce emissions below business as usual. The sum of the pledges represented 
a marked departure from established emissions trajectories. At the same time, 
they were no more than a small first step towards achieving the reductions in 
emissions that would be necessary to achieve agreed climate change objectives.
The United States pledge represented a large departure from earlier 
perspectives. President Bush told a meeting of representatives of large economies 
in 2007 that US emissions would continue to rise to a peak in 2025. The Cancun 
pledge was for emissions to fall from 2005 levels by 17 per cent by 2020, 
corresponding to a 16 per cent fall from 2000.
Canada pledged to match a binding commitment by the United 
States—a substantial undertaking unless the Canadian Government had it in 
mind to annul it by saying that the US pledge was not binding even if it were 
being met. 
Some of the pledges contained conditional and unconditional elements—the 
latter being triggered if other countries took strong action. The European Union 
pledged to increase its emissions reductions from 20 to 30 per cent (both based 
on 1990) in the context of strong international action. 
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The Australian pledge was unconditionally to reduce emissions by 5 per cent 
on 2000 levels by 2020, and to increase the reduction to as much as a 25 per cent 
in the context of strong international action. The unconditional commitment 
represented a sharp break in the trajectory of Australian emissions growth, 
influenced as it was by the developed world’s most rapid growth in population 
and economic activity and exceptionally rapid expansion of emissions-intensive 
resource export industries. In 2011, the Australian Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency estimated that existing policy, without the new 
policies legislated in 2011, would see Australian emissions rise by 24 per cent.
The Chinese target was to reduce the emissions intensity of economic output 
by between 40 and 45 per cent between 2005 and 2020. This represented the 
largest departure from business as usual in terms of tonnes of emissions avoided. 
It could have had a galvanising effect on the Copenhagen meeting at which 
it was revealed to the international community. That its importance was not 
noticed and brought to account was a failure of diplomacy in China and many 
other countries.
Other developing countries made pledges amounting to major changes from 
business as usual trajectories, with the Brazilian and Indonesian pledges being 
noteworthy. 
The other large developing country, India, made commitments to reductions in 
emissions intensity that were more modest, but were accompanied by statements 
that India would never allow per capita emissions to exceed those of developed 
countries (Planning Commission Government of India 2011). This formulation 
has the potential to be a powerful instrument of global mitigation in the context 
of strong action and rapid reduction in emissions across the developed world. 
It could be usefully incorporated into a global framework for assessing the 
reasonableness of national contributions to a global mitigation effort.
The various pledges within the context of concerted unilateral mitigation 
added up to a much larger departure from established emissions trajectories 
than the notionally binding commitments at Kyoto. The pledges, however, left 
global emissions on trajectories that were far too high for achievement of the 
two-degrees objective, unless much more ambitious additional commitments 
were made for the periods from 2015 and 2020. 
Of course, one cannot say now what the Cancun pledges mean for the 
containment of global warming, as they say nothing about what happens after 
2020, and do not allow for the possibility of concerted raising of ambition for 
what is left of the period before 2020.
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Encouraging Progress 
There is good and bad news in the story of humanity’s struggle to find 
a basis for effective collective action on climate mitigation. The early news was 
never going to be all good on an issue as complex, difficult and new to the 
international community as this one.
The best news is of immense importance: emissions generally seem to be on 
paths to meet or exceed the Cancun targets. They are on track to meet or exceed 
the pledges even in the cases of China and the United States—the world’s biggest 
emitters of greenhouse gases, the largest and most influential economies, and 
the pledges of which represent dramatic reductions in established trajectories. 
Moreover, the achievement of current pledges is being achieved at less cost 
than was anticipated by most analysts. Early and widely based progress at 
surprisingly low cost establishes sound foundations for a large and early increase 
in national mitigation ambition.
Far from reaching a peak in emissions in 2025, as Bush foreshadowed in 
2007, it now seems that US emissions reached their highest level in the year 
in which Bush was speaking, and have been declining since then. Some have 
suggested that a decline in economic activity in and following the Great Crash 
of 2008 has dragged emissions down; the reality is that US output is now higher 
than in 2007.
Two recent private US studies, by Resources for the Future and the National 
Resource Defense Counsel, have concluded that the United States is on course 
to meet its emissions reduction targets despite the defeat in the Congress 
of  President Obama’s proposal for an emissions trading scheme (Scientific 
American 2012; National Resource Defense Counsel 2012). An emissions trading 
scheme would have allowed the same reduction of emissions at lower cost, but 
higher cost means can still achieve large reductions in emissions. The Resources 
for the Future studies attribute 10.5 percentage points of emissions reduction to 
US federal regulation of mobile and stationery energy, 2.5 per cent to state-level 
regulation and emissions trading schemes and 3.3 per cent to the expanded 
availability of cheap gas and other energy market developments. Since 2009, 
the US Government has invested heavily in research and development for new, 
low-emissions technologies, and this can be expected to be reflected in new 
opportunities for emissions reductions over time. Low gas prices—the result of 
combining tight restrictions on exports with large expansions of reserves—are 
becoming increasingly important over time, leading to the decommissioning of 
much coal-based generation capacity. 
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Europe is already close to achieving its Cancun objectives for emissions 
reductions by 2020. Slow economic growth has subdued demand for emissions-
intensive goods and services, but the extent of reduction and the low price of 
abatement in the emissions trading scheme suggest that emissions reductions 
have been achieved at lower cost than had been anticipated. 
In Japan, as in Europe, economic stagnation has contributed to over-
performance on emissions reduction goals, despite the setback to low emissions 
energy with the 2011 nuclear breakdown at Fukushima. Tokyo’s introduction 
of emissions trading arrangements has been accompanied by especially rapid 
reductions in emissions, which, in turn, have generated extremely low emissions 
entitlement prices (Rudolph and Kawakatsu 2012).
In Australia, too, emissions growth has been well below anticipated levels 
over recent years, tending around zero, despite the continuation of robust 
expansion of population, output and emissions-intensive resource investment 
for export. In the electricity sector, stagnant or declining demand has intersected 
with increased renewable energy production forced by the renewable energy 
target to cause faster decarbonisation than had been suggested in the official 
estimates. The introduction of carbon pricing from July 2012 and the use of 
part of the associated revenue to support renewable energy innovation will 
extend the reduction in emissions. Preliminary data suggest that emissions from 
electricity generation in the first six months of the emissions trading scheme are 
over eight per cent lower than in the corresponding period of the previous year, 
with slowing demand growth, the renewable energy target and the emissions 
trading scheme contributing to reductions. 
China’s 12th five-year plan, 2011–2015, embodies far-reaching measures to 
constrain emissions within the intensity targets which the Chinese Government 
has communicated to the international community. In 2011, the first year of 
the new plan, emissions continued to grow strongly. This was discouraging for 
the international mitigation effort. The emissions reductions policies bit more 
deeply from 2012 and, together with economically driven structural change, 
changed the emissions trajectory in 2012, to an extent that over-performance 
against the pledge seems possible and strengthening of the pledges feasible in 
the context of increased global effort. 
Within the electricity sector, accounting for over 44 per cent of China’s 
emissions in 2010 (IEA, 2012), demand growth slowed to 5.7 per cent in 2012 
after demand doubled over the previous decade. The slower growth in demand 
was in response to energy efficiency and structural policies as well as a moderate 
easing of output growth (GDP growth 7.9 per cent through the course of 2012). 
The energy efficiency policies and structural change are likely to keep electricity 
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demand growth much lower than in the first decade of the 21st century, and bring 
within reach the 3.5 per cent annual increase in primary energy consumption 
necessary to achieve the electricity targets of the 2011–2015 plan. 
A Chinese State Council decision added detail to energy plans in early 2013 
(Xinhua 2013). Annual primary energy consumption 2011–2015 would be held 
to 4.3 per cent per annum compared with 6.6 per cent through the preceding 
five years. This corresponds to about 3.5 per cent over the next three years. 
Annual coal consumption will be capped in 2015. Given the constraints on 
reducing coal consumption in steel-making and other industrial activities, this 
implies some decline in coal combustion for electricity generation. 
Table 14.1 describes the remarkable change in the extent and composition 
of electric energy growth in 2012. 
Table 14.1 China: power generation 2011 and 2012
2011 2012 % increase
Total power generation (TWh) 4,692 4,959 5.7
thermal 3,900 3,925 0.6
hydro 668 800 19.7
nuclear 87 102 17.2
wind 74 100 35.8
Other n/a 32 n/a
Source: NDRC/State Information Center, based on information from the National Energy Administration, 
January 2013.
Note: ‘Other’ is solar, biomass and geothermal. There was a large percentage 
increase in 2012 from a low base (more than 100 per cent for solar photovoltaic), 
but data on the composition of ‘Other’ are not available for 2011. Note that 
the components for 2011 exceed the total by a small percentage, but, at the time 
of writing, the author has no explanation for this anomaly. 
Total electricity demand growth slowed to 5.7 per cent in 2012. While early 
data for 2012 contain some inconsistencies and are subject to revision, they 
are striking and encouraging. There seems to have been almost no growth in 
thermal power generation. Output of all low-emissions energy (‘clean’ energy 
in the Xinhua terminology) sources of electricity grew rapidly: hydro-electric 
by 19.7  per cent; nuclear by 17.2 per cent; wind by 35.8 per cent. Solar 
increased much more rapidly still from a low base. While hydro-electric power 
generation is affected by climatic conditions which were unfavourable in 2011 
and favourable in 2012, it will fluctuate around a rising trend. Nuclear power 
generation is likely to continue to rapidly increase its share of power generation 
and wind and solar to do so at an even more rapid rate.
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Within thermal power generation, a number of factors led to reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of electricity. A number of Chinese policies 
will contribute to maintaining the new momentum in reducing emissions from 
thermal generation that became apparent in 2012. There is still some way to 
go in replacing high-emissions coal generation in small, inefficient generators 
with ultra-supercritical plants operating at the world’s efficiency frontiers: the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) refers to 68 GW of small (less than 100 MW) 
and 138 GW of medium (100–300 MW) of coal-generating capacity remaining in 
2010, which is slated for replacement (IEA 2012). The replacement of inefficient 
small by efficient large plants reduces both coal use and emissions per unit of 
electricity output. The careful research of Mai (2013) shows that the small for 
large scheme will lead to reductions of between one and two per cent per annum 
in thermal coal use in the years immediately ahead.
Policy is focused on substantially increasing the natural and unconventional 
gas share of thermal power generation from the current low base. The State 
Council sees the gas share of primary energy consumption doubling to 
7.5 per cent by 2020 (Xinhua 2013).
China is investing more heavily than any other country in technological 
development for capture and storage of carbon dioxide waste from fossil fuel 
combustion. Deregulation of electricity and coal prices in 2013, accompanied 
by removal of coal transport subsidies, are likely to contribute to easing 
in electricity demand and to increasing costs of supply from the coal sector. 
Major  investment in high-voltage, long-distance transmission and in pumped 
hydro storage is leading to more complete utilisation of intermittent renewable 
energy capacity, and to expanding options for new investment in renewables. 
The 12th five-year plan greatly increases financial commitments to energy 
efficiency and for innovation in low-emissions technologies, including in the 
electricity sector.
The electricity supply and demand developments seem to have stopped 
growth in emissions from combustion of coal in electricity generation in 2012. 
This is a dramatic break from established trends, of historic importance in global 
terms. It takes us way outside the conventional wisdom on development of the 
Chinese energy market. The IEA had assessed that China would need to increase 
coal-based generation capacity from 710 GW in 2010 to 1190 GW in 2020, 
with total emissions rising despite continued replacement of economically and 
environmentally inefficient plants by ultra supercritical capacity (IEA 2012). 
That assessment is obsolete.
In more than three decades of work on Chinese economic growth and 
structural change in the reform era, I have become accustomed to Chinese and 
foreign observers alike underestimating the capacity of China’s economy to 
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respond quickly and powerfully to incentives and to opportunity. The current 
energy market adjustment seems to be another case of underestimation of the 
Chinese economy’s capacity for rapid transformation in the reform era. Of course, 
the outcome will depend on the policy that emerges from continuing debates 
and political contests within China: in the Chinese political system, as in its 
counterparts in the West, the success of the public interest in shaping policy is 
qualified by pressure from vested interests. 
The strengthening of policies and actions to change the trajectory of China’s 
greenhouse gas emissions extends over all major sectors. 
Industrial emissions, which are largest in steel production, are experiencing 
much slower growth as a result of policy-enhanced slowing in the rate of 
growth of heavy industry, and by innovation to reduce emissions intensity. 
Forced closure of inefficient plants (32 million tonnes of steel capacity alongside 
8,000 MW of coal electricity generation in 2011 alone (NDRC 2012)), higher 
costs of electricity and other inputs, export taxes and restriction of investment 
in new capacity have slowed expansion in energy- and emissions-intensive 
activities. The goal articulated in the 12th five-year plan to reduce the energy 
intensity of  steel production by a percentage point per annum is a realistic 
extrapolation of recent trends.
In transport, the heavy investment over the past decade in inter-city and 
intra-city rail will ease somewhat the growth of automobile traffic from what 
it would have been. Within the automotive sector, ambitious official targets for 
electrification are being strongly supported by a range of policies (NDRC, 2012). 
The combination of rapid expansion of public transport led by rail, automotive 
electrification and decarbonisation of the electricity sector are likely to add up 
to unexpectedly early peaking of emissions from the transport sector. 
China’s and Australia’s International Roles
Within concerted unilateral mitigation, it is important for each country to 
make pledges that are recognised as a fair share in a global mitigation effort, and 
to deliver on those commitments. 
China matters because of its importance as a source of emissions and its 
economic and strategic weight. China also matters because it is likely to have 
comparative advantage in mass production of capital goods embodying low-
emissions technologies: large-scale production of photovoltaic units in China 
has lowered the cost of solar power generation all over the world, and similar 
developments are likely in other technologies. 
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China has become one of the world’s main sources of direct foreign investment. 
Direct investments in transmission by China’s State Grid Corporation have greatly 
reduced the costs of modernising transmission systems in the Philippines, 
Portugal and Brazil in recent years, and is set to become important in Australia.
Both Australia and China can contribute to innovation in the low-emissions 
industries. Australian research institutions, notably Electrical Engineering at the 
University of New South Wales, have been at the forefront of applied research 
in solar technologies, the commercialisation of which has been concentrated in 
Chinese enterprises. Australia is disproportionately represented in innovation 
in the biological sciences with relevance to emissions reduction. 
Australia and China share a strong interest in the nurturing of opportunities 
for international trade in emissions entitlements. Each has comparative 
advantage in emissions-intensive activities: China in manufacturing, Australia 
in tradeable energy. Large-scale exports of emissions-intensive products will 
tend over time to make both Australia and China relatively large sources of 
emissions per person. It is economically desirable for these two countries, and 
for the world as a whole, that they are able to maintain high levels of exports of 
emissions-intensive goods, and to meet part of their abatement responsibilities 
by buying emissions entitlements from other countries.
How can we build on these shared interests and favourable circumstances to 
improve the chances that humanity is able to manage the anthropocene?
First, we can share views on all aspects of the climate change challenge. 
These include views on industrial transformation—including China’s experience 
in upgrading transmission grids to reduce energy losses, to connect energy 
resources to distant centres of demand, and to integrate intermittent electricity 
sources more efficiency into the major grids. They include, as well, experience 
with mitigation policies (Jotzo 2013), and the sharing of analytical insights. 
Second, we can together take the lead in initiating an independent global 
analysis of what constitutes a ‘fair share’ of the strong global mitigation effort 
that will be required to meet the two-degrees objective. China and Australia can 
be among the countries that work together to provide an essential component 
of successful concerted unilateral mitigation.
Third, we can work together to strengthen the pledges that the substantial 
economies have made to reduce emissions, and to ensure that international 
trade in entitlements remains a legitimate means of meeting emissions 
reduction pledges. 
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The third area of cooperation is especially important, as the international 
community faces decisions over the next two years which will determine 
whether the two-degrees objective remains within reach. This chapter has 
explained that marked strengthening of pledges for 2020, and the adoption at 
Paris in 2015 of strong targets for the period after 2020, are essential to achieve 
the two-degrees objective, to raise prices of traded entitlements to economically 
and environmentally rational levels, and to underwrite a continuing role for 
domestic and international trade in entitlements. 
It is common for commentaries to focus on the failures of international 
cooperation on climate change. This chapter has drawn attention to some 
successes that could become the launching pad of a strong international effort 
to bring within reach the agreed objective of holding temperature increases to 
two degrees.
Conclusions
This chapter has drawn attention to the fact that the major economies including 
China, the United States, the European Union and Japan (despite the setback 
to nuclear energy at Fukushima) and Australia are making unexpectedly rapid 
early progress towards realising their pledges to the international community. 
Reducing emissions is proving to be less costly and disruptive than had been 
anticipated by expert observers. 
The chapter has noted the importance of international trade in emissions 
entitlements in reducing the costs of mitigation for the world as a whole. One 
weak point in contemporary collective action on climate change is the low prices 
for carbon units in the European Union and other emissions trading systems, 
and in the CDM. The continuation of low prices would discredit international 
trade as well as domestic emissions trading systems. The low prices themselves 
reflect the unexpectedly low cost of reducing emissions. 
Of course, there is no problem with low prices if they emerge from targets that 
are strong enough to achieve the agreed global mitigation objectives. But we are 
currently far from that point. Current targets fall well short of those necessary 
to achieve global objectives. In these circumstances, the remedy for prices that 
are well below the cost and value of optimal abatement is the same as the remedy 
for a global mitigation effort that currently falls well short of the requirements 
of the two-degrees objective: an early tightening of targets. 
The recent rapid progress towards announced targets on emissions 
reductions in many countries, and the revelation that costs of reducing 
emissions have been unexpectedly low, together provide the foundations for an 
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early tightening of announced targets in developed and developing countries 
alike. An international climate change system built around concerted unilateral 
mitigation provides a favourable context for China and Australia to play their 
parts in a renewed international effort to achieve the agreed objective of the 
international community. 
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15 China’s Energy Demand 
Growth and the Energy Policy 
Trilemma 
Simon Wensley, Stephen Wilson and Jane Kuang
Introduction 
China’s remarkable pace of development and transformation in recent decades 
has been well documented, analysed and discussed. In less than 25 years, from 
1985 to 2008, China’s GDP per capita increased more than fourfold. The path 
between comparable levels of development took half a century in Japan (1916 to 
1967), a century in Germany (1856 to 1958) and the United States (1840 to 1940), 
and 120 years in the United Kingdom (1820 to 1940) (Shell 2013). 
Yet, China is only now just reaching world average levels of energy and 
economic development. And, outside China’s coastal provinces and major cities, 
energy use and economic development are still well below world average levels. 
This naturally raises the question as to where China’s development will take 
it in the next 20 years, and what the implications are for energy supply, the 
economies of China, Australia and the world, and the environment both locally 
and globally. 
Over the past decade, the rapid redevelopment and construction of China’s 
cities has put pressure on commodity supply chains, particularly for the metals 
required in the early phase of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation 
of infrastructure to build the new urban environments. Energy demand tends 
to develop more gradually and steadily with economic growth. Indeed, energy 
is a key input and driver of economic growth: the first section of this chapter 
explores the relationship between energy per capita and GDP per capita 
through both cross-sectional comparisons between countries and longitudinal 
trajectories over time within countries. The two decades from 1990 to 2010 saw 
a strong linear correlation in China between energy per capita and GDP per 
capita. The first section also discusses the factors that are expected to moderate 
the correlation in coming decades. China is also looked at beyond national 
averages: the energy-economy data shows the wide range across provinces—no 
one province in China is equal to the national average. The emerging demand 
picture underscores the energy challenge ahead of China as it becomes a society 
of increasing prosperity. 
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Section two introduces the Energy Policy Trilemma: the tension between 
maximising security of supply, minimising cost and minimising environmental 
impacts including emissions. Resolving the Trilemma is the key challenge for 
energy policy makers everywhere. This chapter explores the Trilemma through 
four case studies: the 1970s oil crisis, China’s cost revolution in nuclear power 
that is quietly unfolding today, the US unconventional oil and gas techno-
economic revolution, and the challenge for Japan in closing the 30 Gigawatt gap 
in the power system post-Fukushima. 
The third section considers the resource challenge to meet China’s growing 
energy demand. This includes the opportunities and challenges involved in the 
development and management of China’s resources; the increasing role of imports 
to balance domestic supply in oil, gas, coal and uranium; and the evolution 
of the fuel mix, taking into account fuel diversity and import dependence. 
The final section explores emerging technologies, many of which China 
is actively developing, that have the potential to open up new energy 
transformation, conversion and utilisation pathways between hydrocarbons 
and key sectors of the economy. These include coal to liquids, coal to chemicals, 
coal gasification, gas to liquids, compressed natural gas and liquefied natural gas 
for transport, and electric vehicles. 
China has recently become the world’s largest energy consumer, and yet 
it is still in the very early stages of its energy–economic and environmental 
development path. 
Energy is a Key Driver of Economic 
Development and Growth 
China’s Development Compared with other Countries
This section presents a straightforward, but not commonly seen way 
of looking at historical data on demographic, economic and energy development 
paths. No advanced mathematical or econometric knowledge is required of the 
reader. The data itself, presented in visual form, is rich and informative, 
challenging and stimulating for experts, policy-makers and investors alike. 
Figure  15.1 charts GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars, adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP) versus per capita primary energy supply 
(in the common units tonnes of oil equivalent, toe). The bubble sizes represent 
population. 
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Figure 15.1  Energy–economy development paths: China, the world and selected 
economies, 1990–2010 
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2012, IMF online economic database. 
Many observations can be made from the data: 
• There is a large range between the industrialised economies and the 
world average. 
• There is a range of energy intensities between economies, from the United 
States and Canada using seven to eight toe per capita; Australia, South Korea 
and Russia using between five and six; Japan, Germany and Taiwan using 
between four and five; and, the United Kingdom between three and four. 
The world average is below two toe per capita. China is at about the world 
average in terms of energy per capita, while its GDP is well below the world 
average: China’s economy is more energy-intensive than the world average. 
Brazil’s GDP per capita is just below the world average, but it is less energy 
intensive. India is a long way below the world average in terms of GDP 
per capita and primary energy, which is a long way below one toe per capita. 
India’s economy is on a less energy intensive trajectory than China’s, and has 
barely begun to develop. Indonesia is ahead of India and on a more energy 
intensive trajectory. 
• The development path of South Korea has been particularly energy intensive. 
• In contrast with the steady development of China’s economy from 1990 to 
2010, the dramatic effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union is visible in the 
trajectory of Russia. 
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• The effect of the 2008 global financial crisis on the energy sector and 
economies of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom is marked 
and contrasts with the limited impact on Australia: a testament to Australia’s 
linkage with China. 
• In China there has been a strong correlation between energy and GDP: 
98  per  cent of the growth in per capita energy requirements of the past 
two decades can be explained by the growth in real PPP-adjusted GDP. 
The relationship (not shown here) between electricity and the economy is 
even stronger, explaining over 99 per cent of the growth using GDP per 
capita as the independent variable. One could equally say that the level of 
energy supply or consumption almost entirely explains the level of economic 
activity of the past two decades. Bearing in mind that correlation is not 
causation, the relationship between energy and the economy is strong. 
• The IEA’s ‘current policies scenario’ implies a significant degree of structural 
change in China’s economy combined with about one per cent per annum 
technical energy efficiency improvement over the next two decades. The 
450 ppm scenario allows for only a very small increase in primary energy 
consumption per capita in China, with sustained growth in GDP per capita. 
China has undergone a remarkable story of growth and development in the 
past three decades, and particularly during the last 10 to 20 years. Hundreds 
of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. Modern industrialisation, 
urbanisation and mobilisation have driven the process of development, and 
energy in its manifold forms has played an essential role in this process. This is 
clear in the data for the last 20 years. 
International visitors to Beijing and Shanghai today may come away with an 
impression of prosperity suggesting that China is approaching the mature end 
of its development curve. Yet the cross-section of international comparisons in 
Figure 15.1, with a diverse set of major economies at widely varying stages of 
development shows that China as a whole is only now approaching the global 
average on the energy–economy development curve. 
Economic Structure and Energy Efficiency 
If China was to continue on the linear trajectory of the past 20 years, it would 
approach North American levels of energy consumption per capita by the time 
per capita GDP had reached the low 30,000s. This is not expected to happen, 
however, for several reasons. Firstly, given the size of China’s population, the 
stress that this would place on global energy markets would be expressed in 
prices that would tend to moderate demand. 
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Secondly, the structure of China’s economy is expected to begin to evolve 
away from the energy-intensive, heavy industries towards higher value-adding 
lighter industries and the services sector and towards increased standards of 
living for households. This trend will, to some extent, happen naturally, and 
will also be encouraged by policy-makers. On average, each unit of energy 
consumed will be expected to generate a greater contribution to GDP. An 
example of a trajectory showing the effect of economic structural change is 
shown in Figure 15.1. 
Thirdly, the technical efficiency of energy use is expected to increase, 
driven by improved technology and the many opportunities in a rapidly 
growing economy with a high proportion of new capital stock to install the 
latest technology. Increasing incentives for improved efficiency are provided by 
higher energy prices, and the encouragement of policy-makers. It is difficult to 
estimate the extent of actual historical technical energy efficiency improvement 
in an economy, but it is relatively easy to estimate the effects of future technical 
energy efficiency improvements. The effect of technical energy efficiency 
improvements of one per cent and two per cent per annum compounding are 
shown in Figure 15.1. In practice, two per cent is substantial. This is clear when 
one considers that it is equivalent to saving 20 per cent of energy across all end 
uses in 10 per cent of the market every year in perpetuity. 
There is no Average Province in China 
It is informative to go beyond the cross-section of international comparisons 
in Figure 15.1 and disaggregate the China data to the provincial level to see the 
diversity in the rates of development between the major cities and the inland 
provinces. This shows the degree to which provinces that might be thought 
economically diverse seem to cluster with respect to electricity and economic 
development, as well as the broad diversity of development paths across 
provinces. Figure 15.2 shows electricity per capita versus GDP per capita in 
RMB terms for each of China’s provinces. 
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Figure 15.2  Electricity–economy and population cross-section of China by provinces 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Electricity Council. 
Bubble sizes represent population. The enormous development between 
1990 and 2010 is clear in the figure, with the national average increasing from 
a few thousand RMB and less than 1,000 kWh per capita in 1990 to just over 
30,000 RMB and 3,000 kWh per capita in 2010. Even more striking is the wide 
range of development between the provinces, from the cluster of three key 
cities Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai; to Zhejiang and Jiangsu clustered together; 
then the four coastal provinces of Liaoning, Shandong, Fujian and Guangdong, 
all with very similar levels of GDP per capita and electricity use per capita. 
Inner Mongolia, and especially Ningxia and Qinghai are extremely electricity-
intensive. The income levels of the inland provinces remain below the national 
average, as does their electricity consumption, with the exception of the coal-
rich provinces, which tend to have higher per capita electricity consumption. 
Unlike 1990, none of the provinces is representative of the national average 
marked as ‘+’ at the centre of the circle representing the 2010 China population. 
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The Policy-Makers’ Challenge 
Resolving the Energy Policy Trilemma 
‘Policy-makers looking for simultaneous progress towards energy security, 
economic and environmental objectives are facing increasingly complex—and 
sometimes contradictory—choices’ (International Energy Agency 2012: 24). 
This may be referred to as the Energy Policy Trilemma (Figure 15.3). 
Figure 15.3  The Energy Policy Trilemma 
Source: Authors’ own schema.
Energy prices, both for liquid fuels, electricity and natural gas, are a 
political concern in every country: large or small, rich or poor, free market or 
centrally planned. Every country has an energy policy, and policy makers in all 
countries are trying to achieve the same three objectives: maximising security 
of supply, minimising cost, and minimising environmental impacts including 
emissions. These three objectives are usually in tension—difficult trade-offs are 
normally required. 
Exceptions occur after a major disruptive change. Four case studies illustrate this: 
• The 1970s oil crises 
• China’s quiet revolution in nuclear power 
• The US unconventional oil and gas revolution 
• Fukushima and Japan’s ‘30 GW problem’ 
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Case Study 1: The 1970s Oil Crises 
The two oil crises of the 1970s—the oil embargo following the 1973 Arab–
Israeli war, and the supply disruptions following the 1979 Iranian revolution—
brought large step changes in the price of oil, and its price relative to alternative 
fuels. Policy focus on environmental concerns was in its infancy in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, in retrospect, the oil shocks can be seen as having brought the 
objectives of the Energy Policy Trilemma into alignment. Countries exposed 
to the price shocks, particularly the United States and the other industrialised 
economies of the OECD, responded by finding substitutes for oil where possible, 
particularly in power generation. 
Case Study 2: China’s Quiet Cost Revolution 
in Nuclear Power 
One of the ways that OECD countries, such as the United States, France, 
Germany and Japan, displaced or avoided oil use in the power sector was to 
build nuclear power plants. In the 1950s it was famously said that nuclear 
power would be ‘too cheap to meter’. For various reasons, particularly in the 
United States, the economics of nuclear power turned out to be less attractive 
than expected, largely due to capital cost overruns. 
In recent years, China has challenged the contemporary Western conventional 
wisdom on the economics of nuclear power. Through the partnership 
between the State Nuclear Power Technology Company (SNPTC) and Toshiba 
Westinghouse to build the third generation Advanced Passive AP1000 reactor, 
and subsequently to scale up and develop the design, China is radically reducing 
the capital cost of building new nuclear reactors, such that nuclear power is 
now the lowest economic-cost generation option in China. This technological, 
design, manufacturing, project management and financing cost revolution 
brings all three elements of the Trilemma into alignment, and explains China’s 
nuclear power policy and stated long-term goal to build 400  GW of nuclear 
power capacity by 2050, which would be more than the entire global capacity 
today (China’s Medium to Long Term Energy Strategic Plan). 
Case Study 3: The US Unconventional Oil and 
Gas Revolution 
The past five years or so have seen a techno-economic revolution in the 
United States from the innovative combination of two established oil and 
gas production technologies. Horizontal directional drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing have unlocked gas in low permeability shale beds and tight oil in 
similarly low permeability structures, enabling its commercial production. 
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Prior to these developments, most observers of the industry expected that the 
United States would become a major importer of seaborne Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) to meet its domestic gas demand. Spot natural gas in the United States 
had seen two sustained price spikes into the mid-teens in terms of dollars per 
million British thermal units ($/MMBtu) in the 2000s: market conditions that are 
conducive to attracting LNG imports. 
The recent growth in the production of shale gas was so rapid as to lead 
to temporary overproduction and a price crash to under $2/MMBtu. At the 
time of writing, prices had recovered to over $4/MMBtu. Widespread industry 
views suggest US natural gas prices will stabilise around $4 to $6/MMBtu. 
Reflecting the diametric shift in the supply-demand balance, and the large price 
differentials between North American and European and Asian gas prices, the 
nation is now publicly debating the extent to which it should export LNG. 
The benefits of free markets and free trade are being weighed against energy 
security and domestic industrial renewal and employment. 
As the energy economy seeks a new equilibrium, the unconventional gas 
revolution has aligned the three Trilemma objectives in the short run. In the 
long run, the system-wide emission-reduction benefits of gas relative to coal 
may be offset by the deferral due to low cost gas of new nuclear and renewable 
energy investments. 
Case Study 4: Fukushima and Japan’s ‘30 GW Problem’ 
The enormous offshore earthquake and subsequent tsunami that struck the 
north-east coast of Japan in March 2011 caused a chain of events that resulted 
in the catastrophic failure of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, a 
second-generation boiling water reactor plant that was first commissioned in 
1971. In response, all of the reactors in Japan’s nuclear fleet went off-line after 
their first scheduled maintenance shut down following Fukushima. The 47 GW 
of capacity in Japan’s pre-tsunami nuclear fleet ran at an average load capacity 
of about 30 GW, thereby leaving a large gap of about 30 per cent in the national 
power generation supply, which needed to be met initially by gas from LNG 
imports, and to a lesser extent by increased coal burn. 
With the previous policy to increase nuclear capacity to 50 per cent of 
the fuel mix no longer publicly acceptable or practical, and Japan virtually 
100 per cent dependent on imports for all its energy needs, the search for a 
new energy policy confronted a very severe version of the Trilemma. Meeting 
earlier CO2 emission reduction commitments had become practically impossible 
without large expansion of nuclear power. Japan’s current account swinging 
to deficit due to increased energy imports, particularly of LNG, highlighted 
the seriousness of energy cost concerns. At the same time, Japan’s traditional 
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energy security concerns were exacerbated by the reduction in the most secure 
energy source in the mix: Japan maintains probably the longest supply duration 
uranium stockpiles in the world for its nuclear reactor fleet to provide maximum 
energy security. 
Resources, Domestic Supply and Imports, 
and the Fuel Mix 
China’s Resources 
Although China’s discoveries of crude oil and natural gas reserves rose in 
recent years thanks to active and extensive exploration, the reserves are still 
relatively small compared to its coal resources, which underpin the country’s 
energy security (Figure 15.4). China also has only modest uranium resources—a 
critical energy source to fuel its massive nuclear power plant expansion plans. 
According to the OECD-produced ‘Red Book’, estimates of recoverable resources 
at 166 100 tU (approximately 432M lbs U3O8) in China is only about a tenth of 
the level of Australia’s known recoverable resources (OECD 2011). Also, China’s 
deposits are mostly small, remotely distributed and have high estimated mining 
costs. The natural resource endowment has decided the fuel mix structure of 
China’s energy supply, which is coal dominant (Figure 15.5). 
Figure 15.4  China’s energy resource endowment 
Source: BP Statistics, 2011 year-end data, Btoe.
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Figure 15.5  China’s energy demand by fuel mix 
Source: China Customs Statistics, China Customs, Beijing, 2011 year-end data.
Domestic Supply and Imports 
As China’s energy requirements have increased, it has made the transition 
from a producer–consumer, with small net exports, to a major net importer in 
oil in 1993–1994 (Figure 15.6), in gas in 2006–2007 (Figure 15.7) and in coal in 
2008–2009 (Figure 15.8). Oil import dependence is now over 60 per cent and gas 
import dependence over 20 per cent. Coal imports are still less than ten per cent. 
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China’s ability to provide its own needs is limited by the fact that its 
proven oil and gas reserves are small in relation to its consumption. At current 
production rates, the reserve to production ratio of oil is only ten years, while 
gas is 30 years (source: BP statistics, reserve is proven and excludes resource 
estimates). Consequently, China’s reliance on fossil fuel imports has grown 
significantly in recent years—oil dependency is at 60 per cent and natural gas 
dependency at 20 per cent and rising. 
Figure 15.9 shows a typical evolution of an emerging economy from 
energy producer–consumer to net energy exporter to net energy importer. 
Two contrasting policy choices are shown in stylised form: the pursuit of self-
sufficiency at all costs for as long as possible, and stewardship of domestic 
resources relying on market forces to balance imports with domestic supply. 
Figure 15.9  Policy choices 
Source: Authors’ own schema.
The former policy will tend to increase the marginal economic cost of supply 
and hence prices, while accelerating the depletion of indigenous resources. 
At its limit, it will bring forward the date of resource depletion and import 
dependence. The latter policy will tend to minimise marginal costs and hence 
prices, and optimise the depletion of indigenous resources. 
Another policy choice (which would be lower and flatter than the stewardship 
curve of Figure 15.9) would be to increase imports now to conserve domestic 
resources for future generations. Such a policy would be expected to increase 
marginal costs and hence prices, and to push depletion to a later date. 
A further policy (which would create a higher and more ‘peaked’ curve than 
the self-sufficiency of Figure 15.9) would be to encourage exports. The United 
States is currently debating whether to allow unrestricted LNG exports now, at 
the possible cost of higher prices and depletion of shale gas resources faster and 
sooner. Stewarding domestic resources and relying on market forces may result 
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in net imports balancing supply and demand in some countries and at some 
times, or in net exports balancing supply and demand in other countries or at 
other times. 
Evidence from current policy settings and the evolution of energy policy in 
China suggests an approach best described as stewarding domestic resources for 
the long run by increasingly relying on market forces to find the appropriate 
balance between domestic supply and imports. 
Tax policy can be used to fine-tune such an approach, as has been done in 
China with, for example, a shift from duties and taxes that encouraged coal 
exports towards duties and taxes that discourage coal exports. 
Opportunities and Challenges: The 7 Ds Facing the Coal 
Sector 
Despite the fact that coal provides the fundamentals of China’s energy 
security of supply, the over-reliance on this sector and massive production 
rates at close to 4 billion tonnes per annum has imposed increasingly greater 
challenges to this sector’s future development. 
The challenges facing China’s coal sector can be summarised in seven D’s: 
depletion of the resource base, characterised by increasing mining depths; 
quality deterioration; increasing geological difficulty; increasing distances from 
mines to markets; and, the imperative to improve safety to reduce mining deaths. 
The  challenges of these resource fundamentals are compounded by China’s 
changing demographics and socio-economic development, in which the labour 
pool has begun to shrink, and employment opportunities continue to improve 
with economic growth. 
Opportunities and Challenges: Unconventional Gas 
The shale gas revolution and production boom in the United States has given 
rise to hopes for China to unlock its unconventional resources and improve 
energy security in general. According to a consultant’s estimate, published by 
the US Energy Information Administration, China has larger shale gas resources 
than the United States (Advanced Resources International, Inc. 2011). Estimates 
by Chinese geologists from the Ministry of Land and Resources estimate China’s 
shale gas resources are around the same scale as the United States. 
The benefits of a shale-gas boom in China would be enormous, with the 
potential benefits and likely environmental costs perhaps even greater than 
in the United States. So far, however, the sector’s success is limited by the 
challenging geology and the monopolistic structure of China’s oil and gas sector. 
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While over 100,000 horizontal wells have been drilled into shales in the 
United  States and hydraulically fractured or ‘fracked’, China has only about 
80 drill holes to date. The sector is characterised by investors as a high risk 
proposition, with insufficient infrastructure in place, no third-party access to 
the pipelines (over 80 per cent of China’s pipelines are owned and operated 
by China National Petroleum Company) and potentially further complicated by 
local environmental concerns in relation to groundwater and disruption and 
disturbance of the daily lives of host communities. 
Analysts at the optimistic end of the range expect that large-scale, commercial 
production could happen in the next ten to 20 years. The International Energy 
Agency predicts China’s unconventional gas production could rise from 10 Bcm 
in 2010 to over 110 Bcm in 2020 and 390 Bcm by 2035 (2012). Under this scenario, 
total gas production rises from just under 100 Bcm in 2010 to nearly 475 Bcm in 
2035, and unconventional gas accounts for 83 per cent of total gas production 
by the end of the projection period. Unconventional gas production in 2035 
is predominately from shale gas (56 per cent). Coal bed methane (38 per cent) 
and tight gas (six per cent) provide smaller shares. While China would still rely 
on gas imports, the unconventional gas success would significantly reduce its 
foreign gas dependency ratio (Table 15.1). 






2010 2020 2035 2020 2035
Production 97 246 473 139 194 279
Unconventional 12 112 391 37 112 279
Unconventional share of total 12% 45% 83% 27% 58% 25%
Net imports 14 77 119 143 262 –143
Imports as share of demand 12% 24% 20% 51% 57% –37%
Gas share of the energy mix 4% 8% 13% 7% 10% 3%
*Delta is the difference between the Golden Rules Case and the Low Unconventional Case.
Source: Data and projections: International Energy Agency.
Diversity and Dependence 
In China, energy security of supply is already equal with or greater than cost as 
a policy priority. The environment has historically been a lesser concern. This is 
changing as incomes increase, leading to greater impacts on the environment 
from increased mobilisation, industrialisation and urbanisation. Reducing the 
emissions that contribute to local air pollution from oxides of sulphur and 
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nitrogen dioxide and particulate matter is becoming an increasingly important 
policy priority. This is particularly evident in China’s major cities and the more 
developed coastal provinces, where incomes are highest. 
Pushing the Technology Envelope 
Traditional and Emerging Energy Pathways 
The degree of competition between ‘the big three’ hydrocarbons—oil, gas 
and coal—varies from country to country. Since the oil crises of the 1970s, 
however, oil has tended to be priced out of uses such as power generation in 
most oil-importing countries where new economic alternatives are available. 
The growth of the gas industry in the second half of the 20th century in Europe 
and the United States also displaced oil from the industrial sector, leaving oil as 
the dominant fuel in the transport sector, where it is has the greatest advantages 
and where it is most challenging to find attractive substitutes. Oil, gas and coal 
have generally found niches for which their particular characteristics are best 
suited. The security, cost and logistical advantages of coal are most evident in 
the power sector. Gas is the premium fuel for the residential, commercial and 
industrial sectors. The degree of inter-fuel competition varies somewhat from 
country to country and region to region. The left hand panel of Figure 15.10 
illustrates this. 
Figure 15.10  Hydrocarbon energy conversion and utilisation pathways 
Source: Authors’ own schema.
Technology, led by China in particular, is opening up the prospect for 
emerging new pathways to transform hydrocarbons. As the right hand panel of 
Figure 15.10 illustrates, this would increase the potential variety of applications 
for each fuel and hence the extent of possible substitutability. Coal combustion 
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in the residential and commercial sectors is expected to be replaced by gas 
where possible and, subject to availability and price, gas use will increase in the 
industrial sector. 
Oil and Gas: Alternatives to Imported Crude Oil—Easing 
the Pinch Point for Energy Security 
The right hand panel of Figure 15.10 shows four emerging new fuel-technology 
pathways for transport: natural gas vehicles (NGVs) using compressed natural 
gas (CNG) or liquefied natural gas (LNG); coal-to-liquids (CtL) technologies; gas-
to-liquids (GtL) technologies and electric vehicles (EVs). 
Gas use in vehicles via CNG and LNG technologies has begun, including 
for heavy-haul vehicles in China, and is expected to be encouraged by policy 
settings, and potentially by relative prices, although the oil-to-gas price 
differential in China is not expected to be as wide as it has been in the United 
States in recent years. 
China is working on CtL technologies and pilot plants. GtL technologies are 
less likely to be applied in China (compared with the Middle East, for example), 
as China’s oil and gas companies do not have a surplus of gas to monetise. 
Many CtL technologies, however, use coal gasification as the first step in the 
process of producing liquid fuels. 
Small electric vehicles for urban use, notably scooters, are already common in 
China and domestic companies such as BYD are manufacturing electric vehicles. 
Coal: Pressures to Reduce Coal Use; Pressures and 
Opportunities to Increase Coal Use 
China is facing a number of internal and external pressures to reduce coal 
use. These include the economic pressures of rising costs, the social need to 
further reduce the rate of coal-mining deaths, the need to reduce the impacts 
of mining on land and communities, and local and international environmental 
concerns. At the same time the energy required for economic growth brings 
pressures from the demand side to increase coal use. Profitable opportunities 
for Chinese companies to develop and mine coal reserves, along with profitable 
import opportunities also bring supply-side pressure to increase coal use. 
From the policy level, the importance of reducing pressure on the oil market 
may increase upward pressure on coal. 
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Displacing imported oil to increase energy security of supply is a key focus 
of the emerging new hydrocarbon pathways in China. Alternatives for coal, 
including increased use of gas in small-scale applications where emissions are 
difficult to control and monitor, and to enforce regulatory standards, enable 
coal to be released for transformation to relieve the pressure on oil demand. 
In addition to CtL, coal can be gasified and the gas used directly. There are over 
100 coal-to-chemicals (CtC) projects in various stages of proposal, planning, 
development and operation in China. 
China’s nuclear build program, the largest in the world, will complement 
efforts to relieve the pressure on oil demand. Developing the balance of China’s 
hydro potential, as well as from intermittent renewable energy forms will also 
contribute to the same goal. 
China’s efforts to push the technology envelope are best understood within 
the framework of the Energy Policy Trilemma, and particularly in terms of 
concerns about oil security of supply. There is a risk of rapid growth in China’s 
oil demand driven by personal and commercial transportation activity rising 
with incomes and economic growth, which will put enormous stress on the 
global oil-supply system. This could be expressed in high prices, even in the 
absence of supply shocks similar to those of the 1970s (for example a conflict-
related closure of the Straits of Hormuz). 
Conclusion 
China has undergone an enormous economic transformation in the past 
two decades and is now approaching world average levels of per capita income 
and energy consumption. Energy is a key driver of economic development, 
particularly in China’s case, where relatively energy-intensive industries have 
played a key role. Rapid economic transformation has been primarily driven by 
the coastal provinces and the major cities. Looking beyond national averages 
into province-level data shows that energy demand and economic development 
still have a long way to go in China. Structural change in the economy towards 
a greater weighting of less energy-intensive secondary industries and higher 
value-added services are expected to moderate the strong linear relationship 
of the past two decades between energy requirements and GDP. Improvements 
in technical energy efficiency will further help moderate the rate of energy 
demand growth. 
In absolute terms, China is abundant in energy resources. Relative to the 
scale of demand arising from the scale of its population and its rapid economic 
development, however, it will increasingly be fundamentally energy short. 
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China was historically energy self-sufficient, and even able to export a small 
proportion of its energy production. Exports of oil stopped in 1993, gas in 2006 
and coal in 2008. Security of supply is already the highest policy priority, which 
is felt most acutely in oil. The trade-offs between the three corners of the Energy 
Policy Trilemma are steadily becoming more acute in China. As China’s energy 
import dependence deepens from oil to gas, security of supply is expected to 
increase rather than decrease in importance. The challenges for policy makers 
will increase as the economic pressures on coal production grow, caused by ‘the 
7Ds’ of resource depletion and demographic change. The increasing imperative 
to reduce the environmental impacts of energy use on China’s local air quality, 
water resources and soils emphasise the challenge. 
China’s energy mix is changing, driven by the cost revolution in third 
generation nuclear reactor technology, the push to increase the role of the 
gas sector and encouragement of renewable energy technology. In parallel, 
technology offers the prospect of increased flexibility by transforming coal to 
oil, chemicals or gas and by new applications for gas and for electricity in the 
transport sector. 
Energy imports, including gas, coal and uranium from stable regional trading 
partners, such as Australia, have a key role to play in balancing production 
of China’s own resources with its large and rapidly growing energy needs. 
Continuation of the reforms that have enhanced the scope for price signals to 
indicate opportunities for energy imports will help to facilitate this process to 
the mutual benefit of China’s people and her regional trade partners. 
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16 Financial Constraints 
on Chinese Outward Direct 
Investment by the Private 
Sector1
Bijun Wang, Miaojie Yu and Yiping Huang 
Introduction
China’s outward direct investment (ODI) has become a worldwide phenomenon 
in recent years, having increased from $2.85 billion in 2003 to $74.65 billion in 
2011 in flow terms, and jumped from $29.9 billion to $424.8 billion in stock 
terms during the same period. China, following the United States, Japan, United 
Kingdom, France and Hong Kong, was in 2011 the sixth-largest ODI investor in 
the world, and the largest in developing countries. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are currently the major players in Chinese 
ODI, albeit their relative importance is declining (Wang and Huang 2012a). 
Wholly state-owned unincorporated enterprises devoured 66 per cent of total 
investments in 2010. Meanwhile, SOEs under central government contributed 
nearly 80 per cent of Chinese total overseas investments.
Should private enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) pursue ODI? Such a question obviously should be left to the investors 
themselves. But international experience and existing literature seems to 
argue that even those primarily domestically oriented SMEs must operate 
internationally in order to improve their competitiveness and maintain viability 
(Etemad 1999, 2004). There is also evidence that entry into foreign markets, 
regardless of how this happens, could significantly promote, improve and increase 
the development, performance and profitabilty of firms, thus contributing 
to domestic wealth (Daniels and Bracker 1989). Besides, ODI compared with 
exports is found to generate the highest profit level and maximise control 
of critical knowledge (Lu and Beamish 2001; Tang and Yu 1990).
1   The study is supported by the Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ministry 
of Education of the People’s Republic of China (Project No. 11JJD790027). 
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Then, why is it that SOEs currently dominate Chinese ODI? It has been 
proposed that this is the result of the growth of a Chinese-style ODI (Huang and 
Wang 2011), which forms part of an evolutionary path from Chinese-style 
ODI, to Japanese-style ODI and finally US-style ODI (Wang and Huang 2012b). 
That SOEs dominate current Chinese ODI partly reflects the focus of Chinese 
ODI being to strengthen domestic production, rather than moving factories 
overseas, to improve the competitiveness of investing firms, rather than exploit 
existing, firm-specific advantages. But domestic financial repression also makes 
the dominance of SOEs possible. The direct result is that private sector SMEs, 
especially, face severe financial constraints. The direct, firm-level evidence 
on the effect of financial constraints on ODI has, however, been limited. 
The application to China is almost zero. 
This chapter fills this void by providing a detailed analysis of the role that 
financial constraint plays in restricting firms’ ODI activity. Using detailed, firm-
level data of Zhejiang Province between 2006 and 2008, three main findings 
become clear: first, firms with less financial constraint (more liquidity, or with 
foreign ownership) are more likely to enter the foreign market, pursuing ODI; 
second, higher productivity can mitigate some of the negative impact of financial 
constraints for exporters, but can not compensate for the financial constraint 
that is faced by ODI firms. 
This evidence indicates that financial constraint hinders Chinese private 
enterprises pursuing ODI, and their higher productivity does not mitigate that 
negative impact. These results are verified by sensitivity analysis. Other variables 
that might affect ODI activities are controlled, including firm productivity, 
size, age, profitability, capital intensity, firm export experience, cyclical effects 
and industry-specific effects. The empirical approach adopted here addresses 
some concerns about reverse causality by using lagged variables, and reducing 
observations to ODI for the first time. 
The chapter implies that if financial constraint is still in existence, those more 
viable, more productive and more competitive private enterprises are likely to 
be shut out of opportunities for ODI. As a result, the quality and return of 
Chinese ODI, and the image and reputation of overseas Chinese enterprises, will 
become a concern. Section 2 of this chapter reviews existing literature on firm 
heterogeneity and internationalised activities. Section 3 is a data description, 
which is followed by variable construction. Section 4 employs a multinomial 
logit model to assess the impact of financial constraint on a firm’s decision to 
become the domestic, exporter, or ODI player. Section 5 presents the impact of 
financial constraint on the amount of ODI made; and, Section 6 provides some 
concluding remarks.
Financial Constraints on Chinese Outward Direct Investment by the Private Sector
323
Literature Review
Firms generally have three channels to serve foreign customers: through 
export, through foreign subsidiaries, or through licensed foreign partners. 
Comprehensive considerations influence a firm’s choice of using a single or 
mixed channels. S. Lael Brainard (1997) offers a characterisation of, and empirical 
support for, the proximity-concentration trade-off in the face of a firm’s ODI/
export decision. That is, firms invest abroad rather than export when the gains 
from proximity to local market outweigh the cost advantages to concentration 
(economies of scale). 
Firms are heterogeneous; even facing the same industry costs and the same 
investment opportunity, they may still make different choices about market 
entry. Paul Krugman (1980) produced one of the early studies incorporating 
firm heterogeneity into a trade model. As an extension, Marc Melitz (2003) 
develops a dynamic industry model based on heterogeneous firms and shows 
that exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the 
export market, some less productive firms continue to produce only for the 
domestic market, and the least productive firms will be forced to exit the market. 
Stephen Yeaple (2005) shows similar findings based on a general equilibrium 
trade model in which homogeneous firms choose competing technologies and 
workers of heterogeneous skill. 
With the growth of multinational sales outpacing trade expansion, 
literature increasingly focuses the impact of firm heterogeneity on the choice 
between exports and ODI. The most important one is Elhanan Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (henceforth HMY). HMY develop a simple, multi-
country model based on multiple sectors of monopolistically competitive firms. 
The heterogeneity of firms arises from productivity differences. They find that 
cross-sectoral differences in firm heterogeneity predict the composition of trade 
and investment: the least productive firms serve only the domestic market, the 
relatively more productive firms export, and the most productive firms engage 
in ODI. They also prove the argument by using US exports and affiliate sales 
data that cover 52 manufacturing sectors and 38 countries.
Several other studies try to test HMY’s argument. Going beyond tests for 
differences in mean productivity, that are typically found in the literature, 
Sourafel Girma, Richard Kneller and Mauro Pisu (2005) apply Kolmogrov–
Smirnov stochastic dominance to UK-owned multinational corporations. 
Their finding is quite consistent with HMY’s: the productivity distribution of 
multinational firms dominates that of export firms, which in turn dominates 
that of non-exporters. 
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HMY’s model assumes that all ODI is horizontally motivated and happening 
among economies with similar factor price and market size. Keith Head and 
John Ries (2003) extend the model to vertical ODI by introducing heterogeneous 
labour costs in different countries, which involve fragmentation of production 
across countries. They show the productivity ordering predicted by HMY can 
be reversed if the foreign country is the low-cost production site. That is, the 
low productivity firms may also engage in ODI in low-cost foreign countries, 
and more productive firms may stay at home and supply foreign markets 
through exports. But, as David Greenaway and Kneller (2007) point out, since 
the data sample in Head and Ries (2003) only consists of 1070 large, publicly 
listed Japanese firms, their result could be an exception to the general pattern. 
Productivity is not, however, the sole determinant of firms’ internationalisation 
behaviours. Many productive firms only serve the domestic market, while many 
less productive firms engage in export or ODI (Bernard et al. 2003; Mayer and 
Ottaviano 2007). Figure 16.1 displays the distribution of the log of productivity 
(approximate total factor productivity and Labour productivity) for Chinese 
ODI firms and Non_ODI firms. As shown, firms engaging in ODI are generally 
more productive than those that do not. Nevertheless, the two distributions 
overlap. That is, many productive firms do not invest abroad. Conversely, many 
unproductive firms make ODI decisions. Analysts have found similar patterns in 
the United States, Belgium and Japan (Bernard et al. 2003; Mayer and Ottaviano 
2007; and, Todo 2011).
Credit constraints influence whether the firm can finance the initial costs 
of export and ODI. Using cross-country data, Kalina Manova (2008) finds 
that equity market liberalisation increases exports more in credit-constrained 
sectors than in other sectors. There is also growing micro-evidence that credit 
market imperfections severely restrict the export capacity of firms. Using 
detailed customs data from China, Manova, Wei Shang-Jin and Zhang Zhiwei 
(2011) have identified the negative impact of credit constraints on export 
performance. More specifically, they find that financial frictions limit exporters’ 
product scope, number of trade partners, and volume of cross-border flows 
within each product-destination market. Robert Feenstra, Li Zhiyuan and 
Yu Miaojie (2011) developed a theoretical setting where banks do not observe 
firms’ productivities, and induced a tighter credit constraint on exporters than 
on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters’ home market. Their empirical 
application to Chinese firms strongly supports the theoretical results, and they 
find a sizable impact of the financial crisis in reducing exports. Similar results 
are reported in Mirabelle Muuls (2008), Nicolas Berman and Jérôme Héricourt 
(2008) and Raoul Minetti and Susan Chun Zhu (2010). 
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Figure 16.1 Distribution of productivity across Chinese firms
Source: Wang 2011.
To address the endogeneity of financial constraints to firms’ international 
trade decisions, Mary Amiti and David Weinstein (2009) have employed 
exogenous shocks to firms’ access to external finance, and found that Japanese 
banks transmitted financial shocks to exporters during the crises in the 1990s. 
In addition to export decisions, Yasuyuki Todo (2011) also finds credit constraints 
have a negative effect on firms’ ODI decisions. 
Credit constraints are particularly severe in SMEs and have a greater impact 
on their investment behaviours (Berger and Udell 1998; Hall 1992). Compared 
with large enterprises, SMEs usually have higher failure rates, more pronounced 
problems of agency and asymmetric information (Bruderl et al. 1992). As a result, 
some policy schemes, like direct loans, interest subsidies and loan guarantees, 
have been set up to alleviate the credit constraint of SMEs (Cressy 1996, 2002). 
Nevertheless, there has been limited study in the existing literature that 
explores the financial constraints SMEs face when pursuing ODI, although quite 
a number of studies have found that SMEs frequently face a shortage of capital 
to finance their exports (Bilkey & Tesar 1977; Crick 2004; Hook & Czinkota 
1988). A survey by the European Commission suggested that SMEs, engaging in 
ODI, might confront a shortage of capital (European Commission 2003a). Wouter 
de Maeseneire and Tine Claeys (2012) found the home bias of financiers, and the 
capital gearing method used by banks to evaluate small firms’ foreign projects, 
give rise to financial constraints for Belgian SMEs’ ODI projects.
The majority of studies on firms’ heterogeneity and decisions with regard 
to internationalisation are based on experiences in developed countries and/
or are limited to analysis of export behaviour (for example, Bernard et al. 2003; 
Greenaway & Kneller 2004; Girma, Kneller & Pisu 2005). The inclusion of ODI 
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into reviews of internationalisation decision-making starts with HMY (2004), 
but mostly are still drawn from high income economies, such as the United States 
(Helpman et al. 2004), and Japan (Head & Ries 2003; Tomiura 2007; Todo 2011). 
This line of research following developing economies’ experience is 
limited. One exception uses Slovenian manufacturing data, and finds roughly 
a 20 per cent average productivity advantage of exporting and ODI firms over 
those that serve only domestic markets (Damijan et al. 2007). But, according 
to the same study, in Slovenia, due to transition-specific features related to 
inherited foreign investments of large inefficient firms, there is no statistically 
significant productivity advantage of ODI firms over exporting firms. 
Another exception is Tian and Yu (2011). To our knowledge, theirs is the 
only firm-level empirical investigation on the relationship between Chinese 
manufacturing firms’ productivity and their ODI decision-making. They find 
firms with high total factor productivity (TFP) are more likely to engage in ODI, 
and the higher TFP the firm has, the more the ODI is. But Tian and Yu (2012) 
do not explore why firms with similar TFP will make different decisions with 
regard to ODI.
This chapter makes two distinct contributions to the literature. First, this 
study applies to Chinese ODI with firm level information. The research on 
Chinese ODI lags behind China’s influential role in global ODI scene. MOFCOM 
(Ministry of Commerce, China) data is currently the most widely used official 
data, but analysis based on such data should be accepted with caution because 
it is aggregate data, and information is missed during the process of aggregation. 
This study uncovers a real picture of Chinese manufacturing firms’ ODI with 
a valid, representative, authoritative and comprehensive micro foundation. 
Secondly, this study provides evidence on the effects of financial constraints on 
private SMEs’ ODI. This study not only describes the productivity characteristics 
of firms that only serve domestic markets, and firms entering foreign markets 
through export and/or through ODI. It also goes a step further in uncovering 
the impact of financial constraints, in particular, on private enterprises and 
SMEs, and on firms’ internationalisation behaviour. These factors reflect the 
institutional features in transitional economies, such as a repressive financial 
system and a controlled capital account. This study provides micro-evidence 
of the urgency in deepening domestic reform and restructure. It also provides 
reference to other emerging and developing economies. 




To uncover true pattern of Chinese ODI in manufacturing, this study is 
based on a comprehensive and authoritative firm-level data from 2006 to 2008 
in Zhejiang Province.2 
ODI from Zhejiang Province is widely representative of China’s local 
investing firms’ behaviour. From 2003 to 2009, although 82.57 per cent of 
Chinese non-financial ODI flow is produced by enterprises under the central 
governments, 92.24 per cent of Chinese ODI firms are local. Among those local 
firms, 66.5 per cent on average from 2005 to 2009 are contributed by Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Guangdong, Shanghai and Heilongjiang provinces. 
The  largest amount of ODI investors is from Zhejiang Province, accounting 
22.44 per cent of the total.
ODI from Zhejiang Province is also widely representative of the behaviour of 
China’s private investing firms. Of these investors, 70 per cent are from Zhejiang 
and Fujian provinces. The decisions of private firms are reflected in market 
forces, and they are less influenced by political and administrative elements. 
Thus, it is useful to compare this evidence with international experience and 
the existing literature. 
Firm-level ODI data is merged with firm-level production data, which 
is compiled by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of 
manufacturing enterprises. Table 16.1 reveals the ODI pattern and, thereupon, 
three aspects are evident.
First, the majority of ODI investors went to developed economies, but there 
is larger-scale investment in developing countries. The economy that attracts 
most Chinese firms is the United States, followed by Hong Kong, United Arab 
Emirates, Germany and Vietnam; four of these five are high-income economies. 
In fact, 66.82 per cent of Chinese ODI investors concentrated their efforts on 
developed economies. Investment scale in developed economies is not, however, 
as large as in developing countries. Of this, 33.18 per cent of investors occupied 
58.44 per cent of the investment in developing countries. Vietnam has the largest 
share of this investment, while Cambodia is also an important host country. 
Second, most of Chinese ODI institutions are in the form of trading or 
trade-related companies, and very few enterprises set up their production 
facilities abroad. Of Chinese firms, 82.89 per cent conducted ODI either through 
2   This data is owned by the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau of Zhejiang Province.
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establishing economic and trade offices, or by establishing a trading company. 
Only 9.23 per cent of Chinese ODI firms were involved in production activity, 
while 5.51 per cent produced for the processing trade. Nevertheless, because 
of the higher cost of setting up production facilities, in comparison with 
establishing trading offices, 63.93 per cent of Chinese ODI was used for funding 
production.
Third, among the top five Chinese ODI industries, the largest group of 
investors was from the machinery manufacturing industry, but investment 
in textiles accounted for a larger share in ODI value. As shown in Table 16.1, 
16.82 per cent of investors were from the textile industry and they contributed to 
40.49 per cent of the investment amount. Meanwhile, investors from machinery 
manufacturing industries were also important ODI players, but their investment 
scale was smaller.
Variable Definition
To measure the severity of financial constraints, the literature in corporate 
finance has suggested several possibilities, including investment–cash 
flow sensitivities (Fazzari et al. 1988), the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of 
constraints (Lamont et al. 2001), the Whited and Wu (WW) index of constraints 
(Whited  and Wu 2006), the size-age (SA) index of constraints (Hadlock and 
Pierce 2010), and various sorting criteria based on firm characteristics. There is 
considerable debate with regard to the relative merits of each approach. But the 
variables consistently predict that a firm’s financial constraint status, after 
controlling for size and age, are a firm’s leverage and cash flow (Hadlock and 
Pierce 2010). That is, larger, older firms with lower leverage and more cash flow 
usually face less financial constraints. But, because of the endogenous nature 
of this variable, it is necessary to use caution when assessing leverage as an 
indicator for financial constraint.
Therefore, after controlling the size and age of the firm, we consider two 
measures of firm-level financial constraint. The first is liquidity, defined as the 
share of current assets in total assets. Given other factors, the lower liquidity, 
the larger the financial constraint. 
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The second measure is the dummy variable for foreign invested enterprises 
(FIE). Various researches have found that FIE are less financially constrained since 
they have additional funding sources from their parent company. For instance, 
research has found that the affiliates of US multinational corporations use less 
external financing in countries with underdeveloped financial markets, but have 
greater borrowing from the parent company so as to overcome imperfections in 
external capital markets. Similar evidence is also found in China (Desai et al. 
2004). Analysis using detailed customs data from China, has shown that foreign-
owned affiliates and joint ventures have better export performance than private 
domestic firms, and that this advantage is systematically greater in sectors at 
higher levels of financial vulnerability (Manova et al. 2011). The effect of FIE 
on ODI could also, however, proxy for foreign market experience, which does 
not necessary reflect the financial constraint considerations. To address this 
concern, the export experience is controlled in the model specification of this 
analysis.
Productivity is measured as the output per worker, after controlling for 
capital intensity. There are two reasons for the adoption of labour productivity 
rather than TFP (based on Olley and Pakes 1996) as a productivity measure. 
First, labour productivity is the most widely used way to measure productivity 
in literature (for example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004), making our 
results comparable to existing studies. And second, accounting data does not 
necessarily correspond well to the underlying economic variables in theoretical 
production functions (Head and Ries 2003), and the principle shortcoming of 
productivity estimates cannot be greatly reduced by more complex econometric 
methods that appear to make strong identifying assumptions (Syverson 2004). 
Table 16.2 reports the definition for other control variables and their 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 16.2 Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Liquidity Current assets/ total assets 0.71 0.18 0 1
FIE 1 if it is foreign invested firms; 
0 otherwise
0.20 0.40 0 1
Productivity Log of output per worker –0.60 0.77 –8.01 6.44 
Size Log of labour 4.38 0.98 0 10.39 
Inventory Inventory/total sales 0.13 0.18 0 11.17 
Age Years since firms established 8.19 5.68 1 133
Profitability Return on assets 0.12 15.57 –9.23 5325
Capital intensity Capital/labour 0.74 3.79 0.00 776.85 
Export share Export/total output 0.27 0.39 0 4.50 
Source: Calculated based on the firm survey data provided by Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Bureau of Zhejiang Province.
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Higher Financial Constraint, Lower Propensity 
of Investing Abroad?
We employ a multiple choice logit model to dissect how financial constraints 
impact three decisions on foreign market entry: ODI (may or may not export), 
purely export, and domestic oriented. In addition to financial constraints, we 
also control other variables that might play a role in a firms’ decision, including 
productivity, size, inventory ratio, firm age, profitability and capital intensity, 
as well as year dummy to capture cyclical effects and industry dummy to capture 
industry-specific effects.
Accordingly, we obtain the following multinomial logit model for estimation:
   (1)
j is the nature of the firm, which is either ODI firms (F), exporters (E), or 
domestic firms (D).Yd is year dummy, and Id is industry dummy. The description 
for other variables and their mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
is shown in Table 16.2. 
Basic Results
Table 16.3 provides the results for estimating equation (1) for the full sample. 
For both measures, financial constraint plays a significant and influential role 
in Chinese firms’ export and ODI decision. Firms with less financial constraint 
(more liquidity, or with foreign ownership) are more likely to enter foreign 
markets, pursuing ODI. This finding suggests that financial constraints reduce 
the probability that a firm will engage in export and ODI, as this it is difficult 
to finance the initial costs of entry into a foreign market. Todo (2011) also finds 
such a negative effect in Japan, but there it is not significant. It can be implied 
that the financing constraint is a more serious and repressive factor in China 
than in Japan. 
Besides this, firms with higher productivity are more likely to conduct ODI 
and export. This is consistent with Melitz (2003) and HMY (2004). In addition 
to productivity, firm size also positively affects the probability of engaging in 
both export and ODI. And the magnitude of such positive influence is much 
larger by firm size than by productivity. For instance, firm size compared with 
productivity has roughly three times larger positive effects on firms’ probability 
of ODI. That the impact of productivity is smaller in magnitude has been found by 
other analysts (Bernard et al. 2003; Greenaway and Kneller 2004). The coefficient 
of profitability is also negative and generally significant. For Chinese firms it 
means that the higher their profitability, the lower the probability that they will 
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enter foreign markets. This behaviour may be partly because of the higher risk 
involved in internationalisation. When firms earn a reasonable profit at home, 
they may be reluctant to take such risk. This behaviour also reflects why some 
Chinese firms lack a global perspective. 
Table 16.3 Results for multinomial logit model: full sample
Liquidity FIE
Export ODI Export ODI
Financial constraint 0.185*** 1.254*** 1.208*** 0.966***
(0.036) (0.292) (0.019) (0.113)
Productivity 0.0442*** 0.512*** 0.0165 0.512***
(0.009) (0.060) (0.010) (0.072)
Size 0.833*** 1.509*** 0.736*** 1.414***
(0.007) (0.039) (0.008) (0.046)
Inventory 0.257*** 0.17 0.0995** 0.259
(0.035) (0.253) (0.040) (0.261)
Age –0.0121*** –0.0231*** 0.000884 -0.00919
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009)
Profitability –0.617*** –1.024*** –0.586*** –0.923***
(0.068) (0.275) (0.073) (0.317)
Capitalintensity 0.0129*** 0.0157*** –0.00576 –0.00288
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.028)
Year-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134,051 115,969
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.1826
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
Mitigating Effects of Productivity?
This section considers if there are mitigating effects of productivity on 
financial constraint. That is, if higher productivity could to some extent 
compensate for financial constraints when firms make foreign market entry 
decisions. The following equation therefore includes the interaction terms of 
financial constraint and productivity in the multinomial logit model (2):
  (2)
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Table 16.4 Results for multinomial logit model: consider the mitigating effects 
of productivity
Liquidity FIE
Export ODI Export ODI
Financial constraint 0.135*** 1.272*** 1.148*** 0.852***
(0.046) (0.321) (0.022) (0.123)
Financial 
constraint*productivity
-0.0784* 0.0723 -0.108*** -0.263**
(0.045) (0.325) (0.021) (0.125)
Productivity 0.101*** 0.456* 0.0421*** 0.602***
(0.034) (0.254) (0.012) (0.086)
Size 0.833*** 1.508*** 0.738*** 1.414***
(0.007) (0.039) (0.008) (0.046)
Inventory 0.257*** 0.168 0.0976** 0.249
(0.035) (0.253) (0.040) (0.258)
Age -0.0121*** -0.0231*** 0.000866 -0.00934
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009)
Profitability -0.621*** -1.025*** -0.565*** -0.885***
(0.068) (0.275) (0.073) (0.329)
Capitalintensity 0.0126*** 0.0153** -0.00306 0.00298
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.019)
Year-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134051 115969
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.1828
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
(2) Year-specific fixed effects and Industry-specific fixed effects are controlled.
Source: Authors’ own estimations. 
As seen in Table 16.4, the mitigating effects of productivity indeed exist in 
export decisions, but are not generally valid for ODI decisions. After controlling 
for financial constraints and productivity, there is still a significantly negative 
impact of their interaction terms on export decision. The results of interaction 
terms on ODI decisions are mixed, however: liquidity measure for financial 
constraint does not have a significant impact, while the FIE measure predicts 
a significantly negative sign. It suggests that higher productivity can mitigate 
some of the negative impact of financial constraint for exporters. But financial 
constraint is so serious for ODI firms that higher productivity could not 
compensate for its presence. 
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Dealing with Potential Endogeneity
One challenge for studies that try to establish a causal effect of financial 
constraint on firms’ foreign market entry decisions is that the measures of 
financial constraints may be endogenous. For example, a 2007 study found that 
the financial health of UK firms improves after they begin exporting, despite 
the fact that at the time of entry into the export market, future exporters do 
not demonstrate as financially healthier than firms focusing only the domestic 
market (Greenaway et al. 2007).
To deal with potential endogeneity in the specification here, one-period lag 
variable for financial constraint is included in the multinomial logit regression. 
Here, FIE variable is time-invariant. In addition to the fact of financial constraint, 
it could also proxy for the foreign market experience. The export share is, 
therefore, incorporated with one-period lag in the robustness check to control 
for the possible foreign market experience. Results are reported in Table 16.5. 
As seen, after including the liquidity variable with one-period lag and control 
export share variable with one-period lag, financial constraint is still negatively 
impacting the ODI decision, as well as the export decision. Firms  with less 
financial constraint (more liquidity, or with foreign ownership) are more likely 
to enter foreign markets, pursuing ODI. Also, productivity and size have a 
significantly positive effect, while profitability is a negatively influential factor.
Table 16.5 Results for multinomial logit model: one-period lag 
Liquidity FIE




0.163** 1.468** Financial 
constraint
0.774*** 0.571***






Productivity 0.0157 0.455*** Productivity 0.170*** 0.679***
(0.019) (0.132) (0.018) (0.098)
Size 0.805*** 1.644*** Size 0.708*** 1.396***
(0.015) (0.082) (0.015) (0.061)
Inventory 0.239*** 0.0511 Inventory 0.371*** 0.624**
(0.063) (0.561) (0.065) (0.263)
Age -0.0171*** -0.00729 Age -0.00602*** -0.0106
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.012)
Profitability -0.644*** -0.504 Profitability -0.462*** -0.809**
(0.134) (0.805) (0.129) (0.393)
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Liquidity FIE
Export ODI Export ODI
Capitalintensity 0.0173*** 0.0224* Capitalintensity 0.00213 -0.0114
(0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.044)
Observations 78713 Observations 68353
Pseudo R2 0.1502 Pseudo R2 0.5209
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
(2) Year-specific fixed effects and Industry-specific fixed effects are controlled.
Source: Authors’ own estimations. 
To deal with potential endogeneity in this specification, the sample is reduced 
to firms pursuing ODI for the first time in the period 2006–2008. The results of 
re-estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 16.6. As reported, even for firms 
pursing ODI for the first time, financial constraint is still a significant negative 
factor that firms with less financial constraint are more likely to conduct ODI. 
Still, productivity and size play a contributing role in foreign market entry, 
while profitability is negatively related with the probability of ODI and exports. 
Table 16.6 Results for multinomial logit model: first-time ODI 
Liquidity FIE
Export ODI Export ODI
Financial constraint 0.185*** 1.170*** 1.260*** 1.099***
(0.036) (0.319) (0.019) (0.123)
Productivity 0.0445*** 0.425*** 0.216*** 0.726***
(0.009) (0.067) (0.012) (0.116)
Size 0.834*** 1.518*** 0.755*** 1.486***
(0.007) (0.043) (0.008) (0.051)
Inventory 0.257*** 0.0385 0.355*** 0.523*
(0.035) (0.312) (0.045) (0.293)
Age -0.0121*** -0.0192*** 0.000943 -0.00293
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010)
Profitability -0.618*** -0.984*** -0.883*** -0.728
(0.068) (0.352) (0.073) (0.573)
Capitalintensity 0.0128*** 0.0155* -0.00311 0.00934
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Observations 133961 115103
Pseudo R2 0.1521 0.1831
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
(2) Year-specific fixed effects and Industry-specific fixed effects are controlled.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.  
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Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides firm-level evidence on the harmful consequences of 
financial constraint on firms’ capability to pursue ODI. It shows that financial 
constraint severely restricts the probability of a firm entering the ODI market. 
This finding is robust after controlling for possible endogeneity. 
Consistent with existing literature, this chapter also finds firm productivity 
plays a significant contributing role in a firm’s ODI activities, in the decision to 
engage in ODI, and how much to invest. But it is clear that such contributing 
role does not mitigate the negative impact of financial constraint for ODI, albeit 
it could relieve some financial constraint for exporters. That is, even if a firm 
improves its productivity significantly, if the financial crunch remains, the firm 
may be unable to pursue ODI. 
This chapter has strong policy implications. Financial constraint for SMEs is a 
worldwide problem, but it is even more serious in China, which is characterised 
by financial repression and controlled capital account. The Chinese Government 
has attached great importance to outward direct investment and also provides 
a fiscal subsidy for ODI players. But this cannot compensate for the financial 
constraint Chinese private SMEs face when they decide whether or not pursue 
ODI, and how much to invest. As a result, the more viable, more productive and 
more competitive enterprises are likely to be shut out, which is detrimental to 
capital efficiency and the transformation of growth mode.
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Kunwang Li and Bingzhan Shi 
Introduction
As information and communication technology (ICT) products are becoming 
more common in society, the development and diffusion of ICT, because of its 
high-tech content, has been widely seen as a major contributor to the growth 
of productivity, and economic growth more generally. First, ICT is known as 
a key tool for enhancing innovation, and promoting technological progress, 
resulting in the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) in the ICT sector 
itself. Second, firms tend to be engaged in large-scale investment in ICT in 
capital formation to improve productivity. The two factors together constitute 
the direct contributions made by ICT to productivity growth (Jorgenson et al. 
2008). Trade can play an important role in fostering development of the ICT 
sector. Studies suggest that strong export performance in ICT products yields 
higher economic growth rates and improvement in productivity (Greenaway 
et al. 1999, Rodrik 2006, Hausmann et al. 2007). For this reason, an increasing 
number of countries have introduced polices and allocated more resources to 
encourage exports from the ICT sector.
China is now the largest producer of ICT goods in the world. In 2007, of the 
world total, China produced 48 per cent of phone handset, 46 per cent of personal 
computers, 42 per cent of colour TVs, 65 per cent of monitors, 58 per cent 
of program-controlled switchboards, and 57 per cent of digital cameras. Based 
on China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (1998–2007), we calculate that 
the share of the ICT sector in manufacturing value-added products increased 
from 6.3 per cent to 9.1 per cent over the period 1998–2007, but the ICT sector 
contributes 15.6 per cent on average to manufacturing productivity growth in 
the same period. The trade data shows that the development of Chinese ICT 
goods relies heavily on export markets. During the period 1998–2007, export of 
ICT goods accounts for about 40 per cent of the sector’s total sales.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the determinants of China’s exports 
of ICT goods in two dimensions: export quantity and quality. Our main finding is 
that China’s ICT export growth is mainly achieved by producing a high quantity 
of low quality. Furthermore, the volume and pattern of China’s ICT exports 
are largely determined by foreign direct investment (FDI), processing trade and 
government supporting policies. While processing trade mainly accounts for 
the high quantity and low quality of China’s ICT exports, FDI and government 
policy may help to upgrade the export quality, but decrease export quantity. 
The challenge for China is, therefore, to upgrade its ICT export quality while 
maintaining its ICT export volume through a combination of different policies.
The chapter is organised as follows: In Section 2, we describe the pattern of 
growth of Chinese ICT exports; Section 3 present the econometric model and 
introduces data used in the analysis; and, Section 4, presents and discusses the 
estimation results. 
Stylised Facts about China’s ICT Exports
China’s export has expanded at the pace of almost 14.5 per cent per annum 
from 1995 to 2010, while the world’s growth rate is only 7.2 per cent over the 
same period. As a result, China’s share in total world exports rose from four 
per cent to 11.8 per cent over the same period. China has, in the past, held 
a  large share of the world market for traditional, labour-intensive industries, 
such as textiles, shoes and clothes, and is now rapidly enlarging its share in high 
technology industries, such as ICT products. Figure 17.1 shows the shares of ICT 
exports in the world total exports of these products by those main producers:
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Figure 17.1 Share of world’s ICT exports of the main producers
Note: NIEs: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan; ASEAN: Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia; EU: the EU15; BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.
Source: CEPII BACI Database, authors’ calculation.
China’s share of the world’s ICT exports has risen fast, from only three per 
cent in 1995 to 30.1 per cent in 2010. In contrast, the share of all other major 
producers decreased over this period. The relative changes demonstrate that 
China has been gaining increasing competitiveness in producing and exporting 
ICT products in the world markets. China’s ICT export is already exceptionally 
high (Rodrik 2006). In illustrating a cross-country relationship between 
sophistication of exports and the per capita income, Dani Rodrik finds that 
‘China is an outlier in terms of the overall sophistication of its exports: its export 
bundle is that of a country with an income-per-capita level three times larger 
than China’s’. Peter Schott (2008) arrived at a similar conclusion. We examine 
this conclusion from the perspective of the changing market share of China’s 
ICT products. Figure 17.2 illustrates a cross-country relationship between 
export structure and per capita income, where export structure is measured by 
the ratio of ICT products in the country’s total export: 
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Figure 17.2 Per capita income and export structure
Source: CEPII BACI Database and WDI, authors’ calculation.
China’s ICT export ratio of its total exports is also an outlier as compared 
with its per capita income level, which verifies Rodrik’s (2006) and Schott’s 
(2008) conclusion. 
China’s ICT exports are, however, dominated by foreign firms, including 
wholly foreign owed firms (WFOF) and joint ventures (JV). These firms are 
largely responsible for the ever-growing share of China’s ICT exports and they 
played a dominant role in increasing China’s ICT exports during 2000–2006. 
Figure 17.3 illustrates this role:
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Figure 17.3 Breakdown of China’s ICT exports by category of firms
Source: Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), 2000–2007, authors’ calculations.
It is clear that foreign affiliates are at the core of China’s ICT exports. 
They accounted for 77.4 per cent of China’s ICT exports in 2000, and increased 
to 85.9 per cent in 2006. The increasing role of foreign affiliates in China’s ICT 
exports was entirely due to WFOF, which accounted for more than half of China’s 
ICT export since 2003. Chinese domestic firms are clearly losing ground in ICT 
exports, and are responsible for less than 20 per cent of China’s ICT exports.
Also, China’s ICT exports have been driven by the reorganisation of 
production in Asia. China is used as an export base by firms located in 
advanced Asian economies, which, instead of exporting finished goods to the 
US and European markets, now export intermediate goods to their affiliates in 
China. China’s exports have skyrocketed and have displaced Japan’s and NIEs’ 
exports at an accelerated pace. This triangular trade pattern can be seen from 
the extensive role played by China’s processing trade. Table 17.1 shows the 
processing, ordinary and other custom regime shares in China’s ICT exports.
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Table 17.1 Breakdown of China’s ICT exports by custom regime (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Processing 90.4 91.0 90.7 89.2 87.9 87.2 83.7
Ordinary 7.5 6.9 7.4 8.2 8.7 9.4 12.6
Other 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.6 3.5 3.4 3.7
Source: Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), 2000–2007, authors’ own calculations.
China’s ICT exports are heavily concentrated in processing trade, which 
accounts for 90 per cent of China’s ICT exports. Thus, China’s ICT exports 
are largely due to the international segmentation of production processes. 
China imports parts and components of ICT products, which are incorporated 
in processed exports. China’s ICT exports, therefore, can be explained by their 
high import content. In fact, it has been shown that the share of domestic 
content of China’s manufactured exports was about 50 per cent, and relatively 
sophisticated products, such as electronic devices, have low domestically 
produced contents (about 30 per cent or less) (Koopman et al. 2012).
Furthermore, Chinese authorities have been actively promoting the level of 
technology in China’s export structure through tax and other policy incentives. 
A particular manifestation of these incentives is the proliferation of special 
economic zones (SEZs), economic and technological development zones, high-
tech industrial zones, export processing zones and free trade zones around the 
world. In order to analyse policy effects on ICT exports, Table 17.2 reports the 
export ratio of different policy zones:
Table 17.2 The ratio of different policy zones in China’s ICT export (%)
Policy zone 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 11.0 10.6 9.2 8.5 6.8 6.5 6.4
2 11.3 13.1 13.0 14.2 17.6 20.7 19.8
3 6.3 7.1 7.7 8.9 9.5 10.2 8.9
4 7.2 7.1 8.1 7.6 8.0 6.7 6.4
5 0.0 0.7 2.4 3.5 4.0 5.6 4.7
6 64.2 61.4 59.7 57.3 54.1 50.2 53.8
Note: Policy zone 1 stands for special economic zones. Zones 2 to 5 stand for economic and technological 
development zones, high-tech industrial zone, export processing zones and free trade zones respectively, 
6 stands for others. The policy zone accounts for nearly half of China’s ICT exports. Government policies, 
therefore, do effect China’s export structure.
Source: Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), 2000–2007, authors’ calculations.
The above analysis shows that the extent of China’s ICT exports is 
overestimated if we do not consider the role played by foreign affiliates through 
international segmentation of production processes. Government policy also 
plays an important role in enhancing China’s exports. There is, however, another 
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important difference between China’s ICT exports and those of developed 
countries. As Schott (2004) points out, current international trade specialises 
within product rather than across product. Although China is responsible 
for nearly one-third of world ICT exports, the quality of China’s ICT exports 
have been lower than those exported by developed countries. Following David 
Hummels and Peter Klenow (2005), we disaggregate the share of China’s ICT 
exports in the world market into three margins: extensive margin, quantity and 
quality. Table 17.3 reports the main decomposing results: 
Table 17.3 The extensive margin, quantity and quality in China’s ICT export ratio 
Year Ratio Extensive margin Quantity Quality
1995 0.030 0.786 0.071 0.544
1996 0.035 0.818 0.085 0.498
1997 0.037 0.827 0.088 0.508
1998 0.043 0.827 0.100 0.514
1999 0.046 0.842 0.109 0.505
2000 0.056 0.841 0.111 0.603
2001 0.072 0.848 0.123 0.685
2002 0.104 0.848 0.159 0.775
2003 0.135 0.848 0.234 0.679
2004 0.161 0.853 0.271 0.696
2005 0.193 0.918 0.232 0.906
2006 0.216 0.920 0.241 0.973
2007 0.243 0.925 0.285 0.923
2008 0.261 0.911 0.300 0.954
2009 0.282 0.896 0.330 0.951
2010 0.301 0.894 0.373 0.903
Growth rate (%) 229.3 12.9 165.7 50.7
Source: CEPII BACI Database, authors’ calculation.
For the quality index, the number is smaller than one, which means that 
China’s ICT export quality is lower than the world average level. From the 
dynamic view, the growth rate of the ratio is 229.3 per cent, with an extensive 
margin growth rate of 12.9 per cent; a quantity growth rate of 165.7 per cent 
and a quality growth rate of 50.7 per cent. The results, therefore, show that 
China’s ICT export growth is mainly driven by increases in quantity, which 
accounts for 72.3 per cent of China’s ICT export growth, with the contribution 
made by quality accounting for only 22.1 per cent of China’s ICT export growth. 
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To summarise the above analysis, China’s ICT export value is increasing, 
which is driven by the growth in quantity. The quality of these exports, 
however, is lower than the world average.
Empirical Strategy and Data
 The modelling approach adopted here explains not only the fast growth of 
the ratio and quantity, but also the low growth rate of quality. Export value, 
quantity and quality form the dependent variables in the model estimation. 
We consider several categories of determinants (Xu & Lu 2009, Wang & Wei 
2008), including the use of processing trade; the development of central and 
local government policy to promote these sectors; the role of foreign affiliates; 
and, the characteristics of the trading partners, such as their levels of GDP and 
physical distance from China. Formally, the econometric specification is given 
by the following equations:
  (1)
where  is the log of firm i’s export index to country j in product k 
at year t. We define the index of export by using three different dimensions, 
they are value, quantity and quality, with quality measured by the unit value. 
 is a dummy, if firm i in year t is a wholly foreign owned firm or joint 
venture, it is 1 ; if firm i in year t is a Chinese firm, then it is 0.  is also 
a dummy, indicating whether the trade involved is processing trade according 
to the customs regime.  is a dummy variable to show whether the firms 
have received some of kinds of policy promotion provided by the governments. 
 is the log of the gross domestic product of the importing country j in year 
t,  is the distance between country j and China.  are product and year 
fixed effects.  is the error term as normally defined.
In order to check the robustness of the regression results, we define the 
indexes of fdi, process and policy in a more detailed way. We can further classify 
fdi into two subgroups, wfof and jv, where wfof standing for the wholly foreign 
owned firms and jv representing joint ventures. For the index process, we 
also have two detailed indexes, process1 and process2, where process1 means 
‘processing and assembling’ and process2 means ‘process with imported 
materials’. For the index of policy, we have five different policy zones, policy1 
being ‘special economy zone’, policy2 being ‘economic and technological 
development zones’, policy3 being ‘high-technology industrial zone’, policy4 
being ‘export processing zones’, policy5 being ‘free trade zone’. So we have the 
following equation for robustness check: 




It is argued that foreign firms have certain inherent disadvantages as 
compared with indigenous firms, such as communication costs, language and 
cultural barriers, and limited familiarity with local environments. Foreign 
firms, therefore, must possess certain advantages over local firms in order to 
compete in the host country market. One of the advantages that foreign firms 
have in investing in the host country is possessing more advanced technology, 
which local firms do not have. Furthermore, the literature on FDI also suggests 
that ownership structure is a key determinant of the level of technology 
chosen by foreign firms while investing. According to the ownership-location-
internalisation paradigm, WFOF have the advantage of internalising superior 
technologies or knowhow within the firm, and JV rely more on the relationship 
with local partners to be more competitive in local markets. So, foreign firms 
should consider the trade-off between securing a better position in the market 
and allowing local partners to share with them the technologies and profits. 
The  foreign investors with more advanced technologies will therefore prefer 
WFOFs to JVs. To summarise, we expect that the FDI will not only increase 
China’s ICT export volume, but also upgrade the quality of China’s ICT exports, 
and this effect is more apparent for WFOFs.
As we have discussed, processing trade plays a dominant role in China’s ICT 
exports. As Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy (2006) point out, China is able 
to export huge quantities of ICT products only because it imports most of the 
value-added parts and components embodied in the exports. Estimates of the 
share of foreign content in China’s high-technology product export are up to 
80 per cent (Koopman et al. 2012). We expect, therefore, that processing trade 
will increase both China’s ICT export value and quantity.
Policy is an important factor in determining a country’s involvement in the 
international splitting up of the value-added chain, which further upgrades 
countries’ technology and promotes ICT exports. China has followed a dual-
track trade policy, by imposing customs tariffs to protect domestic industries, 
while offering tariff exemptions on imported inputs for export production. 
These policies help increase China’s ICT exports. Apart from these policies, 
Chinese authorities have also used other policy instruments to promote exports. 
A particular manifestation of these incentives is the proliferation of special policy 
zones, including special economic, economic and technological development, 
high-technology industrial, export processing and free trade zones. We expect, 
China: A New Model for Growth and Development
350
therefore, that government policy through various kinds of instruments will 
increase China’s ICT exports, and some policy may also be conducive to upgrading 
China’s ICT quality.
Finally, the characteristics of the importing country may also affect China’s 
ICT exports at the firm level. As in the traditional gravity model, larger GDP and 
shorter distances should lead to larger export value and quantity. The quality 
of firm’s exports should increase with distance (Hummels and Skiba 2004). 
We  expect, therefore, that the importing countries’ GDP positively correlates 
with ICT’s export value and quantity, and their distance positively correlates with 
quality and negatively correlates with quantity and value. Before reporting the 
regression results, Table 17.4 provides the variable descriptions and summary 
statistics.
Table 17.4 Variable descriptions and summary statistics
Variable Description Observation Mean Standard 
deviation
lnv Log of export value 973,742 9.22 2.65
lnp Log of export quality 973,742 1.75 2.63
lnq Log of export quantity 973,742 7.47 3.39
fdi Dummy for foreign firm 973,742 0.41 0.49
process Dummy for processing trade 973,742 0.31 0.46
policy Dummy for policy zone 973,742 0.25 0.43
wfof Dummy for wholly foreign-owned firm 973,742 0.28 0.45
jv Dummy for joint venture 973,742 0.13 0.34
process1 Dummy for processing and assembling 973,742 0.23 0.42
process2 Dummy for processing with imported 
materials
973,742 0.08 0.27
policy1 Dummy for special economic zone 973,742 0.09 0.29
policy2 Dummy for economic and technological 
dev. zone
973,742 0.07 0.25
policy3 Dummy for high-technology zone 973,742 0.04 0.20
policy4 Dummy for export processing zone 973,742 0.05 0.21
policy5 Dummy for free trade zone 973,742 0.01 0.09
lngdp Log of importer’s GDP 973,329 20.07 1.53
lndist Log of distance between China and 
importer
963,358 8.49 0.77
Source: Authors’ definitions and descriptions.




Table 17.5 reports the estimation results from the basic regressions on value. 
The estimated coefficients on fdi are both positive and statistically significant in 
regressions 5.1 and 5.4; the estimated coefficients on process are both positive 
and statistically significant in regressions 5.2 and 5.4; the estimated coefficients 
on policy are both positive and statistically significant in regressions 5.3 and 
5.4. These results show that foreign firms, processing trade and government 
policy all have positive and statistically significant effects on upgrading China’s 
ICT exports. The estimated coefficients on lngdp are all positive and statistically 
significant in the regressions 5.1~5.4, and the estimated coefficients on lndist 
are all negative and statistically significant in the regressions 5.1~5.4. All the 
regression results support the theoretical analysis and predictions reviewed in 
the previous section. 
A further observation finds that the estimated coefficient on fdi becomes 
much smaller in regression 5.4 than in regression 5.1, when we take into account 
the effects of processing trade. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on policy 
becomes much larger in regression 5.4 than in regression 5.2, when we take 
account of the effects of processing trade. The estimated coefficients on process, 
however, are nearly the same in regressions 5.2 and 5.4. These results imply that 
processing trade is the most important and robust factor that promotes China’s 
ICT export. Foreign firms can promote China’s ICT exports, and the effect of this 
will decrease when taking account of the role of processing trade. This means 
that foreign firms promote China’s ICT exports mainly through processing trade. 
Following the same logic, the effects of policy on promoting China’s ICT are 
underestimated by ignoring the influence of processing trade in determining 
China’s ICT exports.
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Table 17.5 Basic estimation results for dependent variable lnv







lngdp 0.194*** 0.181*** 0.226*** 0.176***
(114.645) (110.409) (133.018) (107.064)
lndist –0.169*** –0.174*** –0.197*** –0.170***
(–49.629) (–52.717) (–57.390) (–51.507)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.127 0.175 0.107 0.176
Note: The dependent variable is log value. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Table 17.6 reports the robustness of the regression results for value regression. 
In  regressions 6.1 and 6.4, we break fdi into wfof and jv. The estimated 
coefficients on jv are both positive and statistically significant, but it becomes 
smaller in regression 6.4, which implies that the jv firms’ effect on China’s ICT 
export is mainly through processing trade. So the results on jv confirms our 
discussion in Table 17.5. In regression 6.1, the estimated coefficient on wfof is 
positive and statistically significant, but in regression 6.4 it becomes statistically 
indifferent from zero, which also confirms and strengthens the analysis based 
on the results in Table 17.5. In fact, 92.4 per cent of WFOF’s ICT exports are 
finished by processing trade.
In regressions 6.2 and 6.4, we distinguish two kinds of processing trade, 
where process1 means the processing and assembling and process2 means 
processing with imported materials. The coefficients on the two variables are 
all positive and statistically significant, having nearly the same magnitudes 
in regressions 6.2 and 6.4. We conclude, therefore, that processing trade has 
the most robust effects on China’s ICT export, whichever kind of processing 
trade it is.
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Table 17.6 Robustness check for dependent variable lnv



















lngdp 0.194*** 0.181*** 0.224*** 0.177***
(114.556) (110.402) (131.914) (107.210)
lndist –0.169*** –0.174*** –0.201*** –0.174***
(–49.504) (–52.756) (–58.407) (–52.730)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.127 0.175 0.109 0.177
Note: The dependent variable is log value. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
In regressions 6.3 and 6.4, we break policy into five different policy zones, 
as defined in Table 17.4. We find that only the estimated coefficients on Policy 
2 and Policy 3 are positive and statistically significant. Policy 2 is the economic 
and technological development zones and Policy 3 is high-technology industrial 
zones. Both zones are aimed at attracting FDIs with more advanced technologies, 
thereby upgrading the production and trade structures for firms operating 
in these zones. Policy 1 is the special economic zone, the aim of which is more 
complex and not only confined to technology upgrading. Policy 4 is the export 
processing zone, the effect of which may be embodied in the variable of processing 
trade. Policy 5 is the free trade zone, the aim of which is to enlarge trade volume 
using whatever technology levels that the trading products may contain.
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To summarise the discussion for value regression, we found that processing 
trade is the most robust and important force in promoting China’s ICT exports. 
Only joint ventures and some kinds of special policy zones have robust and 
positive effects on China’s ICT export.
Quantity Regressions
Table 17.7 reports the estimation results of the basic regressions for the 
quantity. The estimated coefficient on fdi in 7.1 is positive and statistically 
significant but turns negative and also statistically significant in 7.4, when 
we consider the processing trade effects. The estimated coefficients on policy 
are both negative and statistically significant in regressions 7.3 and 7.4. The 
estimated coefficients on process are both positive and statistically significant in 
regressions 7.2 and 7.4. So we can conclude that foreign firms and government 
policy tend to decrease the ICT export quantity, while processing trade tends to 
increase the ICT export quantity.
The estimated coefficients on lngdp are all positive and statistically significant 
in regressions 7.1–7.4. The estimated coefficients on lndist are all negative and 
statistically significant in regressions 7.1–7.4. These results are similar to the 
results in the regressions for the value.
Table 17.7 Basic estimation results for dependent variable lnq







lngdp 0.166*** 0.127*** 0.176*** 0.151***
(85.566) (67.171) (91.809) (80.064)
lndist –0.316*** –0.296*** –0.317*** –0.315***
(–80.922) (–77.889) (–81.851) (–83.453)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.298 0.331 0.304 0.342
Note: The dependent variable is log quantity. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Table 17.8 Robustness check for dependent variable lnq



















lngdp 0.166*** 0.127*** 0.177*** 0.150***
(85.445) (67.329) (92.544) (79.876)
lndist –0.315*** –0.295*** –0.319*** –0.313***
(–80.735) (–77.748) (–82.330) (–83.023)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.298 0.332 0.306 0.344
Note: The dependent variable is log quantity. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Table 17.8 provides the robustness check results for estimating quantity 
regressions. Based on these results, we can conclude that both WFOFs and JVs 
have negative effects on export quantity, when taking into account processing 
trade. Both processing and assembling, with imported materials, have positive 
effects on export quantity. All the five types of policy zones have negative 
effects on export quantity. 
To summarise the results reported in tables 17.7 and 17.8, we found that 
processing trade can promote ICT export quantity, but FDI and government 
policy lead to smaller export quantity. We found, however, that policy can 
promote export value, which requires further analysis of the quality regressions.
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Quality Regressions
Table 17.9 reports the basic estimation results for quality regression. 
The estimated coefficients on fdi are positive and statistically significant in 9.1 
and 9.4, and are nearly the same in magnitudes. The estimated coefficients on 
policy are positive and statistically significant in 9.1 and 9.4, and are also the 
same in magnitude. Foreign firms and government policy, therefore, tend to 
upgrade the quality of China’s ICT exports, and this finding is robust, even 
taking into account processing trade.
The estimated coefficient on process, however, is not robust. It is positive 
and statistically significant in 9.2, but it turns negative and statistically 
significant in 9.4, when taking into account fdi and the role of government 
policy. So, processing trade may degrade the quality of China’s ICT exports, but 
it promotes value and quantity of China’s ICT export as found in the previous 
regression on quantities.
The estimated coefficients on lngdp are positive and statistically significant 
in regressions 9.1–9.4. The larger the gross domestic product level is, the more 
demands for ICT product, the more fierce competition firms face. Only  those 
firms, therefore, who can produce high quality products can export to these 
markets. The estimated coefficient on lndist are positive and statistically 
significant in regressions 9.1–9.4, so the longer the distance, the higher the 
quality (Hummels and Skiba 2004).
Table 17.9 Basic estimation results for dependent variable lnp







lngdp 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.026***
(22.778) (43.383) (40.567) (21.069)
lndist 0.147*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.145***
(59.180) (48.383) (48.181) (58.938)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.530 0.512 0.523 0.538
Notes: The dependent variable is log quality. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Table 17.10 provides the robustness check results for quality regressions. 
We can conclude that both WFOFs and JVs have positive effects on export quality. 
Both processing and assembling, and processing with imported materials have 
negative effects on export quantity. The five types of policy zones have positive 
effects on export quantity. The larger the GDP level, the further the distance it 
is, the higher the level of export quality. All these results are supportive of the 
basic regression results reported in Table 17.9.
Table 17.10 Robustness check for dependent variable lnp



















lngdp 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.027***
(22.849) (43.431) (38.200) (21.732)
lndist 0.146*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.139***
(59.056) (48.154) (47.826) (56.691)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 963,358 963,358 963,358 963,358
R2 0.530 0.516 0.531 0.542
Notes: The dependent variable is log quality. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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We can summarise the regression results reported in Tables 17.5 to 17.10 
as follows. FDI, processing trade and government policy are important key 
determinants of China’s ICT export pattern. FDI can upgrade export quality, 
but decrease export quantity and value. Processing trade promotes export value 
through lower quality and larger quantity. Government policy increases value 
and quality, but decreases export value. These results suggest that, in order to 
further increase the export quantities of ICT products and, at the same time, to 
increase the export qualities of these products, China may consider applying 
different policy instruments for addressing different objectives. For example, if 
export quality is a concern, the government should do more in attracting FDI 
with more advanced technologies, and in further developing high-tech zones. 
Conclusion
In this chapter we focus on the quantity and quality of China’s ICT exports and 
its determinants to find out the key characteristics associated with China’s ICT 
exports. We arrived at the following conclusions: China’s ICT export is mainly 
driven by high quantity and low quality production; and, FDI, processing trade 
and government policies are the main determinants for China’s ICT export growth. 
FDI, processing trade and government policies, however, have a different impact 
on quantity and quality. Processing trade increases quantity but decreases 
quality, while FDI and government policy have the opposite impact. How to 
upgrade quality and increase quantity simultaneously, therefore, is a challenge 
for Chinese central and local governments in their efforts to restructure the 
export sectors and move production towards producing high value-added and 
high quality products, while increasing the level of employment.
In this sense, the pattern of high quantity and low quality production and 
export will have an important influence on China’ future growth. As quantity 
contributes significantly to China’s ICT exports, it means China should continue 
to employ a large labour force to produce the export quantity; the quantity-
driven export growth pattern, therefore, is good for employment. Considering 
that China is still relatively abundant in labour supplies, the quantity-driven 
growth pattern is consistent with China’s comparative advantage and quantity, 
therefore, remains a policy option for the time being. Quantity-driven growth 
patterns, however, consume more natural resources and tend to lead to more 
pollution and damage to the environment, which is harmful to sustainable 
economic growth. As product quality is important for maintaining export 
competitiveness, and leads to more endogenously determined economic growth, 
how to upgrade the export quality is important for China’s sustainable export 
and economic growth. Importantly, China is undergoing a fundamental change 
in its demographic structure leading to the slow growth of its labour force, 
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apart from ageing, with rising wage levels (Cai 2013). This will add further 
pressure for the Chinese Government to optimise its economic structure and 
move towards producing more high-quality products. As a result, one would 
expect that China’s export sector will be transformed from the quantity-driven 
to an extensively margin-driven and quality-driven one. This transformation is 
consistent with the new growth strategy adopted by the Chinese Government 
in confronting the new challenges for future growth.
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Appendix: The Disaggregating Procedure for 
Table 17.3 
We follow the method of Hummels and Klenow (2005) to decompose trade 
ratio to get Table 17.3. 
Considering China and world’s ITC export, supposing the exporting product 
sets are  and , and the overlapped exporting products set is , that is 
, then the ratio of export between China and world can be expressed 
as equation (1)
   (A1)
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Similar to Feenstra (1994), Hummels and Klenow (2005),  
means extensive margin; if the kinds of product in China’s export is more than 
the world’s , than the extensive margin is bigger than 1, therefore, it expresses 
the meaning of product variety of China’s export.  means the intensive 
margin.  stands for export value. It can be furthered decomposed into price 
and quantity, as equation (A2):
  (A2)
The ratio ,  stands for value share, 
At last we can decompose the export ratio of China’s ITC export into three 
margins, as equation (A3):
  (A3)
EX is extensive margin, which measures the variety of export. P is relative 
price of China’s exports to the world average, which stands for the quality index. 
Q is the quantity ratio of China’s exports to the whole world, which provides 
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